The History of Contract in Early English Equity by Barbour, Willard Titus
THE  HISTORY  OF CONTRACT  IN 
EARLY  ENGLISH  EQUITY 
W.  T.  BARBOUR, A.M.,  LL.B., B.LITT. 
ASSISTANT-PROFESSOR  OF LAW  IN THE  UNIVERSITY  OF 
MICHIGAN,  U.S.A. NOTE 
THIS  essay has been materially  abridged in  order to bring 
it  within a reasonable length.  Had I followed  out  the plan 
originally  projected, it would  have  contained  an  additional 
hundred pages.  Part I stands as originally written ; Part I1 
has been somewhat condensed.  I should have liked to include 
more  extracts  from  the  petitions  and  to  submit  a  greater 
number of cases, but it seemed desirable to make this study as 
brief  as possible.  As it is,  I have  burdened  the text with 
numerous  quotations,  but, as the  chancery  material  is  not 
available in published form, a mere reference to a petition  by 
number without indicating its content would not be convincing. 
I hope, however, that I have  not  obscured  the argument by 
too frequent quotation. 
The chancery petitions  are cited  by indicating  the bundle 
number  in  Roman  numerals and the number of  the petition 
in  Arabic  numerals.  Thus, XII.  10  means  Bundle  twelve, 
Petition number ten. 
In  the  Appendix  I  have  given  a  few  select  petitions. 
They were  chosen  from  among some 500 transcripts  which 
I  made  at the Public  Record  Office. ANALYSIS  5 
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INTRODUCTION 
THERE  is  scarcely  a  subject  in  legal  history  which  has 
occasioned  more  discussion  than  the  history  of  contract. 
Particularly  in  English  law  it  has  excited  the attention of 
many able investigators ; '  and as so much has been written, it 
may seem presumptuous to undertake to say anything more. 
The only excuse for such an essay as this is that the material 
upon which  it  is based  is  new and, so far as I am aware, has 
never been published. 
I propose  to discuss the history of  contract in chancery in 
the fifteenth century, and I shall base  my argument largely 
upon  the petitions which were brought before the chancellor 
during that period.  It is my purpose not alone to show what 
was  actually done in  equity, but also  to determine  so far as 
possible the principles upon which the chancellor acted.  Our 
chief interest lies in  the development of parol contract, but  it 
seemed  to me  desirable  to give  some  consideration  to the 
contract  under  seal  as well.  My reasons  for so  doing will 
appear later. 
e. g. Holmes, The  Common Law, Lecture VII ;  Pollock and Maitland, 
History of English  Law,  vol.  ii, chap.  v ; Ames, History  of  Assumpsit, 
Norvnrd Law Review, vol. ii, pp. 1-19,  53-69 ; Ames,  Par01 Contracts, 
idem, vol. viii, pp. 252-64 ; Salmond, History of Contract, Law Quarterly 
Review,  vol.  iii,  pp.  166-79;  Salmond,  Essays  in  Jurisprudence  and 
Legal History, Essay 1V ; Jenks, The Doctrine of  Consideration (Yorke 
Prize  Essay,  1891) ; Holdsworth,  History  of  English  Law,  vol.  iii, 
' chap.  iii.  See  also  Holmes,  Early  English  Equity,  Law  Quarter& 
Review,  vol.  i,  pp.  162-74;  Vinogradoff,  Reason  and  Conscience  in 
Sixteenth-century Jurisprudence, idem,  vol. xxiv, pp. 373-83. 10  INTRODUCTION 
This essay then deals chiefly with the development of  con- 
tract  in  equity.  But  it is  impossible  to consider  equitable 
doctrines  alone  and  by themselves.  Their  significance  is 
apparent  only when  they are placed  side by  side,  and  con- 
trasted with the doctrines of  the common law.  Accordingly 
I  have  divided  this essay  into  two parts.  Part I, which  is 
introductory, gives a brief review of  the history of contract in 
the  common  law.  Part  I1 is  an attempt  to set  forth  the 
equitable doctrines with regard to contract. 
PART  I 
CONTRACT  IN  THE COMMON  LAW 
CHAPTER  I 
INTRODUCTORY 
THE theory of  contract  as it existed  in  the common  law 
must be found in the history of the common law actions.  'So 
great is  the ascendancy of  the Law of Actions in the Courts 
of  Justice', remarked Sir Henry Maine,l '  that substantive law 
has at first  the look of  being gradually secreted in the inter- 
stices of procedure.'  And so we find it in the common law in 
the fourteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries.  Accordingly  I  have 
based  the discussion  of  contract on  the  actions of  Account, 
Covenant, Debt, Detinue, and  Assumpsit.  These  are practi- 
cally the only common law actions which had any effect upon 
the development  of  the substantive law so far as contract is 
concerned. 
As one  looks at the common  law as a  whole,  one  must 
continually notice the insistent testimony which it bears to its 
feudal  origin.  This  appears in  the division  of  society into 
classes of  men, upon whom certain liabilities are imposed.  It 
will  become  very  evident  in  our  discussion  of  assumpsit. 
Again, it is  seen in  the dominating position  given to the land 
law.  For  example,  in  1285  a  new  rule  was  introduced  by 
statute,  that an  Assize of Novel Disseisin would lie for a corody. 
A  corody is  really  a  benefit  derived  from  contract; yet the 
right  to receive  it is  treated  as if  it were  a  right  in  land." 
This situation must  have had its effect in  the development of 
contract.  I merely wish to call attention to it here. 
'  Early Law  and Custom, 389 (quoted, Maitland, Equity, 295). 
See P. and M.,  ii.  1-35. 12  CONTRACT  IN  COMMON  LAW  [PART  I 
In reviewing the common law  I am  considering a subject 
which has been very fully discussed elsewhere.  Hence I shall 
be  as brief as possible.  I  have treated at some length cases 
which  do not  seem to have been considered  heretofore ;  and 
in  one  or  two places  I have sought to put a different inter- 
pretation upon cases that are well known.  In general, however, 
what is said here is merely a summary of the work of previous 
writers. 
At the same time I have adopted a different point  of  view. 
I  have  sought  to  show  not  so  much  the  efficiency  of  the 
common  law as its inefficiency ; I have stressed the defects of 
the actions, and  have attempted  to set forth  the important 
types  of  contract  for  which  there  was  no  remedy.  In  the 
second  place,  the study of  the  common  law  is  not  carried 
beyond  the year 1504,  when  assumpsit first obtained general 
recognition  as an  action  on  contract.  In  that  respect  it  is 
fragmentary, but it suffices for the present purpose.  In equity 
I  have  considered  only  the fifteenth  century,  and  in  con- 
sequence the contrast  is with  the common law  of  the same 
period.  By  the  action  of  assumpsit  the common  law  was 
able in  the sixteenth century to retrieve  its lost jurisdiction 
over contract, but we are here dealing with  an earlier period. 
In  brief,  I  have  treated  the  common  law  as  a  means  of 
approaching chancery, and  in  this light I have attempted to 
sketch the history of the different actions. 
CHAPTER  I1 
THE  COMMON  LAW ACTIONS 
THE  precise moment when  the action of  Account  made its 
first appearance  cannot  be  fixed with  certainty,  but  one  of 
the  earliest  known  cases in which  it was  used  was  in  1232.1 
From  that time  onward  it  appears with  greater  frequency, 
until at length it succumbed to the competition with chancery ; 
but  in  the Year Books it is a common  form of  action.  The 
form  of  the writ  shows  that  it  was  modelled  upon  the 
proprietary  writs ; the '  command ' was  that  the defendant 
should render  the plaintiff an account, while  the plaintiff  in 
stating his case must show how the liability to account  arose, 
and how and where the money claimed was re~eived.~ 
According  to the  theory  of  the common  law  the action 
existed for  one  purpose  only:  to enforce the obligation  to 
account.  It becomes important, therefore, to inquire into the 
precise  nature of  this obligation.  It was  not  founded  upon 
contract ; rather  was  it  an  independent  creation  of  the law 
itself,  and  though  a  bond  were  conditioned  to  render  an 
account, it would not  support the action unless the necessary 
conditions which created the obligation to account did exist." 
P. and M., ii. 221 ; Note Book, p!.  859.  ' Precipe A quod iusta et sine dilatlone reddat B rationabile compotum 
suum  de tempore quo fuit ballivus  suus in  C  receptorum  denariorum 
ipsius B ut dicit .  . .'  Pollock, H. L. R., vi. 401.  See Maitland, Equity, 
382. 
e.g. '  Un homme  porta un bref  d'acompte  vers  un  autre et assigna 
les resseites  par my la mayn un tiel:  Y. B.  11 & 12 Ed. III [R. S.]  315. 
'  For  this  statement  of  the obligation to account  I  am indebted  to 
Langdell, H. L. R., ii. 242-57. 
H. L. R., ii. 243,  and cases cited. 14  CONTRACT  IN  COMMON  LAW  [PART  I 
We may enumerate four essentials, without the concurrence 
of  which the action did not lie : ' 
(I) The person  on  whom  the obligation  is to be imposed 
must have received property not his own, of  which the 
person imposing the obligation is owner. 
(2) The receipt  of  the  property  must  not  amount  to  a 
bailment. 
(3)  The  receiver  must  have  possession,  as distinguished 
from custody. 
(4)  There must be privity between the parties. 
It  will  be  obvious, then,  that  account  was  confined  to 
a  narrow  orbit.  Indeed,  the  common  law  recognized  as 
accountable only three  classes of  persons: guardians, bailiffs, 
and  receivers, and the extension by statute  to the guardian 
in socage was not a material enlargement.  In none of  these 
cases does contract, as such, have any function. 
It should be noted, however, that the law was  making an 
attempt, confessedly awkward, to meet the widening demands 
of  commerce.  There  is  some  indication  in  the early cases 
that primitive arrangements, which to the modern eye suggest 
partnership br  agency,  were  attempting  to  take  shelter 
beneath the mantle of  account.  Thus, where two embarked 
on a commercial venture, one sought to hold  the other to an 
account for the time when he '  fuit receptor denariorum ipsius 
A ex quacumque causa et contractu ad  communem utilitatem 
A et B proveniencium '.  In 1340 a plaintiff seeks to compel 
a defendant to account for money received to trade with.  But 
such  instances  are  comparatively  rare.  The  action  never 
acquired  sufficient flexibility  to serve any useful  purposc  for 
See more fully H. L.  R., ii. 243-8. 
a  Prov.  Westm.  (1259),  c.  12 ; Stat.  Marlb.  (1267), c.  17, and see 
Y.B.B.  12 &  13 Ed. 111  [R. S.]  321;  18  &  19 Ed.  111  [R.S.] 325 
(action does not lie till heir 1s  of full age) ; 19 Ed. 111 [R. S.] 449. 
In later common law co-partners as such were not accountable to each 
other (see  Langdell,  H. L. R.,  ii. 265,  citing  Lindley,  Partn.  [4th  ed.] 
1022 n. R.), but I am referring to the early cases. 
Y. B.  33-5  Ed. I  R.S.]  295. 
6  Y.  B.  14 Ed. I11 [R.S.]  283; and note a curious case in 16 Ed. I11 
ipt. i) 191, where an action was brought  against  the keeper of  a marsh 
who dug turves and sold them, keeping the profits himself. 
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merchants  or  traders,  and  we  note  the  above  cases  as 
exemplifying a tendency, and nothing more. 
It is  sometimes asserted  that Debt, and later  Indebitatus 
Assumpsit,  superseded  Account.  Such  an  assertion  rests 
upon a confusion of ideas ;  for a debt was necessary to support 
either of  those actions, and obviously an obligation to account 
could not constitute a debt.' 
Circumstances  might  of  course  arise in which  the receiver 
had so dealt with the property  that the obligation to account 
could  be treated  as having  been  converted  into a  debt; in 
such  case the plaintiff  would  have  the option of  holding the 
receiver to account  or  of  waiving  the account and bringing 
debt.  Thus, where  a receiver granted by deed  that he  had 
received £46  of  the plaintiff, to be  employed  to his use, and 
further  granted  to  repay  the  £46  to the  plaintiff;  there 
account  might  be  brought, or  if  the  account were waived, 
debt would lie on the grant to repay.3  This became important 
if  there were a death on  one  side ; for  account would not lie 
against  the  executor  or  heir  of  the receiver, whereas  debt 
would, provided there were a deed.4 
The suspension of  the action  in  case of  death was a vital 
defect.  Though by statute Vt  was extended in favour of the 
executor of  the obligee, the common law never  regarded  the 
executor  or  administrator  of  the obligor  as answerable  in 
ac~ount.~  Furthermore, damages were  not  recoverable,? nor 
could  a  receiver  be  held accountable for   profit^,^ and  if  the 
plaintiff counted  of  a receipt by his own hand, the defendant 
might  wage  his  law  and  acquit  himself  by oath?  But,  in 
The point is fully discussed in Core's Case, 28 H. VIII, Dyer, 20 (a). 
e. g. by converting it to his own use. 
See Y.B.  16 Ed. I11  (pt. ii) [R. S.] 383. 
4  6 Tut fut ceo a derener par voie d'acompte  en sa vie ceo  q'il  devoit, 
apres sa  mort il ne poet aver accion forsqe par voie de dette.'  Kershuile J. 
in Y. B.  16 Ed. 111 (pt. ii) [R. S.]  383. 
'  13 Ed. I (Westm. ii), chap. xxiii : and see Coke, 2nd Inst., 404. 
Y. B.  16 Ed. I11 (pt. ii) [R. S.]  383.  This was remedied  by statute, 
but not till 1705 : 4 Anne, c. 16, s. 27.  '  Y. B.  14 Ed. 111 [R. S.] 287 (per Schard J.). 
Langdell, H. L. R.,  ii.  247 ; Rol. Abr. Accom#t  (0) pl.  14, 15. 
Y. B.  13 & 14 Ed. 111 [R. S.]  289 ; otherwise where receipt  could  be 
Proven by deed, Y. B. 16 Ed. 111 (pt. i) [R. S.] 5. 16  CONTRACT  IN  COMMON  LAW  [PART  I 
addition to these technical  defects, there was  one still  more 
grave.  The only adequate remedy was specific performance ; 
that is, the defendant  must  be  compelled to account; to the 
accomplishment  of  such  a  purpose  the  machinery  of  the 
common  law  was  ill  adapted.'  Doubtless  this  occasioned 
the early intervention  of  equity ; for  in  the Bill  for  account 
the chancellor had a more efficient remed~.~ 
An application to equity was made as early as 1385.~  No 
reason  is mentioned for  applying to the chancellor,  but the 
explanation  may lie  in  the fact  that  the  complainant  was 
a '  clerc de la Chauncellerie '.  Thenceforth appeals to equity 
become  more frequent.  In the early cases the complainant 
usually  assigns his  poverty:  or inability to get hold of  the 
defendant by common law process,5 as the occasion for coming 
to chancery ;  but at length the subject-matter of  an account 
itself was treated as a sufficient cause.G 
From this brief  consideration  of  the action, it is apparent 
that account could do little for  the law of  contract.  Founded 
upon  an obligation  which  was  essentially  a  creation  of  the 
'  Sometimes  the  common  law  endeavoured  to  coerce  an  obstinate 
defendant  by  putting  him  in  irons.  By  statute (St.  Westm.  ii,  c.  10) 
auditors had power  to  award  a  defendant  to prison  if  he were found 
in  arrearages and refused  to  account.  See Termes de la Ley, fol.  4 ; 
in Y.  £3.  18 & 19 Ed. 111 [R. S.]  413 it was held that a defendant should 
be put in irons. 
A defect in the action arising from its beingpurely legal is well stated 
in the words of  Mr. Hening : '  The plaintiff in account was compelled to 
undergo the delay oftwo distinct trials, the first before a jury to determine 
his right  to an accounting, the judgment for the plaintiff  being that  the 
defendant  do account  (guod computet), and the second trial being  the 
accounting  itself  before  the  court-appointed  auditors.'  Anglo-Am.  iii. 
359. 
111. i (10 S. S. I). 
'  XI.  358  (where  a  complainant  says  that  because  of  his  poverty 
and the defendant's wealth he has no power to sue the common law). 
Thus  in VI.  168 it is  alleged  that  the defendant 'luy  purpose  de 
passer hors de  jurisdiccon  dicest Royalme', and by no process of  law can 
he be restrained.  The prayer asks for a writ of  subpoena in a penalty of 
£1 000. 
'  It is not always easy to distinguish Bills for  accounting from other 
applications ;  for commonly the relief  sought is '  general ', i. e. the com- 
plainant  trusts to the  chancellor's  discretion.  See VII.  186 ; IX.  382. 
If the true intent of  XVII. 335 (10  S. S. 107)  is to have an account, it would 
seem that the common law requirement of privity was not strictly enforced 
in equity.  However, the jurisdiction of equity in account is scarcely within 
the range of  this essay. 
CH. 11]  THE COMMON  LAW  ACTIONS  I7 
law, and restricted even within its narrow sphere by procedural 
disadvantages,  it could  not  be  the source of  any important 
substantive doctrine.  For the common law theory of contract 
we must look elsewhere. 
SECTION  11.  COVENANT  AND  THE  CONTRACT 
UNDER SEAL 
The  Action  of  Covenant. 
Nothing  shows  more  forcibly  the  insistent  conservatism 
of  the common  law  than  the development  of  the action of 
Covenant.  Here was  an action  which  drew  its name  and 
being  from  agreement  (conventio), and remained  throughout 
the early period the most purely contractual action of  English 
law:  indeed for  two centuries and more the only vehicle for 
enforcing  executory  contracts  which  gave  unliquidated 
damages =;  and yet when its claims are evaluated it will  be 
found  that it contributed  very  little  to the substantive  law 
of contract.  Even its position as a  contractual remedy was 
attained only by a struggle. 
In  England  of  the early twelfth  century the dominating 
force, juristically considered, was  the land  law ; it is not sur- 
prising,  therefore,  that  Covenant  first  manifests  itself  in 
connexion with agreements relating  to land.  We find  it  in 
the  earliest  extant plea  roll:  which  comes  from  the reign 
of  John, and by the time  of  Henry I11  it was  a  common 
form of action and might be had ' as of course '.6  '  En auncien 
temps',  remarks one of  counsel  of  a  later period,  '  homme 
soleit lever fynes par bref de covenant,'  a practice which may 
account  for  its popularity,  but the occasion of  its invention 
was not a desire  to simplify conveyance, but  to protect  the 
termor.  For while the termor had at this time no real right, 
he  was  allowed  the  benefit  of  a  covenant ;  the  need  for 
Holdsworth, iii. 326.  Holdsworth, ii. 310. 
Select Civil Pleas (3 S. S., pl. 89) ;  P. & M.,  ii.  216. 
'  See  Maitland,  Register  of  Writs,  H. L. R.,  iii.  113-15  (especially 
jp.  115, No. 6). 
P. & M.,  ii. 216.  Y. B.  16 Ed. 111 (pt. ii) 523. 
P. & M.,  ii.  106. 
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protection of leases brought the writ into existence.  Bracton 
says that it had become  the ordinary remedy of  the lessee, 
who might thereby obtain a judgement for specific performance: 
that he recover possession of  the land. 
Gradually the action  was  extended  to covenants  not re- 
lating to land,  though  in  the time  of  Glanville2 the king's 
court  showed  great  reluctance  to concern  itself  with  mere 
private  agreements  (p~ivatae  conventiones).  By  the  time 
of  Bracton:  however,  Covenant  was  regarded  as a  general 
remedy, and any doubt which  might  have remained was set 
at rest  by the Statute of Wales4 (1284),  where the action  is 
treated  as co-extensive  with  agreements.  This looks as if 
a  flexible  and elastic contractual  remedy had  been  evolved 
in the thirteenth century;  indeed it had  possibilities, which 
were, however, negatived  by  two  limitations, and  its sphere 
of action was materially restricted. 
These  limitations  are  curious,  but  at  the  same  time 
characteristic  of  the common  law.  The first  appears from 
the rules of evidence, when we inquire as to what was necessary 
to support the action.  Could the plaintiff  sustain his case by 
the production of suit ?  There is a  time (e. g.  in the middle 
period  of  Edward  1's  reignI6 when  the judges  show  some 
uncertainty, but it was ultimately settled that Covenant could 
not be maintained without a deed.7  This decision was fraught 
"Solent  aliquando  tales  cum  eiecti  essent  infra  terminum  suum  . 
perquirere sibi per breve de conventione.'  Bracton (R. S. ed. Twiss),  iii. 
468 (bk. iv, chap. xxxvi, fol. 220) ; and see Digby,  Hist.  R.  P.  (5th ed.), 
176, 178.  See also  Y. B. B.  20  &  21  Ed.  I  [R. S.]  279; 2  & 3 Ed. I1 
[S. S.]  84; 18 & 19 Ed. 111 [R. S.] 409 ; 19 Ed. 111 [R. S.]  17 ; 20  Ed. 111 
(pt. i) [R. S.]  107 ; and cf. Y. B.  18 & 19 Ed. I11 [R. S.]  523. 
Glanville,  x, cap. 8 ; 'privatas  conventiones  non  solet  curia  domini 
Regis tueri . .  .' (icl'ent, x, cap.  18). 
P.&M.,ii.218,n.3.  Holdsworth, iii. 325. 
ti  Maitland, Equity, 358. 
Y.  B.  20  SL  21 Ed. I [R. S.] 223.  Mr. Salmond (Essays in  Jurispru- 
dence,  184)  cites  this  case  as deciding  'that  a  writing  was  the  only 
admissible  proof  of  an  agreement '.  It  is  submitted  that  the  case 
makes no  such  decision.  Witness  the  dialogue : '  Lowiere :  Quey avez 
del  covenant ?  Sjigumel : Sute  bone.  Lowiere : Avez autre  chosse ? 
Spz;qumel:  dit ke non.  Lowiere : Jugement, si  nus devum respundre 
a  sa sute sans escrit, Stc.'  Here the case ends.  The reporters leave us 
uncertain as to the decision, but it was evidently still doubtful whether or 
no suit would support an action of  Covenant. 
'  Y.  n. 32 & 33 Ed. 1 [R. S.] 201 ; see P. & M.,  ii. 220, n.  I. 
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with  tremendous  consequences.  It swept  to  one  side and 
gave  a  peculiar  character to obligations  under  seal; it  left 
executory par01 contracts helpless until the rise of  Assumpsit 
restored them to their rightful position. 
These  remarks  apply only  to the king's  court.  Though 
the authority  is  very  meagre,  it seems to be pretty clearly 
established that a different rule prevailed  by special  custom. 
In London1 and probably  in  Brist01,~  Covenant lay without 
a  sealed  instrument.  The origin of  this peculiar  custom has 
occasioned  much  speculation, with  which  we  are  not  here 
concerned.  We may  note  in  passing,  however,  that  there 
is some significance  in the fact that the custom  subsisted  in 
communities which  were  essentially  mercantile  and affected 
by commerce.  Perhaps  it  is  more than  a  coincidence  that 
Covenant  without  specialty abode in the same county with 
gavelkind.  At all events the special custom had small effect 
on the substantive law; it never  received  recognition in  the 
royal  courts,  and  from  the  frequency  with  which  citizens 
of  London  appeal to the chancellor when they wish to bring 
Covenant  but have  no  deed, one  may  well  doubt whether 
it ever obtained general recognition. 
The second  limitation upon  the action  is so curious  as to 
excite some surprise.  Covenant did not lie for a sum certain, 
but  only  for  the  recovery  of  damages  for  the  breach  of 
a  promise  in  writing.  The remedy  to enforce  a  covenant 
to pay a definite amount of  money or chattels was Debt, and 
not Covenant.Vence though a debt be proved by a writing 
under seal, Covenant would  not  lie  upon  it.  This rule per- 
sisted till  the late sixteenth century, and even  in  1613 the 
'And note well that no writ of  covenant shal be mayntenable wythout 
especialty, but in the Cytie of  London or in other suche place privileged, 
by  the custome  and use.'  Termes de la Ley,  sub tit. Covenant ;  and 
see F. N.B.,  146A; Liber  Albus  (ed.  Riley),  181,  189.  It would  seem 
that  the whole  transaction  must  have  taken  place  within  the City  of 
London.  See XIX. 354 6,  XIX. 354 c, Ajjendix of  Cases, p. 205,  XIX. 
493,  ibid., p.  209.  In Y. B. 48 Ed. 111. 6.  11 Candish J. called  trespass 
on the case an '  action de covenant ', and said it was maintainable without 
specialty.  There appears to have  been  some confusion  in  the learned 
judge's  mind. 
Wade  and Bemboe'  Case (H. 25  Eliz.),  I Leon, 2. 
Ames, H. L. R., ii. 56. 
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judges of  the Common Bench remarked  : '  If a man covenant 
to pay £10  at a  day certain, an action of  Debt lieth for the 
money and not an action of  Covenant.'  The common law was 
ever chary of allowing concurrent remedies.  There was already 
in existence an action the function of  which was the recovery of 
specific sums, and the judges consequently restricted Covenant 
to claims for unliquidated damages." 
The advantages and  disadvantages  of  Covenant  may  be 
briefly summarized.  The proof  required was simply the pro- 
duction of  the deed itself \ and as the action was  supported 
by  specialty  it lay  against  the executors  or administrators 
of the original covenantor, and even against his heir if he were 
named in the ~ovenant.~  On the other hand, a plaintiff could 
never recover a greater sum than he claimed  ;  the exact point 
in  which  each  covenant  was  broken,  and how  and  wherein 
damage was sustained, must be stated with great particularity ; 
and the necessity for the assessment  of  damages required the 
presence of  a jury. 
The  Contract  zbrzdeg,  SeaLG 
Our discussion would  be incomplete without some detailed 
consideration  of  the obligation  which  was  the basis  of  the 
action of  Covenant-the  contract under sealO7 It  is true that 
the sealed instrument was  broader than Covenant, and, as we 
have already seen, in certain cases would  support Debt, but 
it is proposed for the time being to drop the procedural point 
of view, and to look at the substantive law. 
C'lzawner v.  Bowes, Godb. 217 (cited Ames, H. L.R.,  ii. 56). 
' .  . .  cety  bref  de Covenant,  ke est  naturelement  done  a  recoverir 
damages .  . .' (Aseby, in Y. B. 21 & 22 Ed. I  [R. S.] 183). 
e. g. '  TzZtone : Quey avez  de covenant.  I<az~f:  Bone escrit!  Y.  B. 
20 & ZI Ed. I [R. S.]  181 (sp. ref.  183).  '  Britton. i. 29. I 5 : Tenks, 162. 
y.  B. 16 ~d:  ~fi  '(Gt.  i) [R. S.]  183. 
The discussion of  the contract under seal is put  here for the sake of 
convenience.  Of  course  in  a  great  many cases  a  deed  was  the basis 
of  the action of  Debt.  These remarks apply to Debt as well as Covenant, 
in all cases in which the former was brought on a sealed instrument.  '  There is a  curious  remark  in the Kentish  Eyre (6 Ed. lI), wherein 
a deed (fet) is distinguished from a specialty (es$eciaZte).  The plaintiff in 
support of  his claim had introduced a tally.  Counsel for the defendant calls 
the tally a '  deed' and remarks : '  Jugement si par tie1 fet qe nest especialte 
deit estre response.'  Anon. v.  Anon, Y.  B. 6 & 7 Ed. I1 [S. S.]  35. 
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A  distinguished  writer  has  objected  to the term  'formal 
contract ' when  applied  to the sealed  writing.  '  Considera- 
tion ', he  remarks,'  '  is as much  a form as a seal.'  Doubtless 
this is true to-day, when modern law, especially in the United 
States,  has  practically  abolished  all  distinctions  between 
sealed  and unsealed writings, but any such proposition would 
have  received  scant  appreciation from  a  mediaeval  lawyer. 
His  eye never  penetrated  beyond  the seal  into  the genesis 
of the contract ;  to him a deed was more than evidence, it was 
con  tract itself.' 
We are not concerned  here with the origin of  the doctrine 
which gave a sacramental importance to the presence of a seal. 
To be able to write tvas in  the twelfth century a  tremendous 
accomplishment, and any written  document was bound to be 
impressive  to  the  ordinary  person.  Moreover,  the  belief 
certainly existed at this time that the Romans did stipulate 
by writing, and this belief was fostered by the confused account 
of  '  stipulatio ' in the Institutes,%herein  substance and proof 
are hopelessly  confounded.  Doubtless  these  elements  com- 
bined  to give peculiar significance to any written  document ; 
and apparently such writings were always sealed, for when an 
attorney  or judge  speaks  of  a  writing  he  means  a  sealed 
instrument.'  At all  events, the contract under seal attained 
a peculiar position, of  which we must note two consequences. 
I. The mere attaching of  the seal to a  writing  bound  the 
party to whom the seal belonged.  Even if one carelessly lost 
his seal,5 and another made improper use  of  it, there was no 
defence.  It follows that the use of the seal bound the owner, 
whether he were actually a party to the contract or not.  This 
Holmes, 273. 
e  6  En dette  sur contract  le  plaintiff  monstra  in  son  count  pur  quel 
cause le defendant devient son dettour ; autrement in dette sur obligation, 
car  L'obligation est  co7ztract  in Iuy  mesnze.'  Bellewe,  8  Rich. 11,  I I I 
(ed. 1869) ; see Salmond, Anglo-Am., iii.  323, n. z. 
Institutes, iii.  21 ; see  Girard, Manuel ClCmentaire de Droit romain 
(4th ed.) 500.  Of course in Roman law the written instrument does not 
bind ; it is merely evidence, and the binding force comes from the stipula- 
tion which it attests.  Thus Paulus, Dig.xliv. 7.38 '  non figura litterarum, 
Sed oratione, quam exprimunt litterae, obligamur.' 
'  See Williams, R. P. (20th ed.),  149-50, and authority there cited.  '  Glanville, x.  12.  But cf. Britton,  i.  zg.  21. 2 2  CONTRACT  IN  COMMON  LAW  [PART  I 
situation is well  illustrated  by a  case in 6 Ed. 11, Bokela~zde 
v.  Leanore?  An agreement was made between one Peter the 
Mason and John  Bokelande (the plaintiff) that the said Peter 
should  build  two  mills  for  the  plaintiff.  When  the  deed 
which recited  the transaction was  read, it  appeared  that the 
original  agreement  was  made between  Bokelande  and Peter 
the Mason only, but  that for  greater security  the names  of 
Roger Leanore and others were added, and that they affixed 
their seals.  Obviously this was a clumsy attempt to produce 
a  relation  of  suretyship.  The mills were not built according 
to  the  covenant,  whereupon  the  plaintiff  sued  a  writ  of 
Covenant  against Roger  Leanore, who objected  that he was 
not a party to the contract, and that he attached his seal only 
'for further security'.  Spigurnel J.  disposed  of this defence 
summarily and said : '  Si un  home se oblige a vous en dette 
par escrit et die en l'escrit, "  et a greignour surte ieo troef un 
tie1 qe se oblige " et il  met  le  seal  a1  escrit, conzeat  q'il  ne 
paldent  pas  ceo que I'autre  parle,  il  afferme par le mettre du 
seal, par quei responez  au fet.'  The judge, arguing from the 
analogy of a covenant to pay money, compelled the defendant 
to answer to the deed.  He could not contradict by extrinsic 
evidence what he '  affirmed ' by his seal.  There could scarcely 
be a  better example of  the strict and relentless  logic of  the 
common law. 
2. The second consequence is really only another phase of 
the first.  The  written instrument was interpreted very strictly ; 
the obligor was taken to mean  exactly what he said.  As he 
could  not show that he was not a  party to the contract, if  he 
had attached his seal,  SO he could not deny nor explain anything 
he had written.  '  By a writing,'  says Fleta,2 ' . . . any one will 
be bound, so that if  he has written that he owes  it, whether 
nzoney waspaid ov not, he is bound by the writing, and he will 
not  have  an  exceptio  pecuniae  non  numeratae  against  the 
writing,  because  he  said he  owed  the  nzoney.' "  Fleta is  not 
a compelling authority, but his statement finds support in the 
Y. B. 6 S(  7 Ed. I1 [S. S.] 9. 
Fleta (Selden), ii. 56, $ zo. 
Bracton makes practically the same statement ; see f.  IOO  b. 
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year  ~~~ks.  A promise to pay money was enforceable though 
conditiollal upon  the happening  of  an impossible  event,  as 
some defendants, who wrote not wisely but too well, must have 
learned to their cost.  Indeed such a situation was  explained 
by the use  of  a  delictual  maxim, when a reporter I  remarks : 
6  Note that the Law will suffer a man of  his own folly to bind 
himself to pay on a certain day if he do not make the Tower 
of London come to Westminster ;  whereof said Bereford C. J. : 
VoZenti nonjit inizrria2  although the written law says, Nenzo 
obl&atur ad impossible ".'  We thus see that the fundamen  tal 
principle  of  the sealed  writing  is  its absolute conclusiveness 
against the obligor. 
A graphic illustration of this principle is affforded  by a con- 
sideration of the defences  which  might be brought  forward. 
We might  better say defence ; for  there was' scarcely more 
than  one  real  defence.  However grievous  might have been 
the misconduct of the obligee in  procuring  the obligation, it 
was  of  no avail  to the obligor,  save  in  one case;  for  the 
common  law  made an exception in  favour  of  d~ress.~  But 
fraud,5 failure of  consideration  and accord  and satisfaction  6 
were not pleadable against a specialty.  It  was, of course, open 
to the defendant  to deny the authenticity of  the writiIfg  and 
tender an averment to the country that it was  not his deed, 
a plea technically described  as ' nient  son fait '.7  Otherwise 
he  must show a  sealed release or acquittance ; for what was 
Y. B.  3 & 4 Ed. 11 [S. S.] 199. 
To-day the maxim  is inter~reted  to mean  that  damage  suffered  bv 
consent ishot a cause of action.'  Broom, Legal Maxims, 2;7  ff. 
Ames, H. L. R., ix. 57. 
Britton,  i.  29.  zo.  The mere  fact that  the  obligor  made a  bond 
in  prison  in  order  to  obtain  his  freedom  was  not evidence  of  duress. 
Anon. v.  Anon., Y.B. 6 & 7 Ed. I1 [S.S.]  36. 
'  Ames,  H. L. R.,  ix.  51.  Fraud  was  not  an  admissible  defence  at 
coyrnon law until the Common Law Procedure Act (1854). 
Y.  13. 3 & 4 Ed. I1 [S. S.]  145.  And  though  the obligee  has already 
brought  suit and recovered, the obligor has no,defence, unless  he  can 
show acquittance.  Anon. v.  Anon.,  Y.  B. 6 & 7 Ed. I1 [27 S.S. 371.  In 
such a case Shardelow J. said : '  He charges you  by  an obligation ;  why 
then was it not cancelled? (i. e. in the previous action).  And  you  do not 
Produce any acquittance of the debt.'  Y. B.  17 Ed. 111 [R. S.] 297. 
8  '  Y.  B.  3  H.  IV.  2.  8.  Where a  seal  was  'glue  a1 fait',  the  court 
held  it  to be suspicious  and declared the deed void.  Y.  B.  7 H.  VI. 
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done by deed  could  only be undone  by deed?  'Quand  un 
hornme conust un fait et ne monstra especial matier  de voider 
ceo, le plaintif ad cause de recouvrer meintenant sans plus.' 
Perhaps it was not always so.  Some judges, particularly in 
the early cases, show an inclination to go behind the seal, and 
allow parol evidence to be introduced.  Thus  where Debt was 
brought on  a  deed to recover  LIO  for  a  lease, the defendant 
was  permitted  to show that as a matter of  fact  he had  been 
~usted.~  This looks like an attempt to apply the doctrine of 
quid pro  quo  to sealed  instruments.  In 1292 a plaintiff  was 
allowed to bring Debt for chattels which were given by deed 
unconditionally, ai?d to aver that the gift was conditional upon 
the defendant's  marrying her.4  ' Fut ceo la cause du  don ke 
vous la dussez esposer ou non ?' was the incisive  question put 
by  Metingham  J., and  issue  was  joined  on  the condition. 
These are early and isolated cases and cannot be said to  affect 
the trend of judicial opinion.  If  they indicate anything, it is 
that the rigid  enforcement  of  the general  rule  produced  so 
much hardship that occasional attempts were made to  consider 
a particular  case  upon  its merits.  But there was  never  any 
general admission of parol evidence to engraft a condition upon 
a deed.  To  do  so the defendant must show '  lettre del plaintiff 
ou enroullement  de court qe porte record <.'  Parol evidence 
was  of  no  avail.  In Esthnlle  et  Herlison  v.  Esthalle-he 
defendant bound himself  in a simple obligation, but there was 
a separate defeasance bond, bearing a condition.  Both these 
obligations  were  delivered  to one  G. for safe-keeping.  The 
condition was performed, and after G.'s  death the obligations 
Y. B. 3 & 4 Ed. I1 [S. S.]  145.  '  Rien  luy  doit ' cannot  be  pleaded 
against a deed.  Y. B. 9 Ed. IV. 48.  3 (continued, 53.  17). 
Paston J. in Y.  B.  g H. VI. 37.  12. 
Bereford J. said : 'When the Parson ought to have had an estate by the 
grant of  the Prior, he had nothing.  (And he drove them to answer over.) ' 
Y.B.  I Sr 2 Ed. I1 [S. S.]  160.  See Holdsworth, iii. 327, n. 3. 
Y.B. zo& 21 Ed. I [K. S.] 367.  But  see  Fitz. Abr.  De6t,  169 (T. 4 
Ed. 11). where it was held that no evidence of  a condition could be intro- 
duced '  sans monstre fait del condition '.  If a condition were endorsed on 
the  deed, parol  evidence  was  admissible  to  prove performance  of  the 
condition.  Y. B.  20 H. VI. 23. 
8ritton, i. 29. 22. 
Y.  B.  6 & 7 Ed. I1 [S. S.]  19 [za]. 
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came  into the hands of his  executors, one of whom  was  an 
obligee in the simple  obligation.  The executor brought  suit 
against the defendant, who endeavoured to  set up the condition. 
Then ensued the following dialogue : 
Spigzrmel Y.  : Ou est le fet devenuz qe tesmoigne la con- 
dicion ? 
Malvzerthorpe:  Geoffrei l'avoit  en  garde  et nous  avoms 
bilk pendaunt vers ses executours, cesti Reynaud (theplaintzf) 
et altres, de cel escrit et des autres. 
Spigurnel 7.  : Ceo fut folie a lesser vostre  bastoun  hors de 
vostre main. 
The court refused to stay judgement till the defendant could 
recover his defeasance  bond  and  put it in evidence, deciding 
rigidly  on principle : '  pur ceo qe J. et R. mettent  avaunt le 
fet  Richard  de E., q'est  simple,  et il  allege  une condicioun 
destourtre  de la  dette et de ceo  ne moustre rien  &c.  ne nu1 
autre chose qe luy peuse valer encountre l'obligacion q'est son 
fait, si agard la curt qe J. et R. recovere les C li vers Richard 
de E. et lour damages de C s. et Richard en la merci.'  If one 
had  an  acquittance and  lost  it,  he  would  be in  the  same 
unenviable position.  It  was his folly ; the court turned a deaf 
ear to his plaint. 
In the end, we  come  back  to the remark of  Lord  Bacon: 
' The law will not couple and mingle matter of specialty, which 
is  of  higher  account, with  matter  of  averment,  which  is  of 
inferior account in law.' 
Debt and Detinue were  intimately related, and may profit- 
ably be considered together.  While it would be venturesome 
to say that the latter action descended from the f~rmer,~  there 
was  a  close  connexion  between  them  which  was  recognized 
after they had  become  distinct  forms of  action ; for  Detinue 
was held to be within the purview of a statute :;  which referred 
Bacon,  Maxims  of  the  Law,  Reg.  a5  [cited, Salmond,  Essays  in 
Ju$prudence,  57  I., 
See P. ~r M.,  11.  177.  9  Ed. II1,st.  I,  c.  3. 2 6  CONTRACT  IN  COMMON  LAW  [PART  I 
in  express words  to Debt alone.  In so deciding,  Hillary J. 
remarked: '  The process is quite the same in Debt and Detinue ; 
and in a plea of  Detinue the essoin and warranty of  attorney 
shall  be  in  the  words  "  de  placito  debiti ".'l  Before  we 
attempt  to  point  out the line of  cleavage  between  the  two 
actions, it will be well  to examine the origin and form of  the 
writ of  Debt. 
Debt represents an archaic c~nception.~  The active party 
appears at first as a demandant rather than a plaintiff, and the 
action is itself '  petitory '. Wne  claims what is his ow~z. 
This comes out forcibly in  Glanville's  statement of  the writ 
of Debt (which was modelled on the Praecipe in capite), where 
the defendant  is  ordered  to 'render  A  one  hundred  marks 
which he  owes  him  and of  which  he (i.e. A) claims  that he 
(defendant) deforces4 him '.  This suggests that the action  is 
proprietary,  and that all distinction between  obligation  and 
property is  obliterated.  It would  be dangerous, however, to 
assert this as a general proposition." 
Gradually the word '  deforces ' disappears, and the plaintiff 
asks  that  the defendant  render  him  so  many  pounds,  &c., 
which '  he owes and unjustly  detains '.G  We have  here  Debt 
in the ' debet et detinet '; it seems better able to express the 
relation between debtor and creditor. 
At the same time a notion  is coming to the fore that there 
are certain cases in which the word '  debet ' ought to be used, 
and certain other cases in which one should say '  detinet ' only. 
' Debet et detinet ' is  proper  enough so long as the original 
creditor sues the original debtor, but if there has been a death 
on either  side the word 'debet ' is out of  place.  The repre- 
sentative of  the debtor '  detains ' money ; he does not '  owe ' 
it.I  If the situation be reversed, and the representative of the 
' Y.  B.  17 Ed. IIITIR.  S.] 141. 
Maitland, Equity,  332. 
P. & M., ii. 207, n. I (citing Note Book, pl. 645, 732, 830). 
'  Glanville, x.  3 ; see Maitland, Equity, 332. 
Cf.  P. & M.,  ii. 204. 
P. & M., ii.  173.  And see Britton, i.  29.  12. 
'  Nota ke en href de dette porte vers un  homme de autri fet cum ver 
le heyr de le fet et de le dette le pere ou ver executour de le fet le testatour, 
ne deyt  pas mis  le  debet  mes  tout  solement  le injuste detinet.'  Y. B. 
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sue the original debtor, he must use the '  detinet ' alone. 
~h~ property in the debt was supposed to be  in the testator ; 
it was merely '  detained ' from  his  repre~entative.~  Curiously 
enough, the  of  the heir  was  distinguished  in  some 
decisions.  One  of  counsel  in  1339  remarks  that  the  heir 
demands a profit which is due to himselfand shall say ' debet ' ; 
at the same time care is taken  to distinguish  the case of  the 
executor.2  This distinction between '  debet ' and '  detinet ' is 
far remote from any idea of obligation. 
At the same time an attempt is being made to  base the dis- 
tinction on another ground.  Slowly men awake to a nascent 
perception of obligation ; they begin  to discriminate between 
a mzttz~unz  and a comnzodatz~nt. The  use of '  debet ' or '  detinet ' 
is to be determined by the nature of the claim which is sought 
to be imposed.  A reporter  in the time of  Edward I1 distin- 
guishes a claim for money (i. e. current coins) from a claim for 
movable  goods ; in  the first  case  one should  say 'debet '. in 
the second '  detinet '.  It is evident, however, that in the early 
Year Books this distinction has not obtained  a  firm  footing. 
Debt in  the '  detinet' was  brought for L4  due on  a  sale of 
goods,4 money due on a lease,Qgainst  an abbot for the price 
of goods bought  by his  monk,G and  for  twenty  shillings in 
silver.'  On the other  hand, Debt  in  the ' debet  et detinet ' 
was brought to recover sixty marks, where it appears that the 
21 & 22 Ed. I [R. S.] 615.  See also Y. B. 21 & zz  Ed. I [R.S.]  255.  It 
is not clear that a '  debet '  would not lie against the heir.  Thus note this 
dialogue in 1340 : 
'Pole : Judgement of the writ ;  for the writ is in the words "  quas debet ", 
whereas against hers and executors it should be onlv ''  detinet ". 
Pzrlt : It is not so ; against executors it is ':  detinkt " only and against 
heirs it is "  debet et detinet ".' 
(Sem6k) The writ in the '  debet '  against the heir was upheld.  Y. B.  16 
Ed. 111 (pt. ii) [R. S.] 383.  And note that where one granted for himself and 
his: heirs, a writ in the '  debet ' against the heir was upheld.  Y. B.  3 S(  4 
Ed. 11  IS. S.1 148. 
Per-~harhefow  J., Y. B.  17 & 18 Ed. I11 [R.S.] 355. 
Y. B.  12 & 13 Ed. 111  [R. S.] 171 (per Trewith).  :  y. B. 3 Ed. I1  [S. S] 26.  c 
Y. B. 21 & 22 Ed. 1 [R. S.]  293. 
Anon. v.  Anon.,  Y. B.  6 & 7 Ed. I1 [S. S.]  33. 
RaudOVv. L9A66Cde  Hzgirs,  Y. B. 6 & 7 Ed. I1 [S. S.] 32. 
' . '  Wdewayn v. Refn, Y. B. 6 & 7 Ed. I1 [S. S.]  38.  (In this case there 
IS ?O  evidence that the plaintiff~vas  seeking  to recover the specific coins 
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plaintiff was demanding certain specific coins as bai1or.l  But 
at length  Debt in  the ' debet ' drew apart, and  the form  of 
action in the ' detinet ' became indistinguishable from Detinue. 
Detinue was recognized  as a separate action as early as 1292," 
and  as its province  became more clearly defined,3 it became 
important  to distinguish it  from Debt.  Both  lay to recover 
chattels or money; for  one might owe the one as well as the 
other.  Roughly speaking, the distinction was  between  obli- 
gation  and  property.  Where  the  plaintiff's  right  was  it2 
personam, that is,  where he was  enforcing  an obligation  to 
pay money or chattels, the proper remedy was  Debt.  But if 
he  sought  to recover  certain  spec$ic  property  of  which  he 
claimed ownership, Detinue was the proper form.4 
The importance of Detinue in the law of contract lies in the 
fact  that all  bailments  were left  to its protection, and as the 
action developed but little, the law of bailment remained practi- 
cally stationary until Assumpsit superseded Detinue.  We are 
concerned  here with  two questions relating to the action : its 
nature, and the limitations imposed upon it. 
I.  The nntuye of  Detinzte. 
We have  said  that in  bringing Detinue  the plaintiff  was 
asserting ownership of  the chattel claimed.  This, however, is 
a statement which many writers would not permit  to pass un- 
challenged.  We cannot  consider  very  fully  the  perplexing 
question  of  the  fundamental  nature  of  the  action;  for  the 
whole theory of  the law of  movable goods is involved.  But 
on the other hand we cannot ignore it ; the mediaeval lawyer's 
attitude toward bailment  is best  seen in  connexion with the 
'  Y.B. 33-5  Ed.  I  [R.S.]  455  (The fact  that  the  writ  was  not 
challenged excited the attention of  the reporter). 
".  B. 20 gL 21 Ed. I [R. S.] 189. 
Even in the time of  Edward 111 there was still confusion.  See Y. B. 
rg  Ed. I11 [R. S.]  517. 
See Salmond, Essays,  176 ; Salmond, Anglo-Am.,  iii. 321, and cases 
cited,  Ames, H. L. R., viii. 260, n.  I.  And  note  Y. B.  12 &  13 Ed.  111 
[R.S.]  245  (Detinue for  a  sealed bag containing  £20.  The defendant 
asserted that as the demand was for money, Debt  was  the proper  action. 
Shardelowe J. supported  Detinue, on the ground that the defendant had 
no power to take the money out of the bag). 
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.,tion.  Was  it founded  on  contract, or was  it  in  a  sense 
proprietary ?  Was the gist of the action a breach of contract, 
a tort ?  Theredoes not seem to be any categorical answer 
to these questions. 
A  very  keen  student of the common law has asserted that 
Detinue  was,  in  its origin,  founded on contract, and that the 
gist of the action was a breach of contract, namely, the refusal 
to  deliver  up the chattel on request, which  refusal or unjust 
detainer was a tort, only in SO far  as every breach  of contract 
is  tortious.'  This  explanation  is  very  simple,  and if  it is 
sound  it has  far-reaching consequences.  Much  as I hesitate 
to differ  with  Professor Ames, I  venture to question his con- 
clusion.  Before  stating reasons  for  so  doing,  it is  well  to 
examine certain cases. 
Y.  B.  20  & 21  Ed.  I [R.  S.]  189.  A  charter was  bailed  to 
one Maud de Mortymer, while she was married ; her husband 
died, and after his death the bailor attempted to bring Detinue 
against the widow.  Now it is admitted that a married woman 
cannot bind  herself by contract.  The plaintiff, however, con- 
tends that she must answer for her tort ; '  In this case,' he says, 
'the action arises from the tortious detainer, and not from the 
bailment.'  It is unlike Debt.  The  question is debated at  some 
length, but just  at the point where one's curiosity is thoroughly 
aroused, the report ends, and we are at loss to know what was 
de~ided.~ 
Y.  B.  21  ISr  22  Ed.  I [R.  S.] 466.  A reporter in a note says 
that one may count in Detinue by alleging that the defendant 
found  the  chattel  which  is  claimed  (. .  . '  la  ou  meme cele 
chosse  ly fut  endire . . .  la  vynt  yl (the defendant) .  . .  e le 
trova ').3  It  is difficult to see what notion of contract is present 
here. 
Ames, History of Trover, Anglo-Am., iii. 432-4. 
qt  is believed that Mr. Ames  (Anglo-Am.,  iii. 433) has misunderstood 
this case.  He quotes  it as  deciding  that  Detinue  will  not  lie  against 
a widow for a charter bailed during coverture.  'The question is discussed 
--but  no definite  inference  can be drawn.  The decision  can  only  be 
Settled by looking up the case in the Rolls, which I regret to say I have not 
had time to do. 
'  This looks as if Detinue by a  loser against a finder might have been 
at an early date.  Ames (Anglo-Am., iii. 439) says that no instance 
has been  found  prior  to  1371.  A  reporter's  note has not  the  force  of 
,a decision,  but  it  should  be  noted.  Littleton,  however,  in  33 H.  VI. 
26.  12  describes  the  declaration  $el.  inventionent  as  a  'new-found 
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Y.  B. I & 2 Ed. I1 [S. S.] 39.  A son brings Detinue against 
his  father's  executors for  a  bairn's  part of his father's  goods. 
The count  relies, not upon any bailment, but upon a usage of 
the  country  (par usage  du pays).  The defendant  objected 
that the writ  could  not be  maintained, because the plaintiff 
did not  show that he bought  the goods or bailed them, nor 
was  there any contract,  to which  Staunt011 J. replied, '  You 
must  answer  to  the writ.'  The son  would  seem  to have 
claimed his portion of the goods as his reht; and he did this 
through the action of  Detinue.l 
Y.  B. 6 & 7 Ed.  I1  [S. S.] 18.  In Detinue  for  charters, 
Stanton J. remarked: 'They have  counted  that the charters 
came into your possession as their mother's executor after her 
death.  By what  law  can you  detain  these  charters,  seeing 
that you  do not  hold  them  by the delivery of one who had 
a right to them .  .  .  ?' 
Y. B.  17  Ed. 111 [R. S.] 141.  Detinue, for a wife's reasonable 
portion  of  her  husband's  chattels.  Semble,  the  action  is 
maintainable.  Later a writ 'de rationabile parte' was brought, 
and it was  referred  to as ' in  the nature of a writ of  Detinue ' 
(17 Ed. 111, 145). 
6  Hen.  VIII  (Comyn's  Digest,  sub  tit.  Detinue)  per 
Brian J.  The plaintiff  must  have  the  general  or  special 
property at the time of the action to maintain Detinue. 
In  most  of  these  cases  there was  no  bailment; but  even 
where  the action  was  ostensibly founded on a bailment, it is 
not clear that the idea of contract was predominant.  A denial 
of  the bailment  was  not  a  sufficient answer; the defendant 
must  also  deny the detainer.2  Again,  though  the  piaintiff 
alleged a bailment, he based his right to recover on his owner- 
ship in the thing bailed.  This comes out clearly in  a case in 
1344.  Detinue was brought for a horse, bailed by the plaintiff 
to the defendants'  testator.  The defendants contended that, 
as executors, they need not answer without specialty.  It was 
admitted  that  Debt  did  not  lie  against  executors  without 
a  specialty,  and  the  contention  was  that  the  situation  in 
Detinue was  the same.  In answer,  Mowbray  said, 'Sir,  in 
It  is  admitted  that  actions  of  this kind  were  comparatively rare. 
More often the plaintiff went to chancery, e. g. IV.  158, Cases, p.  174. 
Y. B.  20  & 21 Ed. I [R. S.]  193.  And see Y. B.  16 Ed. 111 [R. S.] 167, 
holding that issue must be taken on the Detinue and not on the manner of 
bailment.  See also Y. B.  20  S(  21 Ed.  I  [R. S.] 213. 
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a writ of Debt, if the debt be recovered against executors, the 
execution  Shall always be made of the testator's  goods found 
in the possession of the executors, in which case it is not right 
that  he should  recover  without a specialty ;  but now on  this 
,,it  we  are seeking to recover a horse ;  that is our own chattel 
and not that of the deceased; wherefore .  .  .'  And Sharshulle J. 
ruled that the plaintiff  should be answered without specialty, 
because ' this action does not arise on obl&ation '. 
We may now summarize our objections : 
(I) Even in  the early Year Books, as the cases cited  show, 
Detinue lay where there was no bailment.  The son's action 
for a  bairn's  share of  his father's  goods, the wife's  claim for 
a  share  of  her  husband's  chattels,  the action  by  the  loser 
against the finder, none  of  these sound in contract.  Each is 
an assertion of the right of  ownership as distinct from a right 
by  obligation.  Now  it  is  possible  that  Detinue  began  as 
a contractual  action, and  was  later extended to cases where 
there was no contract.  But so far as our evidence goes, this 
remains  unproven.  We do know  that there are very early 
cases  in  which  Detinue  was  brought,  where  there  was  no 
contract.  It  is incumbent upon supporters of the contractual 
theory to give some explanation of these actions. 
(2)  If Detinue  'sur bailment'  were  founded  on contract, 
it would  follow that the bailor's  right was only  inpersortam. 
The fact that Detinue did not lie against a third hand seems 
to support this.  But we  know that gradually the bailor did 
acquire  a  general  property  in the thing bailed  without  the 
assistance of any ~tatute.~  In  other words, a purely contractual 
right somehow developed into ownership.  This extraordinary 
transformation  of  a  right in personam  into a right in rem by 
a Process of development is not impossible ; but we decline to 
a theory which thrusts so heavy a burden on the common 
law, unless it be shown that no other is tenable.3 
'  Y.  B.  17 Ed. 111  [R. S.] 517 ff.  This is not the same thing as saying 
the  'action  does  not  arise  on  contract',  but  such  seems  to  be the 
~mplication. 
P.  ~r %I.,  ii.  177. 
3  < The transformation .  .  . of the bailor's  restricted  right  against the 
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(3) In later days Detinue lay against a seller on a bargain 
and  sale.  The  payment  of  the  purchase  money,  or  the  -  ~ 
delivery of  the buyer's  sealed obligation, constituted the quid 
pro  quo  which  supported  the action.'  But the principle was 
extended  farther,  so  that  Detinue  lay  upon  a  mere  par01 
bargain  of  sale, where  nothing  was  delivered  to the seller.  - 
This might appear to indicate  that the buyer was enforcing 
a  personal  right  against  the seller,  but  the  remark  of 
Fortescue  C.  J.  destroys  any  such  notion.  Detinue  was 
allowed  because  the property in the thing sold passed  to the  -  - 
buyer; he claimed it as his own.3 
We have  presented  only  one  side  of  the  argument.  It 
cannot be said  that Detinue was proprietary, for in the early 
cases  there  is  convincing evidence  that it was not.  But the  - 
point to  be made is this.  It is not believed that the mediaeval 
lawyer had any theory of the nature of  Detinue at all.  When 
he wrote text-books, he talked in  Roman terms, but when he 
came into court, he dismissed  any theories of substantive law 
and looked  only  at procedure.  It  did  not  matter whether 
Detinue sounded in  contract or in tort; the primary question 
was  whether it would lie upon a given state of  facts.  Limi- 
tations were imposed  on the action, or  its sphere was slightly 
extended,  without  any thought  of  the  effect  upon  the  sub- 
stantive law of contract.  Indeed, nothing more impresses the 
student  of  the  Year  Books  than  the  absence  of  general 
doctrines and the disinclination to make generalizations.  In 
the interest of  analytical jurisprudence  it may be desirable  to 
frame  a  theory of  the nature  of  Detinue; but one imposes 
bailed,  virtually  converted  his  right  ex contractu  into  a  right in rem.' 
(Ames, History of  Trover, Anglo-Am., iii. 435.)  Mr. Ames seems to assume 
that because the bailor's right was originally restricted to an action against 
the bailee  alone, that the right  must have been ex  contractti.  This does 
,  not follow.  Nor has the learned  writer  shown conclusively that Detinue 
was founded on contract. 
Y.  B. 21 Ed. 111. 12.  z ; and see Ames, H.L.R., viii. 259 and cases cited. 
'  If  I buy a horse of  you, the firojerty is straightway in me, and for 
this you shall have a writ of  Debt for the money, and I shall have Detinue 
for the horse on this bargain.'  Y. B. 20 H. VI. 35.4, quoted Ames, H. L. R., 
viii. 259. 
Thus a buyer appeals to equity, alleging that he has no remedy at law 
because the property in the goods sold never vested  in him.  The reason 
was that the vendor had no title.  LIX.  185, Cases, p. 230. 
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such  a  theory on the early decisions at his peril.  Down to 
the  nineteenth century  Detinue pursued  its mysterious way, 
continuing  to confound judges and lawyers in their speculations 
as to its origin.' 
11.  ~i~~itations  in the me  of  the action. 
~f  the defendant persisted  in  retaining the chattel, the 
common law  afforded  no  means  by which its delivery could 
be  compelled.  The plaintiff  in  Detinue  had  to be  content 
damages, if  worst  came to worst ; because  in the rough 
of  early  common  law, 'all things  may be re- 
solved into damages as an equivalent  So  the law remained 
till modern times.' 
(2) In  case  of  bailment  the  bailor  could  bring  Detinue 
only  against the bailee,  or his  repre~entative.~  That is,  the 
defendant's  possession  must  be  connected  with  that  of  the 
bailee, '  as by showing that the possessor was the widow, heir, 
or  executor of  the bailee,  or otherwise  in  a  certain  privity 
with him '.5  If the chattel passed with or without the bailee's 
consent  into  the  hands  of  a  third  party,  the  bailor  was 
helple~s.~ 
(3) While inability to re-deliver, as through the destruction 
of the thing,  was  no  defen~e,~  still  if  the bailee  wasted  or 
misused the thing bailed, Detinue afforded no remed~.~ 
See Note A!  p. 169. 
'  '  Nota.  Det~nue  de chateux.  Le pleintif recoveri damages et noun pas 
le principal, pur ce qe tout court en damages a1 contra.'  14 & 15 Ed. 111. 
31. 
'  Ord.  XLVIII. v.  I  (K. S. C.  1883) empowers the court or judge  to 
order execution toissue for the delivery of  a specific chattel, without giving 
the defendant the option of  retaining the same upon payment of  its assessed 
value. 
'  P. & M.,  ii.  175.  It is a  question whether the executor of  the bailor 
could bring Detinue.  InVI. 177, appeal is made to equity, and petitioners 
allege that as they are executors they cannot bring Detinue.  '  H. L. R.,  iii. 33.  In Y. B.  16 Ed. 11.490 a plaintiffcounted that 
he had bailed a writing to D. to rebail, &c., '  issint qe apres la mort l'avant- 
dit D. I'escript  devynt en la  mayn  celui B.. . .  '  The writ  was brought 
against B.,  and Mutford J.  remarked:  'Pur ceo qe vous n'avez  mye dit 
cOment  il avynt a I1escript, ne vous luy fait mye prive a D. come he~r,  ne 
executour, ne en  autre manere, si agarde la court qe vous  ne prel- 
gnbez rien Par vostre breve.'  Cf.  V1.  245 (10  S. S.  113).  ,  Ames, H.L. R., iii. 33 ;  Y.  B.  B. 24 ~d.  III. 4Ia.22 ;  43Ed. 1II.zg.11. 
Y.B.B.  14 Ed. 111 [R.  S.] 35 ; 20  H. VI. 16.  2. 
Anglo-Am., iii. 441. 
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(4)  In certain cases the defendant might wage his law, e. g. 
if the plaintiff delivered the article by his own hand.l 
We turn now  to a  more  particular  examination of  Debt.2 
I. Cha~acteristics  of  the action. 
I. The writ of  Debt was general.  It merely specified that 
something  was  due; the form  was  the  same whatever  the 
nature of  the claim.  The count  particularized  and  made 
mention of  the specific nature of the demand." 
2.  According  to Langdel14 a  debt itself  was  regarded  as 
a  grant ; this theory seems to be confirmed  by the fact  that 
Debt  was the  exclusive  remedy  upon  a  covenant  to pay 
money, till  a  late  peri~d.~  Covenant  would  seem  to have 
been the more natural remedy, but it was restricted to claims 
for  unliquidated  damages.  A  par01  grant,= however,  would 
not support Debt, except by special c~stom.~ 
The idea that a debt was a grant throws some light on the 
conception of  Debt itself.  The claim in  the action was that 
the  defendant  owed  a  certain  sum;8 he was  conceived  to 
withhold something from  the plaintiff, which it was his duty 
to s~rrender.~  Hence, it followed logically that: 
3.  The claim  must  always  be for  a  sum  certain.1°  The 
Y.  B.  16 Ed. I11  [R. S.]  329.  On this ground appeal was made to 
equity : XI. 427a, Cases, p.  187. 
In the thirteenth century many actions of  Debt were brought, not  to 
enforce a  loan,  or  claim  money,  but  that judgement might  be  had  by 
default ; creditors were using the action as a means of  obtaining security 
before making a loan.  This primitive form of  security passed out of  use 
with  the development  of  the recognizance  and statute merchant.  See 
P. S(  M., ii. 203-4. 
'  '  Each writ of  Debt is general and of  one form and the count special 
and makes mention of  the ;ontract,  obligation, record, Stc.'  ~ole~epher  J. 
in Y. B.  I I H. IV. 73. 
Lanedell. Contracts. 6 100. 
Am&, Anglo-Am., fii:  279, n. 4, and cases cited. 
Y. B. 3 Ed. I1 [S. S.]  191. 
'  e. g. by custom of  London and Bristol.  Ames, H. L. R. viii. 254, n. 2, 
and cases cited. 
'  Le  demand est un  dutie et  le ground  de la action  est  un  dutie.' 
Y. B.  7 H. VI. 5.9. 
Ames. H. L.  R..  viii. 260. 
'O  ~itz.,'~br.,  ~ebt,  158.  See Martin J.  in Y.  B.  4  H. VI.  19.  5  (cited 
Jenks, 165), and note remarks of  counsel in Y.  B.  4 H. VI.  17. 3. 
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defendant  could  not owe a duty to pay an uncertain sum ; it 
must be  reduced  to certainty.  Thus,  in  case  of  a  sale  of 
goods,  the vendee's  promise  to  pay  what  the goods  were 
worth would not support Debt.  ' If I bring cloth to a tailor 
to have a  cloak made', remarked Brian C. J. in 1473,' 'if the 
price  be  not  determined beforehand  that I shall pay for the 
making,  he  shall  not  have  an action  of  Debt against me.' 
Even  when  Indebitatus Assumpsit  first  supplanted  Debt, it 
assumed this limitation, which was afterwards removed.  This 
statement is  not  contradicted by the fact  that damages were 
recoverable, that is, not damages as a sole claim, but damages 
for the detention of the debt.2  In many cases the judgement 
is  that  the plaintiff do recover  his  debt and  damages:  the 
damages being  usually  taxed  by  the  court:  though  if  the 
defendant  waged  his  law  and  afterwards  made  default, 
the plaintiff might recover such damages as he himself alleged 
in the count.5 
4.  It may be inferred from what has already been  said that 
the action  of  Debt was  wider  than contract.  It was  based 
upon the duty to pay money or goods, a duty which arose from 
some source recognized by law.G No one thought of a promise 
as the basis  of  the action.  If money were promised one for 
making a release, and the release were  made, Debt would lie 
for the money  promised; but  it was  the act of  making the 
release, the something done, which  supported Debt, not  the 
promise to pay.7  A  does not  bring an action against B and 
allege that B  promised  to pay him ; he says simply that B 
owes  him  a  certain  sum, and sets up  a  insta causa debendi, 
that is, some 'cause' recognized by law by which money is due. 
'  Y. B.  12 Ed. IV. 9.  22 ;  Ames, H.L. R., viii. 260. 
Of course the plaintiff might bring Debt for damages due as the result 
of some other action, e. g.  damages recovered  in a writ of  waste (43 Ed. 
111- 2.  5).  But in such cases the amount  due was definitely determined, 
an:  the defendant's  duty to pay arose from the judgement  aga~nst  h~m. 
,  e. g. Fitz., Abr., Debt, passim ;  idem  164 (34 Ed. I). 
Where debt  was proved  by  a  deed which  the defendant  could  not 
de2~,  damages were taxed by the court.  Y.  B.  I & 2 Ed. I1 [S. S.] 91. 
Y.B.  12  &  13 Ed. 111  [R. S.]  119; but  cf.  Y.B.  17 &  18  Ed.  I11 
IR;  S.l 623.  The point may be doubtful. 
See The Exposition of  the Terms of  the Lawes of England, fo. 32-3, 
tit. Debt).  '  See remarks (adfin.) Y.  B.  12 H.  VI.  17- 13- 
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Among such  causes  were  the following:  Debt would  lie 
to  recover  statutory  penalties,  amercements,  forfeitures;' 
arrears of  an annuity ;  a claim against a sheriff for allowing 
a  recognizor by a  statute merchant to go at large ;  arrears 
of  rent  service ;4  arrears of  a  parker's wages;  damages re- 
covered  in  a  writ  of  waste;  a  debt  confessed  by a  sealed 
instrument ;  money lent ;  price of  goods sold ;  money due 
from  a  surety.1°  Instances  might  be  multiplied,  but those 
already given are characteristic. 
If  we  except the cases of  Debt on a sealed  instrument or 
some  kindred  security, it  will  be  found  that  the  action is 
never  brought  unless  the defendant  has received  something 
from  the plaintiff.  It therefore  became possible  to deduce 
a  general  principle  from  these  typical  'causes ' which  sup- 
ported Debt, and this deduction resulted  in  the well-known 
doctrine  of  quid pro  quo.  There was  no such  requirement 
where Debt  was  brought  on a judgement  or a sealed instru- 
ment ; but  in  other  cases  the action  was  not  maintainable 
unless a qzdidpro quo were present. 
11.  The doctrine of  quid pro quo. 
I. When this generalization was first made cannot be settled 
with  certainty.  In I 293 l1 there is  what  appears to be  such 
a  generalization,  though the technical  name  is  absent ; and 
indeed, under Edward 11, Bereford l2  endeavoured to apply the 
same reasoning to sealed instruments ; for we find him peering 
P. & M.,  ii. 210. 
Y. B. B. 12& 13  Ed. 111 [R. S.]  109; H. 3 H.VI (Fitz.,Abr., Debt, 16). 
'  Y. B. B. 12 & 13 Ed. I11 [R. S.]  131 ;  id. 355 ;  18 & 19 Ed. I11 [R. S.] 
Y.B.  17 & 18 Ed. I11 [R.S.]  63. 
65'  Y.B.  17 & 18 Ed. 111 [R. S.] 623.  '  Y.  B. 43 Ed. 111. 2. 5'.  '  Sufira. under Covenant.  P. & M.,  ii. 211. 
Y.:.  ;I  & 22 Ed. 1 [R. S.] 293. 
'0  But by the reign of  Edward I11 it was settled that a surety could not 
be held unless he bound himself by deed.  Holmes, 264. 
l1 9.  B. 21 & 22 Ed. I [R. S.]  293.  The plaintiff delivered chattels to 
the defendant, for which the latter did not pay £4.  It was held that  the 
defendant's  admission of  the receipt of  the chattels raised the duty to pay 
the £4.  Thus: 
Metingham].  '  Pur ceo ke Thomas ad reconu ke yl ressut les chateux 
de Ricard e vl ne  out dedire le contract entre ly e Ricard, sy agardom ke 
Ricard recoGere 16 iiij livres ver Thomas,'  &c.  - 
Is  Y.B. I & 2 Ed. 11 [S. S.] 160. 
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behind  the  seal,  and  inquiring  into  the  question,  Did  the 
defendant get what he bargained for? 
ln  1338 it is clearly recognized.  By covenant between  the 
plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiff was made the defendant's 
attorney  for ten  years at 20s. per  year.  The payment  was 
in arrear, but  the plaintiff had  no specialty to  show  for his 
covenant.  Sharshulle J. remarked : '  If one were  to count 
,imply of a grant of a debt, he would not  be received without 
a specialty ;  but  here you have his service for his allowance, 
of which knowledge may be had and you have "quid pro quo".'1 
The appearance of  the phrase in other actions without technical 
significance  indicates that it was some time before it became 
a settled term of art.3 
2. At all  events, whatever  the date of  the enunciation  of 
the doctrine in technical  form, it is very doubtful if  an action 
of Debt  could  ever  be maintained  in  the king's  court, unless 
the plaintiff  could show either  a  specialty, or a  qz~idpro  quo 
received  by the defendant."  By quid pro  quo  is  meant some 
substantial  benefit  received,  and  whatever  the  law  could 
regard as such would support Debt.  This is clearly a benefit 
to the promisor. 
3.  Suppose,  however,  the  benefit  were  conferred  upon 
a  third  party at the request of  the defendant.  Would  Debt 
lie?  At first this was doubted, but at length  the reasoning of 
Moyle  J.5  in  its favour made its way, and it became settled 
:  Y.  B.  11 9r 12 Ed. I11 [R. S.] 587. 
e. g. Y. B.  16 Ed. I11 [R. S.]  527 : in  an  action of  Covenant,  there 
is the remark of Mowbray : '  Quant le Priour se retreit, et puis accorde se 
Prlst, cele  retrere ne put  estre entendu forque pur  le covenant ensuant, 
issint quidpro quo.' 
Mr. Pike's translation of  '  forque pur '  as '  in consideration of' is unfor- 
funate, in that it seems to suggest a technical  meaning.  What is implied 
IS  plain  enough, namely, that in  the process of  levying land by fine, the 
fact that one party retires and permits judgement to go against  him, does 
mean that he abandons his rights.  The prior's  retreating is to be in- 
terpreted in the  l&ht  ofthe  ensuing covenant.  He  withdrew in order that 
he might receive something else in return.  This is quite a different thing  frtm  the technical generalization in quidpro quo. 
Salmond says the phrase was  first used  in 39 Ed. I11 (in a case  un- 
connected  with  contract).  But  this  is  disproved  by  the  cases  cited. 
, which are earlier. 
'  Ames, H. L. R., viii. 254. 
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law?  But it was an essential condition that the defendant, at 
whose  instance  the benefit  was  conferred,  should  alone  be 
liable ; for : 
A.  One quidflro quo would not support two distinct debts.2  x..- 
If 1\ requested B to furnish goods to C, and B did so, relying 
on  A's  request, B  might  maintain  Debt  against  A; but  it 
was otherwise if C became personally liable. 
111.  Debt  m&ht  be  maintainzed  against  a principal  on  the 
contract  made  by  his  agent, provided  the principal  received 
the benefit ;  there  must  be  quid pro  quo, and the quid  must 
pass through the agent to the principal. 
Thus goods  are sold  to an abbot by the hand  of  T, his 
monk.  The monk may be charged in Debt, if the goods went 
to the profit of  the house.3  It is this which makes the '  simple 
contract  to bind  the house';4 the monk  is  a  mere conduit. 
In fact, the law of  agency is extremely rudimentary ;  for the 
only means of bringing suit against a principal was Debt, and 
in  that  action  the requirement  of  quid pro  quo  reduced  the 
agent to a nonentity. 
IV. Proof. 
I. Suit or  secta.  The plaintiff  might  produce  secta,  or 
transaction  witnesses.  This practice  has been so thoroughly 
examined  elsewhere  that it is needless to review it here.  It 
soon became obs~lete.~ 
z.  Deed.  A specialty was proof conclusive, and could only 
be met by a specialty.' 
Ames, H. L.R., viii.  263.  However,  it  did not become  settled  law 
during the fifteenth century (the period considered in this essay), and so 
far as appeals to equity are concerned may be ignored.  In the meantime 
the rise of Assnmpsit had lessened the importance of  this principle in Debt. 
See Holdsworth, iii. 328.  Ames, H.L. R., viii.  263. 
Y. B. 33-5  Ed. I  [R. S.]  537 ; Y.  B. 6 & 7 Ed. I1 [S. S.] 32.  It was 
objected that  the abbot was not  a party to the contract.  Bereford C.  j. 
replied:  '  Jeo  maundrai  moun  homme  a1  marche,  il  achatera  a  mon 
oeps  divers  marchandises  et  il  les fra  venir  a  moun  hostiel et  ieo  les 
dependrai, ne quidez vous qe ieo responde : quod diceret sic.' 
' .  . .  la conversion de la summe a la oeps de la Measson fait le simple 
contract de lier la Meason.'  Y. B. 20  H. VI. 21. 19.  - ...~- 
Holmes, 255 ff. ;  Jenks, 174-86. 
The last case alluding to the practice  appears  to be Y. B.  13 Ed. I11 
[R. S.]  44, in which it was said that the mention of  suit was a mere form. 
Y.  B.B.  o  & 31 Ed. 1 [R.S.]  159; 33-5  Ed. 1 [R. S.] 331 ;  s@ra 
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3. Tally. 
Doubtless  the  difficulty of  securing  sealed  writings 
opened  the way for some simpler mode of  proof.  This was 
found in  the tally.  A  tally,  however,  was  not  considered 
a very valuable means of  proof, as it was too easy to alter it ; 
indeed  Herle  in  disparagement  referred  to  it  as  a  mere 
fusselet '.I 
(b) Except  by  the  law  mer~hant,~  the defendant  might 
wage his  law  against  a  tally.3  An early case  shows  an in. 
clination  to extend the custom  of  the law  merchant  to the 
royal  courts, at least  in such cases as concerned merchants,' 
but  subsequent  decisions  do not  indicate that the tally  was 
thus favoured. 
(4)  If the plaintiff could produce neither specialty nor tally, 
he must show that the defendant had received a quid pro  qub. 
V.  Disadvaatages of Debt. 
(I) The claim  must  always  be  for a  sum  certain.  Thus 
damages for  the breach of  an executory par01 contract could 
never be obtained in Debt. 
(2) The plaintiff  must  prove  the  precise  amount  of  his 
claim.5 
(3) Great particularity was required in the count.6 
(4) If  the  plaintiff  could  not  produce  a  specialty  the 
defendant  might  wage  his  law.  Wager  of  law  remained 
a  glaring defect  of  the action. 
(5) Wherever wager of  law was possible, the action would 
' .  . .  mais ceo qevous mettez avant pur especialte n'est qe un fusselet 
en le quel n'est pas la demand note . . .', per Herle in Anon. v. Anon., Y.  B. 
6 & 7 Ed. I1 [S. S.] 35.  Herle went on to say that the amount due was indi- 
cated  only  by  notches,  which  might  be  increased  or  whittled  away at 
pleasure. 
Y.  B. 20 & 21 Ed. I [R. S.]  69. 
There may have been an exception  in favour of  a sealed tally.  See  Y.  B. 3 Ed. I1 [S. S.]  46.  As examples of  wager of  law  against a  tally, 
See  Y.  B. B.  20  & 21  Ed.  1 [R. S.] 331 ; 20  Ed. 111 (pt. ii) [R.S.]  449. 
Y.  B. 21 gL 22 Ed. I [R. S.]  457.  (Note the remark of  Metingham.) 
'If he (i. e. the plaintiff) demanded a debt of  £20,  and proved a debt 
of £19,  he failed as effectually as if  he had  declared in Detinue  for the 
recovery of a horse and could only prove the detention of  a cow.'  Ames, 
H. L. R.. viii. zhr. 
~rnes,  H.L.R.,  ii.  57. 
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not lie against executors.  The deceased  might have waged 
his law, but the executors could not do this for him ; '  hence 
the action failed. 
SECTION  IV.  ASSUMPSIT 
From the foregoing discussion the rigid limitations of the old 
contract remedies are quite obvious.  Agreement, or '  accord ', 
as such played no part in the theory of the common law ; and 
yet it is inconceivable that the transactions of a busy commercial 
life  could  have  been  satisfied  by  such  meagre recognition. 
Pressure  was  being  exerted  from  without; suitors weary  01 
the ineffectuality of the existing remedies were turning to the 
chancellor  for  aid.  If  the  common  law  were  to retain  its 
commercial jurisdiction, the idea of 'contract' must be widened. 
This  is  what  was  done,  in  effect.  But  the  method  was 
characteristic.  No  new  remedy  was  invented ; an  old  one 
was  taken  and  perverted  from  its  original  purpose.  The 
vitalizing  force  for  agreement  came  from  an  unexpected 
source, from  an  action  which  sounded  originally  purely  in 
tort, trespass  on  the case.2  The perversion  which  so vitally 
Y. B. 17 & 18 Ed. 111 [R. S.]  5 13.  Shardelowe J. remarked : '  Quele 
est  la  cause en  Dette pur  quei  executours ne respoundrount pas saunz 
especialte de dette due par lour testatour ?  Pur ceo qe lour testatour poait 
aver fait sa ley, et cel respons faut a eux.'  And see Holdsworth, iii. 455. 
Vn  H. L. K.,  xxv.  428  (March, 1912),  Mr.  Deiser puts  forward  an 
ingenious  theory.  He contends that by  means of  the  Statute of  West- 
minster I1 a remedy was found 'not merely for trespasses, but for all those 
miscellaneous instances of  litigation that did not fall into any well-defined 
category '.  He believes, therefore, that at this early period a remedy wa,s 
found 'for  breaches  of  covenant or contract  in  the action on  the  case . 
But there appear to be insuperable objections in the way of  this theory. 
I. All actions in which an Assumpsit  was  laid would  sound  in contract 
and not in  tort.  In consequence, Mr. Ames's  explanation of the presence 
of an Assumpsit in Trespass on the case is gratuitous.  Mr. Deiser fails to 
explain why this Assumpsit appears in the early cases, and disafienrs  after 
the idea of  tort became widened. 
z. All the cases he cites (and he has produced  none that are new) are 
examples of  misfeasance.  In other words, the breach of  contract never 
takes the form of  a mere failure to perform the promise.  This is certainly 
peculiar.  If  the action  were  basec!  dr the promise, we should  certainly 
expect to find examples of  breach by non-feasance. 
3.  Upon Mr. Deiser's  own showing, there are only 52 reported cases of 
trespass on the case from  I275  to 1471.  Rearing in  mind  the fact  that 
litigants began to appeal to the chancellor  in  the latter part of  the four- 
teenth century, it seems remarkable that more use was not  made of  this 
convenient action (case) if  in fact it was available for breach of contract. 
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aKected the law of contract was  a branch of  this action, and 
came to be known as Assumpsit;  but to the end  it retained 
indelible marks of its delictual origin. 
*hat  the chief contract remedy of the common law should 
be a de]ictua] action perverted  to another use has excited the 
curiosity  indeed  astonishment  of  many students.  But 
is  it, after all, so very  extraordinary?  Doubtless from  our 
notions to-day  it may seem  so ; but  if  we  inquire into the 
workings  of  the  mediaeval  lawyer's  mind,  the matter  may 
appear simpler.  What was  meant  by the form  'contract'? 
mTas  agreement  a  different thing?  Was there a  sharp line 
drawn between  contract  (as we think of it to-day) and tort? 
~t is worth while  to look  for  a  moment  at these questions 
before tracing summarily the development of Assumpsit. 
Perhaps no case  more  clearly  emphasizes  the distinction 
between  Debt  and  Assumpsit.  or the contemporary notion 
of  contract itself, than an action of trespass on the case which 
was brought in 1536.l  This falls without the period considered 
in this essay, but it may serve as a useful introduction to the 
earlier cases.  The plaintiff had imprisoned one Tatam in the 
Counter for debt; the defendant  came to the plaintiffs  wife, 
the  plaintiff  himself  being  away,  and  'assumpsit  super  se 
all  feme'  that  if  the plaintiff  would  discharge  Tatam from 
execution, he (i.e. defendant) would pay the debt 'a  tie1 jour 
a]' baron,  si  Tatam ne  paia  devant '.  When  the  plaintiff 
returned,  his wife  told  him  of  the defendant's  undertaking, 
whereupon  he '  agrea a l'assumption ', and discharged Tatam. 
Tatam, however, though he rejoiced in his liberty, showed no 
eagerness to discharge the debt ;  and then the plaintiff brought 
his action on the case against the defendant, seeking to charge 
him 011  the undertaking.  The action was held to be properly 
brought. 
In  the  count  the  plaintiff  had  alleged  that  defendant 
'  assumpsit  super  se  a1  plaintiff. . .  ' ; defendant  traversed 
the  assumpsit,  and  upon  the  introduction  of  evidence,  it 
appeared that the undertaking, as already stated, was made 
the wife, in  her husband's  absence.  The defendant seized 
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upon  this  'variance',  and  made  his  exception,  contending 
that  the  wife  'ne  poet  estre  party  a  tie1  assumption  sans 
commandement  de  son  baron  devant .  . .'  This question 
afforded  some difficulty to the judges, but they finally  over- 
ruled  the exception, and then the defendant moved in arrest 
of  judgement,  alleging  as  his  chief  reason  that  the  action 
should  have  been  one  of  Debt.  This was  the crux of  the 
case.  Was there here any '  contract '  ?  What was the basis of 
this action ?  Brook thought Debt would not lie in such case 
as this ; for '  on n'aura bref de Dette mes ou un contract est, 
car  le defendant n'ad  qrtid p~o  quo,  mes  I'action  [i. e.  in  this 
case] est solement fonde sur l'assumption, que sonne merement 
en covenant .  . .'  Spelman J. was inclined to think both Debt 
and Case would lie ; but his reasoning, based on  the analogy 
of  the concurrence of  Detinue and Case under certain circum- 
stances, is not very convincing.  He could  not  show how the 
defendant  here had  quid pro quo.  FitzJames C. J. adopted 
Brook's  view.  His comment is  worthy  of  being quoted  at 
length : 'Donque, s'il  aura  accion  de Dette ou  cest  accion 
(i.e. case) ; et come me semble, il n'aura  accion de Det : car 
icy  a'est  ascupz  contract ni  le  defendant  n'ad  quid pro quo; 
purque il dad  autre remedy sinon Accion sur son cas.  Comme 
si un  estranger in London eme  un  piece  de drap, et jeo  die 
a  le merchant,  s'il  ne paie  vous  a  tie1 jour, jeo  paiera ; icy 
n'est ascun contract parentre le merchant et moy, et il n'aura 
accion  de Dette vers moy . .  .  issint in le cas icy, pur ceo que 
n'est  ascun  contract parentre  le plaintif  et le  defendant, le 
plaintif  ne  poit  avoir  accion  de  Dette,  mes  solement  cest 
accion.'  The action  was allowed : the  motive which  led  to 
this result  was  the thought  (of  which  there  is  frequent  ex- 
pression in the course of  the discussion) that the plaintiff  had 
no remedy '  sinon accion sur son cas '. 
What,  then,  is  the  significance  of  the  use  of  the word 
'  contract '  ?  Why  is  the  '  assumption '  so  carefully  dis- 
tinguished?  We may  examine  first  the  use  of  the  word 
'contract ' in the Year Books. 
The  Year  Book  reads  'acre',  which  is  an  obvious  mistake  for 
'  accion '. 
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ln  ~i~~h~~b~~t'S  Abridgement  one solitary case  supports 
this  and that was an action of Debt,'  in which the whole 
discussion revolved about quid pro quo.  Counsel and judges 
take pains to distinguish '  contract ' from a sealed writing, an 
,,bligation;2  a  grant  is  not  a  contract, for  it  must  be  by 
specialt~.J In early days contract was swallowed  up by the 
larger  idea  of  property,  and  even  in  the time  of Hale and 
Blackstone it was treated '  only as a means of  acquiring owner- 
ship or p~~~ession  '.  But  it  is used  chiefly, one might say 
almost always, in connexion with the action of  Debt.Vrue, 
sometimes find a bailment  of  chattels called a  contract,6 
though the use  is  not  common.  A sale,'  and  a  loan:  were 
the  characteristic   example^.^  The association  with  Debt, 
and the doctrine  of  quidpro qzto, limited the use of  the word 
'contract'  to transactions  in  which  there was the transfer of 
some material thing.  '  In every contract ', remarks Coke, '  there 
must  be  quid pro  quo,  for  contractus est quasi actus  conhn 
actzu?z.' lo  In general it may be said that the simple contract 
of the Year  Books approaches, though it is not the same as, 
the Roman 'real contract' ;  and so, speaking somewhat loosely, 
we  may  describe  Debt as being  founded  usually  on  a  real 
contract.  A word  of  such limitations  could scarcely include 
the idea  of agreement; indeed, we  do not  find  the thought 
of  a  promise,  or  consent, playing  any part  in  the  law  of 
'contract '.  The '  assumption ' which  supported  Assumpsit 
was a different thing ; and as in the principal case, great care 
Y.  B. 37  H. VI. 8.  18. 
Y.  B. B.  17 & 18 Ed. 111  [K. S.] 73 ; Fitz., Abr., Debt, 83 (H. 35  Ed. 
113) ;  3 H. IV. 2.  8 ; 20 H. VI. 21. 19. 
Y. B.  3 Ed. I1 [S. S.] 191.  *  P. & M.,  i. 57. 
"ebt,  of course, lay where there was  no 'contract', in the early sense, 
at all.  But the association of the word with Debt explains such anomalous 
dogmas of English law  as a '  Contract of  Record'.  Iri the later attempts 
at generalizing, it seems  to have been  thought that  wherever  Debt would 
lie, there must  be a contract, and the term was forced to stagger beneath 
a Fd  which logic could not have forced upon it. 
,  Y.  B. 19 Ed. 111  [R. S.]  329. 
e.g. Y. B.  20 H. VI. 21.  19. 
8,  Y.B.  17 Ed. 111 [R. S.] 7 (at p.  11). 
,  ,,See  an instructive note by Ames, Ang1.-Am., iii. 306, n. I. 
Co. Lit. 47 6.  It seems scarcely necessary to say that the etymology 
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is taken to make the distinction.'  Too much may be made 
of  an argument  based  upon  the use of  one particular  word ; 
but it is  not a  matter of  small importance that the  idea  of 
contract became enlarged very slowly, and  that many agree- 
ments  became  enforceable  before  they were  thought of  as 
contracts at all.  The damage which  one may sustain  from 
relying  upon  a  promise  that  is  unfulfilled  is  not so remote 
from  damage  resulting  from  a  direct  infringement of  one's 
rights by a tort.  The ideas may exist side by side ; and that 
they did  so is revealed  in  the development of the action  of 
Assumpsit. 
One of the first cases  in  which an Assumpsit was laid was 
in 1348.~  The  defendant undertook to carry the plaintiff's ox 
safely  acrdss  the river  Humber, but  negligently  overloaded 
his  boat,  with  the  result  that  the  ox  was  lost.  The 
objection that no  tort was  shown  was  overruled, the court 
remarking that the trespass consisted in overloading the boat.3 
One who  undertook  to cure a horse of  sickness, but did his 
work so  negligently that the horse died, was also charged in 
Case in  the form  of  Ass~mpsit.~  Case was, however, main- 
tained  against a  smith for  laming a horse  where  no specific 
undertaking  was  laid.5  All  these  are  cases  of  active  mis- 
conduct  on the part of the defendant ; the damage resulted 
directly  from  his  wrongful  act.  To-day  they  would  be 
regarded as pure tort ; and the question arises at once why 
any Assumpsit was  laid  in  the first  two cases, and why, in 
the case of  the smith, the writ  was  adjudged  good, though 
there was no express undertaking to shoe carefully. 
The answer is  to be  found in  the primitive  conception  of 
liability fAr  a wrongful act.  The typical  tort  was  an injury 
caused to property by a stranger, one who had no authority 
e. g. Prisot J. in Y.  B. 37 H. VI. 8. 18 asserted that  an agreement (or 
undertaking) to pay the plaintiff  roo marks if  he married  the plaintiffs 
daughter was not a contract. 
22 ASS., pl. 41. 
'  I1 semble qe vous luy fistes tresp' quant vous surcharg' le bateau, par 
que sa jument  perist,' &c.  22 Ass., pl. 41.  '  Y. R. 43 Ed. 111. 33. 
Y.B.  46 Ed. 111.  19. 19; Fitz., Abr., Case,49 (T. 46 Ed. 111. 19). 
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to deal with it in  any way.'  If  a person saw fit  to place his 
property in another's care, or to authorize another to do some 
act with regard  to it, any damage which  might result  from 
improper action, or failure  to act  at all,  did  not  raise any 
liability.  The law did not, however, remain stationary in this 
respect; the narrow notion of liabilitywas extended in twoways: 
I. From  motives  of  public  policy  the  law  placed  certain 
persons  or  classes  of persons  in  a  peculiar  position.  Inn- 
keepers, common carriers, and smiths were required  to show 
a certain amount of diligence in their respective work.=  It  was 
not necessary that the smith should undertake  to shoe care- 
fully.  The law imposed upon him the necessity of exercising 
a  proper  degree of skill;  and this requirement removed  the 
case  from the old  rule.  Gradually  this  notion  was  pushed 
further, so that a smith incurred liability if he refused to shoe 
a horse, and damage resulted  from his inaction, while an inn- 
keeper who declined  to provide  food and fodder  at his inn3 
became  liable in  an action on the case.  Taverners, vintners, 
and butchers must sell food of  a certain quality; even without 
representation that it is good, they become  liable in '  Deceit ' 
if the food is inferior and damage  result^.^ 
2. If, however, the person sought to  be held liable did not fall 
within one of these classes into which mediaeval society divided 
itself, he might still be held to account, under certain conditions. 
The reason for stating an Assumpsit is clearly shown in the 
remarks of  the judges  in  an action5 brought against a horse 
doctor for  killing  a horse by 'contrary  medicines ',  when  he 
had  undertaken  to  cure  it.  The defendant  traversed  the 
Assumpsit, and  the  question  before  the  court was  whether 
'  Ames, H. L. R.,  ii.  3 K  Throughout  this sketch of  ~ssumpsit  I am 
greatly  indebted  to  Professor  Ames's  articles  in  the  H. L. R.  (~01.  ii, 
PP. 2 and 53). 
Holdsworth,  iii.  331.  And  note F.N. B., 94 D  : '. .  .  it  is the duty 
of ~tch  artificer to perform his art duly and truly as he ought.' 
Nota que fut  agree par tout le Court : Que You  un  smith denie de 
femer mon cheval ou un Hosteler denie moy d'avoir  herbage en son hos- 
terie, j'avera  Action sur le case, nient obstant que nu1 act est fait, car ceo 
ne sound en covenant!  18 H. VII, Keilw. 50.4. 
,  '  Y.  B. g H. VI. Mich.,pl.  37; Holdsworth, iii. 331, n. 3. 
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Case would lie, if  there were  no undertaking  at all.  It was 
agreed that it would not ; the traverse to the Assumpsit went 
to the root  of the action.  '  Vous n'avez  monstre',  remarked ' 
Paston J,, '  q'il est un  common mareshal  a  curer tie1 cheval ; 
en  quel  cas,  mesque  il  tua vostre  cheval par ses  medecines, 
uncore  vous  n'aurez  accion  vers  luy  sans  assumption .  .  .' 
And Newton C. J. said : ' Si j'ay  un malade en ma main et il 
appon  un  medecin  a  ma  heel, par quel negligence ma  main 
est mayhem', uncore jeo n'aurai  action sinon que il assuma sur 
luy  a  me  curer.'  In  these  early  cases  the  objection  was 
continually  raised  that  the  plaintiff  should  have  brought 
covenant ; '  ceo soun en covenant ' is constantly on the defen- 
dant's lips, but the objection was overruled.  The defendant's 
undertaking, coupled with damage resulting from his nzisdoing 
what he had undertaken  to do, together  constituted the tort 
to the plaintiff.  Or, as  the  mediaeval  lawyer was  fond of 
phrasing it, a covenant was converted by matter ex Post facto 
into a tort.  The  breach of  the undertaking was not itself the 
source of the liability.  The promise or undertaking was laid 
merely to make an act wrongful  to which  otherwise  the law 
attached no consequences ; it was the damage resulting from 
the act which  was  wrongful  because  contrary to the under- 
taking which was the gist of the action. 
So  long as the action on the case in the form of  Assumpsit 
was confined to cases of  active misconduct on the part of the 
undertaker,  the  action  sounded  purely in  tort.  But  as one 
follows the decisions, he notices a constantly recurring attempt 
to extend the action from  damage which  resulted  from  im- 
proper  action, to damage which  ensued from failure  to act 
at all.  The  thought of the promise is still in the background ; 
the  judges are not troubled by questions of gratuitous promises 
or promises  given  for  a consideration.  Before that question 
can arise, it must be determined  whether  Assumpsit  will  lie 
for any non-feasance at all, and it is the struggle to carry over 
the action  from  misfeasance  to non-feasance  which  stands 
forth so vividly in the reports.  It is this which we may now 
trace very briefly? 
For  the  sake of  brevity, I have omitted  the cases involving  bailees, 
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L~~ us  suppose  that  a  carpenter  undertakes  to build  a 
house, but for some reason fails to  begin the work at all.  This 
is pure non-feasan~e  ;  is there any remedy ?  If the undertaking 
were under  seal  a  writ  of  Covenant  would  lie  against  him. 
 hi^ thought seems to have been prominently in the minds of 
the judges.  Why, therefore, allow another remedy, when  the 
plaintiff might  have  protected  himself  by having  a  deed ? 
so  when one Lawrence  Watton  sought  to  charge  Thomas 
Brinth  in  Assumpsit  because  he had  undertaken  to  rebuild 
certain houses and  neglected  SO  to do, Rickhill J. dismissed 
the action ;  l  the plaintiff had counted on a covenant, and had 
nothing to show for it.  In a  similar case,2 which arose nine 
years  later,  the  plaintiff argued  that  if  the  defendant  had 
built the house badly, he would have his action on  the case ; 
why then should  he  not  be allowed  his  action where he sus- 
tained  damage because  the  defendant  had  refused  to carry 
out  his undertaking?  The court, however, could  observe no 
analogy.  In neither of  these cases is there any discussion of 
what the defendant was to receive for his promise. 
That  it  was  the question  of  allowing  an action  for non- 
feasance, irrespective  of  the  nature  of  the  promise,  which 
absorbed the attention of judges  and reporters is emphasized 
by  the case against  one Watkin~,~  mill-maker.  The action 
was  trespass  on  the  case  for  not  building  a  mill;  and the 
plaintiff  counted  that the defendant undertook  to build  him 
a mill within a certain time, but failed to do so, to the plaintiff's 
damage in  10  marks.  The defendant objected that there was 
"0  showing that he was  to have anything for his work;  the 
plaintiff replied  that this  did  not  matter.  The contention 
was dismissed  lightly,  with  the suggestion  that it  must  be 
intended  that the defendant would  be properly  rewarded  for 
his work, and the disc:lssion settled down to a reconsideration 
of the old problem.  Martin  J. was convinced that the action 
not  lie.  Case  would  only lie  where  some  tort  was 
shown ; to fail  to act was  no tort, and the plaintiff had been 
as Y. B.B. 12 Ed. IV.  13. 9; Iz Ed. IV. 13. 10;  16  Ed. IV. 9.  7;  $. VII. 11. g. 
Y. B.  z H. IV. 3. 9.  Y. R.  11 H. IV. 33. 60. 
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able to produce nothing but a promise, which would support 
an  action  of  Covenant if  under  seal, but nothing more.  He 
admitted that if  Watkins  had begun the mill and left  it in- 
complete or built it improperly an action would lie ; for doing 
the  work  badly  converted  what  was  covenant  into a  tort. 
'  Mes en le cas al' barr n'est  mye issint,'  he interjected, 'car la 
nu1 tort est suppose par le bref  par le fesance d'un chose eins 
le  non-fesance  d'un  chose  etc.,  le  quel  sonne seulement  en 
covenant.'  Babington C. J. was not so certain.  He  thought that 
if  one undertook to roof a house, and from his inaction damage 
resulted, as by rain ruining the timbers, a good cause of  action 
arose.  The illustrations which  he gave involve non-feasance 
followed  by subsequent damage, and it is  obvious  that the 
distinction between non-feasance and misfeasance was beginning 
to be  felt oppressive.  Cokayne J. agreed with Babington in 
favouring  the action, but  Martin  J.  kept  resolutely  to  his 
position,  asserting  that if  this  action  were  maintained,  one 
could  bring  trespass  for  the '  breach of  any covenant  in  the 
world '.  All this  discussion  passed  without  arriving  at  a 
decision ; for the parties did  not  'demur in judgement'  on 
this question.  The defendant, evidently fearing that his con- 
tention would  not be sustained,  proceeded  to allege  that  he 
had  completed  the mill a long time after the ' covenant ' was 
made, and that the plaintiff discharged him.  Issue was joined 
thereon, and with  that  the report ends, leaving us  uncertain 
as to what was decided. 
Babington's  inclination  to allow the action finds support in 
the  dicta  of  some of  the later judges  of  Henry VI's  reign. 
Apparently  strong  pressure  was  being  exerted  from  some 
source other than the common law.  Restricting trespass on the 
case to misfeasance left parol executory contracts unenforce- 
able ;  and, after constant attempts to  get a hearing at common 
Babington C.J. cut short the discussion by saying that it was  idle to 
talk, since the parties had not definitely joined issue.  Ames (H. L. K., ii. 
I I) interprets this to mean  that  Babington was shaken in  his opinion by 
Martin's  remark.  I  do not  think  there  is any such implication.  It is 
obvious that the defendant did  not feel very secure of  his  position, or he 
would not  so hastily have abandoned it, directly Babington  stopped the 
discussion. 
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law,  disgusted  litigants were  flocking to the chancellor.  It 
was  only a  question  of  time till  the distinction should break 
down, and  in  14.36~  Paston and June JJ. agreed  in holding 
that Case in the form of Assumpsit would lie for non-feasance, 
provided damage ensued from the failure to act. 
This  decision  has  been  attacked by  Professor Arnes,2 as 
being anomalous, and against  all  authority.  He regards it 
as an enforcement of  a  gratuitous  parol  promise, a  decision 
which was  made without  precedent and had no following '.3 
~t is with great reluctance  that one ventures to disagree with 
so learned a student of  the common law ;  but as this may be 
considered  a  pivotal  case,  it is  worthy  of  being  examined. 
with care.4 
All the facts, so far as they are available, are given in the 
statement of  the count : '  Un R suist un bref  de trespas sur le 
cas et counta coment le plaintif  avoit  bargaine certein  terre 
pur  certein some del defendant et monstre tout en certein, et 
que  le  covenaunt  le defendant fut que il doit faire estraunge 
person avoir releas a luy deinz certein terme, le quell ne relessa 
poynt ;  issint l'accion accrue a luy.'  We  may note the follow- 
ing points : 
I. The use of the word ' covenaunt' does not imply a deed ; 
the  word  was  frequently used  to describe  the undertaking, 
upon which Assumpsit was based. 
2.  It is impossible to determine from the report whether or 
no the undertaking was gratuitous.  From a somewhat blind 
remark of June J. at the conclusion of  the case, it is apparent 
that this '  covenaunt ' was regarded, not as '  accessory to ' the 
main agreement, but the principal thing itself.  It  is submitted 
that the following  interpretation  is justifiable : the  plaintiff 
'bargained ' land of  the defendant '  pur certein  some';  this 
was paid or to be paid (we do not know which) in return 
for  the  release  to be  made  by  a  stranger  to the plaintiff, 
without which  he could  get no title to the land.  If such be 
', Y.  B.  14 H. VI. 18. 58. 
>  H. L. R.,  11.  " I I. 
H. L. R.,  ii.  10-11. 
, '  As the year Book  report  is somewhat unsatisfactory,  I have given a 
transcript of the case, taken from MS. Harl. 4557.  See Note B,  P. 170. 50  CONTRACT  IN  COMMON  LAW  [PART  I 
true, the '  covenaunt ' was not gratuitous, and if, as seems not 
improbable, the money was actually paid, the decision, instead 
of  having no following, is simply an earlier declaration of the 
principle which was later generally accepted.l 
3.  However, this question of  'consideration' was thrust into 
the background.  The reporters wanted  to know if  an action 
were to be allowed for non-feasance ; the time-worn argument 
that the matter  sounded  in  covenant  was  brought  again  to 
the fore.  Elleker,  as counsel for  the defendant,  introduced 
the carpenter  and the house that was so long a-building, nor 
did he forget the case of the smith.' 
The  defendant  had  undertaken  to  cause  a  stranger  to 
release  to the plaintiff; this was  covenant pure and simple: 
the writ must abate.  Newton replied for the plaintiff, arguing 
from the analogy of the action for misfeasance.  The plaintiff 
sustained damage in this case, from the defendant's failure to 
carry out his undertaking;  this was parallel to those cases in 
which  the  damage  resulted  from  improper  action,  and  the 
action  should  be  allowed.  This  argument  prevailed  upon 
Paston  and June JJ.  The principle  upon  which  these two 
judges acted was  that the breach  of an undertaking (be it by 
misfeasance or non-feasance) was actionable, if damage  to  the 
jlaintzff  ensued.  At last the absurd distinction between mis- 
feasance and non-feasance was broken ;  Assumpsit  was  shak- 
ing off  the shackles of  tort and becoming a contract remedy. 
Not that Paston J. necessarily realized  this; but the decision 
is significant and fraught with great consequences. 
It is not asserted that the conclusion reached in this case, namely that 
Assumpsit  would  lie  for  non-feasance,  obtained  immediate  acceptance. 
The  cases which Mr. Ames cites (e. g. Y. B. B.  20  H. VI. 25.  11 ;  20  H. VI. 
34.  4; 21  H. VI. 55.  12; 37 H. VI.  g.  18; 2 H. VII. 11. g, &c.),  to prove 
that Paston and June J J. were merely giving effect to an inclination of  their 
own, only show how slowly the notion of  an action for non-feasance made 
its way.  But in the famous case in 1504 (Keilw. 77. 25) Frowyk C.J.  said : 
'  If I sell my land, and covenant to enfeoff you and do not, you shall have 
a good action on the case, and this is adjudged.'  And yet this failure to 
enfeoff is a mere non-feasance.  The difference between  the covenant  in 
1504  and the case at bar  is  too  slight  to make  a  sound  distinction. 
Granted that the reasoning of  Frowyk proceeded  on different  lines, still 
the two decisions make for the same end.  '  Elleker's  reference  to  the smith was  not  peculiarly  happy.  At  all 
events, in later times the smith was made answerable if  he refused to shoe 
a horse.  17  H. VII, Keilw.  so.  4. 
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~~t the principle of the decision was too wide.  The  common 
law after much travail had  determined  to allow an action for 
non-feasance;  it  now  became  necessary  to  classify  non- 
feasances, to impose limitations.  Otherwise  it would  become 
impossible to distinguish  between agreements which were en- 
forceable and  those which  were not ; '  Pacta  sunt  servanda ' 
would have been received with a vengeance.  The test which 
was  ultimately selected was  reached  through another line of 
decisions: the actions of  Deceit on the Case.  These we  may 
pass in  brief review. 
In 1429  a plaintiff sought to charge a defendant in Deceit, 
because  there  was  an  agreement  that  the  plaintiff  should 
marry the defendant's daughter, and that the defendant should 
enfeoff them  of  certain  land.  The daughter was  married to 
another  and  the conveyance never made.  The action failed, 
but  it is noteworthy as showing an attempt to find in Deceit 
a remedy for the breach of an undertaking.  Four years later 
another  plaintiff  was  more  successful.  The defendant:  for 
a  sum  to be paid  him, undertook  to buy  a  manor  of  one 
J. B.  for the plaintiff, but, '  by collusion between himself  and 
one M. N. contriving cunningly to defraud  the plaintiff,'  dis- 
closed the latter's  evidence and bought the manor for M. N. 
The judges  treated  this as more than a mere non-feasance ; 
the betrayal of the plaintiffs secrets was an act which amounted 
to an invasion of his rights ;  the fraudulent act changed what 
was Covenant before into a tort.  '  Jeo die ', said Cotesmore J., 
'que mater que gist tout en covenant, par mater ex post facto 
peut  estre convert en deceit; . . .  uncore quand il est devenu 
de Counsail d'un  autre, c'est un deceit  et changer' tout cest que 
fiit devant forspue  covenant entve Iesparties, des quel deceit il 
aura accion sur son cas.' 
Suppose there were, however, no '  matter  ex post  facto ' to 
achieve this miraculous  conversion.  This was  the situation 
which  the court  was  at length  compelled to face,  when, in 
I442, a bill  of  Deceit was  brought against one John D~ight.~ 
3  Y. B.  7 H. VI. I. 3.  y.B.11H.vI.18.  10,24.1,5~.26. 
Ames, H. L. R.,  ii.  12. 
'  See Ames's  quotations from same case, H. L. R.,  ii. 12. 
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The  plaintiff counted that he had bargained with the defendant 
to buy land  for him  for  £100  in hand  paid,  but  that  the 
defendant enfeoffed another of  the land and so deceived him. 
So  far as the plaintiff was concerned, the defendant was guilty 
of  nothing more than a  non-feasance ; this act in conveying 
to another could be no infringement  of  the plaintiff's  rights, 
unless  his undertaking gave  the plaintiff  some claim  against 
him ; for  there  was  no  difference, from  this point  of  view, 
between  merely failing  to enfeoff the plaintiff, and enfeoffing 
another in  his stead.  When the case was  heard in the Ex- 
chequer Chamber, this fact was prominently in the minds of the 
judges.  How in all consistency could the action be allowed ? 
Ascoughe  J. was  convinced  that  this  was  a  plain  case  of 
Covenant; Case did  not  lie without  misfeasance, which  was 
absent  in  the case at bar : 'issint en nostre cas, si defendant 
ust retenu  la terre en sa main  sans feofment fait, donques le 
plaintif  n'aura  forsque bref  de Covenant ;  jeo  entend tout zm 
cas qaatrd Ze  defendant$stfeofment  a un estranger et quand il 
retient la terre en sa main.'  This was doubtless the conclusion 
of strict logic ;  but a majority of the judges thought the action 
would lie.'  The  motives which impelled them to this conclusion 
are intere~ting.~ 
I. The defendant  had  paid  his money;  he could  not  get 
it back  again, nor had  he  any means  of  compelling a  con- 
veyance  of  the  land  at common  law.  He, therefore,  had 
a strong '  moral ' right, which  it was difficult for  the common 
law to ignore.  It is not certain, though highly probable, that 
the chancellor recognized  such  a  right  at this  time;  at all 
events he  ultimately held  that in such case the vendor stood 
seised  to the use  of  the purchaser.  Jealous  of  the fast en- 
croaching jurisdiction  of  chancery,  the common  law  judges 
were forced  to strain every effort  to give relief  to a plaintiff 
under such circumstances. 
2.  But even if  the purchase price were not paid, there was 
a powerful analogy in the law relating to chattels.  From the 
This cannot be treated as a decision, for the case was adjourned. 
For an able statement,  upon which I have drawn largely, see Holds- 
worth, iii. 338 & 
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remark of Fortescue  C. J. in this same year:  it appears that 
in  the  case of  sale of  a  chattel for a fixed  price, the vendor 
had at once his action of Debt for the money, while the vendee 
might maintain Detinue for the chattel.  By a curious logical 
inversion, Newton  C.  J. applied this to land: ' . . . quand le 
plaintif  avoit  fait  plein bargain ove le defendant, maintenant 
le defendant purra demander ceux deniers par bref  de Dette 
,t  gq  et  en  droit  le  plaintif  doit  avoir  la  terre, 
mesque  la  ~ropriete  ne peut passer en luy par ley sans livere 
dell  seisin.  Donc  ceo  serra  merveillous  ley  q'un  bargain 
serra  parfait  sur que l'un party serra lie par action  de Debte 
et  q'il  serra sans remedie  envers  I'a~tre.'~  The words  'in 
conscience  and  right'  come  as  a  strange  echo  from  the 
chancery. 
It is  not  difficult to detect a  flaw in  Newton's  argument. 
Inasmuch  as  the  property  in  land  could  not pass without 
livery of  seisin,  there was  no quid pro  quo  to support Debt 
against the p~rchaser.~  The analogy with the sale of a chattel 
was far from perfect.  But law is something more than a sport 
for logicians, and  its development has not always been con- 
sistent and harmonious.  Fallacious or not, this argument had 
its effect ;  the courts, in struggling to give wider scope to  the 
action of  Assumpsit, disregarded logic and looked at facts. 
By  the  time  of  Henry  VII  it  became  established that 
a breach of undertaking by conveyance to a  stranger was  an 
actionable de~eit.~  The gap between  misfeasance and non- 
feasance was  practically  bridged  for  good  and all,  when  in 
1504' it was  decided  that  if  money were  paid for an under- 
taking, and nothing were done, case in the form of  Assumpsit 
would  lie.  But  a  limitation  was  imposed  upon  the action ; 
*ssumpsit  did not lie for all non-feasances, but only when the 
plaintiff in reliance upon the defendant's promise had incurred 
a detriment, as, for example, by parting with money.  In the 
beginning  of  the sixteenth century  there  is  thus  found  an 
Y.  B.  20 H. VI. 34.4; see supra, p. 32, note 2. 
Y.  B. 20 H. VI. 34. 4 (adfifz.).  :  See Ames's criticism, H. L. R.,  ii.  I I, n. 6. 
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action  which  will  lie upon  parol  contract.  The subsequent 
history and development of  the action  lies outside the limits 
of  this essay. 
To summarize : Assumpsit made its  appearance about  the 
middle of the fourteenth century.  The presence of the under- 
taking in  the delictual  action was  occasioned by the limited 
notion  of  delictual liability.  Used  at first  in  cases  of  mis- 
feasance  alone,  the  action  was  extended  after  a  prolonged 
struggle to breaches of  undertakings by non-feasance.  This 
was accomplished first in trespass on  the case ; the limitation 
which  was  ultimately  imposed  on  Assumpsit  was  reached 
through  Deceit.  But  Assumpsit  in  I504 still  remained 
a  delictual  action  in  the  theory  of  contemporary  jurists. 
There was no theory of consideration ;  the question of gratui- 
tous  promises  had  not arisen  at all.  The promise was  not 
definitely recognized as the basis  of the action  till later.  It 
then became necessary to frame a test whereby  the enforce- 
ability of  promises might  be determined, and that test  was 
found in the doctrine of consideration. 
We have now  to make  a  brief  review  of  the situation  of 
contract  in  the  common  law  during  the  fifteenth  century. 
Assumpsit  need  not  be  considered,  for  it  did  not  become 
available as a  contractual  action  till  1504.  Covenant  was 
useful, but  it  had  no  application  except  to contracts  under 
seal.  There remain, then, Account, Detinue, and Debt.  From 
what has been  said, it  must be obvious that the influence of 
the first two  on  the law  of  contract was very slight.  Debt 
was  the contractual  action par excellence, for  all that it gave 
to the term  contract a very  limited  significance.  The 'real 
contract' was  enforced  at  common  law, but  all  parol agree- 
ments which failed to come within its scope went remediless. 
If we  look  for a moment  to what the common law did not 
do, the need  for  equitable  intervention  becomes  the  more 
apparent.  It is  somewhat  difficult  to  find  a  satisfactory 
scheme of classification which will emphasize this point.  The 
one which follows is open to criticism as a logical division ;  bl.lt 
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it is hoped  that it may to some extent bring into prominence 
the 6 gaps ' in the common law. 
I. No yegnedy is provided by  the common law. 
1.  particular contracts. 
(1)  Contracts to convey land. 
Whether  or  no  the  purchase  price  was  paid,  the 
common  law  afforded  no  means  of  compelling 
conveyance, nor of obtaining damages for failure to 
convey (unless the promise were under seal). 
(2) Marriage settlements. 
A promises to give B L50 if B will marry his daughter. 
It was ultimately settled that Debt would lie, but  it 
is very  doubtful  if  it  was available  in  the fifteenth 
century.  If the promise were to make an estate of 
land, there was no common law remedy.' 
(3)  Executory contracts for the sale of chattels. 
There was no action to recover damages for the breach 
of such a contract. 
(4)  Indemnity and Guarantee. 
A  surety could  not  be held  if  he  bound  himself by 
parol.  Par01  promises  '  to  save  harmless ' (i. e. 
promises of indemnity) did not support an action. 
(5) Agency. 
The contract of agency received very slieht recognition. 
u  - 
Debt was the only action which couldu lie agakst the 
principal on the contract  by his  agent, and in such 
case  the principal  must  always have  received  quid 
pro quo. 
2.  The particular  contracts mentioned  do not exhaust the 
list ; they are chosen merely  as conspicuous examples.  In 
short, there was no action whereby one might obtain damages 
for the  breach  of  an executory  par01  contract.  The large 
class  of  contracts  which  ultimately  found  support  from 
Assumpsit were left without a remedy. 
3- There were certain relations in which parties might stand 
toward one another that did not fall within the class of express 
contracts.  From  such  a  relation  an obligation  might  arise, 
Of course this refers to a $avo2  promise. 56  CONTRACT  IN  COMMON  LAW  [PART  I 
which natural justice would regard as  enforceable, but which was 
not sufficiently recognized by the common law.  As  examples 
we may note  contribution^ between persons liable for the  same 
debt ;  or contributions between partners. 
11.  Theoretically the law provides a refncdy,  bztt  it fails  i7t  the 
particular case. 
I. This might arise from difficulties of  pleading or proof. 
(I) Transactions out of England. 
Even if a contract were of such nature that the common 
law  afforded  a  remedy,  the  remedy  failed  if  the 
contract  were  made  out  of  England.  To bring 
an  action  at law  the venue  must  be  laid  in  some 
English county ; this of course was impossible where 
the transaction took place abroad. 
(2) Action against a feme covert. 
A  married  woman  could  not be held by her contracts 
at  common  law.  This  might  present  a  difficult 
situation, e. g. see IX. 472,  considered infra,  p.  roo. 
(3) Actions by one partner or executor against another. 
One executor could  not  sue another at common law; 
nor  could  one  partner  hold  another  to  account. 
Partnership, so far  as relations  between  partners is 
concerned,  was  largely  ignored  by  the  common 
law.' 
(4)  Loss of an obligation. 
If  an obligation  were  lost, stolen,  or  destroyed,  the 
obligee lost his right of action. 
(5) Assignment of a chose in action. 
A  chose  in  action  could  not be  assigned  at common 
law so as to enable the assignee to bring suit. 
(6)  Actions against personal representatives. 
Personal representatives could not be held liable for the 
debt of the deceased, unless it were proved by a deed. 
Generally speaking, death terminated all liabilities. 
Fitzherbert  states  that  one  partner  might  bring  Account  against 
another.  F. N. B.  117 D.  I do not  know of  any cases in the Year Books 
which support  this  statement ; on  the other hand, one partner frequently 
filed  a  petition  in  equity against his  co-partner, alleging that he had no 
remedy at law.  And see Langdell, Survey of  Equity Jurisdiction, H. L. R . 
ii. 242 ff. 
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,.  Again,  it might  arise from  limitation within  the action 
itself. 
(I) In Debt. 
(,)  A benefit conferred on a  third party at the request of 
the defendant would not support Debt in the fifteenth 
century. 
(6)  If it was  not definitely  agreed how much  one should 
have  for  a  chattel  sold,  or  for  work  done,  Debt 
would  not  lie.  The quankm merzbit  and quantum 
valebunt  counts never  gained  a  foothold  in  Debt,' 
nor  were  they recognized in  Indebitatus Assumpsit 
till 1609.~ 
(2) In Detinue. 
(a) When Detinue was brought on a bailment the require- 
ment  of  privity  was  strictly enforced.  If  it  were 
sought  to charge some one else than  the bailee,  his 
possession must be connected with that of the bailee. 
(6)  Detinue  did  not  enable the bailor to recover damages 
for misuse of  the thing bailed. 
111.  The remedy at law is insz@cielzt. 
I. Recovery of  specific chattels. 
The common  law  afforded  no  remedy  by  which  the 
delivery  of  a  specific  chattel  could  be  compelled. 
The defendant  in  Detinue  could  always  discharge 
himself by paying the assessed  value of the chattel. 
2. Specific performance. 
There was no means of compelling specific performance 
of a contract, and yet in many cases damages proved 
an inadequate remedy. 
IV. The remedy at  law is dzficult or  inefectual. 
1.  Taking accounts. 
The action of Account was a clumsy method of obtain- 
ing an accounting.  Common  law  process and pro- 
cedure were inadequate to secure the desired end. 
2. Set-off. 
A defendant might have an adverse  claim against  the 
plaintiff, but he could not make use of  it at common 
law by way of set-off." 
Ames, H. L. R.,  viii. 260.  Ames, H. L.  R.,  ii. 58. 
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V. Strict interpretation of  the contract under seal. 
This topic is somewhat out of place in the present classifica- 
tion, but it is worth while to point out the defects in the law 
of obligations. 
I.  Duress,  fraud or  failure  of  consideration  could  not  be 
alleged by way of defence against a deed. 
2. Payment, unproved by an acquittance, was not a defence. 
3.  If  an  obligation  were  executed  for a  specific  purpose 
(not appearing on  its face), the fact  that the purpose 
had been  accomplished  did not  afford  any defence to 
an action by the obligee. 
4.  A  condition by parol  could  not  be  pleaded  against an 
obligation absolute on its face. 
5.  An obligation  could  not  be  varied  by any subsequent 
parol agreement. 
Such were the defects in the law of contract as it existed in 
common law in the fifteenth  century.  The question therefore 
remains : How far were  these '  gaps ' supplied by the relief 
granted to litigants in equity ? 
CHAPTER  I11 
THE DOCTRINE OF CONSIDERATION 
THE  history of parol contracts raises two distinct problems: 
(,)  How  did  parol  contracts become  actionable at all?  (2) 
~~w did consideration become the test of the enforceability of 
such contracts ?  Before it is possible to  classify agreements and 
determine what are enforceable and what are not, it must be 
first  settled  that  a  contract  will  support an action.  Any 
classification or generalization is a matter for later  considera- 
tion.  In consequence, nothing but confusion will result if  we 
fail to observe the historical sequence of these two problems. 
Now  the answer  to the first question is to be found in the 
history  of  Assumpsit.  Starting as an action  on the case,  it 
was  extended  after  the struggle of a  century from  cases  of 
misfeasance to cases of non-feasance.  Throughout this struggle 
there appears  no theory of contract, nor was it apparent even 
that the judges  considered  the promise  as the basis  of the 
action.  The delictual  origin of the action  overshadowed  its 
development.  The result  is  that  at the  beginning  of  the 
sixteenth century Assumpsit has in fact become  an action to 
enforce parol contract, but such an achievement is not realized 
by contemporary lawyers.  The reason is to be found  in the 
principle upon which the action was allowed.  A detriment to 
the plaintiff was  an essential condition to its use ; or,  stated 
differently, a  breach  of  promise  supported an action when, 
and only when, it could be regarded as a deceit to theplaintzf. 
There was still a very strong element of  tort in the theory  of 
the action. 
Some time in the sixteenth century another principle  ob- 
tained a  foothold.  Men  begin  to  speak  of consideration, of 
Promises as made in consideration  of some act or forbearance. 
The early history of this doctrine is wrapped in obscurity.  We CONTRACT  IN  COMMON  LAW  [PART  I 
do not know  how  or when it made its first  appearance, and 
there is much dispute as to its source.  But we do know that 
the first use of  the word at common law was in the action of 
Assumpsit,  and  that ultimately  it  became  settled  that  no 
promise  was  enforceable  unless it were  made upon  a  valid 
consideration. 
To-day in  the interests of  logic  it is deemed advisable to 
resolve every consideration into a  detriment to the promisee. 
Such a definition, however, does not meet  the situation in the 
sixteenth century.  The  word was  then of  wider use than it is 
to-day ; for  when  we  now  speak  of  consideration,  only 
a valuable consideration is meant. 
Historically, consideration seems to have meant any motive 
or inducement which was sufficient to support a pr0mise.l  It 
included such diverse species as (I) a benefit  to the promisor, 
(2)  detriment  to the promisee,  (3)  a  moral  obligation,  (4) 
natural  love  and  affection.  All  of  these  are  not found  in 
Assumpsit, but it would be a mistake to confine the doctrine 
to that  action.  The quid  pro  qzto  which  was  essential  to 
Debt became  ultimately  absorbed by the wider  idea.  Now 
in  a  certain phase, namely  as a  detriment  to the promisee, 
consideration  bears  a  striking  resemblance  to the originaI 
limitation  in  Assumpsit, the detriment to the plaintiff.  But 
the question remains, Is this more than an analogy?  Is there 
any historical connexion between the detriment to the plaintiff 
in Assumpsit, and the detriment to the promisee  into which 
consideration  was  ultimately  resolved?  This is the crux of 
the matter.  We  may therefore notice three principal theories 
of the origin of  consideration. 
I. '  The requirement  of  consideration in all parol contracts 
is simply a modified generalization of the requirement of quid 
pro  quo to raise a debt by parol.' 
This is  the theory advanced  by Mr. Justice Holmes.  But 
there are great difficulties in the way of its acceptance. 
Salmond,.  Anglo-Am., iii. 331. 
L.Q. R., I.  171.  And see Holmes, Common Law, 258ff.  Mr. Justice 
Holmes  endeavours  to connect the requirement of  quid  pro quo  in Debt 
with  the secta, and  transaction  witnesses.  For  a criticism  of  this see 
P.& M.,  ii. 214,n.4. 
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(,)  ~t assumes  that the doctrine  started  from  a  narrow 
basis  and  became  widened.  Originally  a  benefit  to the 
promisor,  consideration came to embrace the notion  of  detri- 
ment  to the promisee.  But  there is no evidence that this is 
what happened.  Consideration as a rule of  contract made its 
first appearance in the action of  Assumpsit, and not in Debt. 
~f this theory be correct, then the basis of  one action  must  in 
some  way  have  become  the basis of  the other.  From the 
sharp  line which  was  always drawn  between  Debt and As- 
sumpsit, it seems in the highest degree improbable. 
(%) The consideration  in  indebitatus  assunzpsit  was  not 
a modification of quidpro quo, but identical with it.l 
(3) The idea of consideration as a detriment to the promisee 
never appeared in Debt; though repeated  efforts  were  made 
to extend quidpro quo to cover detriment.2 
For these  reasons we  must  reject  this theory.  It fails to 
take  recognition  of  the  wide  idea  embraced  in  the word 
consideration ; it requires a  transformation  of  quid  pro  quo 
which was never effected. 
11.  Another theory  is  put  forward by Professor  Ames in 
a brilliant series of articles in the Harvard Law re vie^.^  He 
there identifies consideration with the detriment to  the  plaintiff 
upon  which  the action  of  Assumpsit  was  founded.  This 
theory has a  certain  decided  advantage.  It  shows a regular 
and consistent development  in Assumpsit  culminating in  the 
evolution  of  the  principle  of  consideration  from  within  the 
action itself.  So far as the Year Book  cases are themselves 
concerned it seems impossible of  refutation.  But  the theory 
is open to the following objections : 
(1) It assumes  that  consideration  is  identical  with  the 
detriment  to the plaintiff.  As we have already pointed out, 
there is a strong analogy between consideration when resolved 
into a  detriment to the promisee and the limitation  fixed in 
the  action  of Assumpsit.  But this analogy does not mean 
that the principles are identical.  It is submitted that Professor 
Ames has not demonstrated this identity beyond peradventure. 
Ames,  H. L. R.,  ii.  18.  Salmond, Essays, 222. 
H. L.  R., ii, pp.  I and 53.  See also H. L. R., viii.  252-64. 62  CONTRACT  IN COMMON  LAW  [PART  I 
The principles may be extremely close to one another, and yet 
have no historical connexion. 
(2) It does not account for all the species of  consideration, 
such as moral obligation, for  example.  A moral  obligation 
is  no  longer  a  consideration, but  it  was  once.  Moreover, 
a precedent  debt  was  recognized  as a valid  consideration  in 
inctebitatus assumpsit.  It is difficult to see  how a precedent 
debt can by any contortion be twisted  into a detriment to the 
plaintiff. 
(3) This theory rests upon the assumption that the principle 
of  consideration was a creation  of  the common law pure  and 
simple.  So keen  is  Professor Ames  to emphasize this point 
that  he is led  to make certain  unwarranted  assertions  with 
regard  to equity.  Not only does he  contend that '  in equity 
.  . .  a remediable  breach  of  a parol  promise was  originally 
conceived  of  as  a  deceit',l  but  he  goes  on  to  say  that 
'chancery  gave relief  upon  parol  agreements only  upon  the 
ground  of  compelling  reparation  for  what  was  regarded  as 
a tort to the plaintiff or upon the principle of preventing the 
unjust enrichment of the defendant '.2  We shall take pains to 
examine both of these statements later on ; it is  believed that 
neither  of  them  is correct.  If, on the other hand, the Chan- 
cellor did  exercise a general jurisdiction over parol contracts 
in  the fifteenth  century,  if  in  fact he did  evolve a principle 
upon which promises were held binding, it is surely fafuous to 
suggest that he borrowed this principle from the common law, 
which  did  not  possess a general  contractual  action  till the 
sixteenth  century.  Furthermore,  if  parol  contracts  were  so 
recognized  in  equity,  that  alone  throws  considerable  doubt 
upon the correctness of this theory. 
(4) It should  be noticed, finally, that all the early cases in 
Assumpsit involve a specific undertaking.  There is no recog- 
nition  of  agreement  or  a  bargain  as such.  Indeed,  it  was 
found necessary in  Slade's case to resolve that every contract 
executory  imported  an  Assumpsit.  That is  to say, the fact 
of  agreement did  not  of itself 'raise'  any undertaking.  In 
'  H. L. R.,  ii.  15.  H.  L. R.,  viii. 257. 
That is, an action applicable to parol contracts generally. 
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consequence we are forced to the position that originally every 
,forceable  contract  took  the  highly  technical  form  of  an 
undertaking.  But  does  this  seem  a  natural  way  in  which 
a contract should  arise?  Men  make  informal  agreements or 
'  accordes  without troubling to incorporate them into a par- 
ticular form.  I venture to suggest that there were many such 
agreements which  fell  without  the  scope  of  undertakings; 
in  fact, the theory  which  relies  upon the '  undertaker ' 
fails to take account of many formless agreements which were 
the common experience of everyday life. 
For these reasons we  may question the theory advanced  by 
Professor Ames.  We can, however, state our objections with 
more effect after examining contract in equity. 
111.  Still  another  theory  is  advanced  by  Mr.  Salmond? 
He  ref~~ses  to admit that the doctrine  of  consideration  was 
identical with  the detriment  to  the  plaintiff  in  Assumpsit. 
Rather  does he  think that it was not '  a logical development 
from within the action  at all, but was a ready-made principle 
imported a6  extra '.2  Now if we go back to the first cases in 
which  Assumpsit  lay  for  non-feasance,  we  find  that  the 
detriment to the plaintiff assumed one particular form. 
He had parted with money on the strength of  the defendant's 
promise, and that money had been received by the defendant. 
If, therefore, we shift our point of view, what on  the one side 
appears to be a detriment to the plaintiff  may  on  the other 
side be  regarded  as a benefit  to the promisor.  The theory 
that a promise is actionable because the promisee has incurred 
damage by relying upon it is essentially delictual.  From the 
standpoint of contractual theory, a promise should  be action- 
able if there were a sufficient ground for  making it, regardless 
of whether or  no the promisee had suffered damage from  its 
breach.  But  in  the specific case we are considering, the two 
principles  amount  to different ways of  looking at the same 
thing.  A promises  to make an estate of lands to B for £50. 
Pays the money, but A fails to make estate.  B has suffered 
a detriment, because he has parted with £50  on  the strength 
Salmond, Essays in Jurisprudence, Essay NO. IV. 
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of  A's  promise.  On the  other hand, there was  a  sufficient 
inducement  for  A's  promise,  namely  the payment  of  £50. 
Mr.  Salmond's  contention  is  this : Somewhere outside  the 
common  law  the  principle  was  evolved  that a  promise was 
binding  if  there were  a ' legally  sufficient  motive or induce- 
ment for making it '.I 
Now the promises which  were  first enforced  in Assumpsit 
were  only such as had a legal  inducement ; for the promisor 
had always obtained a direct benefit by  the payment of money. 
It therefore became possible that the one principle should be 
substituted for the other.  In short, the doctrine of considera- 
tion, already evolved, was thrust into the action of Assumpsit 
from without ; and its entrance into the action was facilitated 
by the strong analogy which it bore to the limitation already 
engrafted  on  Assumpsit.  This 'introduction  of  a  foreign 
principle '  breaks  the logical  continuity of  the development ' 
of the action. 
This  theory  is  certainly  plausible.  But  it  leaves  two 
questions unanswered : 
(I) How and when did consideration gain its entrance into 
Assumpsit if it came from without?  This Mr. Salmond  does 
not answer satisfactorily.  Indeed, it is doubted whether this 
question  can  be answered  at all.  The reports do not show 
effectively  the  manner  of  appearance of  consideration.  In 
fact the doctrine  is  at first  shrouded  in  mystery which  it is 
very difficult  to pierce.  But  if  consideration was somewhere 
recognized as a principle before it was adopted in Assumpsit, 
the presumption that it was introduced from without becomes 
very strong.  We therefore ask : 
(2) Whence  came  the  doctrine  of  consideration?  Mr. 
Salmond  asserts that  it  had  become  established  in  equity. 
This is  the weakest  point  in his argument.  He  can produce 
few  cases;  he  is  compelled  to reason from  inference.  An 
occasional  hint  from  the  Year  Books,  and  a  brief  quota- 
tion  or two  from  contemporary  writers,  are all  he has  to 
offer.  This,  it  must  be  admitted,  is  not  very  convincing. 
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M~.  salmond is not to be blamed for this defect, for he had no 
to the materials whence  proof  might be drawn.  But 
it is  at this  very  point that  our  real  inquiry  begins.  The 
burning question,  which  has been  largely ignored,  is  this: 
What evidence is there that par01  contracts were  enforced in 
equity, and  if they  were  enforced,  upon  what  principle  or 
did the chancellor act  ?  To this inquiry the second 
part of the present essay is devoted. 
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PART  I1 
CONTRACT IN EQUITY 
CHAPTER  I 
INTRODUCTORY 
EVERY  one who is familiar with the records of  the fifteenth 
century  is  aware  of  the  activity  of  the court  of  chancery. 
Aside from matters of grace which were thought to  be properly 
within  its purview, the court was  exercising  a wide influence 
upon the development of the substantive law.  Not even the 
freehold  was  sacred  from its interference.  A  long series of 
protests  in  Parliament1 bear testimony to the encroachment 
of  the chancellor  upon  the sacred  precincts  of  the common 
law,  and  as  most  of  these  complaints  emanated  from  the 
Commons, they were,  no  doubt,  the work  of  common  law 
attorneys who resented the intrusion of  another court.2  Here 
and there in  the Year Books appear  references  to the com- 
petition  of  chancery;  Fairfax J.,  in  a  well-known  remark,3 
urged  pleaders  to pay  more  attention to the action  on  the 
case, and thereby lessen  the resort  to the subpoena.  In fact, 
there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  eagerness  displayed  by 
certain judges to extend Assumpsit from misfeasance to non- 
feasance was  prompted  by the strong desire to retain juris- 
diction that was fast slipping away.4  There is thus abundant 
extrinsic evidence of  the interference of the chancelIor within 
what was regarded as the domain of the common law. 
'  Theseprotests begin in the reign of Richard I1 and continueat intervals 
for more than a century. 
Kerly, History of  Equity, 37 ff. 
'  Et issint jeo vous conselle que estes pledes et donque les Sub paen* 
ne seront my cy soventment use come il est ore, si nous attendoms tiels 
action:  sur les cases et maintenoms le Jurisdiction  de ce court et d'autres 
courts.  Y.  B. 21 Ed. IV.  22. 6. 
See I Spence 243, note b. 
Hitherto, however,  the  precise  nature  of  the chancellor's 
jurisdiction  in  contract  has  been  largely  a  matter  of  con- 
jecture.  Investigators  have  quoted  Doctor  and  Student, 
passages  from the Diversig of  Courts, and other  interesting 
texts.  These do not carry us very far.  The language of  the 
writers is  not always free from ambiguity ;  furthermore, 
our inquiry is not satisfactorily settled by the opinions of even 
the most  trustworthy contemporaries  as to what  could  be 
done in  chancery.  The actual  pleadings  are available, and 
before we  can attempt to say anything definite, it is necessary 
to examine them. 
unfortunately, only a small fraction of  this material exists 
in  published form.  In the two volumes of the Proceedings in 
Chancery a  number  of  selected  petitions  are  printed,  and 
in  the  tenth  volume1  of  the  Selden  Society  publications 
Mr.  Baildon  has  presented  an  interesting collection of  cases. 
We find among these a few cases relating to contract, but they 
scarcely do more than  rouse  our  curiosity.  Moreover, it is 
questionable whether the material so far published adequately 
represents the great bulk of  the petitions that are preserved. 
In consequence it seems desirable  to go back  to the original 
records. 
The material which is the basis of this part of the investiga- 
tion is found in the collection of  petitions in the Public Record 
Ofice catalogbed under the title,'Early Chancery Proceedings '. 
This  collection  includes  all the  petitions  addressed  to  the 
chancellors from Richard I1 to the early years of  Henry VIII, 
so far as they have been preserved.  The petitions are divided  > 
into 377  bundles  containing an  estimated  total  of  300,000 
cases.  Obviously it is impossible for one person to make an 
adequate examination of  so vast a number of cases.  All that 
One  can hope to do is to make as representative a selection 
as possible. 
Before  describing  the  method  followed  in  making  such 
a  selection, a  few  words  may  be  said  with  regard  to the 
Petitions  as  a  whole.  Even  a  cursory  examination  shows 
This volume contains all the petitions in Bundle 111,  and a few others 
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that the province of chancery was not definitely settled in the 
fifteenth century.  Theoretically, appeal is to be made to the 
chancellor only where  there  is  no  remedy  at law, but  this 
allowed  a  very  wide  latitude to the chancellor's  discretion, 
and in  fact, if  he chose to assume jurisdiction  in a particular 
case, there was  no means of  preventing the use  of  the sub- 
poena.  Equity might enjoin  a  plaintiff  from  prosecuting  an 
action at law, but the King's Bench or Common Pleas had no 
process to restrain a petitioner from bringing suit in chancery. 
We do not mean to say that relief was given in every case in 
which it was sought, but it is apparent that there was a general 
belief  that in equity wrongs which escaped the common  law 
courts  would  be  remedied.  'Nullus  recedat  a  Curia  Can- 
cillariae sine remediol,l exclaimed a  chancellor  when  a  legal 
technicality  was  urged  against the subpoena in  a  particular 
case.  This maxim cannot be applied literally ; it is, however, 
very  interesting  as  indicating  the  attitude  of  chancery,  an 
attitude  which  helps  to explain  the  presence  of  so  great 
a  variety  of  cases. 
No  doubt  in  many of  the  early cases the petitions  were 
experimental ; at all  events  some  of  the  alleged  causes  of 
action  are so  fantastic  that  they  read  strangely to modern 
eyes.  The chancellor  is  asked,  for  example, to restrain  the 
defendant from using '  the craftys of enchantement, wychecraft 
and sorcerye',  whereby  the petitioner  '  brake his legge and 
[his] foul was hurte'.  We are scarcely surprised to learn that 
under such circumstances '  the comyn lawe may nouzt helpe '.2 
Another petitioner  alleges  that  he has been  injured  by the 
evil practices of the defendant who ' par divers artez erroneous 
et countre la foy Catholic, cestassavoir socery, .  . .  ad sustretez 
la  ewe de une  certeine pounde de mesme  cesty  Suppliaunt 
deinz la close avauntdit en graunde parde et anientisment des 
bestez  esteauntz pastez  deinz mesme le  close '.  After failing 
in  an action  of  trespass this disappointed litigant  concluded 
that the loss of water by sorcery was 'une mater de conscience', 
and  so he  prayed  for  a  ~ubpoena.~  Again, injury has been 
Y. B.  4 H. VII. 4. 8.  I Cal. Ch. xxiv. 
XII. 168.  For another petition  seeking relief for damage caused  by 
alleged sorcery, see XII. 210. 
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done to the '  Kinges foul called an Estrich ', and a petitioner 
demallds compensation.'  One  is  tempted  to dally  longer 
over  these delightfully ingenuous  petitions, but they do not 
concern us here, except in so far as they indicate the diversity 
of causes heard in chancery. 
The cases  involving  contract  represent  only a  small  pro- 
portion  of  the Chancery  Proceedings.  Bills which  soL~nd  in 
tort  are very comm~n,~  and  together with those in which the 
cause of action is purely equitable (e. g. breaches of trust, &c.), 
they make  up the majority of the petitions.  There remains 
a residuum of cases in  contract, and it is these which require 
our attention. 
Naturally it is  impossible  to consider even  this restricted 
class of cases  in  its entirety.  Two principles of  elimination 
were  therefore  adopted.  First, I have  confined  myself  very 
largely to the earlier bundles.  What we chiefly wish to know 
about equity is how far it enforced contracts before the common 
law obtained a rival remedy in Assumpsit.  Consequently the 
fifteenth  century is  the  most  important period, and  we  look 
with  particular  interest  at the first  half  of  it.  None of  the 
petitions which  are cited  in  the remainder of  this study are 
of later date than 1485, and  most  of  them  are much earlier. 
In other words, they all antedate the appearance of Assumpsit 
by at least twenty years.  Secondly, such cases in contract as 
present  purely equitable doctrines have not been considered. 
Within the two limitations mentioned, I  have  attempted  to 
present  a  selection  of  cases  which  is  characteristic  of  the 
whole body.3 
XI. 227. 
e. g.  Briddicote v. Fovsier,  I  Cal. Ch. iv : LXVII I. 44 (10  S. S. I 23) ; 
a bill against a surgeon for damage due to misfeasance.  The petitioner 
Says he cannot bring an action at law '  par cause de graunde mayntenance 
encountre le dit suppliant en ycest partie '. 
The specific bundles which I have examined are as follows : Bundles 
IV to X were  examined  with  great  care ; in  fact I looked  at every case. 
After that I relied  more largely upon the catalogue, looking only at such 
cases as seemed to involve contract.  In this manner  Bundles XI to XX 
were examined.  Bundles  XXI to XXVI were  omitted ; but I examined 
Bundles XXVII toXXXI, XXVIII to XXXIX, XLI, XLIV,LIX,LXVII.I 
LXXI.  By studying the catalogue with care I was able to select petl- 
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The word '  cases ' has been used in referring to this material, 
but  such a description is scarcely appropriate.  For the most 
part  we  have  only  the complainant's  petition;  the  answer 
and  other pleadings  do not  often appear.  Probably  this is 
due to the practice, which  prevailed  for a considerable time, 
of  not  recording  the defendant's  answer  in  writing.  When 
the defendant appeared, he was  examined  viva  voce  by the 
~hancellor,~  but no record was made of  it.  In the later cases 
we  find defendants  putting in  answers in  writing  and some- 
times  the pleadings  continued, and  there  was  a  replication 
from  the  complainant  and  a  rejoinder  by  the  defendant.2 
Largely, however, we  have  to be  content  with  hearing  only 
one side of a case. 
While  this  dearth of  answers  is unfortunate, the  petitions 
suffer from a defect even more lamentable.  Very few of them 
are endorsed with judgement.  Mr. Baildon  estimates the per- 
centage of  final decrees recorded to be about g+  per cent. of 
the total number of  cases, an estimate which I am inclined to 
think too high  if  one  is  to judge  the Chancery Proceedings 
as a whole.  This, however, is not vital.  The question of  the 
authority of  these petitions  is,  on  the other hand, very im- 
portant.  If  a  petition  is  unendorsed  we  cannot  determine 
whether or no relief was granted in that particular case.  Are 
we  therefore precluded  from  drawing  an  inference  at  all? 
I do not think  so.  A  petition  endorsed  with  judgement  is 
assuredly the best evidence, and luckily we are able to present 
endorsed  petitions which  cover a  variety  of  cases.  But  we 
can  go  beyond  this.  Where  there  are  numerous  petitions 
based upon the same or a similar state of  facts, it is submitted 
that  it  may  be  reasonably  inferred  that  relief  sought  was 
granted.  Such  evidence is not  final, but  it has a high  per- 
suasive value.  While we  do lament  the absence of  indorse- 
they represent  the attitude  of  the different  chancellors  throughout  the 
greater part of  the century. 
1 See ro S. S. xxvii. 
e.g. XIX. 59, 56, Cases, pp.  ~gg,.zoz. 
10 S. S.  XX~X,  note I.  This estimate does not, of  course,  pretend to 
apply to all the Chancery Proceedings.  It was based upon  the seiected 
petitions in the Cal. Ch. and 10 S. S. 
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merits,  we must take the material as it exists and make the 
most of it. 
so  for the material upon which our study is  based. 
we may now turn to the cases in contract.  We use the term 
contract in its largest  sense so as  to include obligations under 
seal  as well  as parol  agreements.  While  our  main  interest 
lies  in  parol  contract, the attitude of  the chancellor  toward 
writings is  not without interest.  Moreover, it throws 
a reflex light upon agreement itself.  Attempts were made to 
discharge sealed instruments by verbal  agreements.  Deeds 
were  sometimes conditioned  or otherwise  modified by parol. 
such  transactions raise interesting questions which could not be 
answered  if we were to limit ourselves to parol agreements alone. 
The principles upon which the chancellors acted  can best be 
elucidated from  as wide a  consideration  as possible  of  the 
treatment of contract in equity. 
One preliminary question may be briefly noticed before we 
outline the method  to be followed in this inquiry.  Why did 
petitioners desire  to bring a case before the chancellor ?  Did 
equity afford any advantages not  possessed  by  the common 
law?  The following points may be noted : 
I. In concluding our  survey  of  the common  law  we  had 
occasion to point out certain agreements which did not support 
an action.  The total absence of  a legal remedy drove many 
litigants into equity. 
a.  Even where  a  remedy was provided at law it  might fail 
in  a given  case.  The cause  of  such  failure will  concern  us 
later.  We may note here, however, that  the common allega- 
tion, 'no remedy at law,'  covered  a multitude of  infirmities in 
legal  procedure.  This was  carried  to  such  an extent  that 
wager  of  law  by  the defendant  was  recognized  as a  valid 
ground  for appealing  to  equity.  In  an  interesting  case  in 
'432, a  petitioner  prayed  that he  might have the assistance 
~lthe  chancellor in recovering goods bailed.  He could bring 
Detinue, but  if  he did so the defendant would acquit himself 
On  oath.  The chancellor  took  jurisdiction  and ordered  the 
defendant to return the goods.' 
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3.  Chancery offered  decided  advantages of  which  litigants 
were always eager to avail themselves. 
(a) Chancery process was speedy, and the trial itself was not 
subject to the delays which beset an action at law. 
(6) Remedies were obtainable in equity which did not exist 
at law, e. g. specific performance of  contract. 
(c)  The common  law  would  never  compel,  and  in  some 
cases  would  not  permit,  parties  to testify.  In chancery the 
defendant could always be examined. 
(d)  It  was possible to join  several causes  in the same suit 
in  equity.  We find a petitioner  alleging a variety of  claims 
against one defendant in the same bil1,l and, if  we may believe 
the writer who makes bold to unfold the practice of  the High 
Court of  Chancery, several plaintiffs ' for different and several1 
causes'  might  join  in  one  bill  against  a  defendaht,  while 
a single plaintiff might bring a bill against '  diverse Defendants 
for  several1 and  different  causes'.2  We do not  go so  far 
as to say that equity took  jurisdiction  because  a  petitioner 
had  several  claims against  a  defendant; but, at any rate, if 
any one of them gave jurisdiction to the chancellor, the others 
might be included in the bill. 
We may assume,  therefore, that whenever  possible a case 
was  brought  before  the chancellor.  What has been  said  so 
far  is  only by way of  introduction.  There remains  now the 
vital part  of  our study which is concerned with the examina- 
tion  of  contract in  chancery  in  the fifteenth  century.  This 
falls into three parts : 
I.  The scope of equitable jurisdiction in contract. 
11.  Chancery process and procedure. 
111.  The theory of contract in chancery. 
e. g. IV. 94 (Relief  against  an obligation which was paid, joined with 
a claim against the defendant by a bill unsealed) ; VI. 211  (To secure an 
accounting for moneys received  and to recover charters bailed) ; IX. 147 
(To recover payment due on a sale of  land and to stop suit on an obliga- 
tion) ; XI. 4 (To recover  goods and chattels, and to recover payment for 
land sold),  Such cases are of  frequent occurrence.  Many more might be 
cited.  a  Choyce Cases, 4. 
CHAPTER  I1 
THE SCOPE OF EQUITABLE JURISDICTION 
IN CONTRACT 
THE purpose  of  this chapter is to show the extent of  the 
jurisdiction of  chancery in contract.  As the scheme of  classi- 
fication of  the petitions is not strictly analytical, I wish to say 
something  by way of explanation.  Equity is not an independent 
and  self-sufficient system  of  law.  It  has built itself  into and 
round another  system,  and if  the common  law  should  be 
swept  away, equity would  be  left, so to speak, suspended  in 
the air.  We cannot, therefore, find a principle of  classification 
within  the chancery  material  itself.  In consequence, one of 
two things might have been done.  The petitions might have 
been  divided  according to the types  of  contract which  they 
present ; or we  might have found our basis of  division in the 
causes of  the failure  of  remedy at common law.  Neither of 
the methods has been followed exclusively;  rather have  we 
attempted to use both, and in consequence the scheme adopted 
is open to criticism. 
Before saying anything in  attempted justification  we  may 
outline the method followed.  In Section I are collected some 
petitions  of  a miscellaneous character, which  are brought in 
equity for some reason not concerned with the subject-matter 
of the case.  These petitions  have one element in  common. 
They concern  cases for which  in  theory the common  law did 
Provide  a  remedy.  In  Sections I1 to V  the  common  law 
actions are clearly  paralleled.  Thus, in considering  obliga- 
tions  under  seal,  and  the recovery of  debts in  chancery, we 
closely the actions of  Covenant  and Debt.  Again, in 
the  Petitions for recovery of specific chattels and the petitions 
against vendors of personalty, the parallel is with the 
action  of  Detinue.  The remaining  sections  (VI-XII)  are 74  CONTRACT  IN  EQUITY  [PART  11 
concerned entirely with parol contract, and herein the petitions 
have  been  grouped  according  to the subject-matter  of  the 
agreement and the nature of  the promise. 
It will  be obvious that these sections are not  co-ordinate, 
nor  are they mutually  exclusive.  The divisions  cross  each 
other, and there is a certain amount of  unavoidable repetition. 
This is a  grave  defect.  However, this method, whatever  its 
logical  deficiencies, has  made  possible  what  could  not  have 
been  accomplished  in  any other way.  It enables  us  to do 
three things : 
I.  To examine  the various reasons  assigned  for  bringing 
a petiti~n  in  equity. 
2.  To contrast  the treatment  of  similar types  of cases at 
common law and in equity. 
3.  To classify the cases involving parol contract (for which 
there  was  no  remedy  at  law),  according  to their  subject- 
matter.  Symmetry  has  been  sacrificed  for  what  seemed 
practical utility ;  I hope the cost is not too great. 
SECTION  I.-PETITIONS  BROUGHT  IN  CHANCERY  DESPITE 
THE  EXISTENCE  OF  A  REMEDY  AT  COMMON  LAW  IN 
THEORY 
The Prior and Convent of Mountgrace and their predecessors 
had been seised time out of  mind of  a rent.  The defendants 
(lessees) always paid  the rent  regularly, '. . .  yitte nowe late 
by the  space  of  two yeres  the said . . . (defendants) . .  .  of 
ungodly  disposition  refuse to pay  hit saying that your seid 
besechers  shuld  noo  landes  ne  rentes have there but if  they 
would come and dwell peruppon  and kepe hospitalitee '.  In 
consequence the petitioners  pray the assistance of  the chan- 
cellor, ' .  .  .  consyderyng that your saide besechers be but poore 
symple menne and not enhabited in that contre neiber havyng 
knowlege  [nor]  favor,  nor  being  of  power  to sewe  pe  law 
agaynes payme '.'  The case  is  plainly one of  Debt, yet  the 
petition is brought before the chancellor because of the weak- 
ness and lack of power of  the petitioners. 
This appeal is  typical of  many others.  The disorganized 
XIX. 92. 
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state  of  the  country  induced  by  the struggle between  the 
Houses of  Lancaster  and  York,  the  damage  wrought  by 
robbers and freebooters l-in  brief, the failure of  the ordinary 
courts to  carry  out  justice  because  of  extraordinary  con- 
ditions-all  these stand forth vividly in the chancery petitions. 
There is a remedy at law theoretically, but  it fails because of 
the poverty of  the petitioner, or the power and influence of  the 
defendant.  Juries were packed and bribed, officers of  courts 
were  overawed and induced not to serve writs ; in  fact, there 
were times when the  judicial system of the country was reduced 
to chaos.  Under such conditions parties  took their  cases to 
chancery, alleging in bitter truth that there was no remedy at 
law.  Nor  is  this  all.  Common  law  process was  slow, and 
there  were  many  inevitable  delays.  Merchants  who  were 
only  temporarily  in  England, or soldiers  in  service abroad, 
could  not  always await  the beginning  of  term, nor  risk  the 
perils of  continued essoins on the part of  the defendant.3 The 
remedy, if it  be  remedy  at all, must  be  speedy.  So multi- 
farious are the grounds of appeal that it  becomes difficult to 
classify them.  We  shall  attempt, however,  to bring  them 
under certain  heads.  It should  be  remembered  that  in  all 
the  following cases there is  supposedly an adequate  remedy 
at law.  The chancellor is not providing  a  new  remedy, nor 
enlarging the scope of  the substantive law.  For an extrinsic 
reason he takes jurisdiction.  This may be due to: 
1.  The Parties. 
(1)  The king or persons who represented him might always 
bring their  case before the chancellor.  It was not  necessary 
to allege that there was  no  remedy at law; the king  might 
his own  court and appear indifferently in the Common 
Pleas or King's Bench, or  before  the ~hancellor.~  But  the 
e. g. VII. 119. 
In 111.  16 (10 S. S. 10) the petitioner asks for speedy relief in collect- 
ing a debt, because he cannot stay 'ad longam prosecucionem'.  And see 
VII. 119 (Petitioner,  a '  merchant estraunge ', cannot remain  in England 
tO:uffer  the delays of  law). 
e,  g. VI.  175 (Petitioner, being in the service of the Count of Salisbury, 
c?nn~t  stay in England to bring  suit at  law) ; VII. zg.(The  delay of the 
'Of  man law is alleged as the reason for coming to equ!ty). 
In Y.  B.  39 H. VI. 26.  36  it is held that as the pla~ntlff  was a grantee 76  CONTRACT  IN  EQUITY  [PART  11 
personality of  the king was  extended  in various  ways.  The 
defendant by refusing  to pay a debt hinders the payment  of 
the king's  rent; again, he is  stated to be  a 'comond Wyth 
Drawer  of  the  kynkes  custume  out  of  Ingland'.l  The 
petitioner  appeals  to  chancery,  alleging  that  the  king  is 
intere~ted.~ 
(2)  A clerk in  chancery could  not be sued against his will 
in the common law  court^.^  If suit were thus brought against 
him he might  remove  it to chancery by a  s~persedeas.~  So, 
too, a clerk might begin suit before  the chancellor, though he 
had a remedy at law." 
(3)  An alien plaintiff could  not  sue in  the ordinary courts. 
The chancellor (at all events in conjunction with the Council) 
took  jurisdiction  of  cases  where  one  or  both  parties  were 
 alien^.^ 
2.  The place  in which the transaction occurred. 
(1)  It seems, though there is little authority on the point, 
that a  petition  could be brought in equity where the agree- 
ment on which it was founded was made within the chancellor's 
jurisdiction,  namely, within the royal palace of Westminster.' 
(2)  Contracts abroad : The common law did not take juris- 
diction of  contracts made out of  England.8  Thus, where the 
petitioners  seek  to recover  money  lent in  France, they  say, 
of  the king, he might bring an action at  law or sue in equity.  This is stated 
to be a privilege of  the king. 
xv. 237. 
For a collection of  cases where the ground of  appeal is that the pleas 
were supposed to concern the king, see 10 S. S. xxiii-iv. 
Except for felony, or  if a freehold were involved.  Choyce Cases, 38. 
'Par cause que le dit  John Owgham est une  del Chauncerie, il  avoit 
une supersedeas hors del Chauncerie solonc le privelege de mesme le lieu.' 
IV. 76, cf. Y.  B. 3 H. VI. 30. 15.  In an action of  Debt  counsel  for the 
defendant 'vient et mist  avant  un  Supersedeas rehersant come le prive- 
lege de le Chancery est que nu1 q'est  officer ou minister de le Chancery ne 
soit my emplede hors de le dit Place de nu1 ple que sera move, s'il ne soit 
de pleint de terre ou de treason ou de felony, encontre sa volonte ; et pria 
que le  Court  surcesse '.  The supersedeas  was  allowed.  See also Y. B. 
37 H. VI. 30.  15, and Choyce Cases, 78. 
VI. 299, Cases,  p.  177 (An ordinary case of  Debt). 
10 S.S. xlii;  111. 4 (S. S. 3) ;  111. 16  (10 S.S. 10); VII. 71 (A$.Wl 
on another mound) : VII. 106 (semdle).  ,  \ 
111. 3 (To S. s.'z). 
".  g. Hertpol in Y. B. 32-3  Ed. I [R. S.] 377 : '  jufement  si de receyte 
ou de contracte fet en Hyrland deyt ceyns respondre . 
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, .  . .  a cause  que les ditz obligacions furent  fait a  Caleys et 
non pas en Engletere, ils ne sachent en quel Countee d'engle- 
tere, ils purront  prendre leur accion pur trier la dite some '.I 
The difficulty,  which was  procedural  (it  being  impossible  to 
lay  the venue  in  an English county), was  later overcome  by 
a fiction,2  but in the fifteenth century many obstinate debtors 
themselves  of  the  technical  defence  at  law.  For 
example, the plaintiff, being in Rome, there lent the defendant 
A4,  upon promise of '  hasty payment ' as soon as they returned 
to  England ; but  after their  return  '. . .  the  said  Abbot 
(defendant) knowing utterly that your said besecher can have 
no remedy agenst hym by the lawes of this land for as muche 
as .  .  .  the  said  money  was  lent  by yonde the see  and  not 
wythe in  the Realme . . . ', refused  to pay.3  Appeals on this 
ground  are frequenL4  Many  of  these  petitions  relate  to 
obligations  made abroad, but there are others which concern 
more general  transaction^.^  In two cases appeal is  made to 
equity  to introduce evidence  of  an  agreement  made  out of 
England by way of defence to an action at law.7 
LxIx. 131. 
The fiction consisted  in  the use of  a  videlicet.  See Tidd's  Practice 
(8th ed.), 430. 
LIX. 38. 
Thus in XXIX. 317, the petitioner says, '  . .  .  for asmuche as the seide 
bargeyn was made  in  the parties of  beyond the see and not Within  this 
Realme, your seide bisecher hath no remedie bv  the comone lawe of  this 
lande, but onely by supplication afore your good and gracious lordship in 
the Court of  Chauncery'. 
Obligation  made it  Calais : VI. 71 ;  VII. 71 ; VII. 226.  In VI. 161 
the petitioner  asks the chancellor  to  give  him  relief  against an action 
brought at common law on an obligation made in Rouen ; he alleges two 
reasons, first that the obligation is in fact satisfied, secondly '  que la dite 
pbllgacon feust fait es parties ou la comune ley D'angletere ne purrs avoir 
lurisdiccon '. 
Account : 2 Cal. Ch. lxv ;  Debt, XII. 51  (Petitioner says, '  . .  .  for the 
'id  duytees growing by certeyn contracte made by yonde the :ee  .  .  .  [he] 
hath no remedy .  . .  by the Commune law of  %is land .  .  . ) ;  Petition 
against a factour in regard to transaction  in Prussia :  XVI. 427 ; Suit for 
incurred abroad at the defendant's  request : XIX 295 (.'  .  .  .  for 
as moche as the saide expenses  and costs  were  done oute of  this  lande 
Your wide besecher  faileth remedy atte comune  law ') ; Assignment  of 
goods made abroad : LIX. 124. 
,  Agreement made in Spain : XLIV. 253 ;  Transaction at Calais :  LIX. 
'94  (Petitioner says it is not   lead able in bar at law 'by cause it is SO not 
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3.  Inequality of  Parties. 
The weakness of  the petitioner  on the one  hand,  or the 
strength and  power  of  the defendant  on the other, brought 
many cases  before the chancellor.'  'Your  heart  and hand 
must  be  ready  for  the relief of  the poor',  exclaimed  Lord 
Chancellor Hutton in  an address to the  sergeant^;^  and in 
a  tract  relating  to the office  of  the chancellor,  the court  is 
thus described : '  It is the refuge of the poor and the afflicted ; 
it  is  the altar and sanctuary for such as against the might  of 
rich men, and the countenance of  great  men cannot maintain 
the goodness  of  their  cause.j3  That these were  more  than 
a set of  good adages is witnessed by the petitions themselves. 
We may group them in two divisions : 
(I) Poverty of the petitioner. 
These appeals are often  framed  in  piteous  terms.  '  Poor 
fadyrless children' bewail the fact that they cannot afford the 
expense of  a common law action ;  a convent has ejected the 
petitioner from his lease, and he is '  by the meane of  the same 
puttying  oute  so  enpoverisshed  where  thrugh  he  is  noun- 
sufficient in  goodes to mayntene  hys accion  at the comune 
lawe . .  .  '.5  Common law writs were expensive luxuries, and 
if the  petitioner was  reduced  to poverty, he thereby lost his 
remedy.  The denial of justice was substantial,  ifnot theoretical. 
Hence came the appeal to eq~ity.~ 
'  Inequality of  persons  is cause  to hold  suit  here  (i.e.  in chancery), 
although otherwise the matter be determinable properly at the common 
law.'  Green v. Cope, Hill. go Jac., Choyce Cases, 47. 
Sanders, ii, p.  1035 (cited I Spence, 387). 
Lord Ellesmere : Office  of  Lord Chancellor, 21  (Holdsworth, i.  206, 
n. 6).  It may be that this tract is erroneously ascribed to Lord Ellesmere. 
See Pollock, Expansion of the Common Law, 70. 
XIX. 20. 
XXIX. 321. 
In the following cases the petitioners  allege poverty as the ground of 
appeal to chancery:  I Cal. Ch. xiii ; I Cal. Ch. xxx;  2 Cal.  Ch. xii;  111. 
I14 (10 S. S. 40) ; 111. 93  (10 s.  S. 47) ; 111. 91 (10 S. s. 76) ; Ix. 342 ; 
X. 308 (Petitioner '  ys so pouere  that he hath  not where  of  to sewe  pe 
comone lawe ') ; XI. 84 ; XI. 213 ; XVI. 438 (10  S. S.  134) ; XIX.  480 
(' for asmoche as your said besecher hath lost his goodis be yonde @see 
.  .  .  (he) .  . .  is nat of power to sue )e comune lawe. .  .').  In XI. 358, the 
defendant is described as '  havynge grete habundance of  Richesse ', where- 
as the petitioner is 'but a  pore man nouzt  yn  power  to sue the comune 
lawe agenst hym '. 
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(,I  MaintetxulCe and power of the defendant. 
The system of common law courts, depending as it did upon 
a jury and many petty officials, was  one of  which a rich and 
,n,crupul~us defendant  might  readily take advantage.  The 
was tried in the particular county in which the transaction 
took place, and it was easily possible to corrupt the officers of 
the courts or to overawe a jury.  Defendants made use of  the 
influence of  their  family  and  friends l  to procure  decisions 
favourable  to themselves and to obstruct justice.  The  petitions 
repeat this charge with a wearisome monotony.  The defendant 
is riche and mayneteined by strength and your seid besecher 
bath  sued  many  wryties  atte comyn law  and  he  canne  get 
noun  served '.2  '  Howsoever  the  seid  suppliant  would  sue 
against the said William Clopton at common law, he can never 
come to his purpose, because of  the great maintenance of  the 
said William  in  those parts.'  The petitioner  attempted  to 
bring Detinue, but such was the influence of the defendant that 
the sheriffs refused to serve the writs.4 Sometimes the petitioner 
was  himself  threatened  and  oppressed  so  that  he  did  not 
dare bring suit at law ;  '  nulle n'oise pursuer envers luy come 
le commune ley demande par cause de sa grante maintenance '.B 
Bribery  and  corruption  likewise  were  alleged against de- 
fendants.  For example, the petitioner brought suit against one 
Albright Yanson de la Wyke before the bailiffs  of  Yarmouth, 
but the gentleman of that engaging name succeeded in greasing 
the palms of the officers  of  the Court, for our artless pleader 
remarked that '  because that the sayd bailyffs lofe and cherisshe 
the  sayd  Albright, they wil  not  gyfe iugement accordyng  to 
the truth  of the  matter  as faith  and conscience will '.  The 
petitioner  prayed  that  the bailiffs  might  be  brought  into 
1  c .  .  .  les  ditz  Johan et Thomas sont  si grandz de consanguineteez, 
alliancez et amistez  en lour pays, qe le dit  suppliant  n'auera  mye  droit 
deuers eux par ascun prsuite a  la commune ley .  .  .'  111. 82 (10  S. S. 
48).,  In 111. 41 (10 S. S.  34) it  is alleged that the defendant is 'si riche 
et sl forte d'amys en pays  la ou il est demourant '  that the petitioner can 
ne:er  recover against him. 
XII. 205.  VI. 156 (10 S. S.  111).  . :  xI1. 56. 
See 111. 58 (10 S. S. 31) ;  111. 60 (10 S. S. 33) ; 111. 65 (10 S. S. 26). 
II1. 22 (10 S. S.  11).  TO  the same effect, XI. 84. 80  CONTRACT  IN EQUITY  [PART  11 
chancery  by subpoena, '. . . to be examynet  of these pre- 
misses so  that be  your  discrecon  ryght  mey  be  done to all 
parties, for the luf of  god and in the way of charite '.I 
Space forbids  the inclusion  of  further excerpts from these 
petitions.  They bear  eloquent  testimony  to the difficulties 
which  beset  an action  at  law  in  the fifteenth century.  We 
cannot state the relative proportion of  the chancery  petitions 
which  were  based  on  the n~isconduct  of  the defendant,  but 
they are sufficiently numerous  to form  a  large  and distinct 
class.=  We feel reasonably sure that the chancellor did inter- 
vene.  The number of appeals leads one  to suspect this ;  and 
furthermore,  we have  one petition endorsed with judgement. 
An action  of  Debt was brought on an obligation  against  the 
petitioner.  The defendant  caused '  a panel1 to'be retorned of 
suche persons of  his affynyte which woll here no  evydence for 
the part  of  yor seid Orator . . .'  Appeal was  made  to the 
chancellor,  who granted an injunction, restraining  the defen- 
dant from  prosecuting his  action at law until the case could 
be heard in equity." 
4. Failure of cowzmon law process. 
(I) Inability to serve a writ on the defendant. 
A  defendant  by  constantly  moving  about  could  hold 
common  law  process  at bay.  There  appear  to have  been 
many of these elusive persons, who avoided their just debts by 
keeping away from the place  in which they were contracted. 
One petition sets this forth in so narve a manner as to deserve 
quotation : Adam, Prior  of  Tutbury,  borrowed L160  of  the 
'  XVI. 573. 
a  The following petitions, in addition to those already cited, allege the 
power and maintenance  of  the defendant as the reason for appeal to the 
chancellor : V. 65  (Petitioner brought Replevin, but the action failed 'par 
cause de la  graunde puissance . .  .  et subtile confederance '  of  the defen- 
dants) ; VI.  92  (in  nature of  Detinue) ; VI.  156 (10  S. S. 111)  ; VI. 140 
(Detinue) ; VI.  165 (Detinue) ; VII. 219 (another reason as well alleged) ; 
X. 181 (Debt ; petitioner  is unable  to have  any writ  served  against  t!e 
defendant because of the 'favour that he hath of officers in that countre. . .  ) ; 
XI. 84 (Detinue on a bailment ;  the defendant '  hath so grete power and 
mayntenaunce in the said contreethat the saidepouerewydowe 
is of non powere to pursue the comone lawe agenst hym .  .  .') ; XXIX. 410 
(Relief against an action of  Debt which is like to go against the petitioner 
because of the defendant's  maintenance). 
LIX. 242 (LIX. 243 is the defendant's answer). 
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petitioners  and  bound  himself in  four  obligations,  but  on 
the day of  payment  he  refused  to satisfy them.  Then,  say 
the  petitioners,  'le dit  Priour  est home  aliene neez  et en- 
gendrez et de lieger conscience, issint que si les ditz suppliant; 
voillent  conceyver  envers  le  dit  Priour  ascun  accion  a  la 
comune ley, il est divers foitz alauntz outre la meer et diverse 
foitz ad  protections  et  en  diverses  foitz  le  dit  Priour  est 
et demourant  en  divers  lieux priveleges issint que 
les ditz  suppliauntz  ne purront mye  executer la comune ley 
envers IUY a graund damage et arrerisement des ditz suppliantz 
s'ils  n'ount  vostre  tres  gracious  eide  et  socour  en  celle 
partie '.I 
Despite  the  patriotic  avowal of  the  complainants  in  the 
petition already instanced,  we  find  that debtors of  domestic 
nurture  developed  a  capacity  of  movement  not  inferior to 
that of the '  home aliene neez et engendrez '.  Some defendants 
refused to appear at a11 ;  others, who were never '  continuel- 
ment  demourant  en  nu1  moved  rapidly  from  county 
to  county  or  at  the  critical  moment  went  abroad.'  The 
subpoena  was  superior  to the  common  law  writ.  It was 
easier to serve; it  was  not  limited by county boundaries ;  it 
could  be  obtained  very  speedily.  It was  not  remarkable, 
therefore, that despairing creditors took refuge in equity. 
(2) Privileged Places. 
There  were  numerous '  privileged  places ' in  England  in 
which  a  common  law  writ would not  run.  The defendant, 
says  one  petition,  has  departed  to  'place  privileged  and 
seYntwar~  where your besechers can  no remedy  have by pe 
comune lawe . .  .15  Into these numerous special jurisdictions 
Ix. 324. 
x.  76 (Petitioner attempted  to bring Debt, but the defendant refused 
to appear, though he had  acknowledged '  before  notable persones '  that 
the debt was due). 
LXVIII. 228. 
'  e:  g. in 111. 71 (10 S. S. 70) it is said that the defendant '  soi absent 
et !oldit  de lieu en autre issintq'ele nulle recouere ne remedie vers luy ent 
Pulsse auoir  par commun ley. .  .' ;  V1. 168 (The defendant  purposes to 
leave the jurisdiction  and the petitioner '  de luy n'avera recovere solonc le 
y;cesse  de ley. ..'). 
.  =IX.  106.  In XI. 211 it saidthat the defendant 'hath  enhabite hym 
ln suche a place priveleged that the kynges write renneth not. . .' 
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or  franchises  it  was  possible  to  follow  a  defendant  by 
subpoena.  The council had  power to issue  writs  into such 
 jurisdiction^,^ and apparently this same power was exercised 
by the chancellor.  At all events we  find petitions addressed 
to the  chancellor  in  which  a  subpoena  is  prayed  against 
defendants, who  are in Wales:  in  the franchise  of the Abbot 
of  Whitb~,~  or in the county palatine of Che~ter.~  Whether or 
no  these  cases  were  heard  before  the  council  we  are  not 
prepared  to say ;  but  at all events the petitioners did expect 
and claim relief in chancery. 
In concluding we may advert to a question which is some- 
what perplexing: Did the chancellor proceed  upon principles 
of  equity and conscience in deciding these cases ?  Mr. Spen~e,~ 
relying upon the authority of  Lord Ellesmere, asserts that in 
the exercise of  his ordinary or common law jurisdiction  the 
chancellor could not advert to matters of  conscience.  Now 
the so-called common law jurisdiction  is usually considered to 
be that exercised over cases  in  which the Crown or a clerk in 
chancery was a party.6  It may be, though  of  this I am not 
convinced, that in  exercising  this jurisdiction  the chancellor 
followed  the common  law.  There is practically no authority 
on the point, but I should like to call attention to the remark 
of the chancellor in a case in 1469. 
A subpoena  was brought against three executors, of whom 
only one appeared.  It was urged that he should be compelled 
to answer, but to this the chancellor was  unwilling  to agree ; 
the  three  executors  together  represented  the  estate  of  the 
testator, and that the answer of one should bind the other two 
I  Spence, 330.  XI. 402.  ".  . .  also for as muche as the. . .  (defendants) .  .  .  dwellen within the 
Franchise  of  the  Abbot  of  Whitby, .  .  .  (petitioner) .  .  .  may  have  no 
manner of  writte for to be executed  agenst  thaym  after the cours of  the 
comune lawe of  this land.. .'  XIX. 471. 
The petitioner brought Debt on a recognizance, but the defendant has 
betaken  himself 'into count  palyse in Chestourshire and in  other places 
priveleged with his goodus and catels and no lond hath at the comyn lawe 
so that the seid beseecher may not have execution of  the seid summe. .  .' 
1%  475. 
I Spence, 337. 
"his  is only a part of  the common law jurisdiction.  See Coke, 4 Inst. 
79, and I Spence, 336. 
The nature of the case does not appear from the report. 
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would, he said, be contrary 20  consciefzcc.  In the course of the 
discupion,  Pigot,  representing  the  complainant,  instanced 
what  he thought was a pertinent analogy.  If an attachment, 
he argued, were sued against several clerks in chancery as 
executors, and one appeared, he  would  be  forced  to answer. 
T~ this the chancellor replied : '  Cel attachment doit ensuer le 
,,ture  dlaction a1 comen ley, et issint n'est  cel Subpoena,' &c., 
ten  l'attachment jay  ij  powers,  un  come judge  temporal,  et 
autre come Judge de conscience, car s'il appiert a moy sur  le 
matter  monstre  en  le  attachment que  conscience  est  en  le 
matter, jeo adjudgera sur ceo come judge  de conscience,'  &c.l 
In the hypothetical  case  the clerk would  appear  as a de- 
fendant and not as plaintiff; and we do not  know the precise 
ground upon which jurisdiction would be assumed.  However, 
the chancellor declares that on an atta~hment,~  which partakes 
of the nature  of  an action at common law, he may decide on 
principles of conscience.  This is an interesting and important 
declaration.  It seems to throw doubt upon Lord Ellesmere's 
statement,  at least  so far  as  the court  of  chancery  in  the 
fifteenth century is concerned. 
However, even if  it be granted that in cases in which clerks 
in  chancery  and the Crown  were  concerned equity followed 
the  law,  there  still  remains  that  large  class  in  which  the 
poverty  of  the complainant, the power of  the defendant, &c., 
or  the fact that the transaction  took  place  abroad, brought 
the case  before  the chancellor.  The petitions,  one and all, 
demand relief in accordance with reason and conscience ; they 
are framed upon exactly the same lines as those  upon  which 
the chancellor  granted  relief  not  obtainable at common law. 
Are we  to believe that reason and conscience were  exhausted 
in conferring jurisdiction?  Must the chancellor admit all the 
technical defences available if  the action had been  brought  at 
law  ?  Though matter of  conscience arise, must it be ignored ? 
In the absence  of  any endorsed  case  it  is  difficult  to  tell. 
I  however,  to suggest  that  the chancellor  decided 
'2  Y.  B.  8  Ed. 1V. 5.  I (p. 6). 
An attachment was a wrlt Issued against a defendant who, after service 
Of  the subpoena, did not appear at the time fixed.  I  Spence, 370. 84  CONTRACT  IN  EQUITY  [PART  11 
these  cases  on  his  own  principles  wherever  they  conflicted 
with a rule of law.  The court which gave relief in the face of 
a technical legal defence, such as wager of  law, would  not be 
likely  to withhold  such  relief  as  accorded  with  reason  and 
conscience, no  matter  upon what  specific  ground  it assumed 
jurisdiction.  Any other conclusion  seems to run  counter to 
the principles and practice of the chancellor. 
SECTION  11.  PETITIONS  RELATING  TO  OBLIGATIONS 
UNDER  SEAL 
In  examining  the  doctrines of  chancery  with  regard  to 
obligations under  seal we  shall not  consider defences which 
are purely equitable, as, for example, fraud.  Without doubt, 
from  early times equity granted  relief against sealed writings 
procured  by  duress l  or induced  by fraud  ; there  is much 
talk of  false obligations and  feigned  acquittances.  In a  case 
which may be noticed as typical, a petitioner besought the aid 
of the chancellor, because the obligor had '  feyned acquitaunce' 
to bar  a just  debt; he  prayed  that the defendant  (obligor) 
might  be brought  into chancery  'for  to be examined in pis 
matiere and pere  for  to answer in pe same and to receve pat 
pe court shall award '.3  But, though the multiplicity of  these 
appeals tempts one to examine them  further, our real interest 
lies in those cases in which equity definitely met the law in its 
own  field  and  supplemented  or  altered  the  stricter  legal 
doctrines from principles of reason and conscience. 
The specific topics to be considered are as follows : 
I.  Cases in which the obligation  is satisfied but the obligor 
has no acquittance. 
11.  Simple  (i. e.  unconditional)  obligations  which  are  con- 
ditioned by parol. 
Ancient  Petitions,  No.  14806 (lo S. S.  127) ; I  Cal.  Ch.  xliv ; IV. 
6 ;  V. I 18.  Payment procured by duress was good ground for the chan- 
cel!or's  intervention.  Thus where  one by  duress  of  imprisonment  con- 
strained another  to pay a debt already satisfied,  a  confident  appeal was 
made to equ,ity to recover  the second payment ' come  conscience et bon 
foy requiert  .  XI. 23. 
"11.  3 (10  S. S. 2); V.  64; VI. 117; XI. 257. 
'  XI. 257. 
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111 Obligations  executed  for a  specific  purpose which  has 
been accomplished. 
IV.  Variation of an obligation by parol. 
V.  Inquiry into the consideration of sealed instruments. 
1,  Obligation is satisjed bttt still retained by the oblzgee, and 
has no acqzdittance. 
6 There is a general maxim in the law of England that in an 
.,tion  of Debt sued  upon  an  obligation  the defendant shall 
not plead  that he oweth not  the money, ne  can  in  no wise 
discharge himself  in  that action, but  he have an acquittance 
some other  writing  sufficient  in  the  law, or  some other 
thing  like, witnessing  that he  hath  paid  the  money;  that 
is ordained by the law to avoid a great inconvenience . .  .  that 
every man  by  a  nude  parol  and  by a bare averment should 
avoid an obligation. . .  .  And yet . .  .  [the law] .  .  .  intendeth 
not, nor commandeth not, that the money of right ought to be 
paid  again,  but  setteth a  general  rule,  which  is  good  and 
necessary to  all the people,  and that  every  man  may  well 
keep,  without  it  happen  through  his  own  default.  And 
if  such  default happen  in  any person whereby he  is without 
remedy  at  the  common  law,  yet  he  may  be  holpen  by 
a  subpoena . . .' 1  So speaks the  Student  in  the  famous 
dialogue.  There  is  abundant  external evidence that  many  - 
suitors  were  appealing to the chancellor  to  be '  holpen  by 
subpoena '  ; for the frequent recourse to the subpoena  excited 
the envy and indignation of the defenders of the common law. 
An irate serjeant complains bitterly of  the interference of  the 
chancellor, who, he says, '  regarding no law but trusting to his 
Own  writ  (sic) and  wisdom,  giveth  judgment  as  it  pleaseth 
himself and thinketh that his judgment, being in such authority, 
is far better and more reasonable than judgments that be given 
by  the king's justices  according  to the  common  law  of  the 
realm '.2 
The chancery  pleadings  afford ample proof  that the rigid 
law rules regarding sealed instruments were counter- 
'  Doctor and Student, i.  12.  ,I  A Replication of a  Serjeant at the Laws of  England to. .  .  certain 
Points In  the Dialogue.  Doctor and Student (ed. Muchall), 347- 86  CONTRACT  IN EQUITY  [PART  II 
acted  by the  chancellor's  intervention.  So innumerable are 
the appeals  that  it  is  impossible  to take note of  them all. 
They appear in the earliest records preserved, and the stream 
continues  unabated  to the end  of  the Early  Chancery Pro- 
ceedings.  The chancellor was giving ear to the unwary, the 
simple people, the ' fatui ',I  who through ignorance or careless- 
ness, or because they reposed confidence in the honour of  the 
obligee, paid their debts but took no acquittance.  '  He  so of 
his innocencye and for such  confidence as he had to the said 
Henry (obligee and defendant) left his obligation in his hand ',2 
exclaims one complainant who repented him of  his folly, after 
making payment.  The obligee in  this case had promised  to 
deliver the obligation, but time passed, his memory grew dim, 
and he so far forgot himself  as to bring an action of  Debt in 
the Mayor's  court in  Bristol.  The complainant was  in dire 
distress ; he knew  he would  be  compelled  to pay again ;  he 
felt  it was  against all  law and conscience, nevertheless, as he 
related in his petition, he knew he was helpless at law : '  your 
said  pore  besecher  can  not  make any barre in the lawe. . . 
for that it is his dede which s/lall be demed his  foly . .  .I3  He 
asked, therefore, that the defendant  (the obligee) be brought 
before the chancellor by subpoena, and  that a writ  of  Corpus 
cum  causa  issue  to  the  'Mayor  and  Bailyffs'  of  Bristol. 
Thereby he might  accomplish  two things : he could stop the 
action  at law,  and  obtain  an  examination  of the defendant 
under oath.  Unfortunately this petition is not  endorsed ;  we 
cannot say' definitely that the relief  sought was granted, but 
so numerous and repeated are these appeals in exactly similar 
circumstances  that  the  presumption  is  very  strong  in  the 
complainant's favo~r.~  Furthermore, the chancellor definitely 
recognized such a situation, for he said : ' Si on paye un  duty 
d'un  obligation  et  n'ad  escript,  ceo  est  bon  conscief~ce;  et 
'  Deus est procurator fatuorum.'  Y.  B. 8 Ed. IV. 4.  11. 
XXIX. 406. 
Id. 
'  VI. 339; VII. I j5 ;  VII. 218 (Complainant isarrestedand inirison) ; 
Ix. 94 (1441) ; Ix. 190 (1442) ; Ix. 214 ; Ix. 215 ; x. 44 ; x.  168 ; x. 
185 ; XI. 242 (1431) ; XI. 244 ;  XI. 368 ; XI. 370 ; XI. 379 ; XV.  185 ; 
XVI. 263 ; XIX. I 16 ; XIX. 439 b ; XXIX. 308 ; XXIX. 440.  These are 
merely a few selected cases out of  many that might be cited. 
CH. 11]  SCOPE OF EQUITABLE JURISDICTION  87 
~ncore  a1 comon ley nu1 barre.'  This simple state of facts is 
capable  of  almost  infinite  variation  in  detail  without  any 
fundamental  change  in  the  position  of  the  parties.2  Thus 
says one complainant : 
Supplie  tres  humblement  vostre  povre  orator,  Robert 
popyniay, que come il  est grevousement sue et vexe par un 
William  Newland,  marchant  d'everwyke  a cause d'un simple 
obligacion  fait  a  dit William  par le dit suppliant .  .  . nient 
obstant que le dit William est pleynement content et paie . . . 
sicome devant vous par examination sera loialment prove! 
Nor need the payment necessarily be made by the debtor; 
it  was  just  as successful  if  made  by some one  else  in  his 
behalf.4 
Payment made to a testator was a good defence against an 
action  brought  by his executors on  an obligation, although 
the payment  could  not  be  proved  by ~pecialty.~  In this 
connexion  we  may  note  an  interesting and  important case 
which  throws  much light  on the attitude of  the  chancellor 
toward obligations which were in fact satisfied by payment : 
The complainant was  bound in  an obligation  of  10  marks 
to  one Alice  Reme.  She died, leaving  the defendants her 
executors, whom complainant '  truly paied and full contented 
of  the dewete of  the seid obligacion '.  In full  trust  that the 
executors would discharge him, he left  the obligation  in  their  ( 
hands ; one executor died, and some years later the surviving 
executor, despite the payment  made, 'not dredyng God  nor 
th'offens  of  his own  consciens,' brought suit in  the Common 
Pleas on the obligation.  The complainant, well knowing that 
'  Y.  R. 7 H. VII. 10. 2. 
Appeal is made to the chancellor where payment was not according to 
the terms of the obligation, but was accepted by the obligee ;  e.g.  by fur- 
nishing pipes of wine where (apparently) the obligation was to pay money. 
XII. 16.  IV. 94. 
The complainant was bound to the defendant by an obligation.  He 
journeyed up to London to purchase goods, where unluckily the defendant 
(obligee) met him, caused him to be arrested, and would not release him, 
till Complainant's wife paid  the debt.  Afterwards the complainant asked 
for an  acquittance,  which  was  refused,  and  after  a  brief  interval  the 
defendant began suit on the obligation at common law.  The complainant 
Seeks general relief.  VII. 273. 
VI. 197 ;  IX. 83 (1431) ; XI. 46 ; XIX. 219 ; XIX. 123 (The defence 
brought forward by an  executor). Naturally these cases are not SO numerous, 
but they are sufficient in number to establish the point. 88  CONTRACT  IN EQUITY  [PART 11 
payment would be no defence at common law, filed his petition 
in  the chancery, alleging that it was 'contrary  to all reason 
and gode  conscience'  that he  should  be  compelled  to  pay 
twice, and yet  he was 'without  remedy be the Comen Lawe '. 
He asked for a subpoena  requiring the executor to bring in 
the obligation to be cancelled, and that he might be enjoined 
from proceeding further at 1aw.l  The defendant in his answerB 
set  up  the usual  technical  defence with which  most  answers 
as a matter of  practice began : that the matter alleged in the 
bill was not sufficient to put him to answer ;  then he proceeded 
to deny that payment  had  ever been  made, which  he  held 
himself 'redy to averre as this court will award'.  The petition 
is endorsed  with an order for an injunction to the defendant's 
attorney, restraining him  from further prosecuting any action 
at law, until the matter could be heard and determined  in  the 
chancery.  What the ultimate finding of  fact was, we have no 
means of  knowing ;  but there is small doubt that if  the com- 
plainant could prove the truth of his bill, the chancellor would 
order the obligation to be ~ancelled.~ 
Sometimes in the prayer of  the petitions  complainants ask 
that the obligee be compelled to bring in his obligation  to be 
cancelled ; more often the prayer is general, the complainant 
trusting to the chancellor's discretion.  The main thing was to 
get  the creditor  into the chancery,  and  have  him examined 
upon  oath.  A  careful and rigid  examination, coupled  with 
such evidence as the complainant himself might introduce, was 
bound to disclose the facts of the case.  The petitioner usually 
offers  to support  his  case  by  further  testimony.  'Si come 
devant vous par examinacion sera loialment prove,'  '  Si come 
par proves suffisauntz,'  are phrases in constant use.  One man 
alleges payment before  'several  notable persons ',7  another  is 
ready to testify  himself  and  bring  in  his  friends, but  he  is 
particularly eager to have the defendant examined, and prays 
that after such examination right may be done him as reason 
and conscience req~ire.~ 
LIX. 227, Cases, p. 231. 
LIX. 228, Cases, p. 232.  LIX. 227, Cuses,.p.  231. 
*  Cf.  LIX. 285, Cases, p. 232 ; XXIX. 13, Cases, p. 214 ; wherathe chan- 
cellor, being satisfied that  the obligation  should not be enforced, ordered 
it to be cancelled.  6  IV. 94. 
VI. 339.  XIX. 116. 
'.  . .  et sur ycell examinacion de feare droit en  cest partie a dit sup- 
CH. 11]  SCOPE OF EQUITABLE JURISDICTION  89 
'Reason and conscience '  is a thing of great flexibility; indeed, 
in this rough  and ready intervention  of the  chancellor there 
is  observable a desire to isolate each case and decide it on  its 
merits.  It was against reason and conscience that a debtor 
should have to pay the same debt twice ;l and on such ground 
the  chancellor  intervened.  But  this  process  of  reasoning 
applies  equally  well  where  a  debt  has  been  part  paid  as 
where it has been paid in full ;  and it is not surprising to find 
that suitors appealed to the chancellor in such situations.  In 
an  example, selected as typical, the complainant  was  bound 
by obligation  in  45s.,  of  which  sum  he had  paid  34. &., 
but  had  no  acquittance  therefor.  The obligee  brought  an 
action of Debt for the whole sum of the obligation, and, being 
without remedy at law, the petitioner appealed to the chan- 
cellor and asked for a Certi~rari.~  So, too, a debtor who  has 
lost his acquittance:  a surety who  is being sued on an obliga- 
tion, when  the  principal  debtor has satisfied the debt:  one 
who  had  an  acquittance, but delayed so long in  introducing 
it into evidence that it  cannot be received:-all  these  appeal 
with confidence to the chancellor.  A little transaction which 
often created difficulties for the guileless debtor was responsible 
for appeals to equity.  It seems to have been not uncommon 
that a  debtor, for  'further  security',  should  bind  himself  in 
double the amount of the actual debt ; he might pay the debt, 
and  still  the creditor, armed  with his  sealed  writing, could 
collect the full sum named in the deed ; for the common law 
received such evidence  as conclusive.  The debtor's only re- 
source was in the ~ubpoena.~  It would be rash to assert that 
pliant come bon  foy et  conscience  demandent, pur  dieu  et en overe de 
charite . .  .'  VII.  33. 
'  Thus,  excla~ms  one petitioner:  '  . .  .  For oon duetee, withoute youre 
good  grace, your forsaide besecher  is leke to make ijo paiementz  which 
were gretly agenst conscience.'  IX. 459.  '  X.  220, and see IX. 133 (1439) ; X.  175 ; XI. 46.  VII. 92. 
'  X.  94 (Original debtor had an acquittance but  has gone 'beyond the 
sea', taking the acquittance with him); X.  128 ;  XIX. 257. 
IX. 459 ; in which complainant says that '  processe of  the same accion 
(is e. action of Debt  on  the obligation) is so ferre forthe that for defaute 
that the forseide acquytauncez were not shewid nee leyd in due tyme that 
by the comone lawe nowe they mowe not be resseved . 
'  VI.  6; VI. 160 (An obligation for LIO,  which  had  been  paid,  was 
'etained  as security for a further loan of  50  shillings); VII. 33 ; XV. 236 CONTRACT  IN EQUITY 
in  all these cases relief  was granted.  I have stated them to 
show the nearly universal  appeal  made to equity, where  an 
obligation  or  the  intent  thereof  was  ~artially  or  wholly 
satisfied, and  yet the obligor was  helpless.  For in  all these 
cases he would have sought a defence at common law in vain. 
We turn now to other classes of  cases.  The obligation  is 
simple, but a condition has been  engrafted upon  it.  In the 
first case there is an express condition, but it is not available 
at law because it is parol ;  in  the second there is no express 
condition, but one is implied from  the circumstances, namely, 
that the obligation was executed for one specific purpose, and 
for that purpose alone. 
11.  The obligatiotz is sinzple (unconditional),  but a condition is 
anzexed by parol. 
Obviously the condition  might  assume various  forms.  It 
might require,  for  example,  the  doing  of  some  act  by the 
obligee,  before  the  obligation  should  be  effectual,  that  is, 
speaking roughly, the condition might be a condition precedent. 
Few examples of  this  species of  condition are presented  by 
our material.'  Again, the obligation  might have been  con- 
ditioned for the performance of some act by the obligor.  This 
represented  a  common  situation  in  the  fifteenth  century. 
Bonds  were  given in  surety to make an estate of  lands, to 
secure the payment of  rent, for the performance of some act ; 
and  a  prudent  person  would  insist  on  having  a  clause  of 
defeasance  inserted  in  the  obligation  itself,  or  a  separate 
defeasance bond.  Judging  from  the numerous  applications 
to equity, there were many persons who tl~rough  ignorance or 
inattention neglected  to take  this  precaution.  They bound 
(Obligation of  12 marks in security for debt of  6 marks.  The debtor paid 
the 6 marks, but did not secure the obligation, and the obligee is bringing 
suit to recover 12 marks).  And note V.  I 10  (A bond for  was made to 
sepre  a debt of  £20.  Eefore the debt was due the obllgee brought  suit 
on the bond ;  the obligor was cast into prison and compelled to pay £30. 
He appeals to the chancellor to recover the excess payment of  £10  and 
also damages for his imprisonment). 
XV. 231 ; XIX. 249; LIX. 122 (The obligee  is bringingtsuit without 
having performed the condition). 
e. g. to  secure performance of  a covenant,  which  was  to say masses 
for the soul of  a certain person :  VII. 79 ; to resign a church to the obligee : 
IV. go. 
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in an unconditional obligation ; the only condition 
lay  in  the oral  agreement  between  the  parties.  Petitioners 
describe  such a  condition  variously as '  rehersed by words'; 
6 rehersed  by language ',"  saunz  autre condition forsque par 
parole ' ;  the condition, says another, '  n'est  pas  de recorde 
en  I'enscript  mes solement  par  bouche '.4  The chancellor, 
not regarding a deed as of superior value, and being restricted 
by  no  stringent  rules  of evidence, was  able  to  regard  the 
transaction as a whole.  There seems no question but that he 
admitted evidence of  a parol condition  to controvert a sealed 
instrument, absolute on its face.  Here is a typical case :  ti 
Complainant  took  to farm the ' Frank chappel  de Steres- 
brigge'  of  the defendants, paying  IZ  marks  a  year  in  rent. 
In security he bound himself to defendants in a simple obliga- 
tion '  saunz  autre condicion  forsque par  parole'.  The parol 
condition was that he should pay the rent and bear all charges 
connected  with  the  chapel.  He avers  performance  of  the 
condition ; nevertheless  the  defendants  (i. e.  the  obligees) 
'  ount grevosment sue le dit suppliant par force del obligacion 
avantdit,  a  graunde enpoveresment et perpetuel  destruccion 
del dit  suppliant  s'il  n'eit  vostre graciouse eide celle partie '. 
In relief  complainant  asks that writs may issue to bring de- 
fendants before the chancellor  ' . .  . et  sur  ceo  eztx exa~~ziner 
del.faisaunce deloblzgacion avant dit et d'ordeigner due remedie 
a1 dit suppliant solonque vostre tres sage discrecion . . .  ' 
I regret that I am unable to present any cases of  this class 
which are endorsed, but the appeals are not infrequent,'  and 
XIX. 249.  XVI. 450.  v. 143.  VII. 79. 
Even where the obligor had not  performed  the condition, but  stood 
ready to do so, he appealed  to the chancellor.  X.  259  (The obligation 
was bailed on condition, and the obligee's  executor obtained  it  from  the 
bajlee by force). 
V.  143. 
Accord  (with principal case)  IV. 20; IV. 28 ; IV. go ; IV. 139 ; IX. 
37 ; IX. 147 ; XV. 231 ; XVI. 408 (Relief against an action of  Debt on a 
bond, contrary to a defeasance, of  which complainant can make no use, as 
it is in the obligee's possession) ;  XVI. 410 ;  XIX. 279 ; LIX. 113 ; LIX. 
122.  These few cases scarcely give an adequate notion of  the generality 
of the appeal to the chancellor.  They are typical of  many others.  And 
See LIX. 285, Cases? p. 232,  where  an obligation executed for a  specific 
Purpose (i. e. condition implied) which had been accomplished was ordered 
to be  cancelled.  A  forfiori  the obligation  should  be cancelled  if  the 
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the claim  to relief  is fully as valid  as any that might  come 
before the court.  The relief sought is to have the defendant 
(obligee) before  the chancellor, and compel him to  show why 
the obligation  should  not  be  cancelled:  or '  wy he  wol  not 
deliver  the seid  obligacion  as consciens and good  feith re- 
q~yreth'.~  That powerful weapon of the chancery, the examina- 
tion  of  the defendant, could be used with deadly effect ;  and 
once the real position of  the parties was ascertained, an order 
could  be  made  which  would  accord  with  the  demands of 
'  reason  and conscience '. 
111.  Oblzgation executed for* a specz3c parpose. 
In  these  cases  there  is  no  express  condition;  yet  it  is 
understood  that the obligation  absolute on its face is really 
executed  conditionally, the condition  being implied from the 
circumstances under which  it is given.  We cannot  illustrate 
this better than from a case which is endorsed with judgement, 
so that there can be no doubt as to the decision : 
John  Merfyn and William  Clyfford agreed  to enfeoff one 
Agnes in certain lands ;  and '  to the intent '  that this feoffment 
should be made, bound  themselves in  a simple obligation to 
Geoffrey and William Hamond.  The obligors died, and after 
their death the petitioner, as executrix of John Merfyn, caused 
an estate to be made to Agnes, '  according to the trewe intent 
of  the  makyng  of  the seid  obligation '.  Nevertheless  the 
obligees not  only  refused  to  deliver  up  the obligation,  but 
proceeded to bring suit upon it in  the king's court 'callid  the 
Comon place '.  Petitioner appealed to the chancellor, asserting 
that this suit was against conscience, and praying for general 
relief.  The obligees  were  brought  in  by  subpoena,  and 
examined  under  oath.  Upon  examination  they  admitted 
that the obligation was made  for  the intent  specified in  the 
petition, and  that the intent was performed ;  whereupon the 
chancellor ordered that the obligation should be delivered to 
the petitioner to be cancelled. 
~h;  obligation did not disclose the purpose for which it was 
executed,  but  from  an  examination  of  the  defendants  the 
chancellor  was  able to gather the nature of  the wMe pro- 
IV. go ; IX. 37 (semble, obligation to be cancelled).  '  XVI. 450.  '  XVI. 410. 
'  LIX. 285, Cases, p. 232. 
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ceeding.  The obligee had  only a technical  right to enforce 
his deed ;  isolating the case, and considering it on its individual 
the  chancellor  concluded  that  it  would  be  against 
reason and conscience as well as contrary to the intent of  the 
obligation  that it  should  stand good ; hence  the order.  To 
turn to another case : ' 
Complainant  agreed  to  enfeoff  one  Katherine  in  certain 
lands;  in  surety for the performance  of  the  agreement, his 
uncle was  bound, and  complainant  in  turn bound himself  to 
his uncle by a statute merchant to the intent (' a1 intent ')  that 
he should be saved harmless.  The statute merchant  bore no 
condition.  Complainant  enfeoffed  Katherine ; subsequently 
his  uncle died, and the statute merchant came into the hands 
of  an executor who  is bringing  suit against  the complainant 
on the obligation, despite the fact that the purpose for which 
it  was  made  has been  accomplished;  complainant  asks for 
a writ against the executor, commanding him to appear before 
the chancellor with the obligation, and that the chancellor give 
' remedie  en  ceste  partie come la boll foy et conscience de- 
mandent '. 
Appeal was made to the chancellor where a bond was given 
as  a surety, though  it  bore  no evidence of  this on its face,2 
where the intent of the bond was to take seisin of  land:  where 
a bond was bailed as security for a loan:  where an obligation 
was  made  to  warrant  peaceable  possession  under  a  lease.5 
The latter cases  are not  endorsed  with  judgement,  but  the 
principle  upon  which  the chancellor  acted  in  the first case 
cited applies equally well here. 
IV.  Variatiotz of  n deed by  a subseqzrent parol agreement. 
In the cases already considered, the whole agreement could 
only  be  ascertained  by  reading  the obligation  in  connexion 
with the condition, express or implied.  But there is a further 
'  IV. 69, Cases, p. 172.  VI. 229.  '  VIII. 12 (1450).  '  VI. 122.  '  XI. go (Complainant leased  his church  to  X  for  one  year,  and in 
security that X should be in peaceable possession  executed a simple obli- 
gation, which was delivered to X.  X  remained in possession for a year,  . . .  took the profits and died.  Now the obligation has come into the hands 
pf his executors, who threaten to sue complainant, though the purpose for 
which the obligation  was made is  accomplished.  Complainant asks for 
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possible  situation:  the agreement  may be complete  and in 
writing under seal, and at a later time the parties may agree 
by parol  to modify or abrogate the contract as expressed in 
the writing.  It is not a question, then, of explaining a sealed 
instrument  by further evidence : the deed did  represent  the 
intention of  the parties at the time it was made : it is complete 
in itself.  What has really happened  is that another contract 
has been made ; can  it be introduced  in  evidence?  To-day 
one who  sought to use  such  evidcnce would  doubtless  find 
himself  in  difficulties with  the ' parol evidence rule';  in  the 
fifteenth  century  he  would  have  been  helpless  in the king's 
court.  In equity,  however, rules  of  procedure  and practice 
had  not  taken  hard  and fast shape; and  it is  possible  that 
relief would be given in  that quarter.  With this in mind, let 
us examine three cases, which present different aspects of  this 
situation. 
A '  bargaine '  was  made  between Roger Denys, a ' Free- 
mason' of  London, and defendants, that the said Roger should 
build '  I'esglise et le steple de la . . .  ville de Wyburton '.  The 
precise terms of  the contract were reduced  to writing, and in- 
corporated  in an obligation  under  seal.  The mason  was  to 
receive £190  for his work.  Subsequently '  bargaine ceo prist 
saunz especialtee'  between  the same parties : Denys was  to 
build twelve corbels in the church, and make certain alterations 
in  the  steeple,  for  which  work,  in  as much as it was beyond 
the  requirements  of  the original  contract, he was to be paid 
' a taunt come il  expenderoit entre la faisaunce de le dit ove- 
raigne outre le primer covenaunt '.  Apparently this sum was 
not fixed by the parties, but four masons of freestone estimated 
it at roo marks.  Defendants later refused  to pay this addi- 
tional sum.  Denys asserts in his petition that he can have no 
action  against  them  'par brief  de covenaunt  ne  en  autre 
manere' at common  law.  Covenant,  of  course,  would  not 
lie  on ,a verbal  promise ;  but  it is a little puzzling at first to 
see  why  Debt  could  not  be  brought.  However,  there  is 
nothlng  to show  that  there  was  any statement  as to how 
much the mason should  have had  for his work : the sum was 
indefinite ;  and  secondly, any  attempt  to prove, the parol 
This case does not really  represent the modification  of a  deed  by 
parol.  The new agreement was  in  fact a new contract.  I have put the 
case here, however, because it represents a kind of  borderland. 
'  A promise to pay as much  as certain goods or services were worth 
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agreement  would  be  met  by the introduction  of  the  deed, 
behind  which  a  common  law  judge  would  not  go.  At all 
events  Denys filed  a  petition  in  equity, and asked that the 
defendants be summoned '  de respoundre a les premisses '.l 
Complainant  bought  'certeyn  Bales  of  Wode'  of  one 
Thomas Clement, and bound  himself in an obligation of £27 
by  way  of  payment.  Clement  warranted  the  woad  to  be 
according to sample, but it proved  inferior ; upon discovering 
this, complainant went to Clement and threatened to bring an 
action  of  Deceit.  An agreement was  then made that com- 
plainant  should pay only  the actual  value  of  the woad, and 
this  'payment ' was  to take  the  form  of  dyeing  cloth  for 
Clement.  Complainant  did  the work, Clement was satisfied 
and promised to deliver  up the obligation, but shortly after- 
wards  he  died.  The obligation  came into the hands of his 
executors, who refused to give up the obligation 'as gode faith 
and conscience wold ', and brought an action upon  it.  Com- 
plainant appealed to the ~hancellor.~ 
An  obligation  of  10  marks  was  made  in  payment  for 
a  'last  of  rede  heryng '.  Before  the day of payment it was 
agreed '  bi trete ' between the parties, that the obligor should 
have '  longer day of  payment of  the said x  mark if. .  .  (he) 
.  .  . coude fynde  other suerte to be bounde therfor . . .'  The 
sureties  were  found,  and bound  themselves,  but the obligor 
incautiously left  the original  obligation  in  the hands of  the 
obligee, who  is now  bringing  suit against the obligor, though 
the  sureties '  have  trewly  kept  every  day  of  the  secunde 
obligacion '.  The obligor appeals to the chancellor, praying 
that the obligee may be compelled  to deliver up the original 
obligation and to withdraw his suit.3 
With  regard  to  these  cases  we  may  note  the following 
points : 
(I) The original  contract  was  under seal ;  the subsequent 
and modifying agreement was by parol. 
(2)  In each case the complainant has altered his position  on 
the strength  of  the defendant's promise; in  the first case he 
did  additional work, in  the other he has in fact satisfied the 
would never  support a count in Debt.'  Ames, H. L. R., viii.  260.  When 
later it became  the practice  to declare in  Indebitatus Assumpsit though 
"0  price had been fixed by the parties, we see a departure from principle. 
Ames, ZOC. cit. 
VII. 104, Cases,~.  177.  %XV.s. 
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obligation, though not according to its terms.  He has a   lain 
moral right to the relief he seeks. 
(3) The  defendant occupies a strong position, but its strength 
lies  purely  in  technicalities.  If  these  be  brushed  aside, and 
the  plain  equities  of  the  individual  situation  regarded,  the 
obvious right of  the case is with the complainant. 
What  did  the chancellor do in such a situation ?  A  cate- 
gorical  answer  is  impossible  from  the  limited  evidence 
available?  The difficulty  of the complainant  in  each case 
was  due to the fact  that he had  neglected  from  ignorance 
or  carelessness  to  avail  himself  of  his  legal  rights,  and 
this was one of  the notorious  grounds on which equity took 
juri~diction.~  But we  can  state this only as a strong proba- 
bility. 
V.  Inquiry into thc consideratio~z  of  sealed i~tstruments. 
We come now to the final class of cases : those in which the 
obligor  never  obtained the benefit  for which he executed the 
obligation.  In modern phraseology,the consideration has failed. 
The  situation  becomes  plainer  from  a  practical  example. 
Richard  Cordie purchased  a house and forty acres of land of 
Thomas Rose.  He bound himself  to the said  Thomas in an 
obligation,  by  way of payment, but  shortly after going into 
possession,  he  was ousted  by the lord  of  the manor; never- 
theless  Thomas  is  bringing  suit  against  Richard  on  the 
obligation,  'sur  quele  grevauncc  le  dit  Richard  n'ad  mie 
remedie  a1  le  comune ley ', wherefore  Richard  appeals to the 
~hancellor.~  Again, an  obligation was  made  in  payment  for 
land under  a  marriage  contract, but the land was  never con-  - 
veyed ; complainant comes to equity, for 'by way of  conscience 
.  . . the said  obligation  [ought]  to be void  because the said 
William (the obligee) perfourmed not his covenant '.4  So, too, 
where an obligation was made for the price of  woad, which the 
vendke subsequently refused to deli~er.~  Examples might be 
I  do not mean  to imply that  I have exhausted the.evidence.  The 
catalogues of the Chancery Proceedings indicate that the&were  numerous 
appeals of  this nature.  But limitations of  time have prevented  me from 
examining all of  them. 
"ee  vinogradoff, L. Q. R.,  xxiv. 381.  IX. 405 (1440),  Cases, p. 183. 
XIX. 38.  ".  195. 
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multiplied,1 but these are sufficient for illustration.  The same 
situation may assume various forms, but  in the end we come 
back  to this:  the obligor  has  received  nothing,  but  despite 
this  the obligee, relying on his sealed instrument, is bringing 
suit against  reason and  conscience.  The failure of  the con- 
sideration  is total ; the  enforcement  of  a  deed  under  such 
circumstances would  be  inequitable.  If  equity cancelled an 
obligation where the purpose  for which it was made had  been 
accomplished, is there any reason to doubt  that it gave aid in 
these cases ?  Though we have no positive evidence from any 
indorsed petition, it is confidently submitted that complainants 
had good reason to expect relief  from chancery. 
If  the  common  law  provided  any  remedy  which  was 
adequate  and  effectual, it  would  seem  to be  Debt.  The 
scope  within  which  it  acted  was  clearly  recognized  and 
defined;  it was  an  action  in  very  general  use.  We  may 
therefore be somewhat  surprised  to  find  that  many  appeals 
are made to chancery to recover  money due for  the sale  of 
goods,  for  services rendered,  &c.-cases  in  which  there  is 
obviously a  quid pro  quo, and upon  which  Debt ought to lie. 
The  period  we  are  considering,  however,  is  the  fifteenth 
century.  Debt  had  not  yet  attained  its  full  stature, and 
Indebitatus Assumpsit was a thing unheard of.  The problem 
before us is  this :  Did equity to any extent usurp the field of 
Debt, and did  it provide a remedy in analogous cases though 
none  existed at common  law?  The cases to be considered 
therefore fall into two groups : 
I. Cases  in  which  the common  law  in  theory  provided 
a remedy (i. e. by way of  Debt). 
11.  Cases where there is no remedy at law. 
e. g. X.  54 ;  X. 59  (Obligation made in payment for fruits of a church 
which obligor was never permitted to receive) ;  XIX. 4 (Acquittance made 
On  promise to pay a  debt-debtor  after  receiving  acquittance refuses  to 
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I.  Cases ifz which the law theoretically provides a remedy. 
We find numerous cases before the chancellor, in which  no 
reason  for the appeal is  set forth in the petition.  Clerks of 
chancery  claimed  the use  of  the subpoena as of  right; and  * 
the mere  allegation  that one was such a clerk seems to have 
sufficed.l  Other cases  are more  puzzling.  Goods  are sold 
and the price  fixed ; it appears to be  a  plain case of  Debt, 
and yet  the petitioner  confidently comes to equity,  without 
troubling to allege any reason  for  so doing.z  We are some- 
what at a loss to account for the j~risdiction.~  It is more usual, 
however,  to find  some specific  ground of  appeal set forth in 
the petition.  These grounds are interesting  and worthy of 
note. 
I. As we have already seen:  the poverty of the complainant, 
or the great power  and  maintenance of  the defendant, often 
explains the presence of the case in  equity.  Nor was common 
law  process  always effective ; there were light-footed  debtors 
who  moved  rapidly  from  county to  county, and  the  only 
means of  fixing the attention  of  such vagrants seems to have 
been a subpoena.5  Furthermore, one transaction might include 
several  elements.  Land might  be sold, and a bond executed 
by the vendor  to ensure  conveyance.  If  after the land  was 
conveyed,  the vendee  refused  to pay the price and still kept 
the bond, the vendor's  position  at law  was awkward.  If he 
brought Debt for the purchase price, he could not at the same 
time recover the bond, and if it were simple (as often happened), 
e. g. VI. 299, Cases, p.  177.  Complainant describes himself as 'un des 
clerks del Chauncellerie nostre Segnur le Roy ' ; the simplicity with which 
he states his case is noteworthy.  The '  luy doit et luy detient ' recalls the 
count in Debt.  And see IV. 76 (where the defendant is a clerk). 
XI. 454.  Defendant '  bargaynyd and bought '  of  complainant certain 
hops and garlick.  It was agreed that there should be made '  billis indented 
and inselyd  be the parties  aforseid of  and for the certeynte and fulfillyng 
of the bargayn',  in trust of  which complainant delivered the goods.  The 
price was fixed, and it seems that Debt wouldlie.  Complainant, however, 
appeals to the chancellor, without alleging any reason. 
See XI. 8  a, Cases, p. 185.  Complainant, who is seeking to recover rent 
due on a parol lease, asserts that he is without remedy, because he has 'no 
writyng  to ground  him  apon  at the comyn lawe'.  It is not  clear why 
Debt would not lie in such case. 
Slrpm, p. 78.  " e. g. IX. 324.  Vide sujm, pp. 8-1.  , 
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it would  still  be  hanging over  him.  If,  however,  he  could 
bring the vendee  before the chancellor, he might  recover the 
purchase price and at the same time obtain an order  for the 
delivery and cancellation of  the bond.'  The defence against 
the bond  was  purely  equitable ; the claim  for  the price  was 
recognized  by law;  but  in  the early chancery jurisdictions, 
which had no set limits, there is good reason to suppose that 
the two might be combined.  Once equity assumed jurisdiction 
on any ground, it disposed of the whole matter. 
2.  In Debt, the debtor could  always wage his  law.  Early 
in  the fifteenth century  we  find  creditors asking for  a sub- 
poena,  because  if  Debt  is  brought  the defendant will acquit 
himself on oath.  '  A cause que le dit John (complainant) n'ad 
null especialte . . .  le dit William (defendant)  soy  purpose  de 
gager sa ley '  3, exclaims one petitioner, who adds that in conse- 
quence he has no remedy by the common law.  There is pretty 
good evidence that relief was granted.  Witness this case :  4 
Two  were  indebted  to  complainant  'in  certain  sums af 
money  wt  oute specialte'.  They refused  to pay,  and com- 
plainant,  knowing  they would  wage  their  law '  agens faithe 
and good conscience',  sued to the chancellor, and writs were 
issued ; one debtor appeared, was examined  and made agree- 
ment  with  complainant,  but  the other  could  not  be  found. 
Therefore complainant now appeals again, and asks for a writ 
against the defaulting debtor. 
Evidently the debtor  who appeared would  not have come to 
agreement, unless he feared compulsion. 
Even  where the petitioner  had  already brought his action 
at  law  and it  had  failed  for  the above reason,  he was  not 
barred in equity.  Indeed, the actual  failure of the attempted 
legal  remedy  is  sometimes stated as the specific  reason  for 
coming to equity.  The defendant did  his  law that 'he owed 
Your seid besechers ne peny . . .  where of  your seid  besechers 
have  notable  witnes  and profes  of  pe  contrarie . .  .',5  recites 
a petition.  Always  the  complainant  makes  offer of further 
'  See IX. 147. where this is the relief sourht. 
*  At least asearly as 1413,  in all probabilGy.  See VI. 85. 
VI. 85.  IX. 335,  Cases, p.  182. 
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proof  of his just  debt, often by par01 evidence, sometimes by 
way of  examination  of  the debtor.  He is convinced  of  the 
inherent justice of his case ; all he desires is that the whole 
matter may be heard in chancery. 
In the above cases, equity is plainly appropriating to itself 
the jurisdiction  of  the common law.  We pass now to situa- 
tions  which  fell  outside  the range  of  common  law  actions. 
Naturally these are the commoner cases. 
11.  Cases in which no remedy is  provided  at law. 
John  Paynell sold '  xix balettes of wode for a certein sume 
of  moneye'  to 'Mald, the  wyf  of  Robert  Hynde'.  Mald 
apparently traded by herself, for it is stated that she 'paieth 
daly to other diverse merchants and fulfilleth the covenantz 
that she maketh with hem, her husband not pryvy therto, ner 
entermetyng  of  the  hous  ner  the  occupacion  ther  of. .  .' 
Complainant cannot hold the husband, for he was not a party 
to the contract  and there was  no  specialty.  If he should 
bring  Debt l against Mald  she would  allege that she 'is no 
sole marchant and under covertour de Baron '.  He  has parted 
with his  goods, he cannot  recover  against  the husband,  nor 
the  wife,  nor  could  he  successfully  join  them, at common 
law.  In this  dilemma  he  appealed  to the chancellor  and 
prayed for a subpoena against Mald.2  We do not kno.w  what 
relief, if  any, was  granted.  The situation is typical of  many 
presented  by the technicalities  of  early common  law.  We 
shall now  attempt to classify  the cases and consider them in 
groups.  It is  to be remembered  that in all these cases the 
complainant  is  in  equity  because  even  in  theory  the  law 
cannot assist him. 
I. The debt is proved by an obligation which has been lost 
or destroyed. 
At common  law a  deed so far absorbed the debt of  which 
it was  evidence  that  it became  the debt itself.  It would 
'  By custom of London afeme  covert, trading by herself in a trade with 
which her husband did not intermeddle, might sue and be sued as afeme 
sole.  Pollock,  Contracts  (7th  ed.).  83,  citing  Bacon, Abr.  Customs  of 
London, D.  IX. 472. 
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follow logically  from this that the loss or destruction of the 
obligation meant the loss of the debt, and such was the rule. 
Equity, however,  showed no  particular  respect  for the seal. 
AS we have seen, evidence of payment was  admitted against 
a  deed,  though  not  supported  by  specialty.  By  parity of 
reasoning, a creditor who had lost his deed, but still had good 
and sufficient proof of his debt, ought to obtain relief in equity. 
We are not  therefore  surprised  to find  appeals  such as the 
following : 
Complainant, as executor of one Anne I-Iay, seeks to recover 
;t;12  due from the defendant for goods sold.  The defendant 
bound himself  by an obligation, which was delivered to Anne, 
but complainant cannot find it, 'which the seid Richard (obligor) 
knoweth right wele  and how be it he knoweth also right wele 
that he delyvered unto the seid Anne the seid  obligacion in 
her lif as for his dede and dutie, and that he never contented 
her nor any other in her name any peny  of  pe same dutie as 
he hath many tymes confessed . .  ., yet he wol in no wise make 
contentacion of pe seid money by cause he knoweth wele that 
your  seid  Oratour  can  not  fynde the seid  obligacion.'  As 
complainant is without remedy at law he comes to the chan- 
cellor  and  prays for  re1ief.l  Defendant in his answer denies 
all the allegations of the ~omplainant.~ 
Again, where an obligation  was taken by persons unknown 
from the obligee:  and the obligor '  noght wt seyng the seide 
dette, exscuteth  hym  by the seide obligacon, as apereth by 
record of  her plee a fore  the Justice of  the comyn place', the 
obligee  comes to the chancellor  and  prays for  a  subpoena. 
Appeal is made because an obligation has been lost:  or  stolen: 
or  has been  burned  ; in  all  these cases complainants come 
forward and pray aid,  because  they are without  remedy at 
law.  The obligor,  sure of  himself  so  far  as  common  law 
process is concerned, refuses to pay.  It should be noted that 
the complainant always alleges the cause for which the obliga- 
tion  was  made, as for  goods sold, or services  rendered, &c.: 
LIX. 212.  LIX. 211.  X.  160. 
'  XI. 160.'  This is a good  example and is reported  in  full, see Cases, 
P. 186.  -  ~~ 
'5  c The which  obligation was  taken  away from your seid  besecher by 
Persons to hym unknowyn in the troublouse season.'  XXVII. 68. 
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likewise he  is ready  to prove to the satisfaction of  the chan- 
cellor that a just  debt exists.'  The situation in equity is the 
same as if  there had been no deed at all ;  the primary question 
is, what are the facts of the particular case ?  If the defendant 
is withholding something that in right and conscience belongs 
to the complainant, there is every reason to suppose that the 
chancellor  will  not  let  a  mere  technicality  of  law  obstruct 
justice.  We have no petitions here endorsed with judgement ; 
but the general trend  of  reasoning in  equity lends support to 
the view that relief was granted. 
2. Transactions abroad. 
We have already adverted to the fact that the common law 
did not assume jurisdiction over contracts made out of England. 
In  consequence, if  a  debt  arose  from  an  obligation  made 
abroad,  or  from  money  lent  or  services  rendered  out  of 
England,  the action of  Debt  would  not  lie.  In such  cases 
petitioners appealed to eq~ity.~ 
3.  Actions against executors. 
The action of  Debt did not lie against the executors of the 
debtor, unless the debt were proved by specialty ; for by the 
theory of  the common law in  any case where a debtor might 
wage his law, no recovery was  allowed after his death, as the 
personal  representatives  could not acquit themselves on oath 
of  the debt of  the deceased.  This arbitrary though logical 
rule was  provocative  of  much  hardship,  for  most  executors 
stood staunchly on their  legal rights; "n  any such case the 
creditor's  only  possible  relief  was  by the  subpoena.  After 
Assumpsit  supplanted  Debt, it was  doubted  whether  it  lay 
against any one save the original debtor;  indeed, the right of 
e. g.  XIX.  410.  The defendants were bound  to complainant  in  an 
obligation of £20.  Afterwards it was '  accorded' between the parties that 
the defendants  should  deliver  to  the complainant  'moevabble  goodes, 
catelle and money' to the value  of A20, and thereupon  the complainant 
made and delivered to defendants an acquittance.  Now the defendants 
will not deliver the goods, and if  complainant  sues at law, they will  stop 
action by the acquittance;  yet the debt in  equity and conscience  is not 
discharged.  The prayer is for general relief. 
This has already been considered, sz~jua,  p. 76. 
In X. 289, the complainant says that thedefendants (executors) refuse 
to pay their testator's debts, because they know they cannot be compelled 
so to do at law. 
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the creditor against the personal  representative  of  the debtor 
was  not  definitely settled  until  161z.l  From  the following 
cases there is at least a strong presumption that the chancellor 
anticipated  the common  law  by nearly  two  hundred  years.2 
The cases  are  chiefly those  in  which  the petitioner  would 
have  had  an  adequate  remedy  at law  except 'that  death 
intervened.  For example : 
One John Faireman, '  pur  certeinz  infirmitez  quy il  avoit,' 
retained  the complainant 'pur estre  son  fisision  et luy faire 
d'estre seyn  de son maladie'.  It was agreed  that five  marks 
should  be  paid  for  the  cure.  The complainant  'par  son 
diligent labour fist le dit John seyn  de son dit maladie',  but 
before the five marks were paid, the patient was inconsiderate 
enough to die.  His executrix appears to  have  entertained 
some scepticism as to the efficacy of the cure ;. at all  events 
she  refused  to  pay  the '  fisision',  and he  made  petition  in 
chancery and prayed for a ~ubpoena.~ 
The petitioner  seeks  to recover the price  of  merchandise 
sold  to  the defendant's  testator.  He  says  that  'of  grete 
trust  and  confidence  that  your  seid  Oratour  had  to  the 
same John (the testator), he neither  toke ne had  obligacion 
ne  other  writyng  for  the  same  dueteez'.  The  testator 
died  before  the day of  payment, leaving  the defendant,  his 
widow,  his  executrix.  Complainant  often  asked  defendant 
for the debt, and though 'ther  been comyn  to the handes  of 
the seid  executrice  godes  that  were  of  the  seid  testatour 
sufficiant to pay and content all his dettes, legatez, and other 
ordynarie charges, yet that to doo (i. e. pay complainant)  the 
same executrice utterly hath denyed and yet  doth, In which 
case your  seid  Oratour  hath  noon  remedie  by the comone 
law but oonly by this Courte of  conscience '.  He prays that 
defendant may  be  ruled  to  do what  reason  and  conscience 
requireV4 
Complainants make much of their helplessness because they 
have no specialty.  One says he has  'none  escript obligator 
nor none oder mater by pe ywych ye sayd John (defendant), 
executour, may be charged to pay ye said x marc as executour 
Pinchon's Case  in Ex. Ch. g Co. Rep. 86 6.  See discussion in Pollock, 
Contracts (7th ed.), 202, Note G. 
See VI. 20 (c.  1425), Cases, p.  175. 
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at ye comone law '.I  Another  laments that he has no deed, 
but only '  his  (i. e. the debtor's) worde '  for payment, and he 
is dead.  Land is sold, and the price  'parentre eux (i. e. the 
parties)  accordee  saunz  ascun  seurte  eu  de  dit  William 
(vendee) par obligacion ou en  autre manere sinon par simple 
contract ',3  and as death has intervened the simple contract is 
of  no avail.  We might  multiply  instances, but  those  which 
have been quoted show the typical method of appeal. 
There is  a  further  question.  Was it enough to show that 
the testator would have been liable for the debt had he lived? 
Apparently not ; the complainant must go further and prove 
to the court  that  the executors  have  assets of  the testator 
sufficient to pay his debts.  The frequent appearance of  such 
allegations  leads us  to suspect this ; and certainly it would 
be contrary to all the principles of  equity to charge an exe- 
cutor in his own goods for his testator's debts. 
Unhappily, I cannot present any cases endorsed with judge- 
ment ; so, as before, we  must  fall back upon inference.  The 
reason for  intervention  is  plain.  The debt  should justly  be 
a charge upon the debtor's estate ;  the mere accident of  death 
ought not to defeat so just  a claim.  The constant application 
for  subpoenas  against  executors  leads irresistibly to the con- 
clusion  that the chancellor  granted  relief.5  Our conclusion 
is, moreover,  supported by the  declaration  of  a  chancellor 
reported in  the Year  Books : '  si on n'ad ascun escript et son 
XI. 275.  See IX. 40; XI. 237 ; LIX. 93 (' no specialty in writyng ') ; 
also cases cited, infm, note 5.  This is a very common allegation. 
XXX. 18.  XI. 79.  And see VI. 20, Cases, p.  175. 
Thus one petitioner  says that the executors have  'in  their handes 
goodes sufficiaunt of  the said testatour  and more . .  .' XV. 234 ;  and see 
XI. 99 ; XIX. 103 (Executors were enfeoffed of  land for the purpose of pay- 
ing debts). 
It was impossible for me to take down all the cases even in the bundles 
which I have examined.  The following are thought to be representative: 
VI. 20,  Cases, p.  175 ; VI. 71 (for goods sold : only part of the price paid) ; 
VII. 136 (money lent  and goods sold);  IX. 134;  IX. 153 (payment for 
land) ; IX. 221 ; IX. 337 ; IX. 430 ;  IX. 431 ; IX. 434 (for a horse sold) ; 
X.  178 ;  X. 268  (on  par01 grant of  testator) ; X. 289 ; XI. 79 ;  XI. 237 ; 
XI. 275  (executor of vendor v. executor  of  vendee) ;  XI. 413 ; XII. 248 ; 
XV.  234; XVI. 385 ; XIX. 103;  XXX. 18 ; XXX. 50;  LIX. 60; LIX. 
93 ; LIX. 103.  Appeal  is made even where  there  is no executor or ad- 
ministrator, but the defendants have taken the intestate's goods out of  the 
manor with the intention of  defrauding the creditor: V.  102. 
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debtor meur', nu1 remedy per le comon ley ;  et uncore icy per 
ce Court in conscience il aura remedy." 
4.  No definite sum has been agreed upon. 
Goods  might  be  sold  or  services  rendered  without  any 
stipulation as to the precise amount of  payment.  Thus tithes 
were sold, and it was agreed that buyer should pay '  selonque 
le prys que greynes furent comunement venduz ' ; again, an 
agreement was made that the defendant should assume control 
of the plaintiffs lands and pay over the excess in yearly value 
beyond £6  10s.~ In either case, evidence would  have to be 
introduced to fix the amount which was due. 
Such situations resulted  from  many informal agreements. 
Thus, to take the case  of  services rendered, note che  follow- 
ing : 
Complainant  was  '  reteyned  with  Thomas, Abbot of  the 
Church of  Malmesbury to thentent to labour and sue for one 
William  Stevenes  of  Mynty,  Bondman  to the  seid  Abbot, 
whych was endyted of  felony a fore the Justices of  peas . . .' 
The Abbot promised  to recompense complainant of all costs 
and expenses and to pay him  for  his  labour.  Complainant 
sued  out a  Corpus cum  causa,  and Stevenes was  taken 'to 
bay11 ',  but  later  made  escape ; and for  this  default, com- 
plainant had to pay heavily.  Now the defendant (the Abbot) 
refuses to  pay, and  complainant  says  he  has  no means  of 
recovery at law.4 
This case  is  typical.  It appears to have been common to 
request  a  person  to undertake  certain  work,  and  promise 
to pay for all expenses incurred as well  as to give a suitable 
re~ard.~  Necessarily, the  amount to be  paid  could not  be 
definitely agreed upon beforehand. 
'  Y.  B.  7 H. VII. 10. 2.  Ix.  452.  XXXI. 120. 
4  XIV. 1.  - -  - . . -. 
e.  g.  An  Abbot  appointed  the complainant  his '  procuritour . .  .  de 
pursuer en la noune de dit Abbe diverses materes et causes devaunt noster 
seynt pier le pape en la courte de Rome'.  He  promised to pay theexpenses, 
and also reward  the complainant.  The work was  done,  and  then the 
Abbot refused to pay.  VII. 292. 
, Again : A letter was sent to complainant while at Rome, requesting him 
to purchase '  un bulle de  grace que est appelle un pluralite '.  Promise was 
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The petitions cited fall within the fifteenth century ;  indeed, 
one may possibly  be  as early as 13g1.l  Complainants state 
with  uniformity  that they have  no remedy at law.  Is this 
true?  The only common  law remedy available would  have 
been Debt, which lay only for a sum certain.  The  uncertainty 
of  the amount precluded  the use  of  that action.  However, 
the complainant has done the work, and it has not been done 
officiously,  but  at the  request  of  the defendant.  In  later 
times, Indebitatus Assumpsit would have come to the rescue ; 
it  is  submitted  with  some  confidence  that  the  chancellor 
afforded relief much earlier. 
5. The promise to pay is implied. 
This may be considered a corollary to  the principle in  the 
cases just considered.  Goods are sold, but there is no promise 
to repay; services  are rendered  on  request  under  the same 
circumstances.  I am able to present only two  petitions, but 
they are of great interest : 
Complainant was '  factor  et attorne en  la faite ' in Prussia 
to the defendants.  Defendants purchased certain merchandise 
in  Prussia, and for  default  of  payment it was  seized  by the 
vendors,  whereupon  the defendants sent  a  letter of  attorney 
to complainant '  luy requirant de pursuer pur la  recoverer'  of 
the  merchandise.  He did  so and incurred  great  expense; 
when he returned to England he '  allegea la dite lettre d'attorne 
en son accompte et demaunda estre aloue  de toutz les des- 
penses et costages  faitz solonque la fourme de dite lettre . .  .' ; 
which defendants refused to al10w.~ 
Where a  complainant  is  seeking  to recover  the price of 
goods taken, he sets up his case thus  : 
'Also the said  Robert  Saxby toke of  your seid  besecher 
back to England ; but  the defendant  refused  to pay the costs.  XI. 328 
(c.  1471). 
see  also : X.  325 (Complainant '  bath effectually spedde a prorogacian 
of  a pluralite '  at defendant's  request : there was  a  promise  to pay  the 
costs) ; XIX. 295 (Suing to the king at defendant's  request :  promise  to 
pay costs) ; LIX. 169 (Complainant  was  requested  by  the defendant  to 
secure  certain  writings  in  Spain : promise  to pay  expenses and give 
a 'resounable reward for his labour '). 
'  VII. 292.  Addressed to the Archbishop of York. 
IX. 223 (1435-6).  XI. 573. 
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XX 
iiij  bowe  staves wt  oute any price or payment mad be twene 
hem . . .' 
Also  Peers Wympryngham and John Skandylhy, bailyffs 
of Grimesley toke of your seid  besecher wt oute liveraunce  or 
XX 
paiement  made  vj  bowe  staves.'  Complainant  says he  is 
remedy at law. 
The promise is implied from the circumstances of  the case. 
It was  precisely  this  situation which  was  met  in the seven- 
teenth century by allowing the '  quantum meruit '  in Assumpsit. 
Surely it is not without significance that an attempt was made 
to secure the same kind  of  a remedy  in  equity in  the early 
fifteenth century. 
6.  Benefit conferred on a third party. 
A  benefit conferred upon  a  third party at the  request  of 
the defendant would  not  support Debt  l in  the period which 
we  are  considering.  However,  it  was  made  the  basis  of 
appeals to  the chancellor.  Thus we find complainants making 
appeal  where  they  have  ransomed  a  prisoner,Qaid  over 
money? or said  masses  for  the soul  of  one deceased:  at the 
request of the defendant. 
7.  Assignment of debts. 
The common  law  regarded  the relation  between  creditor 
and debtor  as an intensely personal  one ; in consequence, the 
right  of  action  which  arose from such  relation could  not be 
assigned  either  by act of  the parties  or  by operation of  law. 
The dictum  of  Moyle J.,  in Y. B.  37  H.  VI. g.  18, did not  become 
established law till  after  the fifteenth  century.  See Ames, H. L. K.,  viii. 
262-3. 
XLIV. 272 (Defendant promised to pay complainant £20  if he would 
deliver one  B out of  prison  in '  the mount  seint Mighel '.  Complainant 
delivered  B, but  defendant refused  to pay.  He asserts that there is no 
remedy at law). 
XI. 361  (Money paid  to a  third  party  at the defendant's  request). 
XV. 248  (X borrowed  a  certain sum of  Y,  leaving  in  pledge jewels  of 
greater value than the debt.  Later he desired a further loan, and Y,  being 
unable to lend the money himself, desired complainant to advance it to X, 
and expressly 'undertoke  to youre seid besecher  that he shulde be paied 
truly '.  Complainant  made the loan ; subsequently X repaid both  loans 
to Y,  but Y never paid complainant.  Y is dead, and complainant asks for 
rqlief against his executors). 
VII. 79 (Perhaps it  is  stretching a point to treat a  departed  soul as 
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To a certain extent this notion was modified '  by allowing the 
personal representatives to recover the debts of  the deceased ; 
but, as we  have seen, the common-law judges  showed great 
reluctance  in  allowing  any  corresponding  right  against  the 
representative  of  the debtor.  At all  events, it was a settled 
rule of law that a chose in action was  not  assignable, at least 
not so as to enable the assignee to sue in his own name.  This 
rule  was  the logical  outgrowth  of  the  conception  above 
referred to, and was  strictly enforced  throughout  the history 
of  the common  law.  If  the assignee  wished  to bring  any 
action at all, he must bring it in his assignor's name.s 
The practice  in equity was otherwise.  Among the earliest 
petitions  preserved,  we  find  assignees seeking  to  recover  in 
their own names debts which had been assigned to them : 
1413 (?)  * :  Defendant  owed  X  £50.  X, desiring  to com- 
pensate  complainants for  injuries  done them, wrote  a  letter 
under  his  seal requesting  defendant  to pay over  the £50  to 
complainants.  X died, and defendant refused to  comply with 
the request.  Complainants,  having no  remedy  at law,  pray 
for a subpoena. 
1432~  (probable date) : X  was  '  fermour ' to Y,  paying for 
seven  years £35.  Y  by  letter  under  his seal assigned  the 
£35  to complainant.  X  died  and his executors (defendants) 
refused to pay.  Complainant  says he has '  nothyng to shewe 
in  especial1 save such  bokes of a  Countes', but no 'mater  to 
recuver atte comene lawe '. 
1432  (probable  date) : Freight for  wine  was  assigned  to 
complainant  when  he purchased  the ship in which  the wine 
had been transported. 
Mr. Ames (Anglo-Am.  iii. 581) says that this was not a modification 
'  since the representative was lookedupon as a continuation of  the#ersona 
of  the deceased'.  But, if this statement be correct, Debt should lie against 
as well  as for  the personal  representative.  The very reason  alleged for 
not allowing  Debt  against  the personal  representative (i. e. that only the 
original debtor could wage his law) seems to reflect the intimate  personal 
relation between  creditor and debtor. 
a  Coke's explanation (Lnm$et's Case,  10  Co. Rep. 48 a), that the origin 
of  this rule is attributable  to the desire to discourage maintenance and 
litigation, is effectually disposed of  by Mr.  Spence (2 Spence, 850). 
The Year  Book cases  are carefully  analysed  in  Pollock,  Contracts 
(7th ed.), Appendix, Note F.  \ 
'  VI.  141.  Addressed to the Bishop of  Winchester.  The date cannot 
be fixed with certainty. 
IX. 337.  X. 74. 
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1432  : Debts assigned  to complainant '  in  recorde  of  the 
Mayre of Caleys '.  Afterwards the debtor in  London '  a fore 
worthy men knowleged the dewete and payment ther of to be 
to your  seyde suppliaunt'.  Nevertheless  he  refused 
to pay. 
1432  : AS  security for a loan from complainant, X delivered 
(bailla)  two  obligations to him,  by which  W.  and T.  were 
bound  to X, the intention  being  that payment be made to 
To this W. and T. agreed  at X's  request ; X 
died, leaving  no property;  W.  also died.  Defendants  (W.'s 
executor and T.)  refused  to pay complainant, who is without 
remedy at law. 
1450  :  Defendant was indebted to complainant's father in 
10  marks  12  shillings.  The father  died  and  his  executrix 
'graunted  the seid  x  marc  xij s.  to your  seid  besecher  for 
parcell of his fynding at London '.  Defendant agreed to pay 
complainant  and  did  pay  part  of  the debt, but  afterwards 
refused to pay the rest.  Complainant asks that the defendant 
may be compelled to pay. 
It is impossible to determine whether it was  necessary  that 
the debtor should agree to pay the assignee.  In only two of 
the above petitions  is any such agreement expressly alleged. 
Nor  is  it  apparent  whether  or  no  any 'consideration'  was 
required  for  the assignment; it seems probable  that  at this 
time  it  was  not.  Some  three  hundred  years later  it  was 
assumed as common knowledge that an assignment of  a chose 
in action was valid in  equity without any con~ideration.~  The 
petitioners  in  each  case claim  the debt as belonging to them 
in reason and conscience. 
From cases of assignment  are to be distinguished those of 
substituted  agreement, that is, where a new liability is substi- 
tuted for  the old.  This is what  we  should now  describe  as 
novation, but it did not exist at common law before Assumpsit 
was  allowed  on mutual   promise^.^  We may note two early 
cases in equity. 
XI. 47, Cases, p.  186. 
X. 17, Cases, p. 184.  Cf. with this the statement in Y. B. 15 H. VII. 2.3. 
XIX.  151. 
'And first it was admitted on all sides, that if  a man in his own  right 
be entitled  to a bond or other chose in action, he may assign  it  without 
any consideration.'  Lord Carteret v.  Pasc/l.al, (1753) 3  P. Wills.  199. 
The remark  is obiter.  As to the ultimate  requirement  of  valuable con- 
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1.475~  :  One Harry Denne owed complainant £8.  Defendants 
at  the request of  Denne 'became dettours and  promysed  to 
pay your  said  Oratour . . . the said  summe  of  viij li.  at 
a certeyn day .  .  ., uppon trust onely of  which  promyse  your 
seid Oratour acquitted and discharged  the seid  Harry Denne 
of the viij li. and toke them dettours for the same . . .'  Now 
defendants,  contrary to conscience,  refuse  to pay  and com- 
plainant has no remedy at law. 
1475 : K.  was indebted to complainant in £10.  She  desired 
complainant to accept her son (the defendant) as debtor in her 
stead.  Defendant, at  the request and desire of  K. '  made feyth- 
fulle promysse before sufficiant Kecorde to content, satisfie and 
pay .  . .' the said £10. '  Upon truste of such promysse to have 
ben  trewly fulfilled .  , .' complainant discharged K., and took 
defendant as debtor.  He now refuses to pay, and complainant 
is without remedy at law. 
In conclusion, a  word  may be said about the relief sought. 
It is obvious,  of  course, that  the  creditor wishes  to recover 
his  debt ;  sometimes  he asks for the specific sum,3  sometimes 
that  the  defendant  may  be  compelled  to pay what is due.4 
More often  the relief  is asked  in general terms, namely that 
the debtor may be compelled to do  what reason and conscience 
require. 
SECTION  IV.  PETITIONS  FOR  THE RECOVERY  OF 
PERSONAL  PROPERTY 
We have already noticed  the narrow scope of  the action  of 
Detinue as it appears in the early Year Books.  Detinue ' sur 
bailment'  was  the commoner  form  of  the action;  Detinue 
'sur trover' was used  indeed in the fourteenth century, but  it 
did  not  become a  form  of  action in general use till the next 
century.  It is believed that no small amount of  pressure was 
exerted by the interference of chancery ; and that the ultimate 
development of a right in re?%  at common law, in favour of the 
owner  of  a  chattel, was  hastened  by  a ;ealousy  of  the  en- 
croaching equitable jurisdiction. 
LIX. 57.  LIX.  75.  VII. 292. 
'  X.  325 ;  XV.  32 (Alternative relief; land was  sold, and the prayer is 
that the defendant be compelled to pay the price or  make relivery of  the 
land) ; XXIX.  18. 
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In the fourteenth century the disseisee of a chattel had the 
following  remedies:  If  there were  a bailment he might bring 
Detinue, but in such a case only against his bailee or some one 
in  privity  with  him.  If  he  brought Detinue 'sur trover ' he 
must  show how the chattel came into the defendant's hands ; 
the allegation  that the defendant casually found  the chattel 
had  not  yet become a  fiction.  Under certain circumstances 
Trespass would  lie,  but it sounded only in damages.  In no 
case was  there  any common  law process  for  compelling the 
return of a chattel. 
There  was  thus good  opportunity  for  the  chancellor  to 
intervene, as the legal remedies  were  far  from  satisfactory. 
Even where Detinue would lie, we find complainants appealing 
to equity, alleging that because of the defendant's maintenance 
and power:  or the refusal of sheriffs to serve writs2 the action 
at law failed.  Wager of  law is set forth as a reason for coming 
to chancery.  This appears from an interesting case of  which 
the chancellor took j~risdiction.~  In fact, in  many petitions 
no reason  for  application to the chancellor is assigned.  The 
petitioner  simply states his  case, claiming that the defendant 
has  property  which  belongs  to the complainant,  and which 
reason and conscience require should be given up. 
The situation will be plainer from several illustrative cases : 
c. 1405  4:  X, before going to Normandy, placedjhis charters in 
a box and delivered them to the defendant to be kept.  X died, 
and  complainant  (his heir)  asks that the defendant  be com- 
pelled to deliver up the charters.  It is not asserted that there 
is no remedy at law. 
1421-2 : Petitioner  is the heir  of  Richard le Scrope.  He 
seeks to recover charters affecting his inheritance, which 'a les 
mayns de William Mayhewe sont devenus '.  Elzdorsed: The 
defendant is ordered to bring the charters into court. 
VI. 92 ;  VI. 140 ;  XI. 84. 
XI. 56 (Detinue was brought, but it failed for this reason). 
XI.  427 a, Cases,  p.  187. The petition is endorsed with judgement. 
IV. 46. 
IV.  1'58,  Cnses, p. 174. The presence of  the case before the Chancellor 
may be due to the fact that the petitioner was in the wardship of the king. 
But  there were many similar appeals where  there  was  no such reason: 
e. g. V.  63 (141  8)  ; VI.  22 ; VI.  94 (A  widow seeks to recover charters .in 
hands of  her late  husband's  executors) ; VI. 140 (though here  'n~a~n- 
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1413-1426  : Petitioner,  before  leaving  England,  put  his 
charters and jewels in a box, and left them in his house.  The 
defendant came to his house, during his absence, to stay with 
his  wife,  and  treacherously  secured  the  charters.  In  such 
a  situation  petitioner  was  in  a  difficulty at  law.  Detinue  , 
would not lie, and Trespass would only give damages. 
1432 2:  Complainant bailed goods  to defendant in security 
for a loan of  zo shillings.  He repaid the loan and requested 
defendant to redeliver the goods.  Defendant  promised  to do 
so, but afterwards sold them to a stranger.  Endorsed:  Order 
that complainant should recover his goods. 
After 1432  : X, a foreign merchant, delivered certain goods 
to  defendant  at  Colchester,  to be  delivered  to him, or his 
attorney on  demand.  X  gave a  letter of  attorney  to com- 
plainant  giving  him  power  to  receive  the  goods,  but  the 
defendant refused to deliver them.  X  is  being sued for debt 
by creditors  in  London, and complainant  cannot pay  these 
debts, because he cannot recover the goods. 
1438  : Edmund, '  Erle of  Dors ', delivered  by  the hand of 
his servant an '  ouche of  gold  with  dyvers precious stonys in 
hit  set' to Gilis, wife  of  William  Norton, in  pledge  of  £20 
which  he  borrowed  from the said  Gilis.  It was agreed that 
the ouch should be redelivered on payment  of  the loan.  The 
ouch  was  worth  roo marks, and  the bailee and her husband 
refused  to deliver it up when  the complainant tendered  the 
£20,  but  'the same ouche hath solde  and aloyned'.  Com- 
plainant  asks  the chancellor  to  give  him  relief  as  'by the 
comyn  law ther ys  no  remedye  for the seyd Erle to recover 
the seyd ouche '. 
1.439-1440  : Petitioner, probably  as an arbitrator,  was  in 
possession  of  an  obligation.  Defendant  came  to him  and 
asked to see the obligation ; '  and whenne  he (i. e. defendant) 
hadde yt, he held yt and wolnot giffe  it  agayne'.  Petitioner 
attempted  to recover by  Detinue,  but  failed:  and  therefore 
comes to equity for relief. 
'  VI.  175.  Petitioner,  however,  alleges  as his  reason  for  coming  to 
equity, that he is in the service of  the Count of Salisbury and hence cannot 
remain in England to sue at common law. 
XI. 427 a, Cases, p.  187.  Cf. VI. 327, and IX.  109, where  an obliga- 
tion  was  delivered  up  by  a  bailee  in  violation  of  the  terms  of  the 
bailment. 
XII. 262.  XII. 206.  IX. 132, Cases, p.  180. 
He could  not  allege a  bailment,  nor  could  he bring  Detinue ' sur 
trover ';  for the allegation of  loss  by finding was  still traversable at this 
time.  The defendant's act constituteda trespass, but the action of trespass 
afforded no real relief in such a case. 
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Lack of  space forbids the inclusion of  further cases.  With 
these, however, as illustrations, we may proceed to summarize 
our conclusions : 
I. Only in chancery could a plaintiff obtain the relief which 
met the requirements of the case, namely an order for  the re- 
delivery  of  the chattel  s0ught.l  Equity  of  course acts in 
personam,  and consequently its only means of carrying out the 
relief was by decreeing that the defendant should give up the 
chattel in questi~n.~  It is true that in one case we  do find it 
ordered that the '  plaintiff  do recover his goods ' (' quod pre- 
dictus Thomas recuperet bona infrascripta '  7.  This decree is 
certainly curious, and can scarcely be interpreted literally.  It 
seems to show two things : first, that decrees in chancery  had 
not yet  assumed  absolute and definitive form ;  secondly, that 
the chancellor meant simply that his decision of  the case was 
in  favour  of  the complainant,  and  that  he  would  use  such 
process  as lay within  his  command  to make  this decision 
effectual.  A  contumelious  defendant  might  conceivably 
refuse to comply with the order and go to prison  rather  than 
carry it out.  But in the majority of  cases appeal to chancery 
would  succeed in its purpose.  At all events, equity in  the 
fourteenth  century  afforded  a  remedy  for  the recovery  of 
a  chattel  which  did  not  exist  at law  till  the  nineteenth 
cent~ry.~ 
2.  Though the chattel had been bailed, it was not necessary 
in equity to connect the defendant's possession with that of  the 
bailee ; want of  privity did not bar the s~bpoena.~ 
3. But  it  was  not  necessary  to allege a  bailment,  nor  to 
decide the manner in which the defendant obtained possession 
of the chattel.  Apparently, it was enough to show that the 
complainant had the right (at least a moral  right) to recover, 
and that the defendant in reason  and conscience should  give 
Or to bring it into court.  IV. 158, Cases, p.  174.  '  'Equity.. .  acts only in personam,  never decreeing that a  plaintiff 
recover a yes, but that the defendant  surrender what  in  justice he cannot 
keep.'  ~mes  (History of  Trover) Anglo-Am. iii. 436.  - 
XI. 427 a, Cases, p. I 87.  * .Su#ya, p.  33, note 3.  " VI.  175.  And see especially VI. 245 (10 S. S. 113).  See also XXVII. 
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up  possession.l  Thus the  fact  that a charter affected one's 
right to land was ground for reco~ery.~ 
4.  Though the owner were effectually divested of  possession, 
as by  a  tort,  he  was  not  barred  from enforcing his claim to 
recover  his  property in  equityS3  At common  law his only 
remedy  was  by  way  of  damages ; but  it  seems that  the 
chancellor  would  enable him  to follow  his  property  into 
whosesoever  hands  it  came.4 
In brief, the chancellor, untroubled by any complex theories 
or any technicalities of  procedure?  endeavoured  to do sub- 
stantial justice in the individual case.  It is difficult to estimate 
accurately  the  extent  of  the  use  of  the  subpoena in  the 
recovery of personal property ; but from  what has been said 
already it will appear that the influence of chancery in shaping 
the law of  movable goods must have been considerable. 
The petitions  brought  against  vendors  on  the  sale  of 
a  chattel  fall  into  two  classes.  The petitioner  is  asserting 
a claim : (I) for non-delivery of  the chattel ;  (2) for breach of 
warranty. 
I. For non-delivery of the chatted. 
In ordinary cases there would seem to be a plain remedy at 
law.  If  the purchase price  were  paid,  or the buyer's sealed 
obligation  for  the price  deli~ered,~  Detinue  would  lie  from 
early  times.  The buyer's  right  was  extended  in  1442 or 
Cases, supra, pp. 11 1-12.  And see 111.  I I I (10  S. S. 81) ; VI. 94. 
IV. 158, Cases, p.  174.  IX. 132, Cases, p.  180. 
VII. 119 (Complainant had woad on the high  seas.  It was seized by 
robbers and taken to Cornwall, where it was delivered  to the defendant. 
Complainant appeals to the chancellor for a subpo6na  against  the defen- 
dant).  See also 111. 20 (10 S. S. 12). 
Cf.  X.  151  (One  executor  endeavours  to  obtain  an obligation 
from a co-executor.  The defendant [the co-executor] refused to take any 
part in  the administration of  the estate, and yet  would not give  up the 
obligation.  No suit could be  brought at law, 'because dat cte said John 
was made executour in the fourme  aforseid .  .  .') 
The right  to bring Detinue where a sealed obligation  was  delivered 
was recognized in 1344-5 :  Y.  B. 21 Ed. 111.  12.  2 (per Thorpe). 
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thereabouts,  so  that  he  could  claim  the  specific  property 
though he had not paid the price ;  for Debt and Detinue were 
regarded as reciprocal remedies.l  Why then should a vendee 
appeal  to the chancellor?  There seem to be the following 
reasons : 
(a) The  vendor might have sold the chattel to third parties, 
in which case it would be useless to bring Detinue.  The only 
remedy then is by way of  damages for the loss of the bargain, 
and that is what the petitioners claim.2 
(6) Again, if  the vendor  had  no title in  the goods at the 
time of the assumed sale, there would be nothing upon which 
to base  a  common-law  action.  Thus, where  one who  sold 
wool  had no title to it, the vendee appealed  to the chancellor, 
saying he had no remedy at law because '  the proprete of  the 
said  wolles  vested  not  in  your said  suppliant', for the 'said 
wolles were not the said John Adam's (the vendor) at the time 
of the bargain '.3 
(c) The  transaction  might  not  be  a  sale  of  specifically 
ascertained  property,  but  an  agreement  to provide  articles 
of a certain kind by a certain date.  Failure to deliver would 
be a breach of contract ; the basis of  the action would be the 
vendor's non-feasance.  This appears to have been the ground 
of appeal in one very interesting case4 
2. For breach of  warranty. 
From early times a vendor was held liable for breach of  an 
express warranty in  an action  of  trespass  on the case.  We 
have  two  petitions brought  on the same ground in  chancery. 
The reasons for appearing in equity are interesting : 
XI. 512.  Woad  was  sold and warranted merchantable.  It 
proved to be unfit for use.  Nevertheless, complainant is being 
sued at law for the price, and he has no defence at law.  He 
wishes to set-off his loss from the breach of warranty against 
20 Hen. VI. 35.  4 (per Fortescue C.J.). 
a  VII. 201 ;  XLI. 262 (In this case there is a further reason for coming 
to chancery.  The vendor agreed to sell his tithes to the complainant, in 
case he soM them  at all.  Thus it was  not a true contract of  sale ;  more- 
over, the property  was not definitely ascertained, so that Detinue would 
not lie.  Complainant seeks to be recompensed for his loss by this breach 
of  ' Covenant '). 
LIX. 185, Cnses,  p.  230.  *  XX. 39, C(zses, p. 21 I. 
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the claim for the price ;  he therefore comes to the chancellor 
and prays  for a Certiorari, to have the whole case heard in 
equity. 
XXX. 33.  Defendant sold cloth, warranting it to be ' trewe 
marchaunt ', &c., but  it turned  out to be '  motthetyn and rat 
byten'.  Complainant  sought  to hold  the defendant  in  an 
action at law, but  he '  wold not abide answer in the Kynges 
Court' ;  therefore appeal is made to equity. 
This affords an excellent illustration of equity supplementing 
the common law.  But the theory upon which  the relief was 
given  is not  that there is  a  quidpro quo, nor a detriment to 
the plaintiff.  On the contrary, petitioners emphasize the fact 
that the defendant  made  a promise or a bargain and did not 
carry  it  out.  In other words, the claim for relief is based on 
breach of  contract. 
SECTION  VI.  SALES  OF LAND. PETITIONS  AGAINST 
VENDORS 
Actions against  Vendors on  Contracts to convey Land? 
The cases now under consideration possess especial interest ; 
for  it was  in  this  phase  of  contract  that  equity  developed 
a  remedy  peculiar  to  itself,  which  never  existed  at law : 
specific performance  of  contract.  Specific performance  and 
the  injunction  remain  two  enduring  features  of  eguitable 
jurisdiction  which  persisted  in  full vigour into modern times, 
and are indeed conspicuous to-day.  Specific performance did 
not  create, strictly speaking, a new  substantive right, but  it 
was a  new and advantageous  remedy.  We should, however, 
observe that it was invented before the common law regarded 
parol  contracts as enforceable; indeed, we hope to show that 
the chancellor exercised a wide jurisdiction over contract in the 
fifteenth century where there was no remedy at law.  Nowhere 
is this more conspicuous than in the petitio6s brought against 
vendors for non-performance of contracts to convey land.  The 
gist of the action is in each case non-feasance ; the vendor has 
done nothing and refuses to act at all.  No action lay at law 
Further cases of petitions to compel the conveyance of land are con- 
sidered in Section VII, infra, pp.  123  ff. 
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until Assumpsit was formally recognized in  1504,  and at that 
time the payment  of the purchase price was a condition pre- 
cedent to bringing  the action.  Moreover, it was necessary to 
&ow that the vendor has expressly undertaken to convey the 
land ; Assumpsit  did  not  originally  lie  upon  a promise  or 
bargain as such. 
The discussion falls into  three  parts : first, the conditions 
which  were  necessary to bring  the subpoena ; second,  the 
parties  in  favour of  whom, and against  whom  it would lie; 
third, the relief granted. 
I. The types of cases ilz which the subpoena is brogght. 
There are two  features characteristic  of  the cases brought 
before the chancellor.  In the first place, the agreements are 
always by parol.  If the complainant had  a deed, there was 
a ready  common  law  action in  Covenant ; it was the lack of 
any such writing which is most frequently alleged as the reason 
for appealing to chancery.'  But secondly, and this  is  most 
interesting,  we  note  that  the  agreements  are  often  very 
informal.  For,  while  a  complainant  might  allege  that  the 
defendant  undertook  or covenanted  to convey  land,2 this is 
not the usual practice.  The common  statement is that there 
was  an agreement  or bargain,  or that the defendant  'sold ' 
the land to the complainant.  Petitioners do not take pains to 
incorporate the  facts  into  any peculiar  form  of  statement; 
they present  informally the terms  of  an informal agreement, 
and it is the fact  of  agreement upon  which  particular  stress 
is  laid.  This circumstance  seems  of  such  importance that 
I  venture  to state one  example at length. 
One William Serle came to Robert Ellesmere (petitioner) 
and said that he had certain '  termes '  of land to sell.  Petitioner 
wished to see and examine the evidences of  title  before any 
bargain  was  concluded ; in  consequence, it was  agreed  that 
e.g.  complainants  describe  the  transaction  as  'par  parolle  saunz 
escript' (XI.  log) ; '  by mouthe without writyng'  (XI. 485) ; '  upon  cove- 
naunt without  writyng' (XIV. 3), Src. ; and conclude by declaring that in 
consequence they are without remedy at law.  Thus, says  one, '  your saide 
suppliant hath no specialty of pees covenauntez .  .  .  so pat be  comone lawe 
gevof no remedie in  Pis  parhe ' (XXXIX. 52).  This is a typical allega- 
tlon. 
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he should come to Serle's house and look over the documents. 
On the day appointed, petitioner  came with George Horton, 
'  a  man  of  Counsel1 ', who  read  through  the 'evidences' and 
found  them  to be  satisfactory.  Several  other people  were 
present, and after some discussion an agreement was reached, 
and William Serle 'rehersed'  the bargain  to one of the by-' 
standers.  Petitioner then stated the terms of  the agreement 
to George Horton, who turned to William Serle and said '  Be 
ye accordeth in the maner as Robert here hath rehersed ', the 
answer was  in  the affirmative.  Afterwards all went together 
'  To the Swan beside Seynt Antonyes and there they dronke 
to gederes upon the saide bargayn atte the coste of the saide 
-  Robert Ellesmere '.  The agreement was  that the petitioner 
should  have the ' termes'  for ;&40 ; and the parties were to 
meet  subsequently when the price should be paid and a deed 
made, &c.  At the time specified the petitioner  offered pay- 
ment, but  Serle refused to seal the writing or deliver up the 
evidences.  In  consequence, petitioner  has  lost  his  bargain, 
and, as he has no writing of the agreement, is without remedy 
at law.  He prays  for  a  subpoena  directed  to  Serle,  and 
general re1ief.l 
The importance of cases of  this type lies in the fact that 
by reason of  the very informality of  agreement, they were for 
a long time unenforceable at common law.  Yet it is believed 
that such represent a large number of  the ordinary transactions 
of  daily life.  The parties were  not  skilled  in  the technic  of 
law; but they made a bargain  in their own simple way.  It 
was not  only fortunate, but  necessary, that some one should 
give protection to such compacts. 
There is a still further question.  Was it enough to allege  -  - 
a mere bargain, or  must the petitioner go further and show 
that he had  suffered damage by relying upon the defendant's 
promise ?  In other words, has one of  the parties altered his 
position on the strength of  the agreement ?  There is at first 
sight some indication that this was so.  A most obvious way 
XIX.  354 a-354  e, Cases,  pp. 204-207  (consiQting of  petition, answer, 
replication, and three depositions).  Cf. XVI. 412,  Cases, p. 198, which  is 
on all fours with the principal case.  There was an agreement to sell land, 
but 'be cause there was no clerk nor lerned man there to make upp their 
dedes accordyng to the sayde covenauntes, It was appointed and accordid 
betwixte the saide parties that at a  certaine day by them assigned  they 
shuld have met and paied the furst paiement and made upp here dedes '. 
Defendant refused  to make the deed,  though  complainant  tendered the 
price agreed upon. 
in which a complainant might have changed his situation was 
by payment  of part or the whole of  the purchase  price.  In 
the majority  of the petitions I have examined  this was  the 
case ; it is often alleged as ground for relief.2  If anything had 
happened  which strengthened the complainant's  position, he 
did not fail to emphasize it.  Thus we find it alleged that the 
petitioner has spent  money on the land  in  making improve- 
ments:  sometimes even at the defendant's request 4;  again, that 
the petitioner was put in possession and has subsequently been 
~usted,~  or that by reason  of  holding possession he has  been 
distrained of  rent by the chief 1ord.O  These are aggravating 
circumstances which cry aloud for intervention.  They represent 
the strongest grounds of  appeal to the chancellor. 
There is, however, no conclusive reason  for  believing that 
even  payment  of  price  was  a  prerequisite  to bringing  the 
subpoena.  In  fact  there  are indications  which  point  the 
other way.  We know that at a later date an unpaid vendor 
might  be held  a  trustee  for  the p~rchaser.~  Finally, there 
are numerous  petitions in  which  it  is not  asserted  that the 
price  is  paid, though the complainant  usually  adds thqt he 
stands ready to pay it.8 
In conclusion, we may note  that in none of  the petitions is 
an appeal made where there was not, in  fact, a consideration 
for  the agreement.  No attempt  is  made  in  these cases to 
hold the vendor on a bare promise. 
Purchase price  is paid : IV. 96,  Cases,  p.  173 ; VI.  58;  VI.  176 ; 
X.  184; X.  263 ; XI.  109; XI.  178;  XI.  485;  XII.  175;  XIV.  3; 
XV. 222 ; XIX. 101 ;  XIX. 340 a-341 ; XIX. 404 a-404  b,  Cases, pp. 207- 
208 ; XXXIX.  53 ; LIX. 86.  Part  of  purchase  price  paid : IV.  100, 
Cases, p. 173 ; IX. 207 ; IX. 409 ;  X.  323 ; XI. 537 ;  XIV. 16 ; XVI. 377 ; 
XVI. 645 ; XIX. 59-56,  Cases,  pp. 199-203 ; XXVII. 16 ; XXVII. 83 ; 
XXVIII. 227 ; LXX. 148. 
a  e. g. complainant says, 'nient contresteant le paiement devant maynes ' 
the defendant will not make estate.  IV. 100, Cases, p. 173. 
This. in  addition to Davment  of  the ~urchase  mice: IV. 46.  Cases.  .  , 
p.  173 ; XV. 222 ; XVI.  j7: 
XXXVIII. 160 (Com~lainant  was in ~ossession  of an inn under a ~arol 
lease, and expended monky thereon at the defendant's request). 
"V.  126 ; XXXI. 189 (Par01 lease). 
XIV. 3 (The vendor had no estate save in the right of  his wife,-and 
yet complainant, as ostensible owner, was compelled to pay the rent to the 
chief lord). 
~aitland,  Equity, 25 I. 
Purchase  price  not  paid:  IV.  126; VII. 219;  IX. 443;  XV.  19; 
XVI. 347 ;  XVI. 412,  Cases, p.  198 ;  XIX. gi;qa-354e,  Cases, pp. 204-207. 120  CONTRACT  IN  EQUITY  [PART  11 
2. The parties  i?z favozrr  of  whom,  and against whom  the 
subpoe?za lay. 
It seems  that  rights under the contract might be assigned 
either by act of  the parties, or by operation of  law.  We find 
petitions brought by heirs I and  executor^,^ and by a widow3 
to  whom her husband assigned his rights in the land purchased 
on his death.  On the other hand, actions are brought against 
heirs4 on  the contract  of  the  deceased,  where  the  vendor 
covenanted  for himself  and  his heirs, and  against an abbot's 
successors  where they were expressly bound in  the original 
grant.  Whether or no the heir would be liable if  he were not 
expressly included in the contract, we  are not prepared to say. 
But the subpoena was  not limited  to the original contracting 
parties.  It lay against the feoffees  to the use of the vendor 
to compel them to make conveyance, and even against third 
parties  who  had  maliciously induced  the vendor  to  break 
his  contract.  In the last  case, the prayer  is  that the third 
parties, as well as the vendor, should  be  brought  before the 
chancellor to say why an estate should not be made according 
to the agreement. 
3. Relief  Granted. 
(a) Specific performance. 
It is obvious that there are many cases in which a contract 
VI. 176 (Complainant is '  prochein heir  a  dit Nicoll',  the purchaser, 
who is dead.  Purchase price was paid ;  still defendant has sold to a stranger 
'  encountre droit et bon conciense') ;  XIX. 404 a-404  b, Cases,  pp. 207-208 
(Petition by  heir.  Land sold  to petitioner's  father;  price  paid.  Now 
defendant refuses to make estate to the heir after the father's  death.  In 
the answer defendant denies that the land was ever sold). 
Action  by  executors,  XIX.  101 (Defendant,  vendor,  was permitted 
to remain in possession after the purchase price was paid.  Vendee died, 
ordering by his will that the land should be sold.  Complainants, executors, 
have sold the land, but defendant refuses to make estate). 
IV.  126 (The widow  was  in  possession,  though  the price  was  not 
paid.  She was ousted by the vendors). 
XXVII.  83 (In this  case part  of  the  pricf  was  paid  to  the heir. 
This may be a material fact). 
XV.  zzz  (Complainant  had paid  part  of  price, had  entered  into 
possession, and spent money on the land). 
X.  184; XIV. 16; XIX. 59-56,  Cases, pp.  199-203 ;  XXVIII. 227. 
XV. 222 (The vendor by the '  steryng and procurement '  of  X and Y 
refused to make estate.  Petitioner prays for writs against X and Y as well 
as the vendor.  The chief  defendant  was not really the vendor,  but  his 
successor). 
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to  convey  land  is  broken  and  damages  do  not  afford  an 
adequate  remedy to the disappointed vendee.  The land, for 
some reason, possessed a peculiar value to him ;  he may have 
been ready to pay more than the market price.  At all events, 
what he wants is the land, and not some attempted monetary 
compensation in  its place.  Complainants do not always ask 
in so many words for  specific performance:  but  that such is 
their real desire may be gathered from the case set out in the 
petition.  We observe, for example, this interesting  petition 
which was brought about 1433  : 
Complainant is Chancellor of the University of  Cambridge. 
The university had determined to found a new college, and in 
consequence an agreement was made between the defendant 
and complainant that the Chancellor should '  have a place .  . . 
(of  the defendant) adioynyng on every side to the ground of 
the seyd  Chaunceller  and  universite', and that in  exchange 
the defendant should have '  a noder place therfor lyeing in the 
sayd toun '.  The place to be given in  exchange was, accord- 
ing to the petitioner,  of  greater  value.  Complainant  spent 
money in  endeavouring  to carry out  the agreement, but  the 
defendant  'of self  wille  and wythoute  any cause'  refused  to 
do  his  part.  The relief  sought  is that the defendant  may 
be  compelled  to do 'that trowth, good  feith  and consciens 
requiren in this caas '.2 
The land  in  this  case  was  especially desired  by the  uni- 
versity because of its location ; no other piece of land nor any 
amount of damages would be an indemnity for the loss of the 
bargain.  Furthermore,  what  damage  could  be  assessed ? 
For the petitioner's own statement, the actual value of the land 
sought was less  than of  that offered in  exchange.  No jury, 
supposing that there were an action at law, could estimate the 
damages.  Specific performance alone would give relief. 
Again, it is a common practice to ask for subpoenas against 
the feoffees  to the use  of  the vendor  as well  as against the 
vendor  himselfS3 Where  this  occurs  in  connexion  with  a 
e. g.  complainant asks that the defendant be required  to show  why 
he will not make estate : XVI.  645.  And see IX. 135 (An agreement was 
niade to exchange benefices.  Petitioner is ready to perform  his part, but 
defendant refuses.  Relief:  'to sette due remedie for the seide bysecher 
as reson woll '). 
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prayer  for a general remedy, we are forced to conclude that 
the petitioner  seeks specific performance  and  not  damages. 
Otherwise there  would  be no  point  in  bringing  the feoffees 
before the court.  It seems probable, then, that in the majority 
of  cases  the petitioner was  seeking to compel the vendo;  to 
perform his part of the contract, even though he asked merely 
that he should be compelled to do what reason and conscience 
required. 
We may now turn  to the more  interesting  cases in which 
performance of  the contract is specifically asked for.  we  find 
such petitions as early as the reign of Richard 11:  and by the 
fifteenth century they have  become comparatively common. 
In the reign of  Henry VI there are decrees awarding specific 
performance, so that we are sure that the chancellor did grant 
such  relief  at least  as early  as  the middle  of  the fifteenth 
~entury.~  The situation  of  the  parties  where  this  relief  is 
demanded is not materially  different from that in cases where 
it is not.  However, in  all save three of  the petitions I have 
examined, the complainant  had  paid  the whole or a part of 
the purchase  price:  but  it  does  not  appear  that  this  was 
essential;  sometimes  the  part  of  the  price  advanced,  the 
'  earnest money', was very slight  as compared with the price 
as a whole.  The  complainant alleges that he has paid part of 
the price  and stands  ready to pay the rest, but  he does not 
stress the pre-payment  as an especial reason  for carrying out 
the contract.  Apparently, it was  left  for  the chancellor  to 
determine whether  or no  the circumstances  of  the case de- 
manded a fulfilment of  the agreement.  Specific performance 
of an agreement to lease is asked as well  as of  an  agreement 
to ~onvey.~  Finally, we  should  note  that in  some  petitions 
an attempt is made to obtain the land, though the vendor had 
already conveyed  it to an~ther.~  The chancellor  could  not, 
Wkeler v. Huchenden, 2 Cal. Ch. 2 ;  111. 1f03 (10 S. S. 78).  The date 
of the latter petition cannot be fixed with certainty.  It lies either between 
1396 and 1399, or between  1401 and 1403. 
XXV. 111 (10 S. S. I~I),  A. D.  1456 ; z Cal. Ch. 27 (where the decree 
is called an award). 
Price paid :  X.  184 ;  XIX. 59-56,  Cases, pp. 199-203 ; XIX. 101.  Part 
of  price paid :  IX. 207 ; X. 537.  Price  not paid : IX. 443 ;  XXXI.  189 ; 
XXVIII. 160.  *  XXXI.. 189 (Par01 lease) ; XXXVIII. 160. 
X.  134 (Prior conveyance to another 'to disceyve your  seide poure 
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of  course,  set  aside  a  conveyance;  but  it  is  possible that 
he  might  require  the feoffees  to re-convey  to the  original 
(b)  Damages and Rescission  of Contract. 
On the other hand, complainants  appeal to the chancellor 
where the vendor  has put  it out of  his  power  to fulfil  the 
contract, as by conveying to a third party.l  Or again, it may 
be that the vendor had no estate in the land which he assumed 
to  or  the contract  may  have  failed  from  some  other 
reason.3  These  are cases  in  which  the claim  is  plainly  for 
damages ; but most frequently the complainant is asking that 
the agreement be rescinded, and that he be  restored  to his 
former position.  Thus, where  the  price  has been  paid,  the 
petitioner  asks  to be  recompensed  therefor ;  or  if  he  has 
spent  money on the land:  or  has been  compelled to make 
 payment^,^  he seeks to recover what  he has  expended.  He 
asks to receive what equity and good  conscience require ; in 
other words,  that he  may  be  requited  for  the loss  he  has 
sustained by reason of  the defendant's breach of his agreement. 
SECTION  VII.  PROMISES  MADE  IN  CONNEXION  WITH 
MARRIAGE  (MARRIAGE  SETTLEMENTS) 
We  have  here  to consider,  not  the contract  of  marriage 
itself, but  promises  made, as we  should  phrase  it  to-day, in 
consideration  of  marriage.  Needless  to state, these  agree- 
ments are by parol.  The proper form at common law would 
have been  to incorporate the 'accord'  in  a  deed, when  the 
promisee  would  have  had  a  ready  action  in  the  form  of 
Covenant.  But  only  too  often  the arrangement  was  made 
without  endenture of  covenaunt  made  of  the same ','  and 
there was no remedy at law unless the promise had  been  to 
Oratour . . .'  Subpoenas asked against the vendor and feoffees to whom 
he had conveyed the land).  And see XIX. 59-56,  Cases, pp.  199-203 (an 
interesting case with four pleadings). 
X.  163.  XIV. 3. 
111. 34 (10 S. S. 59).  In this case it became  impossible to carry out 
the contract, and complainant asks to be restored to his former position. 
'4 X.  163 (Defendant has conveyed to a third party, and petitioner seeks 
to recover the price paid) ; XIV. 16 ; LIX. 86. 
XVI. 377. 
7 "TI  .  "IV.  3 (To recover rent paid to the chief lord). 1  24  CONTRACT  IN EQUITY  [PART  II 
pay money.  If  one promised or granted  another .&IO  if  he 
would marry the promisor's daughter, would Debt lie ?  This 
question is the subject of  endless  debates in  the Year Books. 
At first,  it  is  thought  that  a  promise  so  intimately  con- 
nected  with  marriage  must  be  enforced,  if  at  all,  in  the 
ecclesiastical courts ; later, the judges  fall  to considering the 
problem of qzbidpro quo?  Despite many dicta to the contrary? 
it can hardly be regarded  as firmly settled that Debt will lie 
on such a promise until  the reign of  Eli~abeth.~  There was 
a  decided  inclination  to  allow  the  action  in  the fifteenth 
century;  but  for  one  reason  or  another  the chancellor  did 
assume jurisdiction  of  these cases:  perhaps because of wager 
of law in Debt.5  Furthermore, if  the promise were to make an 
estate of  lands (and in the petitions such are the more frequent), 
the promisee  or  beneficiary  must  find  relief  in  equity  or 
not at all. 
The discussion deals  with  three  points: (I) circumstances 
under which application is made to chancery ; (2)  the person 
who  brings  the subpoena;  (3)  the  relief  sought,  and  the 
ground on which it is demanded. 
I. Circumstances  under which application is made to chancery. 
These petitions reveal an  interesting, if  rudimentary, form 
of  marriage settlement.  The agreement  is  entirely informal 
and by  parol.  This can  be  better  appreciated  from  a case 
which happily sets forth the facts with some detail: 
A  marriage  was  arranged  between  Richard  Dryffeld  and 
Denys, daughter  of  Thomas Selc6  Dryffeld, the petitioner, 
states that William Brampton, the defendant, made the '  con- 
tracte of  Marriage by his  owne pursuyng  by twene  the seid 
Richard  and Denys';  but  this  is  denied by the defendant, 
who  asserts  that  the  said  Richard  'laboured  to  pe  seid 
Thomas, faper of  ke seid Denys .  . .  of  his owen  desire willing 
to have her to wife'.  At all events  it  was  agreed  that  the 
r 
Holmes, Common Law, 268. 
a  e.g.  Danvers J., in Y. B.  37 Hen. VI. 8.  18. 
See Ames, H. L. R., viii.  262; Ag5jlethwaite v.  Northby, Cro. El. 29. 
* e. g.  XVI.  334  (Petitioner says he has no remedy at law; this  is 
repeated in most of the other cases) ;  XVI. 386, Cases, p.  197 ;  XXVIII. 
299,  Cases,  p. 213 ; XXIX.  254;  LIX. 65 ; LIX.  132-3,  137-9,  Cases, 
pp. 227-230 ; LXXI. 7-8,  Cases, pp. 233-234. 
XVI. 386, Cases, p.  197.  LXXI. 7, Cases, p.  233. 
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parties  interested  should  meet  and  discuss  a  settlement. 
Brampton, as cousin of Denys, represented her.  The petitioner 
asked  for  twenty  marks  'wt  the  seid  Denys';  to  which 
Brampton  answered, '  in  the name of  pe seid Thomas and his 
frendes pat yf pe  seid Richard  wold  have pe  seid Denys  to 
wyf  that  he and  all the frendes of  pe seid Denys wold  make 
hir worth x marc in  money and  in godes.'  Dryffeld  agreed 
and the marriage took p1ace.l 
The promise in  this case was made directly to one of  the 
parties to the marriage ;  but, as other petitions show, it might 
have been made to his father in his behalf.  Especially is this 
true where the person in whose favour the promise was made 
was  the da~ghter.~  A and B agree that A's  daughter  shall 
marry B's son, and B promises A that he will  make an estate 
of  lands  and  tenements  to  the  son  and  daughter  on  the 
marriage.  Thus : 
Agreement (' accorde ') was made between petitioner on the 
one  side and John  Drayton and his  son on  the other, that 
the son should marry petitioner's daughter, and that after the 
marriage, John  Drayton  should  make  an estate  to the son 
and daughter and their heirs.  The marriage took place, issue 
were  born, and the son died, '  le dit estat nient  fait '.  John 
Drayton  refused  to make estate ;  petitioner  asks for  a  sub- 
p~ena.~ 
The cases fall naturally into two groups : 
(a) The promisor  has received  some substantial benefit in 
return for his pr~mise.~  This is the result of  a family arrange- 
ment.  A's daughter is to marry B's son.  B agrees to enfeoff 
The amount to be  paid  is in dispute.  Petitioner contends it was 10 
marks in money, and 10 marks '  in howsold'.  Defendant  in his answer 
says it was 10  marks in money and household (LXXI. 8, Cases, p. 234). 
e.g.  XV.  son-zob,  Cases,  pp.  189-191;  XV.  14on-141,  Cases, 
PP.  192-194.  VII. 250,  Cases, p.  179.  '  111.  104 (10  S. S. 43) ;  IX. 448 (Defendant was one of  the paFies to 
the marriage) ;  XV.  140 a-141,  Cases, pp. 192-194 (Facts were in dispute ; 
after petitioner brought his first petition  a '  trete was taken',  and arbi- 
trators appointed ;  one abitrator at  defendant's instigation refused to attach 
his seal to the award.  Hence the second petition, No.  141) ; XXVIII. 52 
(Petitioner paid defendant 160 marks ; he says furthermore that the mar- 
riage took place '  to the grete costagies '  of himself) ; LIX. 132-3,  137-9, 
Cases, pp. 227-230  (An action against the executors of the promisor.  Peti- 
tioner failed to join all the necessary parties ; hence the second petition. 
In the answer, the defendants make denial of facts alleged  by petitioner) ; 
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the son and daughter of  certain  lands on their marriage, '  for 
the whech  marriage and  estates to be made','  A agrees to 
pay B a  sum  of  money.  B does not carry out his promise, 
and A brings a subpoena and prays relief.  The marriage was 
not the sole inducement to the promise. 
(6) The promise is gratuitous, that  is, the promisor  gains 
no direct benefit from making it.  It is said  to be made 'for 
the marriage ', or, taking the petitioner's  point  of  view, the 
marriage was  made  'on  the faith of' the promi~e.~  These 
cases are more interesting and, so far as my observation goes, 
more  numerou~.~  We  have  direct  and convincing  evidence 
that the chancellor did enforce such a promi~e.~  Ordinarily, 
the promisor is the father of one of the parties to the marriage ; 
but  there are petitions where there was no relationship con- 
necting the promisor  with the husband  and  wife  for  whose 
benefit the promise was made.6 
2.  The person who brings the subpoena. 
Naturally,  in  the majority  of  cases this  is  the promisee, 
even though he were not a party to the marriage.  The father 
claims damages or asks for specific performance on behalf of 
his  son  or  daughter as the case  may be.  The promise was 
made  to him, and his  is the right to enforce it.  But equity 
went beyond  this.  Not only did the subpoena come to the 
rescue of  the promisee, but  the benejiciary might use it.6  He 
was  not  a  party to the contract, but the contract was  made 
for  his  benefit.  This  is  a  matter  of  great interest;  for  we 
know that the beneficiary could  not  bring  A~sumpsit,~  and 
that when Consideration  came to be an accepted doctrine, it 
1 XV. 20 0-206,  Cases, pp. 189-191 (Relief is prayedagainst the defendant 
and his feoffees ; zo b is the answer of the feoffees, who  aver that they are 
ready  to  make  estate,  so  soon  as certain  matters  in  debate  between 
petitioner and defendant are settled). 
1 IX. 401 (Petitioner says that he '  trusting to the faithful accorde and 
promys of the said William was maried to the seid Maud '). 
VII. 250, Cases, p. 179 ; IX. 401 ;  XV.  116; XVI.477 ; XVI.  334 ; 
XVI. 386, Cases, p. 197 ; XX. 4;  XXV. III (10  S. S. 141); LIX. 65. 
XXV. 111  (10  S. S.  141) [Endorsed with  order for  specific perfor- 
mance]. 
XV.  I 16 ; XXIX. 254. 
The beneficiary is the petitioner : XV.  zoa, Cases, p.  1451 (Promisee 
and beneficiary are petitioners) ; XXVIII. 299, Cases, p.  213 ; LIX. 65 
(Promise made to petitioner's father). 
7  Crow v. Rogers,  I  Strange 592. 
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was held  that it must move from the promisee.  But there is 
strong evidence that  the rights  of  the beneficiary were pro- 
tected  in  equity ;  we  shall consider  this  more  at length  in 
discussing the principles upon which the chancellor acted.' 
3.  The  relief  sought  and  the  ground  upon  which  it  is 
demanded. 
(a) Relief. 
For the most part the prayers are couched in general terms ; 
the petitioner  desires to have the defendant before the chan- 
cellor to show why he 'should  not be content  after promys 
made be twix them ',2 but he asks only that the defendant be 
compelled  to do what  reason  and  conscience require.  Of 
course,  what  is really  sought is  specifi!:  performance;  and 
thus we find  it specifically asked  that the defendant be com- 
pelled to pay the money  or convey the land  in accordance 
with his promise.  At all events, there was an especial reason 
why  the  defendant  should  be  compelled  to carry  out  his 
promise  in  these cases.  Specific performance  was the only 
relief which was  adequate.  Often the petitioner, though  the 
promisee, is not the beneficiary.  Obviously he is not seeking 
damages, but rather  asking that the beneficiary's rights may 
be  protected.  Judging the pleadings as a whole, we conclude 
that  the petitioners  are  seeking to  hold  the  defendant  to 
his promise ;  and that the chancellor  did grant an order for 
specific performance.  In the interesting  case  which  is en- 
dorsed, it is noteworthy that the petitioner was content to set 
up the material  facts, and  trust  to the chancellor; a  decree 
for specific performance was made. 
(6) The ground on which the relief is demanded. 
Though, as we  have seen, there is a class of  cases in which 
the promisor  has  obtained a pecuniary  benefit for making his 
promise, it  is  nowhere suggested  that the promise should  be 
enforced on that account.  It is true that complainants  allege 
that they have been put to expense on account of the marriage, 
Infva, p. 164.  LXXI. 7, cases, p. 233. 
LIX. 139, Cases,  p. 230. 
'  XV. 20 a, Cases, p. 189 (The relief was  rayed against the defendant's 
feoffees as well as the defendant).  '  XXV. 11  I (10  S. S. 141). I  28  CONTRACT  IN  EQUITY  [PART 11 
or that they  paid  money  for  the conveyance ; but  even  in 
these  cases stress is always laid on the fact that the promise 
was made '  for the marriage '.  The facts of  the case are such 
that there was a legitimate '  cause '  for the defendant's promise; 
he made it deliberately, and  has  led the petitioner or beneti- 
ciary  to act  on the strength  of  it.  Reason  and  conscience 
require that he should  carry it out.  In consequence, it does 
not  matter  whether  the promisee  or  the beneficiary  is  the 
petitioner.  A promise made to another in the interest of  the 
beneficiary, confers a right  in  equity upon  the latter, just  as 
much  as if  it were made  to him  directly.  There may have 
been  another  factor.  In  most  instances  the  promisor  is 
closely related to one of  the parties  of  the marriage ;  that is, 
there  is the element of  blood  and  natural  affection.  But 
I believe  that  marriage  alone was  a  sufficient cause for the 
promise, and there are petitions which support this.l  Whether 
this may be so or no, it seems to be clear that a promise made 
'in  consideration'  of marriage,  at least  when  the promisor 
was  bound  by  ties  of  family to one of  the parties  to the 
marriage, was enforceable in equity in the fifteeenth century. 
SECTION  VIII.  PARTNERSHIP 
The cases considered in this section relate to arrangements 
of  a  humble nature ; two people have simply put their stock 
of  goods  together  to be  managed  for their  common profit. 
The control  of the property may have been  in the hands of 
one  partner, or  of  both, but  one  has kept all the profits and 
refuses to give the other his rightful share.  The a;rangement 
might be confined to one transaction.  For example : A and 
B  were  taken  prisoners in  Brittany and lost all their goods. 
They bought a ship and goods of C, and B remained with C 
XV.  I 16 (Defendant promised to make an  estate to R pnd S,  petitioner's 
daughter,  on  their  marriage ; in  consequence of  the promise  petitioner 
married his daughter to R) ; XIX. 347-346, Cases, pp. 203-204 (Defendant 
promised to pay J's  debts when he mamed J) ; XXIX. 254 (Defendant in 
recompense for certain wrongs done to petitioner, promised to pay a certain 
sum of money for the marriage ofE.  There is no evidence that petitioner 
or defendant was related to E). 
a  I use the word without any technical significance. 
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6 in  plege ' for himself and A, while A returned to England  to 
sell the goods.  It was  agreed  that A should  come back  to 
Brittany  and  pay  C with  the money  received from the sale 
of the goods,  the residue after  that  payment  to be  divided 
between A  and  B.  There remained  L17,  but  A  refused to 
give  B  his  share;  consequently  B  asked  for  a  subpoena 
against A.' 
The example given is not, speaking strictly, a true case of 
partnership ; for  partnership  implies  a  relation  between 
persons  carrying  on  a  business in  common  with  a  view  of 
~rofit.~  It does,  however,  raise  the same  kind  of  question 
which is presented in the following petitions : 
A  was '  partyng  felawe  in  biyng  and  sellyng  in  certeyn 
marchaundyse'  with  B.  They both  sold  certain cloth to C, 
who was bound therefor  in an obligation, which was delivered 
to B.  By virtue  of  possession of  the obligation, B received 
LIO,  but  refused  to give A his share, '  as right  and consciens 
requireth.' 
A  and  B  were  pedlars and  had  their  goods together  for 
some six years.  B has kept all the increase, and A cannot get 
any part thereof  by common law, 'where  by their covenaunt 
he shuld have the half'.4 
A and B ' were possessed iointly '  of certain fish which were 
to be  sold '  to their  bother  use '.  B sold the fish, '  and noon 
accompte '  will render to A.6 
A  and B had goods  together  to be used to their common 
profit.  B, contrary to '  reason and conscience ', converted the 
goods to his  own  use.  B refuses to give A his share (a half 
of  the profit, &c.).~ 
These  examples are sufficient  without  more to show the 
kind  of  case which came before the ~hancellor.~  Petitioners 
XI. 506 ; see also IX. 39 (A and B agreed that B should buy wood to 
their common use, A paying a part of  the price.  B sold  the wood  to C, 
and refused to give A his share of the proceeds). 
Cf. the definition  in the Partnership Act,  1890 (53 & 54  Vict.  c.  39), 
s. I (1). 
XXIX. 516.  IX. 382, Cases, p.  182. 
XIX. 26, Cases, p. 199.  XXVIII. 378. 
For other examples, see VII. 186 (Ship owned by A and B, but under 
B's  management ;  B sold the ship and will not give A his share of the pro- 
ceeds) ; IX. 131 (An agreement to share profits) ; XXVII. 84 (Ship owned 
by A and B ;  A had the management of the ship and kept all the profits. 
B seeks to recover his share). 
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usually  rest  content  with  asserting  that  the  goods  were 
held in  common, to be employed  to the use  of  both  parties, 
without  alleging  any  express  promise  on  the part  of  the 
defendant to  pay over the  just share.  The question, then, is pot 
one between the partners and third parties,  but rather one of 
accounting between  themselves.  No action  at law  met  this 
situation.  One partner  could  not charge the other as factor 
or receiver, for obviously there was no such re1ationship.l  He 
could  not  bring Debt, for he could not claim a  share of  the 
profits as his sole property ; moreover, a difficulty of pleading 
stood in the way.  One partner could not  sue another at law 
in a matter involving the partnership business.  It  was this gap 
in  the common  law  which  was  supplied  by the chancellor's 
intervention.  The  law  could  handle  adequately  matters 
arising from dealings between partners and third parties ; but 
in  questions  which  arose  between  themselves,  chancery 
assumed  in  the  fifteenth  century a  jurisdiction  which  it  re- 
tained till modern times. 
The principle upon which  equity acted is simple and plain. 
The property  was  held  jointly ; even  without  an  express 
agreement  the  situation  of  the parties conferred  upon  each 
a right to a share of the profits.  This right equity enforced. 
SECTION  IX.  AGENCY 
The contract  of  Agency as we  see it in the Year Books  is 
very rudimentary.  By deed, one might appoint another to do 
many acts  in  his  name ; but it is  in informal agency, which 
existed  without  speciality,  that we  are primarily interested. 
Any such contract  by an agent must  find  enforcement, if  at 
all, in  the action  of  Debt; in consequence,  it was limited by 
the requirements of quidpro quo.  Thus in all cases of sale to 
an agent, it was  necessary to show that the goods sold went 
to  the  benefit  of  the  principal.  We read  th%t an abbot  is 
chargeable on the deed of his monk made for goods furnished, 
which went  to the use  of the convent; but  it is to be noted 
Pollock,  Contracts  (7th  ed.),  140 (citing F. N. B.  117  Dj,  says  one 
partner  might  bring  Account  against another.  But  the principle  upon 
which this was allowed is not stated, nor are any cases cited. 
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that he  is  not charged as for the act of  his agent.  Unless it 
be shown that he obtained  the benefit, Debt would  not  lie; 
and this means that the contract was  unenforceable.  Of the 
undisclosed  principal or  the doctrine  of  ratification  we  read 
nothing. 
The chancery  material  does  not  present  many  petitions 
directly concerned with Agency, but we find that the contract 
received wider recognition than at law.  If goods were sold to 
an agent, and went to the use and profit of  the principal,  the 
principal  was  chargeab1e.I  But the chancellor went  further 
than this.  If  one held out another as his agent, and  he were 
generally so known, then the principal was  bound  to pay for 
goods or money furnished to the agent for  his use.  That is, 
the goods must be supplied to the agent for his principal,  but 
it was  not  necessary  to  prove  that the goods  actually were 
received by the principal.  Thus : 
Petitioner  at ' Brugges ' delivered £100  to M, '  factour and 
attorney veryly knowyn un  to John Warde, . . .  to the use  of 
his seid Maister, to be repaied agen at London '.  M. made out 
a  bill  'signed  with  his  Masteres  Mark', witnessing  the loan 
' after the cours  of  Merchaundice '.  Warde, however, refused 
to pay ;  petitioner alleges that this is '  contrarie to the Cours of 
trewe Marchaundice ' and prays for a remedy.2 
This is a  definite step in advance.  M  was  held out as an 
agent;  he  was  engaged  in  commercial  transactions  for  his 
principal, and consequently from that fact the principal became 
liable.  Moreover, we  note the stress which  is laid  upon  the 
phrase  'the  cours  of  Marchaundice'.  The whole  fabric  of 
commercial dealings rested upon  the validity of  such arrange- 
ments ; and it was the chancellor rather than the judges who 
gave recognition to the claims of the '  lex mercatoria '. 
'  VII. 112, Cases,  p. 14.  Probably this case is in equity because  the 
facts are so in dispute.  Note that petitioner asks for a subpoena  against 
the agent as well as the principal. 
XXVIII. 210, Cases, p.  178 ; XXIX. 317 (Goods were sold to Thomas 
Savage '  in the name of  Roger Chedwyk .  .  .  the same Thomas at  that tyme 
beyng  Factour and  attourney  to  the  same  Roger. .  .  whiche  Thomas 
occupied  at that  tyme all feates of  marchaundises  at Andewarp .  .  .  as 
Factour and Attourney of the seid Roger, And so he there was taken and 
reputed . .  .'  Roger refused to pay, and the vendor appeals to equity). 
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But this is not all.  One petition, at  least, shows a recogni- 
tion of  the rights  of  an undisclosed  principal.  A's  servant 
bought goods of  B, using A's  money.  The servant died, and 
B refused  to deliver  the goods to A.  A came to equity and 
prayed for a s,ubpoena against B, alleging that the servadt had 
acted  in  his behalf  and made  the purchase with his money.' 
It does  not  appear  that  B  knew  he was  dealing indirectly 
with  A.  The undisclosed  principal was  unprotected  at law 
till  much  later.2  It is  surely interesting  that  he  seeks  to 
obtain relief in equity at an earlier period. 
Again, there is recognition of the obligation of the principal 
on a broader ground.  A principal could  be bound by the act 
of his  agent, though the authority were given  by par01,~  and 
though that authority were given subsequent to the act.  There 
is what appears to be a clear case of ratification.  A son made 
an obligation assuming to bind his father.  Whether or no he 
had  authority  at the time  of  making  the obligation  is not 
certain, but afterwards the father acknowledged and expressly 
sanctioned  the son's  act.  The chancellor  decreed  that  he 
should be held.J 
SECTION  X.  GUARANTEE  (SURETYSHIP)  AND 
INDEMNITY 
The petitions  which  we are to consider under this heading 
do not present such  nice  questions of  discrimination.between 
guarantee and indemnity as later arose in  connexion with the 
construction  of  the fourth section  of  the Statute of   fraud^.^ 
The facts are simple, and the classification  is not perplexing. 
Briefly  stated, a  contract of  guarantee or suretyship implies 
a  relation  between  three parties ; the creditor can fall  back 
'  VII. 201. 
See Holmes, History of  Agency, Anglo-Am. iii. 392, citing Scrimshire 
v. Alderton, 2 Strange I 182. 
See XLIV. 163 (Relief on a 'promise to save har9lese ', made by an 
agent for his principal). 
'  XXIX. 13-4, Cases, pp. 214-19.  There were other facts in the case, as 
will appear later in the discussion.  The 'bill ' made by the son was merely 
in proof of  the furnishing of goods ; but it was allowed as a set-off against 
the father.  The son expressly says he acted throughout as agent (XXIX. 
No.  9). 
e.g. Sutton v. Grey [1894] I Q.B.  285 ;  63 L. J. (Q.  B.)  633. 
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upon  the promisor  only in  case  the principal  debtor makes 
default.  In other words, the promisor's liability is contingent 
and secondary.  An indemnity, on the other hand, is a promise 
to save another harmless  from any liability through a trans- 
action into which he enters at  the request of the promisor? 
Neither  guarantee  nor  indemnity were valid  by parol at 
common law in the fifteenth  century.  Though there is evidence 
that  a  contract  of suretyship  might  have  been  established 
without a writing in the Norman period,qt became settled by 
the reign of  Edward I11 that a deed was neces~ary.~  Indeed, 
it appears from an interesting  case in the Eyre of  Kent  that 
resort  was had to the clumsy  method  of  making the surety 
a principal debtor by affixing his seal to the bond.4  Certainly 
this would  not  have  been  attempted, had  it been possible to 
charge  him  without  writing.  The  common  law  therefore 
appears  to have  repudiated  any  nice  distinction  between 
primary  and  secondary  liability.  At all  events, the  parol 
contract  of  guarantee  was  not  recognized  till  the time  of 
Henry  VIII.6  Nor  was  indemnity  a  valid  parol  contract 
during our period. 
We turn, therefore,  with  some interest  to the petitions in 
equity.  Those involving indemnity are  quite numerous ; I can 
present but a few relating to suretyship." 
I. Coatract of Sz~retyship  or Guarantee. 
1443-450.7  One Lawrence Walker bought cloth of petitioner 
for £8, '  for whiche payment as woll and trewely to be made.. . 
(defendant) . . .  undurtoke  and bykome borowe for the seide 
Lawrence, in as muche as the seide supliant nold nothur  have 
'  Anson, Contracts (11th ed.),  74. 
?  See Holmes, Common Law, 260, citing Glanv. x, c.  5. 
Y.  B. 44 Ed. I11 21-3  (cited Holmes, Common Law, 264, n. 4). 
*  Bokeland v. Leanore, Y. B. 6 & 7 Ed. 11.  [S. S.] 9. 
V.  B.  B.  12 H.VII1, Mich. pl. 3 ;  27 H. VIII, Mich. pl.3  (cited Holds- 
worth, iii. 342, n. 4). 
This is not to be understood  to  mean  that  there were very few such 
petitions ;  rather that in the limited  time at my disposal I was only able 
to transcribe a few. 
XIV.  5, Cases, p. 188.  Certain phrases in the petition seem to indicate 
that' the defendant was primarily liable ; if that were so, this would not be 
a case of suretyship.  However, reading the pleading as a whole, I inter- 
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sold nor delyverode the seide clothe unto  the seide Lawrence 
butt  only uppon  trust  of  the seide  . . .'  (defendant).  .t'3 
remained  unpaid.  The debtor  has gone  to estrange  places 
unknowen',  and petitioner,  having  no  remedy  against  the 
defendant at common  law, comes to the chancellor and prays 
to '  have dewe remedy '. 
c. 1475.~  Petitioner sold kerseys to Thomas Ashley for £10  ; 
and for security of  payment 'Thomas Goselyn at the time  of 
the makyng of  the said bargayn was and became  suerte  . . . 
(to petitioner)  . . . and then  graunted  and promittid to the 
same  William  (petitioner)  that if  the seid Thomas Asshley 
paid  not to hym  the seid x li . . .  that then the seid Thomas 
Gosselyn wold pay . . .'  Petitioner is particular  to state that 
he  sold the kerseys trusting to Gosselyn's promise.  Ashley 
paid  A5  and  then went  to ' places  unknowen ', and Gosselyn 
refused  to  pay.  Petitioner  prays  for  a  subpoena  against 
Gosselyn.  Gosselyn in his answer  sets up other facts, tending 
to show that the original debt is discharged. 
We cannot draw strong inferences from two petitions.  Two 
facts, however, should be noted.  The creditor alleges in each 
case that he  extended  credit  only upon  the strength of  the 
defendant's  promise.  Again, that promise was an important 
part  of  the original  transaction.  We observe,  furthermore, 
that the petitioner  has exhausted  his  remedies  against  the 
principal  debtor  before  he turns to the surety.  This seems 
to be of importance ;  for sureties did appeal to the chancellor 
because  the  creditor  is  seeking  to  hold  them,  when  the 
principal  debtors are able  to  pay,3 or  before  the principal 
debt is due.4  The remedy sought was a Certiorari.  I believe 
that a parol contract of  suretyship was recognized and enforced 
in  equity, at least  where the creditor  could  show  that the 
defendant's promise was the inducement to the extension of 
credit to  the  principal  debtor.  On  the other  hand,  equity 
was jealous  of  the surety's  rights; his  liability  was  strictly 
secondary, and he might use any defences open to the principal 
'  LIX. 140. 
LIX. 141.  He also alleges that he became  surety to petitioner only 
on  condition  that Ashley  should find  security  that he should be  saved 
harmless. 
XXIX. 462 (The surety was a joint obligor with the principal debtor. 
The creditor brought suit on the obligation at common law). 
LIX. 61. 
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debtor.'  These promises were gratuitous.  We note this in 
but reserve it for later consideration. 
2. Indemnity. 
This represents a common arrangement.  A desires a loan 
of money from B.  B, however, is unwilling to give credit to 
A alone ;  in  consequence, A goes to his friend C, and induces 
C to become jointly bound  with  him to B, at the same time 
promising to save C harmless as against B.2  Or under similar 
circumstances C might become bound separately to B.3  There 
are two distinctive features common to all these cases ;  C has 
become  bound  to B, not  for  his  own  duty but  for A's ; he 
became  bound  at A's  instance, and  relying  upon  A's  parol 
promise to save him harmle~s.~  This parol promise received 
no recognition at common law.  I believe, for reasons that will 
be stated presently, that it was enforced in equity. 
In the example above given, the promise to save harmless 
was  express.  But  it  need  not  necessarily  have  been  so. 
Indeed,  one  petitioner,  though  he  became  bound  at  the 
defendant's instance and on the faith of  his promise, puts his 
claim  to a  remedy  on  a  broader  ground; for  he asks the 
chancellor to consider ' how  that reson  and good conscience 
wold  that, sith your  seid besecher  was for  and 6y  the seid 
Thomas Oldebury (the defendant and promisor) put in charge, 
that  the same  Thomas  should  him  discharge'.-n  other 
words,  requesting one  to  become  bound  in  your  behalf  for 
j70ur duty raises an implied promise to discharge him.  And 
so we find petitioners relying upon the situation of the parties 
as their ground for equitable relief; the defendant may have 
promised  expressly to protect  them, but  they do not  allege 
any  promise  in  the petition.  The  following  extract  from 
'  This I infer from LIX. 141, p. 134, notez.  And see XXXI. 82, Cases, 
P. 96. 
-  'x. 207,  Cases, p.  184 ;  X.  242;  XIX. 224. 
XIX.  gr ;  XXXI. I 16-17 ; LIX. 104 ;  LIX. 123. 
'  Petitioners  express this in  various  ways : X.  207,  Cases, p.  184 ('at 
Instaunce and prayer of  William Brompton .  . .  And opon ful promlse to 
kepe him harrnelesse') ;  XIX. gr (Defendant promised 'on  his faith and 
troueth to keep him  harmless .  . .  for any suit  or  vexacon  that should be 
hadde .  .  .  ') ; XIX. 224 (' by the steryng request and excitacion .  .  2). 
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a petition is a fair example.  Complainant  thinks it sufficient 
to say that ' . . . where as your said besecher atte request and 
praier  of  on Thomas Mauleson was  bound  in  on obligacyon 
of  xvj li. iij s. x d. to on  John Throkmorton, Esquier, and  for 
defaute of nounpayment of the seid  soum the said'~ohn  sued 
your  said  beseecher  . . . and  now  your said  besecher  hath 
content the party . . .  and  non  parcell  of  the said  soum his 
dute but dute of  the said Thomas .  . .  '.I 
Whether the promise were express or implied the defendant 
has received a substantial benefit.  But we  may go further; 
the promisor will be made to fulfil his promise even though it 
is  gratuitous.  If  he induces  one upon  the  strength  of  his 
promise  to become bound  for the duty of  another, the chan- 
cellor will  require  him  to fulfil his promise.  This comes out 
in an interesting case, which is endorsed with judgement : 
X sold certain goods to Y for L240.  Complainants at the 
'special1 instance  and praier ' of  Z  became  bound  to X  for 
the duty of Y.  Z  promised that they should be saved harm- 
less.  Z died ; X has taken an action on the obligation against 
complainants,  and  they  are  like to have  to  pay  the  sum. 
They therefore appeal  to  the chancellor and ask that defendants 
(2's executors) may be compelled to protect them against X. 
Defendants in their answer  asserted that this was not a proper 
case for relief;  they then proceeded  to deny the facts alleged 
in  the  petition.  The chancellor, however,  after  'good and 
ripe deliberation',  ordered that the defendants should '  acquit 
and  discharge'  the  petitioners  against  X  for  the  sum,  as 
alleged in the petiti~n.~ 
XVI.  440.  In the following  cases the petitioners  allege  that  they 
became bound at the defendant's  request, but no express promise to save 
harmless is set out : X.  186 ; X.  242 ; XV. 237. 
a  XLIV. 143, Cases, p.  224. 
XLIV. 142, Cases, p. 222.  XLIV. 263  is a parallel case, but the peti- 
tion  is  not  endorsed.  The defendant,  late  Prior of  B.,  'sent  his owne 
servaunte .  . . unto your seyd Oratours that they wull do at the Instaunce of 
the same late priour so myche to be seurte and undertake  for on William 
Ecford .  . .  unto John Ellys of  London, Mercer, for the some of  [A5  13s. 4d.l 
and the same late priour grauntid be the same servaunt and messenger.. . 
to save them harmeles for the seyd some in peyne of  xl li .  . .' Petitioners 
became bound as sureties and had to pay the debt, after which  they sent 
to the defendant 'for to content us (i. e. petitioners) acordyng to his promys 
and he denyth and bed  us shewe owre  specialte, and so we  ar wt  owte 
Remady at the comon lawe of  ony accion a yenst the same late priour for 
to be taken, wyth owte your gracious lordschip . .  .'  Petitioners pray for 
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There can  be  no  doubt  about  the decision  in  this case. 
And  reasoning  back  from  this,  we  have  strong reason  to 
believe that relief was granted in the other cases.  For if  the 
chancellor  held  that one  must  fulfil  his  promise, where he 
thereby  induced  another  to become  bound  for  the duty of 
a  third party, a fortiori  he would  hold  him  to his  promise 
where the duty was his own.  It is submitted with confidence 
that  the contract of  indemnity received  clear  recognition  in 
chancery in the fifteenth century. 
As  the  promise  was  to save  the  petitioner  harmless,  it 
became  broken  the  moment  suit  was  threatened  or  begun 
against  the promisee.  Payment  of  the  obligation  was  not 
a  condition  precedent  to bringing  the  subpoena.  In  con- 
sequence,  the  relief  sought  varies  with  the  circumstances. 
Where the petitioner has been compelled to pay, he demands 
repayment  of  the  sum,l and  even  of  the costs sustained  in 
defending a suit.2  Where he  is merely threatened with  suit, 
or  in  the language of  the pleaders, is being 'vexed ', he asks 
that the promisor be compelled  to fulfil  his promise literally, 
that is, that  protection  be aff~rded.~  We have seen that the 
chancellor might so rule.4 
In conclusion, we  may remark  that the executors of  the 
promisor  were  held  to  be  bound  by the  promise,  at least 
where they had in their hands assets of the de~eased.~ 
SECTION  XI.  AGREEMENTS  OF  A  GENERAL  CHARACTER 
The following  cases,  heterogeneous as they are,  are con- 
nected  by one common trait.  The promise  is  for the per- 
formance of  a  definite  act ; the breach  of  the promise, with 
one  or  two  exceptions,  arises  through  failure  to act at all. 
The agreements are all  by parol,  and are very  informal  in 
a subpoena against the defendant, and such relief as accords with reason 
and conscience. 
IX. 41 I (The obligee '  coarted the said bisecher by processe of lawe tq 
contente him ') ;  X. 242 ;  XIX. 224 (Petitioner has been '  arted to content 
the obligee, and now  demands repayment  from  the defendant) ; XXXI. 
116-17  (Petitioner asks that defendant be compelled to pay) ; LIX.  104. 
r XVI. 440.  x.  207 ; XIX. 91 ; LIX.  123. 
'  XLIV. 142, Cases, p.  222. 
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nature.  None of the petitions is endorsed, and to that extent 
the evidence  is unsatisfactory.  But no class of  cases better 
illustrates  the  wide  scope  of  the  chancellor's  jurisdiction. 
An agreement is made to deliver a letter or to transport goods. 
For lack of formality it does hot fall within the'narrow range 
of  contracts  enforceable  by  the  common  law.  Yet  these 
contracts  must  have  been  very  common.  The absence  of 
a  postal  service  and  of  any established  system of  common 
carriers  compelled  the  employment  of  private  individuals. 
Unless these could  be held  to perform  their promises  great 
confusion  would  result.  Herein  there  was  scope  for  the 
intervention of equity.  I  have attempted in a rough way to 
classify the cases. 
I.  Agreements for Personal Services. 
(a) Promise to erect a building. 
The two following petitions  recall  many  of  the fifteenth- 
century cases in  Assumpsit, where  it was  sought to charge 
the promisor for  non-performance of  his pr0mise.l  The pro- 
misor has not begun the work and left it incomplete;  he has 
done nothing at  all.  But there is one thing which differentiates 
these petitions from  their counterparts at common  law : the 
absence of  any specific  undertaking.  In the first  case it is 
simply  said that  an agreement  was  made;  in the other the 
defendant said  that he  would  do a  certain  thing.  To dis- 
tinguish  the latter  from  an  express  undertaking  may seem 
captious,  but the famous  resolution  in  Slade's  case should 
not be forgotten. 
The church at K.  had fallen into disrepair, and an agree- 
ment  was  made with  the defendant 'q'il duist faire l'avaunt 
dite  esglise  bien  et covenablement  estre fait,  reedifie . .  .  et 
reparaille '.  He was to receive 320 marks, of which 280 have 
been paid ; but nothing has been done, and the chancel of the 
church is in  such bad  condition that it is like to fall at any 
moment, to  the  great damage of the parishioners, the petitioners. 
e.g.Y.B.aH.IV.3.g. 
4 Co. Rep., 92 a.  The judges  thought it necessary to say specifically 
that  'when one  agrees to pay money or  to deliver  anything,  thereby he 
assumes to pay or deliver it '. 
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There is no remedy at law, and the chancellor is asked to grant 
relief.' 
0. was in prison for non-payment of  damages in  an action 
of  Waste,  brought  by  petitioner  for  the  burning  of  a  mill. 
Defendant  came to petitioner and  said  that if  0. were  dis- 
charged he would rebuild the mill at his own cost.  Petitioner 
discharged O., but defendant has not  built  the mill, and still 
refuses  to do so, 'contrarie  to his seid  promyse, good feithe 
and  conciens'.  Petitioner  asks that he be . . . 'rewled  and 
Juged as good conciens requyreth '.2 
It is  not  perfectly  clear  whether  the  relief  sought  is 
damages  or  specific  performance.  Probably  in  the case of 
the  church  the  parishioners  were  seeking  to  compel  the 
defendant to fulfil  the agreement.  Even  in  modern  times 
equity  will  decree  specific  performance  of  a  contract to do 
work, under certain  circumstance^.^  Whichever remedy were 
granted, relief  would be afforded where there was no remedy 
at law. 
(b) Carriage and Delivery of  Goods. 
The absence of  any  established  system  of  transportation 
comes out vividly in the following cases.  In each, goods have 
been  entrusted to the defendant, to be conveyed  to a certain 
place. 
Petitioners are John  Lakeham  and Alice  his wife.  Lake- 
ham was in prison  in  London, and sent to his wife, who was 
then  at home  in  Sussex, asking her  to bring  his goods to 
London  so that he  might  be  'socourid  and holpe  with  his 
seide godes '.  Alice, then, ' for the gret trust . . .  that she had 
in  on John Taylour, made covenaunt' with  him  to take the 
goods  to '  Wynchilseye',  whence  they were  to be taken  to 
London by water.  Taylour  came and  took  the goods,  pro- 
mising to carry them to the destination, but instead took them 
to his own  house, where they still are.  Petitioners are desti- 
tute, and come to equity praying that they may ' be restoryd 
to there seide goodys '.4 
'  Acorde  se prist ' between  petitioner  and defendant  that 
defendant  should  carry  certain  goods  of  the  petitioner  in 
a ship from London to Colchester.  Contrary to  the '  acorde ' 
defendant took the ship to a place 'deinz  la fraunchise de la 
'  VI. 21, Cases, p.  176.  LIX. 114, Cases, p.  225. 
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count d'oxenford ', where the goods were seized '  par les officers 
le dit  count ', to the great damage of  petitioner.  He prays 
that defendant be made to find  surety to recover  the goods 
and take them to Colchester, as agreed.' 
Petitioner  delivered  to defendant  two  horges  and  certain 
goods to be delivered to his wife in  England.  Delivery was 
never made, to petitioner's damage, for which he asks remedy.2 
Petitioner  'fretta  en la nief le dit John Dekene (defendant) 
.  . .  xx  ton de frument pur deliverer a burdeux (Bordeaux) '. 
Defendant discharged the grain at Plymouth, to the damage 
of petitioner in '  C li et plus ', whereof he prays remedy.3 
These are cases of misfeasance, and it is notorious that an 
action  lay  at law,  where  there was  an  undertaking.  Why, 
then, are they  in  equity?  Probably,  in  the first  example, 
because the petitioner is in prison and in great poverty, which 
prevented his bringing an action  at law.  In the second, the 
relief  sought  is  not damages, but  that the defendant  should 
find surety to carry out the accord, that is, in  effect, specific 
performance.  In the third,  the  contract  was  made out  of 
England,4 while, in the last case, there was no specific under- 
taking.  The acceptance  of  goods for  transportation  seems 
in  equity to have implied  a  promise  to carry them  to the 
intended destination.  Such was not the case at law. 
(c)  Special Services. 
As examples of  what may be called special personal services, 
I have selected three petitions : A  desires to send a letter to 
B ; there is no  regular post, and if the letter is  to be taken 
some private person  must  be employed.  C presents himself 
and promises to take the letter.  He makes defa~lt.~  There 
is  no  definite  misfeasance,  such  as  confronts  one  in  the 
common  law  cases.  Yet, as damage has ensued  to A  from 
X.  328. 
VI. 59.  There was a further term  in  the contract: that  defendant 
might keep the horses  if  he paid  10  marks.  He  never  made such pay- 
ment.  XII. 181. 
It is alleged that there is no remedy at law, but no reason is assigned. 
XV.  52, Cases,  p.  191. The  case  is  complicated  by  other  facts ; 
namely, that the defendant was in collusion with persons who had received 
petitioners'  goods.  However,  in the prayer, they seek to charge him for 
non-delivery  of  the letter, which  seems to be the essential point.  The 
claim for Ltooo damages for the loss of  goods valued at £500  is certainly 
strange. 
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the failure to deliver the letter, there ought to be some remedy. 
Again, A's  servants are imprisoned abroad ;  A goes to B, and 
agreement  is  made  that  B  shall  ransom  the servants  and 
deliver  them out of prison.  B receives forty marks, but does 
nothing.  In consequence, the servants suffer, are '  distressez, 
stokkes et malement tretes ', because the ransom is not forth- 
c0ming.l  B, however,  is  at most  guilty  of  a  non-feasance. 
A  would  find  cold  comfort  in  seeking  to charge  him  in 
A~sumpsit.~  In these two cases it is quite clear that there is 
no  remedy  at law.  The third  case  is  not  quite  so clear. 
A 'withheld with our sovereigne lorde be kynge '  one B to do 
service on the sea.  B received  his wages from A, but never- 
theless deserted, which put A to '  right grete and notable Cost 
and  losse of  his gudes'.  It is not perfectly obvious why A 
did not have an adequate remedy at common law.3 
2.  Agreements for the Compromise of Claims, kc. 
Under this general heading I have put cases in which  the 
parties made some arrangement with regard to a suit, or sub- 
mitted themselves to an award. 
(I) Cases of  ' award '. 
(a) Promise to '  stand by' an award : 
A  and  B  are in  dispute  as to their  respective  rights  in 
certain  lands.  They  are  about  to  go to  law,  when  'by 
mediacon  of  frundis ' the parties agree to stand by the award 
of  certain  arbitrators.  The award  is  made:  A  carries  out 
his part, or stands ready so to do, but B refuses.  The  common 
law, of  course, afforded  no means  of  compulsion, but  A  can 
present a strong case in eq~ity.~ 
(b)  Promise of  arbitrators to make an award in a particular 
way : 
Certain  matters were  in  dispute  between  A  and  B,  who 
agreed  to submit  to the award  of  defendants.  Defendants 
XII.  201,  Cases, p.  188.  i. e. in the fifteenth century. 
XVI.  285 (1442).  It may  be  that, as the cause  of  action was  for 
desertion, the king would be regarded as interested.  That would explain 
the presence of  the case before the chancellor. 
A. 264 (Petitioner stands ready to perform his  part, and has paid cer- 
tain  money to  defendant) ; XV.  I 8  I a-I  81  c, Cases, pp. I  95-7  (Defendant 
in his answer says that the matter alleged  is not sufficient to put him to 
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made promise to A '  apon their feith, trouth and honeste that 
if  they made ony awarde betwyxt  the seid  parties . .  .  that 
they should  delyver  the same awards in Wrytyng' to each 
of the parties.  A, giving '  full  feithe  And credence'  to this 
promise, became bound to submit to the award.  The award 
was made, but not in writing ; and A and B fell into dispute 
as to its terms, whereupon A requested  defendants to commit 
the award to writing at his cost  'according to their promise', 
but defendants refused.  A  prayed for a subpoena and asked 
that  defendants  might  be  compelled  'to delyver  the  seide 
awarde in Wrytynge .  . . accordyng to their seid  promyse or 
else to make  certayn  reporte  therof  afore  the Kyng in  his 
Chauncerye ther to be entrid of  Recorde'.l 
The defendant's  promise  was  gratuitous,  but  it  was  the 
inducement which  led to A's  changing his  position.  More- 
over, great  damage will  ensue  to A  if  the  promise be not 
fulfilled, because of the dispute about the terms of  the award. 
(2) Agreements concerning litigation. 
A and B made an agreement that A should bring trespass 
against B, and that B should appear in person or by attorney, 
and plead as the counsel  of  A should wish ; and after judge- 
ment A  should release  damages to B.  The purpose of  this 
fictitious suit is not clear.  A  brought the action, B appeared 
and pleaded  as was  desired, with  the result that A  obtained 
judgement for £40.  Afterwards A refused to release the £40 
contrary to the agreement and '  encountre bon foie et conciens '. 
B prays for reliefm2 
A had  brought an action of  trespass  against B, for whom 
C  became  surety.  A  promised  B  to  'take  respyte  and 
sparynge of  the callyng  uppon  the said  action', till  B had 
gone abroad and returned.  B went away, and now A,  contrary 
to his promise, '  calleth  uppon  the said accion,'  and  intends 
to obtain judgement by default.  C, the surety, appeals to the 
chancellor and prays relief." 
(3)  Perfor7nance of  a  spe~zFc  act,  in geneval. 
This heading is not very happily chosen, but it may serve 
to introduce certain cases not easily classified.  The defendant 
has promised  expressly  or  by implication  to do a  certain 
thing  for  the  petitioner,  and  has  refused  subsequently  to 
do it. 
XXXI. 118.  a  X.  163.  XXXI. 82, Cases, p.  219. 
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A gave all his '  goodys and catelle ' to B, to the intent that 
B should furnish him with '  mete and drynke and cloth '  during 
his life.  B took possession of the goods, but refuses to supply 
A with meat and drink 'agens all good feith and concyense '.I 
Again, A induced B to resign his prebend, promising to make 
him  sure of  a  pension  of  the value of  the said  prebend;  B 
resigned, and A refused to fulfil his promi~e.~ 
Agreement  is  made to procure  a  release on the payment 
of 26s. ; the money is paid, but the release is not forth~oming.~ 
A  agreed  to surrender  a  patent  (Rangership  of  the  New 
Forest) so that B might obtain the same, if  B would  pay him 
£20 ;  B paid  the money, A refused  to surrender the patent.4 
'  Covenaunt  and  accord ' was  made  between  A  and  B  that 
A  should surrender  'la garde  de Stanke de Fosse deinz  le 
Counte  D'everwyk',  so  that  B  might  obtain  the  same,  in 
return for which B should  make A sure of  an annual pension 
for life.  B stood ready to perform his part, but A would not 
give up the ' garde '.5 
In these cases we have the promise of  the performance of 
an act in  return  for  money paid,  goods delivered,  or some 
act performed or to be performed.  None of  the promises are 
gratuitous ; there is clearly a consideration, but again, as the 
defendant has refused to act at all, as the contract is to that 
extent executory, the disappointed petitioner is remediless at 
common law. 
l IX.  162 (1438).  XII. 197.  XXXI. 374, Cases, p.  220. 
*  LIX. 10.  X.  276. CHAPTER  I11 
PROCEDURE  AND  PROOF 
IN  considering the chancery procedure and method of  proof 
I shall be as brief as possible.  Both  subjects have been con- 
sidered  at length  elsewhere:  and  in  this  connexion  I  wish  - 
only  to introduce  some  statements  from  the  petitions  and 
Year Books. 
I. Procedure. 
The proceedings  began  by the bill  or petition which was 
addressed  to the particular chancellor who happened  to hold 
the office, thus: 'A  tres reverent  piere en  dieu et mon tres 
gracious  Segnur,  L'erchevesque  d'everwyk  et  Chaunceller 
D'englitere.'  This title is written at the top of the petition, 
and in a rather large hand.  Usually, the petitioner identifies 
the chancellor whom  he  is  addressing  by describing him  as 
the Bishop of  York or Canterbury, &c., as the case may be ; 
this  furnishes, generally speaking, the only means  of  deter- 
mining  the  date  of  the  petition.  Where  a  chancellorship 
extended  over a long period, or where a Bishop  of  the same 
diocese was chancellor at widely separated times, the problem 
of  settling  the period  in  which  the particular  petition  falls 
becomes very  difficult.  For example, Thomas de Arundel, 
Archbishop  of  Canterbury, was  chancellor  in  1399 ; John 
Staff~rd,~  Archbishop  of  Canterbury,  was  chancellor  from 
1443 to 1450.  Now  if a petition is  simply addressed to the 
'Archbishop  of  Canterbury',  it  may  be  very  difficult  to 
determine which Archbishop  is  meant, unless there  chances 
to be  some  statement  in  the petition  which  in  itself  fixes 
e.g. Spence, Equit. Jurisdict. of  the Court of  Chancery; Kerly, His- 
tory of  Equity (Yorke Prize Essay, 1889). 
VII. 250, Cases,  p.  179. 
John Stafford was chancellor  from 1432 to 1450,  but  during the first 
eleven years he was Bishop of  Bath and Wells. 
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a date.'  Again, there are petitions addressed  to the ' Chan- 
cellor of  England' without any further descripti~n.~ 
The petitions  are very much  alike in  form.  They consist 
often of  only  one  long and  involved sentence which  recites 
informally  the  wrong  complained  of,  and  concludes  with 
a prayer for relief.  Great particularity of  statement was not 
required ; '  en  cest  court ',  remarked  a  chancellor,  'il  n'est 
requisite que le bille soit tout en certein solonque le solemnity 
del  comon ley, car icy  il  n'est  forsque petition, etc.'  The 
demand for relief is commonly in general terms, but it almost 
always  comprises  a  request  that  the chancellor  cause  the 
defendant  to come into chancery and be examined upon  the 
matter alleged in the petition.  The petitioner usually asserts 
in  this  connexion  that  he  is  without  remedy at law.  The 
following exatllple is typical :  '  Que please a vostre tres reverent 
paternite  et gracious  Seignurie,  graunter  brief  direct  a1  dit 
Mark (defendant) pur apparere devant vous a certein jour sur 
peyn par vous alymyter, d'estre examine de les matiere suisditz 
et sur son examinacion  luy ensy iustifier et govourner que le 
dit Suppliant purra  aver  ceo qe reson  et bon  concience de- 
maundent  en  celle partie, Considerant  tres  gracious Seignur 
que le dit Suppliant ne poet mye aver remedie en ceo cas a la 
comune ley, et ceo pur dieu et en evre de   ha rite.'^  At the 
end of the petition are usually placed the names of  the persons 
who stand as pledges (flegii de prosequendo) for the petitioner. 
This was occasioned by a statute of  Henry VI,6 which decreed 
that no writ of subpoena should issue until the petitioner had 
found sureties to satisfy the defendant for his damages in case 
the allegations made in the petition were not proven. 
The Subpoena was the writ usually asked for, though we do 
find requests for a Certiorari or Corpus cum causa when it was 
desired to remove a suit  from the common law courts, or to 
obtain relief  from  a judgement.  In response  to the writ the 
defendant  appeared.  At first he appears to have  been  ex- 
amined  at once orally;  but  at length  the practice  arose of 
Wherever petitions are endorsed, the date can usually be fixed from the 
endorsement. 
e. g. Bundles LXVIII-LXXV. 
IV. 100, Cases, 6.  173. 
Y.  B.  9 Ed. IV. 41. 26. 
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putting  in  an  answer  in  writing.  The answer  commonly 
begins by a  protestation  against  the sufficiency of  the bill, 
which  is  followed  by a  traverse  of  the chief  allegations  in 
the petition,  and  the defendant's  statement of,his own case. 
To the answer  the petitioner  might  reply by replication,  to 
which  in  turn  the  defendant  might  put  in  a  rej0inder.l 
I  do  not  know  of  any  case  in  the  Early  Chancery  Pro- 
ceedings  in  which  there  are more than  four pleadings, but 
there  was  nothing  to prevent  the parties  from  proceeding 
f~rther.~ 
After examining  the pleadings  and hearing  the evidence 
introduced  by  the  parties  the chancellor  pronounced  his 
decree.  Probably this decree was made verbally, and in most 
cases no record was made of it.  Chancery was not a court of 
record.  In one case a chancellor said  that'it was customary 
in chancery to grant a certain kind of  relief, '  car nous trovoms 
recorde en le chancery de tiels' ;  again, the cancellation  of 
an obligation  is  ordered  to  be  'inrolled  on  the  record  in 
chancery '  (in  CnnceZlaria . . .  de  recoydo  irrotulari faciat). 
I  do not know what these statements mean, unless they refer 
to the endorsements on  petitions.  Of  a record as such  there 
was  none; and, as has already been  remarked,  the endorse- 
ments are few and far between. 
It is  needless  to say anything further of  the kind  of  relief 
granted.  That will  be apparent from what has been said in 
the preceding chapter.  Chancery of  course acted in personam ; 
the only relief  it could grant took the form of  an order to the 
defendant.  The court could  not  nullify  a  bond ; it  might 
enjoin a defendant from bringing suit upon an obligation, but if 
he chose to be obstinate, it could do nothing except imprisoll 
him.  The common  law judges  resented  the use  of  the in- 
junction,  and in one memorable case  they actually  advised 
a  plaintiff  in  an action  at law  to proceed  to judgement  in 
defiance of  the chancellor's order, saying that if he should be 
imprisoned  in  the Fleet they would  release him  by writ  of 
'  e. g. XIX. 59-56,  Cases, pp.  199-203. 
Vn  the case of  HaZs  et  aZ.  v.  Hyncley,  the pleadings  continued  to 
a surreioinder.  Pike. Common Law and Conscience .  .  . ,  L. Q. R.,  i. 443. 
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Habeas corpus?  This is a threat which, so far as I know, was 
never  carried  out ;  in general,  the intervention  of  chancery 
seems to have been successful. 
11.  Proof. 
In the petition  the complainant  frequently offers to testify 
himself, or to introduce evidence in his own behalf, even going 
so far as to offer to prove his statements 'as this court  will 
award '.2  Payment is alleged in the presence of witne~ses,~  or 
it is said that it was made '  come certeinment par recordez des 
gentz dignes de foi  et as quelx foi est done, devant vous sera 
monstre  Another  complainant avers that his  statements 
are  true '  os  the  ful  reverent  fader  in  god,  the  bishop  of 
Lincoln, in whos presence this covenaunt and acorde was made, 
wole recorde '.6  In short, he takes pains to state that he has 
abundant evidence of the truth of his  statement^.^ 
In the matter of  proof,  a  petitioner  in  chancery had  one 
conspicuous advantage over a plaintiff  at common law.  This 
lay  in the examination  of  the  defendant  under  oath.  We 
have noted that the petitions uniformly ask for an examination 
of  the defendant, and it is common to find it alleged that the 
defendant has already admitted the case against him.  Thus 
it is said that the defendant 'a fore worthy men  hath  know- 
ledged  the dewete and payment to be made to youre seyde 
suppliant ','  or that '  pe  seid  John Loget  (defendant)  before 
notable  persones  hath  knowledged  pe  seid  x  pound  to be 
Y.  B. 22 Ed. IV. 37. 21. 
XIX. 57, Cases, p.202.  . .--  SIX. 121.  '  VI. 161.  QXXIXX:~~,  Cases, p.  221. 
-11.  79 (' Si come mesme le suppliant par pluys notables et sufficiant 
homes de le dit paroche loialment purra prover') ; XVI. 334 (' Accorde of 
mariage was taken and appoynted . . .  in recorde and wittenesse of  many 
thryfty gentilmen') ; XIX. 345,  Cases, p  204 (' Heruppon n~y  wife and I 
will swere uppon  the sacrement that thls is true that we  swere and her- 
upon will bring . . .  (six parties named) . . .  and xxti good men mo to con- 
ferme this true that  my  wife  and I will  swere ') ; XXVIII. 210,  Cases, 
p.  212 (Petitioner has a bill of  a debt, 'testifying the same after the cours 
of  Marchaundice')  ; LIX. 212 (Petitioner alleges the defendant admits he 
owes money, 'ag he hath many times confessed  and seid unto divers per- 
sones which can and wol  testifye the same').  In Y. 13. 22 Ed. IV. 6.  18, 
reference is made to two witnesses  against a matter of  record.  I do not 
think there is any significance in the number. 
-.- 
' XI. 47, Cases, p. 186. 
Y.$.  22 Ed. IV.'~.  18.  XXIX. 13, Cases, p.  214. CONTRACT  IN  EQUITY 
dewe .  .  . as it is above seid '.I  Petitioners even ask that the 
defendants be examined '  et solonc lour respounse a doner iuge- 
ment  solonc ceo que loialte, foy et conscience dema~ndent',~ 
and  there  is record  of  a  decree  which  was  based  primarily 
upon  admissions  made  by the defendants  in the course of 
their  e~amination.~  In  this  the chancery  had  a  powerful 
method for discovering the truth. 
Perhaps the method of  proof  in chancery can be best  seen 
from  one illustrative  case.  The facts were  extremely com- 
plicated, and as the case has already been considered  I shall 
not  restate them.  The defendant,  in  his  answer:  traversed 
all the material allegations in  the petition, and these were re- 
affirmed by the petitioner  in  his  repli~ation.~  Both  parties 
stated that they were ready to prove  their statements as the 
court should  award.  Then  follows  a  series of  depositions : 
the deposition of  John Powele and John Glasse, ' made in  the 
presence  of  my Iord  Chaunceler  at the  More . . . by their 
othes upon a hoke';' 'the deposition of William Nyngel*  ('The 
seid William Nynge, sworn and dywely examyned before my 
Iord Chaunceler in the playn  Court of  Chauncery ') ;  the de- 
position  of  William  Aphowell,  ' afore  the  Maister  of  the 
rollez ' ;  the deposition of  Stephen Stychemerssh the yonger, 
'made  before  George, Archebisshopp of  Yorke,  primat  and 
Chaunceller of  Englond ' ;  lo the deposition of  William Elyot, 
petitioner, in support of his own petition ;  "  the deposition of 
Robert Talbot;12 the  declaration  of  Stychemerssh the elder 
(defendant), in  support of  his answerJ3  The decree14 runs : 
'  Memorandum quod pro eo quod, ista peticione ac responsione 
ad eandem facta et replicatione  in hac parte habita, necnon 
desposicionibus et testimoniis tam ex parte .  .  .  (of petitioner) 
. .  .  quam ex parte .  . .  (of  defendant) . .  .  in  premissis coram 
domino  Rege  in  Cancellaria  sua  factis  et habitis,  lectis  et 
auditis,  ac materia in  eisdem  plenius  intellectis  (sic),  visum 
X. 76.  LXVIII. 49. 
LIX. 285,  Cases, p.  232. 
XXIX. 12, Cases, p.  216. 
XXIX. 11, Cases, p.  218. 
XXIX. 8, Cases, p.  218. 
XXIX. 6, Cases, p. 219. 
XXIX.  4, Cases, p.  219. 
'  Su@ra,  p.  132. 
XXIX. 10, Cases, p.  2x7. 
QXIX.  9, Cases, p. 218. 
lo XXIX. 7, Cases, p. 218. 
l2  XXIX. 5, Cases, p.  219. 
"  XXIX. 13,  Cases, p.  214. 
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est  Curie  Cancellarie predicte . .  .'  that  the  petitioner  had 
proved  the allegations  in  his  petition,  &c. ; an  order  was 
made accordingly. 
-. 
From  this case and  others  we gain some insight into the 
method  of examination  in  chancery.  The party or  witness 
appeared '  in  his  proper  person'  in  the  chancery,  and  was 
examined before the chancellor or the Master of  the Rolls, or 
some person properly qualified.  The examination was under 
oath ;  it is sometimes said to be on the ~acrament,~  sometimes 
'  on  a  boke '.3  If the defendants lived at some distance from 
London, or were  ill and unable to appear, a  commission  by 
a writ of Dedimus potestatem * would be granted to take the 
defendant's answer  and also to examine witnesses.  A  certi- 
ficate of  the answer and testimony would  then be taken into 
chancery. 
The care which the chancellor exercised in ascertaini~g  the 
true state of a case is evident from such documents as these. 
Evidence  verbal  or written  was  placed  on the same footing, 
but  the chancellor compelled a petitioner  to prove his  case. 
If he deemed the evidence insuficient or conflicting, he would 
call  for  more,6 and  no  decree  could  be  had  until  it  was 
produced.  There do not  appear to have been  any rules of 
evidence nor  presumptions as to the burden  of  proof.  The 
whole proceeding was thoroughly inf~rmal.~ 
'  e. g. XIX. 354d-354 e,  Cases, pp. 206-207. 
XIX. 345, Cases, p.  204. 
XIX. 354 4 Cases, p. 206  (Examination of  David  Gogh). 
'  10 S. S. xxvii-xxviii ;  and see XXV.  11  I.  I 10 (10 S. S. 141-2). 
Y.  B.  16 Ed. IV. 9.  10. 
1 have omitted consideration of  those cases  in which an issue of  fact 
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CHAPTER  IV 
THE THEORY  OF  CONTRACT IN CHANCERY 
IN  the fragmentary view of the jurisdiction of  equity which 
is presented in the preceding chapters  we  have noticed  very 
summarily some of  the principles  which  underlay the inter- 
vention of the chancellor.  It  now becomes necessary to  gather 
these together and present them as a whole.  Such a task one 
must approach with great diffidence, and with t'he consciousness 
that the danger of  error is very great.  In the first place, the 
extent of  the equitable jurisdiction  in contract is a matter of 
considerable uncertainty.  Few of  the petitions  are endorsed 
with judgement.  In the majority of cases, it has been necessary 
to fall  back  on  inference  and  to sketch probabilities.  But 
secondly, even if  one knew precisely what the chancellor did, 
it would still be difficult to determine the principles  on which 
he acted.  Herein the student of  the common law has a con- 
spicuous  advantage.  The Year  Books  give not  alone  the 
decision  of  a  case,  but  the discussion  and arguments which 
preceded it.  The contentions  of  counsel, the pointed  inter- 
jections  of  the judges and the comments of  the reporters are 
excellent material out of which to frame a theory. 
In equity, unhappily, it is otherwise.  Beyond an occasional 
case  involving  a  subpoena  which  has crept  into  the Year 
Books, we have no reports ; there are only the bare pleadings 
which came before the chancellor.  These are drawn often by 
petitioners unskilled  in  legal technicalities  and forms ;  for in 
many  cases  the  litigant  drafted  his  own  petition.  Equity 
gave  judgement  'secundum  conscientiam  et non  secundum 
allegata ',I a fact which doubtless accounts for ;the looseness of 
phrasing and ungainly diffuseness of  many complaints.  The 
facts are often  presented  carelessly, the demand  for relief  is 
vague, and even  where a  petition is endorsed  there  is  slight 
indication  of  the  process  of  reasoning  which  leads  to the 
decision.  Confessedly, any theory which  can be put  forward 
must  be  built  up of  fragments ; it  cannot  go  beyond  the 
inherent limitations of the material. 
Absence  of Remedy  at  Law. 
The primary limitation imposed on the use of the subpoena 
lay  in  the fact  that it could  be  brought  only  in  case  the 
petitioner could  show  an absence of  remedy at 1aw.l  The 
burden of establishing this  fact lay upon  the petitioner ;  if  he 
failed  to make out such  a  case  the  bill  must  be dismissed. 
Such, at all events, was the theory.  However, .the chancellor 
did  not  interpret  this  limitation  strictly ; he  recognized  a 
variety  of  circumstances  which  might  produce  a  failure  of 
legal  remedy, and if  the constant  complaint of  serjeants and 
judges  is any criterion, we  may assume that in  spite of  this 
limitation  he found means  of  invading  what  was  regarded 
as  the  peculiar  domain  of  the  common  law.  It becomes 
important, therefore, to  observe in what, as a matter of practice, 
absence of  remedy at law consisted. 
I. First  and  foremost  are  the  cases  which  did  not  fall 
within  the class of  any contracts recognized  by the common 
law.  Such, for  example, were  par01  agreements  which  lay 
outside the scope of Debt ;  in fact, these include all the informal 
agreements  which  were  later  protected  by  Assumpsit, and 
some others besides. 
2.  Cases in  which  the technicalities  of  procedure or proof 
prevented  a  remedy  being  given  in  a  particular  case.  Of 
these  we  may  instance  as  examples,  suits by one  partner 
or executor2 against another ; suits to recover  debts proven 
Y.  B.  39 H. VI.  26.38 (per Jenney) : 'cest action de Subpaena ciens 
ne gist mes ou il n'y  ad ascun remedy a le Comone Ley : donque il  suera 
en cest Court de conscience '.  This does  not  apply to petitions brought 
by the king, or by officers of  the chancery. 
a  Cf. X.  151  (Petitioqer and defendant were both appointed executors by 
the will of the testator.  The defendant was in possession of an obligation 
which belonged to the testator, and though he refused to take  part in the 
administration of  the estate he would not give up the obligation.  In con- 
sequence, the petitioner could not recover  the debt  due to the estate, nor 
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by sealed  instruments  which  have  been  lost  or  destroyed ; 
suits by the assignee of a chose in action. 
3.  Cases  in  which  the  inequality  of  the  parties,  or  the 
failure of common law process, resulted in the practical denial 
of a remedy. 
4.  Cases  in  which  a  remedy was  given  at law, but it was 
insufficient. 
This is exemplified by the suits to recover specific chattels, 
and for the specific performance of  contract.' 
This classification is  intended to be suggestive rather than 
exhaustive.  Absence of remedy at law formed the condition 
precedent to the use  of  a  subpoena; but  it does  not follow 
that  the  chancellor  granted  relief  in  every  case  in  which 
a  petitioner  would  have been  helpless  at law.  True, Arch- 
bishop Morton in the heat of argument declared emphatically 
that  no  one who  came  to chancery  should  leave the court 
without a remedy,2 but  this  rough-hewn  clerical  maxim was 
never  intended  to be  interpreted  literally.  Rather does  it 
suggest  the  motive  which  prompted  the chancellor's  inter- 
vention, and of this we must say a few words. 
The Motive of  the Chancellor. 
In an interesting case, of  which there is fortunately a com- 
paratively  full report, the chancellor  set out certain  specific 
cases in which relief would be granted by subpoena.  Mordant, 
counsel  for  the defendant, immediately generalized these in- 
stances,  and  affirmed  that  the  jurisdiction  of  the court  of 
chancery was  dependent  upon  breach  of  ~onfidence.~  The 
chancellor, however, refused to accept 'breach of  confidence' 
as the sole ground of  appeal  to equity ;  instantly he cited an 
could he secure the obligation by bringing Detinue against the defendant ; 
for he could not bring suit against the defendant at law). 
Of  course it is to be  noted  that the chancellor enforced specific per- 
formance of  contracts before the common law  had  developed  an action 
ap licable to par01 contract. 
rY. B. 4 H. VII. 4.8. 
'MorrEnnt : In touts les cases per Monseignur le Chancellor ils sont 
mesles oves confidence, et pur ceo qu'il  n'ad ascun remedy per le Comon 
Ley, uncore sur le confidence que les parties mettrent in les autres a avoir 
les choses accordant a le covenant  entre eux . .  .  est bon donscience qu'il 
sera aide per cest Court. . .'  Y.  B.  7 H. VII. 10.  2. 
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example  which  suggested  a  wider  principle : '  If one has no 
writing (i. e. deed) and his debtor dies, there is no remedy by 
the common  law ; nevertheless  here by this court of  con- 
science  he will  have  a  remedy.'  Huse  and  Bryan  JJ. 
accepted  the  implication ; for  the  reporter  is  particular  to 
note  that  they  affirmed  clearly  that  a  remedy  existed  in 
conscience where there was none at  common law.3 
This remark of  the chancellor becomes significant when we 
remember  the  social  conditions  of  the  fifteenth  ~entury.~ 
Feudalism was beginning to give way, but one of  its greatest 
monuments, the common law, had yet to shake off the shackles 
of  its origin.  Not  only was  there a  revival  of  culture, but 
a  tremendous  impetus was  given  to commercial  enterprise. 
One has only  to read  the calendars of  chancery to discover 
the introduction of  a strong foreign element  in English trade 
and  commerce.  Agreements  and  arrangements  of  daily 
occurrence  demanded  recognition;  but  a  system  of  law 
inextricably interwoven  with  tenure in  land could  not easily 
adapt itself  to a changing environment.  The deficiencies  of 
the common law became the more apparent as trade increased ; 
merchants  were  not  prepared  to embody their  contracts  in 
a highly technical form.  The  very essence of business develop- 
ment lies in  the possibility of  fluid  and formless agreements 
which may be easily made and easily changed. 
Nor was it only the commercial class which felt the restraint 
of a rigid and unyielding system of law.  There were hosts of 
' accords ' and '  bargains ' among people  of  humble life, who 
from ignorance or  lack of means did  not observe the techni- 
calities of  legal  forms.  The parties  agree  to sell  land,  or 
to make a marriage settlement ; there is no clerk or '  learned 
man'  present,  and  the agreement  remains formless because 
there  is  no one of sufficient skill to incorporate it in  a  deed. 
The reality of  agreement  is present,  but  it  lacks  the sacra- 
l  The Year Book  reads '  in l.  I have  translated  otherwise because  of 
the common reference to chancery as the '  court of  conscience '.  Perhaps 
a  better  rendering  would  bZ  : ' .  .  .  by  this court  (i. e.  chancery) he will 
have a remedy in conscience '.  The meaning is the same in either case. 
Y.  B. 7 H. VII. 10. 2.  Idern. 
'  See Vinogradoff, L. Q. R., xxiv. 373. I54  CONTRACT  IN EQUITY  [PART  11 
mental mantle of form.  And so the bargain is no bargain at 
law.  It needed  the touch  of  humanism  to render the law 
sensitive to the practical needs of the fifteenth century. 
It was  this  breach  which  the chancery  undertook to fill. 
Behind  the scattered remarks of  the chancellors, behind  the 
petitions themselves, we  see the motive which prompted  the 
relief:  the desire, namely, in the interests of  commerce, and, 
if  you will, of the community at large, to supply the defects, 
the '  gaps '  of the common law.  Let us  look  at them again 
by way of  rksumk. 
Money  is  lent  abroad.  The common  law  cannot  take 
jurisdiction,  but  equity  intervenes.  Services  are  rendered 
or goods are sold, but no definite recompense  is  agreed upon 
by the parties;  services are rendered  to a  third  party at the 
request of  the defendant ;  a  debt  is  assigned  by parol;  an 
obligation which proves  a debt is lost or mislaid.  In all such 
cases the creditor will  fail  if  he brings  Debt ; in  chancery 
he finds a remedy.  Again, a foreign merchant  is temporarily 
in London ; his ship is unfreighted in the dock, and he cannot 
wait to bring suit at law.  The chancellor takes cognizance of 
his claim  and provides a speedy remedy.  A debtor acknow- 
ledges  a  debt by signing a  bill  'testifyinge  the same after 
the course of  Marchaundice ' ;  subsequently he refuses to pay 
' contrary to the Cours of  trewe Marcha~ndice'.~  The proof 
is insufficient at law ; it is accepted  in chancery.  Constantly 
in  the chancery petitions we  find  references  to the customs 
of  merchants,  the ordinary  course  of  commercial  dealings, 
which, while sufficient as business transactions, failed to meet 
the  requirements  of  the  common  law.  In  a  well-known 
passage  the chancellor  treated the law merchant as synony- 
mous with the law of nature which it was his peculiar duty to 
observe, and  one cannot  read  the petitions without  feeling 
Cf. the remark of  the chancellor in Y. B.  13 Ed. IV.  9.  5 : ' Cest suit 
est pris par un  marchant  alien  que est  venue par  safe conduct icy, et il 
n'est  tenuz de suer solonque le ley,de le terre a tarier le trial de xij homes, 
et autres solempnities de le ley de terre, mes doit sues'icy, et serroit deter- 
mine solonque le ley de nature en le chancery et il doit suer la de heur en 
heur et de jour pur le sped des Marchants . . ' 
XSVIII. 210.  Y.B.  13Ed.1V.g. 5 (adfin.). 
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convinced that merchants appealed to him with the conviction 
that they would secure a ready hearing.' 
Again,  a  vendor  agrees  to convey  land  on  the  payment 
of  the  purchase  price.  The money  is  paid  over,  but  the 
vendor breaks the agreement.  Land  is promised  by way of 
a  marriage settlement, the  marriage is  performed,  but  the 
promise remains unfulfilled.  In neither case will the common 
law aid  the disappointed  promisee.  In both  cases  he finds 
relief in equity.  We might continue to note particular exam- 
ples,  but  those  which  have  been  given  must  suffice.  The 
point we wish to stress is this: as one traces the chancellor's 
jurisdiction  step by step, one finds  that equity  is  continually  -. 
providing, or endeavouring to provide, for such cases as were 
neglected  by  common  law, wherever  some  general  interest 
would  derive  benefit  from  their  recognition.  This  is  the 
motive which stirred the chancellor to action. 
The mere fact, however, that the common law provided no 
remedy for a particular case was not in itself enough to induce 
the  chancellor  to intervene.  Something  else  must  exist. 
And so we find  that  a  petitioner  always bases  his claim  for 
relief  on  a  principle,  ordinarily  expressed  by  two  words, 
'  reason  and  conscience'.  The  ordinary  phrasing  of  the 
petitions  is  easily  seen  from  one  or  two  examples.  The 
defendant  has  promised  to  convey  land  on  marriage, but 
he has broken  his  promise; the petitioner  asks  that he be 
made to '  appere afore you (i. e. the chancellor) in pe Chancel- 
lerie  of  our  lord  pe  kyng  atte  a  certain  day and  upon  a 
certeyne peyne by you to be lymyted, there to aunswere unto 
]>e  seid premisses  and pere mak hyni do pat good  feith, rig/tt 
and  conscience aske and require, for pe love of  god and by way 
of charite. . . .'  Another asks that the defendant be brought 
into  chancery  by subpoena  and  there examined  'issint  quc 
'  The desire  to protect  merchants,  especially  foreign  merchants, was 
responsible  for  many  interventions of  the chancellor.  It even  had  an 
effect upon the common law of  the fifteenth  century.  For example, the 
doctrine that '  a bailee might be guilty of  theft if  he "determined the bail- 
ment " before he misappropriated the goods .  . .  seems to have been force? 
upon the judges by the chancellor for the satisfaction of foreign merchants  . 
P. & M.,  ii.  179, note 2. 
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remedie  ent  soit  fait  a  dit suppliant  solonc  ceo que  reson 
et concience demaundent. . .  .'  The statements above given 
are fairly typical of  the whole of the chancery material.2  The 
particular  form  of  expression  may  vary,  but  the  principle 
alluded  to is  the same.  Wherever  a  matter  qf conscience 
arises, remedy is  to  be  found  in chancery, though  there be 
none at law.3 
Reason and Conscience. 
The use of  these words was no peculiarity of the chancery. 
We find common law judges referring to matter of conscience 
and right:  but conscience as a principle is  found in  chancery 
alone.  To the  lawyer  schooled  in  the  traditions  of  the 
common law, the operation of this principle seemed too much 
a matter of  whim and  caprice.  The chancellor's disregard of 
precedent, his tendency to isolate a particular case and decide 
it upon principles of  natural justice, appeared to open the door 
to wanton  interference with  the  law  of  the land.  In  one 
of the sixteenth-century tracts a '  Serjaunte  at the lawes of 
England'  complains  bitterly  of  what  appears  to  him  the 
haphazard action of chancery.  And what is this '  conscience ' 
which avails the chancellor ? he asks.  It is '  a thinge of  great 
uncertaintie;  for some  men  thinke  that  if  they treade upon 
two strawes that lye acrosse, that they ofende in  conscience, 
and some man  thinketh  that if  he lake money and another 
hath too moche that he may take part of his with conscience ; 
and so divers men divers conscience ;  . . .  so me  seemeth, that 
VII. 250, Cases, p.  179. 
e. g. IV. 100,  Cases, p. 173 ('que le dit suppliant purra aver ceo qe reson 
et bon conscience demaundent ') ; X. 39 (' de faire droit  a dit  suppliant 
solonc ceo  que droit,  bon  foy et conscience  demaundent ') ; XV.  14oa, 
Cafes, p.  192  ('to do and receyve pat gude fath and consiens requireth ') ; 
XIX. 404 a, Cases,  p. 207  (I contrary to  all good  feith and conscience ') ; 
LIX. I 14, Cases, p.  225 (The defendant' refuses to build a mill, '  contrarie 
to his seid promyse, good feithe and conciens ' ; petitioner asks that he be 
'rewled and juged as good conciens requyreth ') ; LIX. 117, Cases, p. 226 
(' contrarie to his seid promyse and good conciens'). 
Cf. Brooke, Abr., Parlenzent et Statutes, 33 : ' .  . .  ou matter est enconter 
reason  et le party n'ad  remedy a le common  ley il  suera pur  remedy in 
parliment, et nota que a ceo iour plures de ceux suitz sont en le court de 
Chauncerie'.  The reference  is  to  37  Ass.  pl.  7,  but  it  appears  to be 
incorrect. 
'  e. g.  Newton  C.J. in Y.B.  20 H. VI. 34. 4. 
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if the kinges  subjects be constrayned  to be  ordered  by the 
discretion  and  conscience  of  one  man,  they  should  be  put 
to a greate uncertaintie. .  .  .' 
Some utterances  of  the chancellor, as reported in the Year 
Books, seem to give pertinence  to this criticism, if  they  are 
read  as unrelated  statements.  The principle  enunciated  is 
often vague and indefinite ;  it seems to shift and vary according 
to the idiosyncrasies of  the particular chancellor.  One of two 
executors  releases  a debt due to the estate of  the testator 
without  the consent  of  his  co-executor.  Both  the executor 
and  the  debtor  are  brought  into  chancery  by  subpoena. 
Counsel for the defendant contends that as each executor has 
full  power, his  act cannot  be attacked.  But the chancellor 
brushes aside this technicality.  Each rule of  law, he says, is, 
or  ought  to be, conformable to the law  of  God  (le Ley de 
Dieu).  Then with an eye to the particular facts of  the case 
at issue, he reduces the law of  God to one specific statement : 
'  le ley de Dieu  est q'un executor qui est  de male disposition 
ne expenderoit touts les biens, etc.'  If  the executor who  has 
expended  the  assets  of  the  estate  does  not  make  amends 
according  to  his  ability, '  il  sera clamne  in  Hell ' ; but  the 
chancellor  is  not  content  to stop short with  forecasting the 
melancholy  consequences of  such  recalcitrance.  He imme- 
diately  asserts  that to provide  a remedy for  such  a  case is 
'  bien  fait  accord  all  conscience '.  Again,  an obligee brings 
suit  upon  an  obligation  in  a different  county from  that  in 
which it was made.  The obligor appeals to chancery, and the 
chancellor holds that the action is brought against conscience, 
'car le verity de nu1 chose poit  estre conus cibien en nu1  lieu 
q'en le comJ  l'ou le chose fuit fait.' ~bviously  the chancellor 
is acting upon some principle of general jurisprudence, but we 
see the principle, not in  its large outlines, but as it  is specifi- 
cally applied to a particular case.  The only way in  which we 
can  hope to solve the riddle  is  by bringing  analogous  cases 
together. 
In  so  doing, Doctor  and  Student,  that  amazing treatise 
Hargrave's  Law Tracts, 326.  2  Y.  B. 4 H.  VII.  4. 8. 
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in which St. Germain embodied  his  wide knowledge of  both 
canon and common law, is of  great assistance.l  We observe 
that the canon law did find a  guiding rule in  conscience, and 
this  peculiar  coincidence  points,  it seems  irresistibly,  to  a 
'process  of  indirect  reception  of  canon  law"  in  chancery." 
This '  conscience ',  however,  is  not  the conscience  of  some 
particular individual at which the serjeant of  law levelled  his 
criticism.  It is  rather  a  broad  and  flexible  principle.  To 
trace  it even  in  outline would  lead  us  into the  network  of 
canon law ; and so far as St. Germain is concerned, the ques- 
tion has been carefully analysed el~ewhere.~  Suffice it to say 
that St. Germain states distinctly that equity makes exception 
from  the  law  on  the ground of  reason  and  conscience.  In 
chancery we  find  the general  principle  applied  to  concrete 
legal problems, and our interest here lies not so much  in the 
source of the doctrine as in the way in which it worked out in 
practice.  Now the application of the principle of  conscience 
in  chancery  resulted  in  the  formulation  of  three  distinct 
classes  of  cases  which  found  protection  in  the  subpoena : 
(I) cases  in  which  parties  had  failed  through  ignorance or 
carelessness  to  avail  themselves  of  their  rights;  (2)  cases 
of  transactions  based  on  confidence;  (3) cases of parol con- 
tract.  The second class involves matters which are essentially 
equitable in  the modern  sense  of the  word.  This we  may 
ignore and give our attention to the other two. 
I.  Cases  i?z  wkick  a party  has failed  to  anvail  himself  of 
his rights. 
We find the most pertinent illustration of this class of cases 
in  the chancery  doctrines  with  regard  to obligations under 
seal.  A debtor has paid a debt proved by an obligation, but 
he has neglected to have the obligation  cancelled or to secure 
an acquittance.  In consequence he has no proof of  payment 
whichwill be accepted by the common law.  Again,an obligation 
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is  made  to secure  the  performance of  a  certain  act, or it 
is conditioned  by parol.  The obligor  might  have protected 
himself had he taken the pains to have the condition (or intent 
of  the obligation)  inserted  in the deed  itself.  The law treats 
this mistake on the part of  the obligor as his folly ;  it refuses 
to modify a general principle to  do  justice in a particular case. 
An obligation is made in payment for the conveyance of land ; 
the vendor keeps the bond, but refuses  to make conveyance. 
In such  instances  the chancellor  intervened  to protect  the 
obligor.  But the rights of  the obligee were also regarded.  If 
he had lost his obligation, or mislaid it, but is able by extran- 
eous evidence  to establish  a just debt, equity will  assist him 
in obtaining it. 
It was  not  alone  in  the  domain  of  obligations  that the 
chancellor found application for this principle.  A does work 
for B, but there is no agreement as to the definite sum he is to 
receive for  his labour.  Goods are sold, but  the price  is  not 
fixed.  A  benefit is conferred upon a third party at the request 
of  the defendant.  Goods are bailed to A, but they come into 
the possession of C, and the bailor cannot connect the posses- 
sion so as to bring an action against C.  There is no question 
in  any of  these examples  of  the  right  to  recover,  but  the 
case  cannot  be brought  within  the scope of  a  common  law 
action. 
In brief, all these transactions are from the point of view of 
cornmon law irregular.  The law does not order a man to pay 
a  debt  twice or  to perform  services gratuitously.  It offers 
him  certain  means  of  protecting  himself,  but  if  he  fails  to 
avail himself of these, he places himself beyond its protection. 
The chancellor, on the other hand, who  was  not  bound by 
precedent, nor  under  the necessity of  maintaining the supre- 
macy of  inflexible legal rules, was able to decide each particular 
case on a principle of general  jurisprudence.  If we apply the 
text of '  reason and conscience ' to the situation, the answer is 
plain.  And so upon this principle chancery '  excepted ' from 
the conlmon law.  '  In this brief consideration of  Doctor and Student I have  followed the 
andysis of  Professor Vinogradoff in L. Q. R., xxiv. 373 fX 
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11.  Enforcement  of  Parol  Contract. 
In the Diversity  of  Courts  it is  written  that '  a man shall 
have remedy in Chancery for covenants made without specialty 
if the party have  sufficient witness  to prove the covenants '.l 
I do not propose to introduce any further evidence in proof of 
this statement.  I  believe  it has been shown that the chan- 
cellor  did  enforce  certain  parol  promises,  and that  he  did 
so upon the principle of reason and conscience.  It is granted 
even by Professor Ames that the chancellor did enforce certain 
parol agreements, but this admission is qualified by the asser- 
tion  that he  did  so 'only  upon  the  ground  of  compelling 
reparation  for  what  was  regarded  as a  tort to the plaintiff 
or  upon  the  principle of preventing  the unjust  enrichment 
of the defendant '.2 
If then it be said that the promisor is under an obligation to 
perform  his  promise, upon  yhat ~rinciple  did  the chancellor 
enforce this obligation ?  Now every breach of  contract which 
is accompanied by damage bears a strong analogy to a tort, if 
in fact it does not amount to one.  But  an obligation arising 
from a  tort is plainly distinguishable  from  one arising from 
contract.  In the one case it proceeds contrary to the will of 
the person bound ; in the other it is in accordance with, and in 
fulfilment of, his will.  Does the chancellor  then enforce the 
obligation, because the breach of promise amounts to a tort to 
the plaintiff, or because he holds  that one who  has for  legiti- 
mate cause made a promise ought to carry it out ?  In other 
words, in his analysis of agreements, did the chancellor proceed 
upon a principle of tort or of  contract?  This is the question 
which I shall endeavour to answer.  But  first I shall examine 
some illustrative cases. 
1456. A  was  to marry B,  daughter  of  C.  It was agreed 
that A should make an estate of  lands to himself and B, &c., 
and that C '  for  the . .  . mariage and ioynture' should  make 
an estate of lands to A and B and their heirs.  The marriage 
took place ; A made the estate to himself and B, but C refused 
to carry  out his  part.  A  accordingly  brought  a  subpoena 
against  C.  The chancellor, after  examining  the  evidence, 
:  Holrnes, Early English Equity, L. Q. R.,  i.  172. 
Ames, H. L. K.,  viii.  257. 
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decided that the matter  set up  in  the petition was true and 
just, and decreed that, as B was dead leaving issue, C should 
make an estate of  the land to A and his heirs1 
1464-5.  A  made  B  'le  proctour  de son  benefice  et  luy 
promise per fidem que il luy garderait indempne '.  A resigned 
the benefice to B's damage and B brought a subpoena for the 
breach of  promise.  The chancellor remarked : '  Pur ceo que il 
est en damages par le non perfourmans de le promise, il avera 
remedye icy.' 
1467-1468.  A was  bound  to B  in  an obligation  of  £100. 
B told A that if he would  furnish C (B's son) with goods and 
money on request, he would make payment  therefor.  A fur- 
nished C with goods and money to the value of  £94,  receiving 
from C, in  the name of his father, bills witnessing the delivery 
of  the goods,  &c. ;  at the same  time  C promised  on behalf 
of  B that A  should have deduction  of  £94  on the obligation 
of  LIOO. Afterwards A tendered B the bills for £94  and £6 
in  money,  and  desired  him  to receive  them  on satisfaction 
of  the obligation.  B  refused, and  A  brought  a  subpoena. 
Much  evidence was introduced  by both parties.  The chan- 
cellor  decided  that  A  had  proved  his  case,  and  that  the 
obligation of  £100  should  be  considered '  vacuum  et nullius 
valoris '.  Accordingly he ordered it to be ~ancelled.~ 
1470-1471.  A  at the request  of  B, and  on  his  promise to 
save  him  harmless,  became surety to C  for  the debt of D. 
D did not pay the debt, and in consequence A was threatened 
with suit by C.  As B had died, A called upon B's  executors 
to carry out the promise ; but they refused.  He accordingly 
brought a subpoena.  The  chancellor decreed that the executors 
should discharge A against suit from Cm4 
What situation  do  these  cases disclose?  There has  been 
a breach  of  promise  by non-feasance which is succeeded by 
damage,  immediate  or  prospective,  to the  promisee.  This 
element  of  damage is  frankly suggestive  of  tort.  It would 
be possible, if  we  did  not  scruple  to strain our reasoning, to 
resolve  the  gist  of  the  cause  of  action  into  a  tort  to  the 
plaintiff, even a deceit.  Such would be the line of  reasoning 
followed by the common law.  But I do not think one could 
XXV. I11 (10 S. S. 141).  Y.  B. P. 4 Ed. IV. 4. 
XXIX. 13, Cases, p. 214.  I have simplified the facts, and omitted con- 
sideration of the defendant's answer (XXIX. 12, Cases, p.  216). 
XLIV.  142, Cases,  p. 222.  For  the defendant's answer, see XLIV. 
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make a greater mistake than to impose upon the cases in equity 
the peculiar theory of the common law. 
In the first place, why did the common law treat a breach 
of  promise  as a deceit  to the promisee?  I believe a  ready 
and conclusive answer is  found  in the history of  Assumpsit. 
Here we  find  another  example  of  the  manipulation  of  the 
substantive law through the exigencies of  procedure.  From 
the standpoint of contract, a breach of contract was a breach of 
covenant, but I scarcely need remark that a breach of covenant 
was actionable only in case the covenant was under seal.  It 
was never  suggested  by any common law judge that a breach 
of  covenant  was  a  tort,  a  deceit  to the  plaintiff.  Such 
reasoning was unnecessary.  But the promise may be the same 
in essence whether it be under seal or no.  A 'for £50  in hand 
paid  promises  to convey  Blackacre  to  B.  A  breaks  his 
promise.  If the promise is under seal, Covenant lies, becazise 
thepromise is broken.  The law  says in  effect  that one  who 
makes a promise in a deliberate and formal  way  is bound to 
fulfil it, irrespective of  the situation  of the promisee.  If, on 
the other hand, the promise  is verbal, Assumpsit 1ies.l  But 
herein the law adopts a different line.  Assumpsit lies because 
by the breach  of promise A  has deceived B.  It does this in 
order  to bring  a  breach  of  contract  within  the scope of  an 
action which sounds in  tort.  Thus on substantially the same 
state of  facts the law adopts a contractual theory  for  breach 
of  promises  under  seal, a  theory  fundamentally tortious for 
breach of  verbal promises.  There is  no logical basis for this 
distinction ; counsel and  judges  were  aware  of  this, as the 
constant argument in  the early cases in  ssumpsit, 'this is 
a breach  of  covenant ', bears  witness.  The distinction finds 
its justification in the history of  the forms of  action and there 
alone.  Had the  ingenious  suggestion  of  Blackstone,2 that 
Assumpsit  is an  action on the case analogous  to Covenant, 
been  literally  true, the law  might  have adopted  a  different 
theory for parol contract. 
In equity the situation  is  different.  There  was  no  pro- 
I refer, of course, to the action in the sixteenth kentury. 
Blackstone, iii. 158. 
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cedural necessity  for treating a breach of  contract as a tort. 
There was  no  division into  forms of  action;  there were no 
technicalities  of  pleading  to  obscure  the  real  issue.  We 
stand, so to speak, before  breach  of  contract  as a  question 
of first impression.  Analysis  may  lead  us  in  the direction 
of tort  or contract; but both ways  are  open,  and  there  is 
nothing  to compel  us  to take the one  in  preference to the 
other.  I wish, therefore, to submit  such evidence as I have 
been able to find which indicates the attitude of  the chancellor 
in questions of contract. 
I. The chancellor was an ecclesiastic, and probably carried 
with him into the chancery the principles and theories of  the 
ecclesiastical court.  It  is notorious that the ecclesiastical court 
did assume jurisdiction  over Zaesio jidei.  What more natural 
than  that  the chancellor  should  have  proceeded  upon  the 
ground  of  breach  of  faith?  There is at least  a  suggestion 
of this in the petitions.  In  Wheler v.  Hz~chyndenl  a pledge 
of  faith is alleged, and it is quite common to find a petitioner 
saying that the defendant, 'promitted by hie  feith'  or 'pro- 
mytted by his feith '  or promised '  on his faith and troueth '.4 
In one of the cases  stated at length  above, a  promise  'per 
fidem'  is  set  forth.  It would  be  venturesome, however, to 
assert that breach  of  faith was  the sole ground  upon  which 
chancery  took jurisdiction.  It has been  argued  that if  the 
chancellor  proceeded  upon  this  ground, '  equity  would  give 
relief  upon  any and  all  agreements,  even  upon  gratuitous 
parol   promise^'.^  I  do  not  think  it  necessary to base  the 
chancellor's jurisdiction  on breach of  faith alone ; but that he 
did enforce gratuitous  promises cannot be  d~ubted.~  In this 
I  z Cal. Ch. ii.  XIX. 345, Cases, p.  204.  XVI. 277.  '  XIX. 91.  ".  B. P.  4 Ed. IV. 4, sz@ra,  p.  161. 
Ames, H. L. R., viii. 255. 
'  In XLIV. 142, Cases, p.  222,  there  is  a  clear  case  of  a  gratuitous 
promise which was enforced against the promisor's  executors.  See also 
XIV.  5,  Cases,  p.  188  (Promise  made  by  a  surety);  XV. 248 (Money 
advanced to A upon the promise of  B, assuring payment) ; XV. 52, Cases, 
p.  191 (Promise to carry a letter) ; XXXI.  82, Cases, p. 219  (Promise to 
respite an action) ; XXXI. 118 (Promise by arbitrators to deliver an award 
in writing).  The following promises connected with marriage appear to 
have been gratuitous : VII. 250, Cases, p.  179 ;  XVI. 386,  Cizses, p.  197; 
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connexion, however, I do not wish to consider breach of  faith 
except  in  so far  as it tends  to point  to the promise  as the 
essential  factor  in  the  chancellor's  consideration  of  par01 
contract.  The fact  that  some  petitioners  take  occasion  to 
mention  a  pledge of  faith, coupled  with our knowledge  that 
gratuitous promises were enforced, seems to me a very strong 
indication that chancery was employing a purely contractual 
principle. 
2.  If we turn to the petitions  and notice the way in which 
complainants state their case, we find  that it is the promise 
of  the  defendant  upon  which  stress  is  laid.  If in fact  the 
chancellor  did  consider  breach  of  promise  a  deceit  to  the 
plaintiff, it is very curious that pleaders who  were constantly 
appearing before him  do not  make  use  of  so  convenient an 
allegation.  But they do not do so.  Rather do they say that 
the defendant has made a promise which reason and conscience 
require  him  to  perform.  The  defendants  refuse  to  make 
a  conveyance 'solonque  lour  covenantz ',l  or  '  accordantz  as 
covenantz et bargoyne  suisditz ' ;  another defendant is asked 
'to shewe whi  your seid besecher shuld not be content after 
promys  made  betwix  them'.3  Emphasis  is  laid  upon  the 
promise as the indispensable part of the case. 
3. In  certain  cases  the beneficiary  brings  the  subpoena. 
These cases have been considered at length already  ;  .at this 
point I wish merely to refer to the significance of  the right of 
action  in  the beneficiary.  It seems to mean  this.  If there 
is sufficient cause for a promise  which  is  deliberately  made, 
the  chancellor  holds  the promisor  to his  obligation  at the 
behest  of one who has a right to obtain some advantage from 
the fulfilment of  the promise, although he is not the promisee. 
The principle upon which the subpoena  is allowed cannot be 
'detriment  to the promisee',  for the complainant  is not the 
promisee ; it cannot be a '  tort to the plaintiff',  for there is 
nothing but a breach of  promise.  But there is a reason why 
the  promise  should  be  fulfilled, and  this  reason  lies  in  the 
circumstances  under  which  the  promise  was  made;  it  is 
IV. 96,  Cases, p.  173.  IV.  100, Cases, p. 173. 
LXXI. 7,  Cases, p. 233.  '  Szcpm, p.  I 26. 
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suggestive of the fundamental canonistical doctrine of 'cause '. 
Marriage seems to have been  an adequate '  cause ' for a pro- 
mise, and  it  is  for  the  enforcement  of  promises  given  for 
marriage that we most frequently find beneficiaries appealing 
to equity. 
4.  Again,  if  we  look  at the  conditions  under  which  an 
implied  contract arises, some light may be thrown  upon  the 
whole question.  The petitioner  at the request  of  X became 
'  plegge '  to the king for a farm which X held of the king, and 
through  X's  default has had to pay.l  Again, petitioner '  atte 
request and praier ' of B became bound to C as surety for B's 
debt, and as B has failed to meet his obligation C called upon 
the petitioner.'  A at B's request '  undertook ' for B in Ireland 
for certain customs ; B inconsiderately sailed away and left A 
to meet  his ~bligation.~  In none of  these cases is there an 
express promise, but  a  promise  is  raised  by the relation  in 
which  the parties  stand  to  each  other.  As the  petitions 
phrase it, inasniuch as the petitioner has been $at  '  in charge ' 
for the duty of the defendant and at his  request, reason and 
conscience  require that the defendant  should  discharge  him. 
Even where, under  similar circumstances, there is an express 
promise, the same process of reasoning is adduced  to support 
its enforcement.  Reasoning,  therefore, from  the implied  to 
the  express  contract,  we  may  conclude that the promise is 
enforced  because  there  is  some  imperative  reason  why  the 
promisor should  fulfil  his obligation, and this reason is found 
in the circumstances under which the promise was made. 
5.  Finally,  the  suits  brouglit  for  specific performance  of 
contracts  to  convey  land  lend  support  to  the  view  here 
advanced.  While there are many cases in which the promisee 
has paid  the whole purchase  price, there are many others in 
which he has paid nothing, but alleges that he is ready to pay. 
The only damage sustained is the '  loss of  the bargain ', that 
is,  the  loss  of  the  advantage  which  would  accrue  to the 
promisee, if the promisor carried out his promise.  The obliga- 
tion is purely contractual ; there is not the faintest suggestion 
of  a tort. 
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For these reasons I believe that the attitude of  the chancery 
towards  contract  was  radically  different  from  that  of  the 
common law before consideration became the recognized test 
of  the  enforceability of  promises.  The common law looked 
primarily at the promisee ;  it compelled him to show that he 
had sustained damage other than that which resulted directly 
from the breach of  contract.  He must  convert  the breach of 
promise  into a tort, a  deceit, to himself.  Chancery, on  the 
other hand, scrutinized the position of the promisor.  It asked 
whether he had  made  such a promise as in reason  and con- 
science he ought to perform.  In such an inquiry the benefit 
to the promisor or the immediate detriment  to the promisee 
was a matter of  secondary importance.  It  was forced into the 
background, while the promise  and  the circumstances under 
which it was made held the centre of  the stage.  . 
It is with  considerable  hesitancy that  I  venture  to make 
any generalizations, but an examination of  the chancery  pro- 
ceedings  has led  me to the following conclusion.  I believe 
that the chancellor held that one might make a valid promise 
to do anything which  was reasonable  and possible, and that 
the obligation  resulting from such a promise ought to be per- 
formed because the promisor had deliberately and intentionally 
assumed  the  ob1igation.l  By  this  I  do not  mean  that the 
chancellor enforced any and all promises.  But in his analysis 
of  par01 contract he did not require as an essential condition 
to a  right  of  action  that  the  promisee  should  have  been 
deceived  or  that  the  promisor  should  have been  benefited. 
Rather  did  he  inquire  whether  the  enforcement  of  a  par- 
ticular  promise would further  some  general  interest.  If  the 
pron~isor  has  led  the  promisee to alter his  position  on  the  , 
strength of  the promise, there lies upon  him a moral  duty to 
fulfil that pronlise.  It is  desirable, in  the interests  of  the 
community  at large, that such promises  should  be  enforced. 
A pays B A50 for a conveyance of  land, or upon B's  promise 
to deliver a letter A entrusts the letter to him.  The cases are 
different from  B's  point  of  view.  In the first  case  he has 
received a benefit ; in the second, there is no  benefij.  But in 
' Cf. Spence, 852. 
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determining whether  or no B shall be compelled  to perform 
his promise, we  look to some larger  interest than  that of  the 
immediate parties  to the contract.  B induced A to give him 
the letter;  he placed  in A's  mind  a  reasonable  expectation 
that it should  be delivered.  Is it in the general interest that 
such  an  expectation  should  be  fulfilled?  The chancellor, 
I believe, determined that it was. 
Closely  connected  with  this  factor  is  another.  Some 
promises appear to have been enforced because of  the object 
for  which  they  were  made.  Thus money  is  promised  for 
a marriage ; the chancellor decrees that the promise must be 
performed.  We  might  say  that  the promise  is  enforced 
because on the strength of it the promisee  has entered upon 
marriage.  But the fact that the beneficiary could bring  the 
subpoena argues against this.  I believe that such a  promise 
was enforced because of  the purpose for which it was given. 
All  this  is  admittedly  speculative.  One  must  be  frank, 
and  admit that it is  impossible to determine absolutely the 
ground upon which chancery proceeded.  But it seems to me 
that  we  are  driven  to  seek  the  source  of  the chancellor's 
doctrines in the canon law.  I have tried to state my reasons 
for  thinking  it  impossible that  the chancellor  should  have 
applied the theory of  the common law.  Hence we must look 
to the only other system from which he could  possibly have 
borrowed his theory. 
In the  discussion  of  'consideration'  which  St. Germain 
places  in  the mouth  of  the Doctor,  we  find  it  stated  that 
a  promise, to be enforceable, must  have a  reusonable cause. 
This cause  may consist in a material advantage  to the pro- 
misor,  or  in  the  object  for  which  the  promise  was  made. 
I do not think we can completely parallel the whole classifica- 
tion of  promises, as set forth by the Doctor, in  the cases in 
equity, but  I do believe that all these cases can be explained 
from the principles of canon law.  Therein seems to me to lie 
the  only  adequate  and  reasonable  explanation.  It is very 
probable  that the chancellor as a judge in  chancery  did  not 
proceed  to the same lengths as he would  have  done in  the 
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in  chancery  he did  apply so far  as possible  the principles 
of that system in which as a churchman he was trained.  This 
indirect  reception  of  canon  law  is  not  demonstrable  with 
mathematical  precision;  it seems  to me,  however,  that the 
whole line of  decision  in equity points unequivocally towards 
the canon law. 
I have attempted to set forth the main outlines of equitable 
jurisdiction  in  contract.  Of  the source  of  the chancellor's 
doctrines, the canon law, little has been said.  But an investi- 
gation  of  the  principles  of  the  canon  law  with  regard  to 
contract is in itself a special study. 
NOTE  A 
THE diversity of  opinion in  modern  times  with  regard  to  the 
action of Detinue will appear from the following quotations : 
'  The action of  detinue is an action of  wrong  . . .'  Bayley B., in 
1 C. & J. 570 (1831). 
'  Detinue falls within that class of actions called actions of contract, 
and  the  whole  course  of  the  proceedings  shows  that  it  is  rather 
matter  of contract  than  of  tort . . .'  Tindal C.J.,  in  3  M. & G. 
557 (1841). 
The County Courts Act, 1850 (13 & 14 Vict. c. 6r), treats Detinue 
as founded on contract. 
The Common  Law  Procedure Act,  1852 (15  &  16 Vict.  c.  76), 
treats Detinue as a tort. 
'  Detinue is clearly in form an action ex contractu . . .'  Erle C.  J., 
in 11 C.B.  [N.S.] 426 (1861). 
'According  to  all  authorities .  . . detinue  has  always  been con- 
sidered to be an action ex contracfu  . . .'  Byles J., idem, p. 427. 
Tidd classes Detinue (with Case and Trespass) among '  actions for 
wrongs'.  I Tidd's Pr. (8th ed.), pp. 4, 10-11. 
Note also the interesting case of  Bryant v.  Herbert (1878) 3 C. P. 
Div. 389.  The plaintiffs had delivered to the defendant a painting, in 
order that he mightdeterminewhether it was a genuine picture painted 
by  himself or not.  Having come  to the conclusion that it  was  not 
genuine,  the defendant  refused to  redeliver the  painting,  and  the 
plaintiff accordingly brought  Detinue  against  him.  The  question 
raised  was  whether  the  action  was  an  action  'founded  on  tort' 
within the meaning of the County Courts Act (30 & 31 Vict. c.  142, 
s. 5).  It was held that so far as this case was concerned, the action 
was founded on tort within the meaning of the  Act,  and though the 
judges  did not  profess  to decide the  historical question  their com- 
ments are worth quoting. 
Thus  Bramwell  L. J.  said : 'But  if  the  old  learning, as it was 
called, is to  be brought  in  to  help us, I should  come to  the same 
conclusion (i. e.  that the action is founded on tort).  No doubt dicta 
and decisions are to be  found that detinue is an action ex confractu APPENDIX  OF CASES 
Bundle IV, No. 96. 
APPENDIX  OF  CASES 
SELECT PETITIONS ' 
Bundle IV, No.  69. 
,4  tres reverent pier en dieu l'evesque de Duresme et Chanceller 
D'engleterre. 
Supplie  tres  humblement  Reynold  Barantyn  que come nadgairs 
estoit  accorde  perentre  Robert  Cluebrigg  et  le  dit  suppliant  que 
mesme le suppliant  deinz  certein  temps  ore passe  ferroit  enfeoffer 
~f~~~  Katerine sa femme en certeins terres et tenements a1 value de quarant 
1417.  marcz par  an par  terme de sa vie ;  pur la greindre seurtee de quell 
chose Drewe Barantyn, nadgairs citezein de Loundres, qi dieu assoill, 
uncle de dit suppliant, estoit oblige a dit Robert en deux cents livres 
et le dit suppliant adonques soy obligea a I'avauntdit  Drewe en deux 
centz livres par  un  estatut  marchant  a1  entent  que le dit suppliant 
garderoit le dit  Drewe  sanz damage et  perde envers le dit  Robert 
touchant  la seurtee par  le dit Drewe a I'avauntdit  Robert fait.  Et 
combien que mesme le suppliant ad complie et parforme les choses 
desuisdit,  issint  que le  dit  Drewe  ne  nu1 autre  pur  luy  n'est  pas 
unqore, ne iammes, sera endamage envers le dit Robert ne nu1 autre 
pur le dite seurtee par le dit Drewe ensy fait ;  nientmeins un William 
Randolf et certeins  autres  persons, executours del testament  de dit 
Drewe, par force de dit estatut par le dit suppliant a dit Drewe  ensy 
fait, ont pursue mesme  le  suppliant et  unqore pursuont a graunde 
damage de luy et encountre l'entent  suisdite : Qe pleise a vostre tres 
gracious  paternlte  de considerer  les  choses  desuisditz  et  sur  ceo 
d'envoier  pur le dit William  d'estre  devaunt vous a un certein iour 
pur estre examine des ditz matiers, portant  ovesque luy a1 dit iour le 
dit estatut marchant  et que vous  pleise  par vostre  hault  discrecon 
d'ordeigner  remedie  en  ceste partie  come la bon foy et conscience 
demandent, considerant que le dit suppliant autrement ne poet estre 
aide, pour dieu et en oevere de charitee. 
The reader will observe many mistakesof grammar and orthography, 
and  some obvious  lapsus calami, throughout  the petitions.  These are 
intentionally reproduced from the documents, which  are very erratic  in 
this respect. 
A tres noble et tres reverent piere en dieu L'evesque  de Dusre~ne 
(sic), chaunceler D'engleterre. 
Suppliount humblement vos povres  servantez, William Spenser et  Date 
Robert Clopton, qe come le xme iour de Jun darrein passe  un John unce*ain. 
Beverech del Counte de Cambrigge  avoit venduz  as ditz suppliantz 
un mees ove les appurtenantz en Shymplyng  en la  counte de Suff' 
pur xl livers, lez qeux sont paiez, par  force de quell bargein ils ount 
faitz grauntez  costez  entour le mees suisdit; et qe le xijme  iour de 
Septembre adonqes proschein ensuant le dit John duist avoir delivere 
seisin de mesme le mees as ditz suppliantz solonque lour covenantz, 
le quel adonqes il refusa  et unqore refuse a graunt  perde  dez  ditz 
suppliantz, considerantz, tres gracious Seignur, q'ils n'eient  ent accion 
par le comun ley, n'autre  remedie sinon de vostre especial  grace et 
socour: qe please a vostre  tres  gracious  Seignurie graunter  ad ditz 
suppliantz brief directe a1 dit John de estre devant vous en la chaun- 
cerie a1 certein  iour  sur  certein  peine  par vous  alimiter pur y estre 
examinez et ent afaire come vous semble resoune, et ceo pur dieu et 
en oevre de charite. 
Bundle IV, No. 100. 
A tres reverent pier en dieu et tres gracious Seignur l'evesque de 
Duresme Chaunceller D'engleter. 
Supplie  humblement  vostre  humble  servitour,  John  Burton  de  After 
Bristuyt, que come il le lundy proschien devant le fest de Seint Petre  142L 
l'advincle,  l'an  du regne  nostre  Seignur le Roy octisme, a Bristuyt 
achata d'un  Mark Wyllyam de mesme la ville certeins terres et tene- 
mentz  c'estassavoir  xij  mees,  v  salers  et  iiij  gardeins  en  Bristuyt 
suisdit ove les appurtenantz, en noun de toutz les terres et tenementz 
oretarde un Richard Neweton de mesme la ville ;  sur quel bargayne 
l'avantdit  Mark  ferroit  astat  sufficiant  en  ley  et  livroit  seisin  et 
possession a1 dit John  de les avantditz  terres  et tenementz  ove les 
appurtenantz quant il fuist par le dit John  ou  ascun autre en  son 
noun ent resonablement requis, pur un certein some d'argent, cestas- 
savoir CCxl li, dount le dit John paia a1 dit Mark CC  li, en partie du 
paiement  de lavantdit  some de CCxl li.  Et nient  contresteant  le 
paiement  devant mayns par le dit John fait et q'il ad souvent requis THE HISTORY  OF  CONTRACT  APPENDIX  OF CASES 
le dit Mark de faire astat a1 dit John et luy lyvrer seisin et possession 
de les terres et tenementz suisditz en maner come avant est dit, le dit 
Mark ne voet faire astat ne lyvrer  seisine et possession  a1 dit John 
accordantz as covenantz  et  bargoyne  suisditz de les terres et tene- 
mentz  avantditz, a graunt anientisement et perpetuel destruccion de 
dit Suppliant s'il n'eit vostre gracious eide et socour en celle partie : 
Que  please  a  vostre  tres  reverent  paternite  et gracious Seignurie, 
graunter brief direct a1 dit Mark pur  apparere devant vous a certein 
iour sur peyn par vous alymyter d'estre examine de lez matiere suis- 
ditz et sur son examination luy ensy iustifier et govourner que le dit 
Suppliant purra  aver ceo qe reson et bon concience demaundent en 
celle  partie, Considerant, tres gracious Seignur, que le dit Suppliant 
ne poet  mye aver  remedie  en ceo cas a la  comune ley, et ceo pur 
dieu et en oevre de charite. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Willielmus Gastoigne de Brocley, Gentilman, in com' Som'. 
Nichalaus Dany de  Southpoderton, Gentilman, in com' Som'. 
Bundle IV, No.  158. 
8 Hen. V.  Pleise a tres reverent piere en dieu et tres gracious Seignur l'evesque 
de Duresme  Chaunceller  D'engleterre  considerer  coment  apres  la 
mort  Richard le Scrop, Chivaler  Seignur de Bolton  qui  de nostre 
Seignur le Roy teigne en chief et qi heir est deinz age et en la garde 
nostre dit Seignur le Roy estoit a present,  diverses patents, chartres, 
muniments et autres  evidences touchantz le heritage mesme le heir 
a les  mayns de William  Mayhewe  sont devenuz  et unguor  en ses 
mayns  estoient, de graunter  un  brief  de peyne direct a dit William 
luy comandant  d'estre  devant nostre  Seignur le Roy en sa  Chaun- 
cellarie  a  certeigne  iour  par  vous  alimiter,  ameignant  ovesque luy 
les  patentz,  chartres,  munimentz  et  autres  evidences  suisditz  en 
salvacion  del  droit  nostre  Seignur le  Roy  et ceo pur  dieu  et  en 
oevere de charite. 
Eltdorsed:  Decimo septimo die Octobris anno etc. octavo, concor- 
datum est per consilium quod sub magno  sigillo dirigatur Willielmo 
Meyhewe infrascripto essendi (sic) coram domino Rege in Cancellaria 
sua in  crastino  sancti  Martini  proximo  futuro,  deferendo  secum 
litteras,  patentes,  cartas,  munimenta  et  alia  de  quibus  inf~a  fit 
mencio. 
Bundle VI, No.  20. 
A tres gracious et tres reverent pier en dieu l'evesque de Wyncestre 
chaunceller D'engletere.' 
Suppliont  humblement voz poverez  Oratours William  Overay  de  1424 to 
Southampton et Agnes  sa femme, que fut  femme de Bartholomew  '4~~- 
Marmoray, executors del testament  du dit Bartholomewe,  que come 
un John  Mascall,  iadis  Burgeis  de Southampton suisdit, le trezime 
iour D'apprill  l'an du regne le Roy Henry quint, qe qieu assoill, sisme, 
achata du dit Bartholomew a Southampton suisdit xl et vij bales  de 
XX 
waide pur iiij et xiij li, et ix d pur estre ent paier saunz delaie, dount 
le dit John  paia a dit Bartholomewe  iesqes a1  sume de xxviij li., les 
queux xxviij li. le dit Bartholomewe  en sa vie  sovent foith  apres ad 
demande de dit John  Mascall  et il  les dits xxviij li. a dit Bartholo- 
mewe paier ne voleit ;  le quel Bartholomewe fist la dite Agnes adonqes 
sa femme et Tempane de Johane, son cosyn, ses executours, et devia, 
les quex  Agnes et Tempane come executours [du dit].2  Bartholomewe 
sovent foith apres la  mort  de dit testatour  ount requie  le dit John 
Mascall a eux paier les ditz xxviij li. et il les paier ne voleit, et apres 
le dit Tempane devia et la dite Agnes prist a Baron le dit William 
Overay, les qeux William  et Agnes  sovent  foith  requis  le dit John 
Mascall a eux paier les ditz xxviij li.  et il les paier ne voleit ;  le quell 
John  Mascall  fist  ses  executours,  Margerie  adonqes  sa  femme  et 
Henry Baron, et devia, apres qi mort les ditz suppliantz ount sovent 
foitz requie les ditz Margorie  et Henry Baron  come executours a dit 
John Mascall a eux paier les  avantditz  xxviij li.  et ils  les  paier  ne 
volient, de qeux xxviij li. suisditz ne nu1  denier  dice11 le dit testatour 
ne les ditz suppliauntz nient le pluis ne avoient  ascun obligation ou 
autre suertee forsque le simple contracte suisdit, en quel cas les ditz 
suppliantz sount  saunz remedie a la comune ley, a graunde damage 
de ditz suppliantz et en retardation del execusion del testament suisdit, 
s'ils  ne aient  vostre  tres  gracious Segnurie en ice11  partie:  Please 
a vostre tres gracious Segnurie de considerer les matiers suisditz et 
sur ceo solonc vostre  treshaut  et tres  sage discrecion  d'ordener  et 
Bundle VI. No.  19 is a briefer statement of  this case. 
a  Hole in document ;  words in square brackets supplied throughout. THE HISTORY  OF CONTRACT 
agarder  que bone  et due remidie  soit  fait  en  la  mater  suisdit  as 
ditz suppliantz, come foy et  bon  concience le demaundent, pur dieu 
et en oevere de charitee. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Ricardus Thornes. 
Johannes Sanky. 
Bundle VI, No.  21, 
A treshounree et tresgracious segnur et tresreverent piere en dieu 
'l'evesque de Wyncestre et Chaunceller D'engletere. 
Probably  Supplient  tres  humblement  les  povres  parochiens del esglyse de 
after  Kirkby en Kendale en la  Countee de Westmerland  que, come nad- 
''I3'  gairs lour esglise fuist abatuz par veillesse et autres feblesses, ils fisrent 
[agreement]  ovesque un William Thornburgh Esquier, un des paro- 
chiens,  q'il  duist  faire  l'avauntdite  esglise  bien  et  covenablement 
estre fait, reedifie et relever honestment et [reparaille] '  pur sesze vyntz 
marcz, des queux l'avantdit  William ad resceu quatorsze vyntz marcz 
et les  ovesque luy retient ; et ensy est  ore, tres gracious Segnur et 
pier  en dieu, que l'avantdit  William  ne voet  mye  l'avantdit  esglise 
faire estre fait ne reedifie issint que le Chauncell  de mesme l'esglise 
est  en point  de chaier  pur  defaute  de fesure  et  edificacon  dice11 
a graunde tort, disease et pierd  des toutz les parochiens avauntditz, 
et les queux parochiens,  tres gracious Segnur, en cest matier par  le 
comune ley ne poent mye estre eidez en ascune manere ne socourez : 
Si plese as voz tres hounree et tres gracious Seignurie et tres reverent 
paternite  d'envoier  par  brief  nostre  Segnur  le  Roy  pur  l'avauntdit 
IVilliam de comparer devaunt vous en le Chauncellarie nostre Segnur 
le Roy sur un certein peine par vous alimiter  et ensi  ordeyner que 
cest matier par vous tres gracious Segnur poet solonc vostre tres sage 
et tres purveux  discrecon estre socouree et [remedie]:  considerantz 
que  les parochiens avauntditz ne purront mye avoir nu1 eide ne secoure 
a le comune ley, pur dieu et en overe de charitee. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Thomas de Tunstall, chivaler. 
Robertus Belyngeham. 
Hole in document.  a  Or '  pumeux' ? 
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Bundle VI, No.  299. 
A tres reverent piere en dieux et son tres gracious Seignur, l'evesque  After 
de Wynchestre,  Chaunceller  D'engletere.  Supplie tres humblement  1416. 
John Hogham',  un des clerks  del Chauncellarie  nostre  Seignur le 
Roy,  qe come John  Oklee,  le  lundi proschein  devaunt le  fest  de 
Seint  Michel  l'archangele  darrein  passe,  l'an  du  regne  nostre  dit 
Seignur le Roy q'orest  quynt,  tierce, a Loundres en la paroche  de 
Seint  Cristofore en  la  garde  de Bradstrete,  achata  certeins  draps, 
laynes et diverses  colours pur xxvj li., queux luy doit et  luy  detient 
encountre droit ad damages de dit John  Hogham de xli., dount il 
prie remedie, et ceo pur dieu et en oevere de charite. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Ricardus Sturgeon. 
Willielmus Robroke. 
Bundle VII, No.  104. 
A tres reverent pier en dieux l'erchevesque  D'everwyk  Chaunceller 
D1engletere.* 
Supplie  humblement  Roger  Denys  de Loundres,  Fremason, que  1426 to 
come bargaine  ceo prist  a  Wyburton  parentre  le dit  suppliant  et  W2. 
Philip Proketour de Wyburton et Roger Robynson de mesme la ville 
en le fest  de Seint Martyn,  l'evesque, l'an  de regne  le  Roy  Henry 
quint, pier  nostre Seignur le  Roy q'orest, oeptisme, que le dit sup- 
pliant  ferroit  l'esglise  et le steple de la  dit ville de Wyburton8 en 
manere et forme contenuz en un escript endente ent entre eux fait, 
XX 
preignant pur le dit bargayne C iiij x marcz, come  en le dit escript 
plus  pleinement  est  contenuz;  et come en apres a  la dit ville de 
Wyburton,  c'estassavoir  le  lundy proschein  apres  le  fest  de Seynt 
Michell  l'archangell  adonqes  proschein ensuant,  bargaine  ceo prist 
saunz especialtee parentre le dit suppliant et les ditz Philip Proketour 
et  Roger  Robynson,  c'estassavoir  que  le  dit  suppliant  ferroit  xij 
corbellez  en la  dit  esglise  et  q'il  ferroit  enbatailler  le  dit  esteple 
ovesque  legementz  et tables  accordant2  ovesque  franke  pere,  pur 
'  Perhaps '  Hegham '. 
Bundle VII, No.  105,  is another copy of  the same petition ; there are 
slight variations, which are noted. 
After '  Wyburton ', VII.  105  adds : ' de pleyn  overaigne et  de pere 
appelle rough stones saunz table ou  corbel1 ', and omits from 'en manere ' 
to '  preignant '. THE  HISTORY  OF CONTRACT  APPENDIX  OF CASES 
quele ils luy paieront a taunt come il  expenderoit entre la faisaunce 
de le dit overaigne outre le  primer  covenaunt  suisdit, que amount 
a cent marcz, come il ad este aiugge par quatre maistres  masons de 
frank pere;  Et les dit Philip Proketour et  Roger Robynson  les ditz 
cent marcz au dit  suppliant paier ne voillent, et il est ensy, gracious 
Seignur, que le dit  suppliant ne poet  avoir  accion  envers  eux a  le 
comuqe ley par  bref  de covenaunt ne en autre manere, pur ceo q'il 
n'ad  mye especialte de le covenaunt, a graunde anientisement de dit 
suppliant, s'il n'eit  remedie par vostre Seignurie en ycell partie : Please 
a  vostre  tres  gracious  Seignurie de considerer  les  prelnissez et de 
grauntier  severalx  briefs  directz envers les  ditz Phylip  Proketour et 
Roger Robynson eux comaundantz de comparer devaunt vous a certein 
iour et sur certein peine par vous alimitier de respondre a les premisses, 
pur dieux et en oevere de charitee. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Ricardus Johnson de London. 
Willielmus Bridde de London. 
Note on  date of  case.-The  transaction  is  said to have taken place  in 
8 Hen. V ;  as the petition is addressed to the Archbishop of  York, it must 
have come up later than this. John Kempe was made chancellor and Arch- 
bishop of York in  1426, and retained the office till 1432.  The case there- 
fore would seem to fall between those two dates.  Kenlpe was again made 
chancellor in  1450,  and it is possible that this petition came up in his second 
chancellorship.  However,  as  that  would  imply  a  very  great  delay  in 
bringing the case up, the first date is taken as preferable. 
Bundle VII, No. 112. 
A mon Reverend piere  en dieu l'ercevesque D'everwyk chaunceller 
D'engletere. 
Date  Supplie tres humblement John  Goldsmyth  de Melton  Moubray, 
uncertain. merchant,  que  come  il  eit  vendu  a  un  William  Sakes,  servant  et 
Chapman  a  John  Trewe  de Colchestre,  marchant,  troys  quarts et 
demy de woed  a1  oeps et profyt de mesme le John  Trewe pur  un 
certein  some apaierz au certein iour, et  fuist ensy, gracious Segnur, 
que a les iours  de paiement  du dit  some assignez le dit suppliant 
venoit au dit John Trewe pur demander son paiement,  le quel John 
Trewe, ymaginant de defrauder le dit  suppliant de son dit paiement, 
disoit que son dit  servant n'avoit  acchatee de luy synon deux quarts 
et demy de wood et le quell unquore fuist sy malveys et feble quene 
fuist de tie1 value sicome le dit William l'avoit  achate, la  ou en fait 
et  loiaulte  il  avoit  troys  quarts  et  demy  sicome il  sera  duement 
par sufficiantz lettres testimoinalx  provee, et ensy le dit suppliant est 
forbarre et delaie de sa monie et est verrayseble d'estre mys a graund 
damage et perde saunz vostre  gracious eide  et socour  celle partie : 
Que please a vostre tres reverend paternite de  considerer les premises 
et  coment le dit  suppliant  a  cause  q'il  n'ad  ascun especialtee  des 
premises est par le dit John Trewe celle partie estre decieu  et sur 
ceo de vostre  benigne  grace  grauntier  deux  briefs  directz as  ditz 
John Trewe et William d'estre devant vous au certein iour sur certein 
peyne d'estre examine sur la matiere avantdite et par leur examinacion 
de faire que droit et reason demaundent, en oevere de charitee. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Henr' Roos, clericus. 
Reg' Sharp de Melton. 
Bundle VII, No.  250. 
A tres reverent piere en dieu et mon tres gracious Segnur L'erchevesqz 
d'everwyk  et Chaunceller D'englitere. 
Supplie  humblement  Robert  Craunford,  que  come  accorde  soy  After 
prist parentre luy d'un  part, et John Drayton et John son fitz d'autre  1426. 
part, cestassavoir a Aldurmeston en le counte de Worcestre le xxiiije 
iour de septembr l'an du reigne nostre Segnur le Roy q'ore est quinte, 
que le dit John fitz John avoit  et prendroit a femme Anne file a dit 
Robert et que deinz un moys apres les  espousailles et mariage issint 
parentre eux faitz le dit John Drayton  ferroit  astat as ditz John fitz 
John et Anne des teres et tenementz a la value de xx marcz par an 
outre lez  reprisez  deinz  le  maner  de Botilbrigge  en  le  Counte  de 
Huntyngden  et Craunford en le Counte de Northanpton,  a avoir et 
tenir lez dites teres et tenementz issint a la value de xx  marcz par an 
as ditz  John  fitz  John  et Anne  et  a  les  heirs  de lour  deux  corps 
engendrez ;  pur cause de quel accorde la marriage soy prist  parentre 
lez ditz John fitz John et Anne, et puis le dit John fitz John [avoit] 
issue  parentre  luy et mesme cesty Anne et morust, le dit estat nient 
fait, nient  contristeant  que le  dit  John  Drayton a  ceo  faire  sovent 
foitz ad este requis  par  les ditz Robert et Anne, a graunde damage 
du  dit  Robert  et autres: Please  a vostre  gracious Segnurie decon- 
siderer (sic) lez premissez et que le dit suppliant n'ad mye remedie en 
, 
celle partie par la comune ley et sur ceo de grauntier  un  brief  sur 
certein notable peyne a dit John Drayton direct de  comparier devaunt 
Hole in document. 
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vous a certein iour par vous alimiter en la chauncerie nostre  Segnur 
le Roy a1  fyn pur  illeoques  estre  examine de et sur  les  premissez, 
issint que remedie ent soit fait a dit suppliant  solonc ceo que reson 
et concience demaundent, Et ceo pur dieu et en oevre de charite.' 
Bundle IX, No.  132. 
To the right worchipfull fader in god Bisshop of Bathe 
Chaunceller of  Englond. 
1439 to  Beseches mekely your pouer bedeman John Osgodby of  London, 
'44'.  Brewer,  forasmoche as ther  was  a  mater  in  debate by  twyx  John 
Kyffawe, Wodemonger, and Thomas Langley of London, Botelmaker, 
for  the wheche  mater  were  chosen  arbitros  ov  bothe  partyes  and 
eyther  party  bounden  to other  in  obligacions  of  xxli.,  the wheche 
obligacions  were  delivert  to  the arbitros;  and after thus come the 
said John  Kyffawe, the too party, to your  said besecher  by asotelte 
and asked  hym  where was  the obligacion, and your  said besecher 
shewed yt to hym ;  and whenne he hadde yt  he held yt  and wolnot 
gyffe  yt  agayne; and your  said  besecher  toke  accions  of  detenue 
and detenue  (sic)  and canne have  no recovere  by  lawe, and  thus 
your  said  besecher  ys  lykly  to  pay  this  obligacion  of  xxli.,  wt 
outen your  gracious lordship or remedy to be putte on hys  behalf: 
Wherefore  lyke yt to your  gracious  lordship to consider this  mater 
aforesaid  and to  graunte  a  wrytte  under  certeyn  payn  directe  to 
the said  Thomas2 that he may apere afore yowe  in the Chauncery 
atte certein day by yowe alymed and therto be examined afore yowe 
and thenne to reule the mater aforesaid as lawe and conciens wolle, 
for the love of  god and yn the way  of charite. 
Efzdorsed: Memorandum  quod quinto die Novembris anno regni 
Regis Henrici sexti decimo septimo, Willielmus Staynford de London, 
Gentilman, et Iohannes Alkyn de London, Gentilman, coram dicto 
domino Rege in Cancellaria sua, personaliter constituti manuceperunt 
pro  Iohanne Osgodby, videlicet  uterque eorum, quod in casu  quo 
ipse materiam  in hac supplicacione specificatam veram probare non 
poterit, tunc prefato Thome Langley omnia dampna et expensas que 
ipse ea occasione sustinebit eidem Thome satisfacient  iuxta formam 
statuti in hac parte editi et promisi. 
There is a short endorsement, but it is too faint to be legible. 
At first sight this appears to be  a mistake for 'John  ; Thomas, how- 
ever, is the party mentioned in the endorsement, so the presumption is that 
he got hold of  the obligation. 
Bundle IX, No. 206. 
To pe ryght gracious Lord  Chaunceller of England. 
Besecheth  ful humbly Richard ap Howell pat  where  as William,  1440(?). 
Priour  of  be  cherche  of  Seint Cuthlace  of  Hereford,  late  be  his 
Covent  seal1 let  to  ferme  to  on  Leonard  Holand  his  manere  of 
Prioures  Frome wyth Pappourtenances  for a certein some yeerly to 
be paied  to pe  seyde  Priour and his  successours  and  under  oper 
certein condicions comprehended in an endenture betwen hem made 
as in pe seid endenture it is comprehended more  pleinly pe whiche 
Leonard after pe same lees made unto hym, lete over pe same manior 
to pe seid suppliant be his lettre sealed under pe conditions aboveseid 
be vertue of which latter lees pe seid suppliant entred and occupied 
and whenne pe seid suppliant hadde sowen gret part of  pe landes of 
pe seid manoir and done pere upon  gret  husbondrye pe seid priour 
and Leonard  ymaginyng  to putte pe seyd  suppliant  fro  his  ferme 
entretyd  seid suppliant  to leve  pe terme pat  he hadde in j~  seid 
ferme and for pat so to be leved graunted be word  pat  pe seid sup- 
pliant shulde have all pe cornes growyng on  same manoir  frely to 
pe which pe seid  suppliant agreed hym  and upon pys dilivered to pe 
seid Priour by Padvys of fie seyd Leonard as well pe endenture made 
to  seyd Leonard  be pe seid  Priour and convent  as pendenture 
made be pt) same Leonard un to pe seid  suppliant,  pe seid priour 
seyng bope Pendentures pus delivered un to hym wolde not suffre 
seid suppliant to have  pe seid  cornes aftyr pere  seid covenant  but 
hath takyn hem to hys owne oeps to  grete hurt of pe seid suppliant 
in pis partie : That it plese un to youre  gracious  lordshippe to con- 
sidere how pe  seid suplliant hath no remedie at pe comon lawe an 
pere upon to graunte certein  wryttes directid to pe  seid priour and 
Leonard to be before you at a certein day to be examined of pe mater 
above  seid and pere upon to do as consience and lawe wolle for pe 
love of  god and in pe wey  of  charite. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Willielmus Watkyns de com' Buk',  Gentilman. 
Johannes Marchant de London, Gentilman. 
Endorsed1: Memorandum  Haec billa  excerpta  fuit  ex  bundello ' 
brevium in Cancellaria de A0  1~0  H. 6ti. 
Written on the back of the petition in a large hand ;  obviously a later 
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Bundle IX, No.  335. 
To hise fulgracius Lord the Chaunceller of England. 
After  Rightmekely  (sic) besechith  Rauf  Bellers  that  for  as  rnoche  as 
William Harper of  Mancestre  and Richard Barbour weren endetted 
to the seyde Rauf in certain sumes of  mone withoute specialte  to be 
payed unto the seyde Rauf or to hise certain attorne at certain dayes 
past  at  the  wheche  dayes  and longe  aftir  the seyde U7illiam and 
Richard weren required by the seyde Rauf to make hym payment of 
the  seyde  sumes,  to  the  wheche  request  the  seyde  William  and 
Richard wolde not obeye in any wyse  soo that  the seyde Rauf, con- 
sideryng that  seyde William and Richard wolde make hor lawe in 
that partie agens faithe and good conscience, sued to the Archebisshop 
of  Yorke, at that tyme chaunceller of  England, for remedie  in that 
caas,  apon  the wheche  suggestion  the seyde chaunceller  graunted 
under  certain  payne writtes  severally direct  unto  seyde  William 
and Richard to apere afore hym in the chauncery there to be examyned 
apon the seyde matere; by force of  that oon of  the seyde writtes the 
seyd Richard apered in the seyde chauncerie and there agreed with 
the seyd suppliant and the seyd William  myght nat befande soo that 
the writ  direct  unto  hym  stode in none effect: wherefore liketh to 
youre gracius lordeship to graunte a writ under a certain payn direct 
to the seyd William to aper afore yowe in the chauncerie there to be 
examyned apon the matere aforeseyd  for goddis luf  and in werk of 
charite. 
Bundle IX, No.  382. 
To  my full gracious Lord the Bysshop of Bath and Welles and 
Chaunceller of  Inglond. 
1442 to  Prayeth  and  mekely  besecheth  youre  povere  oratour  William 
1443.  Parkoure, that whare  the same suppliant and one Gilbert Bedenall 
of  Benerley in the counte of  York, Mercer, hadde theyr comon silver 
and golde  in  Mercerware  to the price  and value of  xl S. and more 
pakked  in fotepak and in  hors  pak  to  be  demenet and reulet  be 
adviss and labour of the sayd  Suppliant unto theyr bother oeps sex 
yer to geder, that is to say fro the sevent yer of  oure soveraigne Lord 
now beyng unto the xiiij yer of  the same oure soveraigne Lord, with 
in whiche tyme of sex yer the same Gilbert had by thadvise (sic) and 
labour  abovesaid  all  thencresse  (sic)  of  the  said  silver  and  gode 
provenaunt, that  is to say xxxiiij li., and the said  Suppliant  no part 
ne none cane gete by the comon  lawe, whare by their covenaunt he 
shuld have the half:  Wharefore lyke it unto youre graciouse lordship 
to graunte unto the said Suppliant a writte upon a certeyn peyn directe 
unto the same Gilbert to apper be fore yowe in the Chauncery of oure 
seid soveraigne lord at a certeyn day by yowe  to be  lymite to have 
and do in the maters abovesaid as gode treuth and conscience will, 
for goddes love and in way  of  charite. 
Endorsed: Memorandum quod, sexto die Novembris Anno regni 
Regis Henrici sexti vicesimo, Henricus Thwaytes et Iohannes Muston 
coram prefato domino Rege in cancellaria sua personaliter  constituti, 
manuceperunt, videlicet uterque eorum, pro Willielmo Parkour, quod, 
si ipse materiam in hac supplicacione specificatam veram probare non 
poterit, tunc predictus Willielmus (sic) prefato Gilberto pro  omnibus 
dampnis et expensis  que in  hac  parte sustentabit satisfaciet,  iuxta 
formam statuti inde editi et promisi. 
Bundle IX, No.  405. 
Suppleaunt a vous umblement vostre povre oratour Richard Cordie,  1440  to 
que come Thomas Rose vendit a luy un Mese, xl acres de terre, pur  1441- 
C marces de argent, des que C marces lxx marces furent paiez a luy 
et pur lez autres xxli. le dit Richard fuist tenuz a1 dit Thomas en un 
obligacion apaier a luy all iour comprise  deinz mesme le obligacion ; 
par force de quele le dit Thomas enfeffa le dit Richard par un fait de 
feffement de lez ditz mese et terre a avoir et tenir a luy et a ses heirz 
a toutz iours, et oblige luy et cez heirez a garrant  all dit Richard et 
sez heires a  toutz  iourz;  par  lou  graunde  parcel1 de lez  dit  Mese 
et terre fuist tenuz en villenage par cause de quele Seignur de le dit 
terre ad ouste le dite Richard et le dit Thomas sue le dit Richard 
pur lez ditz xxli. comprise deinz le obligacion, sur quele grevaunce 
le  dit  Richard  n'ad  mie  remidie  a1  le comune ley: pur  que plesit 
a vous de graunter un sub pena d'estre direct a1 dit Thomas d'aperer 
devaunt vous  en le chauncerie  all  certein  iour par vous limitez de 
estre examinez sur lez ditz maters, en honour de dieu et par voie de 
charite. 
Endorsed: Memorandum quod vicesimo nono die Iunij Anno regni 
Regis Henrici sexti decimo octavo, Iohannes Dentard de villa Westm', 
yoman, et Willielmus  Rous de Nenton  in com'  Surr', husbondman, 
coram dicto domino Rege in cancellaria  sua  personaliter  constituti 
manuceperunt videlicet  uterque eorum pro prefato  Ricardo quod in 
casu  quo  ipse  materiam  in  hac  supplicacione  specificatam  veram THE  HISTORY  OF CONTRACT  APPENDIX  OF CASES 
probare non poterit, tunc prefato Thome omnia  dampna et expensas 
qua ipsa  occassione  sustinebit  satisfaciet  (sic)  iuxta  formam  statuti 
inde editi et promisi, &c. 
Bundle X, No. 17. 
A tresreverent pier en dieu l'evesque de Bathe son tresgracous 
Segnur. 
After  Supplie humblement John  Polyng, Qe come un Symon Blaundell 
1432.  apprompta de ly xx li. et ly  bailla ij obligacons,  un par  le quell un 
Ric'  Webber  fuit oblige  a1  dit  Symon en ixli., l'autre  par le quell 
un Thomas Trevily fuit oblige a1 dit Symon en vij li.,  de rescevoir lez 
sommes en iceux  contenus en payement et satisfaccon  pur l'afferant 
de lez  ditz  xx li. ;  a  le quel  payement  lez  ditz  Ric'  et Thomas a1 
request du dit Symon agreerunt ;  puis le dit Symon morust  intestat 
sauns ascuns  biens  aver, puis le dit Ric' fist un  Isabell, sa femme, 
son  excecutrix  et morust, quell  Isabell  puis  prist  a  baron  un  Ric' 
Medros ;  Et sovent puis le dit suppliant ad requys lez ditz Thomas, 
Ric' Medros et Isabell de lez payer lez ditz dettes a eux proferant lez 
ditz  obligacions  et  eux, veiantz  que le  dit  suppliant  ne puit  ascun 
accon  avoir  vers  eux a  le  comyn  ley, ne voillent  ly  payer, a  grant 
anyntysment  du  dit  suppliant  s'il  n'eit  vostre  tresgracous  eide : 
Pleise a vostre  tresgracous  Segnurie  de considerer les premysses  et 
de graunter a1 dit suppliant ij breves, un d'eux directe a1 dit Thomas, 
et l'auter  as  ditz  Ric'  Medros  et  Isabell  sa  femme,  de comparer 
devant vous  a  un  certeyn  iour  sur  un  certeyn  peyne  par  vous 
a  lymyter  d'estre  examines  sur  lez  premyssez  et d'ent  faire  droit 
solonc vostre tres gracious discrecon pur dieu et en oevre de charytee. 
Bundle X, No. 207. 
To  my  ful graciouse lord the bysshop of  Bathe chaunceller of 
England. 
After  Mekely besekes unto your graciouse lordship John Derehill of  the 
14 32-  shire of  Comwaill for as muche as the said beseker, atte the Instaunce 
and prayer  of  on William Bampton of  the said  Shire, yoman, And 
opon ful promisse to kepe hym harmelese, was bounden with the said 
William unto on Nicholas late Abbot of  Newenham in the counte of 
Devonshire in an obligacon of a C mark to be paied atte a certain day 
conteyned  in  the  said  obligacon;  Whereuppon  on Tristram  now 
of  the said abbaye be  covyn  and assent of  the said William 
suyth  and vexit  your  said  beseker  with  divers  writtes  in  the said 
counte and putte him to grete vexacion an coste for the said somme, 
to the undoyng of  your  said beseker  in lasse  than hit be  remedyed 
by  youre  graciouse  lordship:  Please  hit  unto your  good  grace  to 
graunt a writte sub pena direct to the said William atte acertain (sic) 
day and opon a certain  somme by  youe alimited  to a  piere a  fore 
your  graciouse presence,  and after  due examinacion  had  to  fynde 
your said beseker  sufficient suirte to kepe  him harmlese agains the 
said abbot as he promised the said beseker, as reson and conscience 
woll after your highe and graciouse discrecon, For  love of god and 
in Werk of Charite. 
Bundle XI, No. 8 a. 
To the full gracious fader in god Bisshop of Bath and Chaunceller 
of  Inglond.' 
Besechith  mekely un to your  gracious  Lordship John  Barnesby  After 
parson of the chirche of Slapton in the Counte of  Norhampton, that  W2. 
where as the seide parson let his chirche to oon William Chacombe 
of Toucestre for the terme of  thre yere  of  grete trist with oute any 
specialte and for as muche as the first two yeres were of  grete derth 
and the thirde yere wexed  grete chepe the seide William, seyng his 
avayle not so grete in the third yere os he had in the two  yeres be 
fore,  Also  he  seyng  that  your  seide  Besecher  had  no  writyng  to 
ground hym apon at the comyn lawe to conceyve any accion by and 
so with oute remedie, refusid to hold the third yere to the grete losse 
and harme of  your seide Besecher the yerely value:  Wherfor, please 
it to your full gracious Lordship to consider  the mater above seide 
and there apon to graunte a writ sub pena directe un to the seide 
William  to appere be  fore  you  at a  certeyn  day  under a certeyne 
peyne by  you  alymet  and ther  to be examyned of  seide  mater  as 
concience will for the love of god and be way of charite. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Willielmus Asshely. 
Johannes Reynolds. 
Bundle XI, No. 8, is a copy of this petition, but it is not addressed to 
any particular Chancellor, and the '  pledges ' are omitted. I  86  THE HISTORY  OF CONTRACT  APPENDIX  OF CASES  187 
Bundle XI, No. 47. 
To  my ful gracious Lorde bysshop of  Bathe Chaunceller of 
Engelond. 
After  Besechith  mekely  un  to  youre  gracious  lordship  youre  pouer 
1432-  servaunt John Leomyster, one of  the Clerkes of  the Chauncery, that 
where one Thomas of  Oclee of Erlygham in the Counte of  Gloucestre, 
Squyer, oweth to Robert Manfeld of Gynes x mark, the which x mark 
was assyned be the seyde Robert Manfeld in recorde of the Mayre of 
Caleys for to be payed  to youre seyde suppliaunt for certeyn money 
that the seyde Robert  Maunfeld  owed to hym; the seyde Thomas 
of  Oclee, late beyng  at London, a fore worthy men knowleged  the 
dewete and payment ther of  to be made to youre  seyde suppliaunt, 
the whiche he utterly  Seth hathe refused : Wherefore please hit un to 
youre lordship to consider thys mater and ther upon of  youre grace 
to graunte the seyde suppliaunt a Sub pena  direct  un to the seyde 
Thomas of  Oclee, to appere a fore yow at a certeyn  day and to be 
examyned of  this mater abovesayd and as ye may fynde be exarnina- 
cion to remedy hit aftur youre discrecion, for the love of  godde and 
in wey  of charitee. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Thomas Asshecombe. 
Johannes Halle. 
Bundle XI, No.  160. 
To  the right Reverent Fader in God the bisshop of Bathe 
Chanceler of Englond. 
After  Humely  (sic)  besechith  youre  poure  Oratour John  Pottok  that 
'43'.  where he solde certeyns goodis and catalles to Harry Brome be the 
handes of  oone  Margrete Wylton  for x li.  For the which the sayd 
Harry was bound in an obligacion to your sayd besecher, the whiche 
sayd  Margrete  lost  the forsayd  obligacion : That it please  to your 
gracious lordship consciensly to consider the premyse and [that] '  your 
sayd besecher  be cause  that  the sayd  obligacion is loste  hath noo 
remedie atte the comune lawe to recover the sayd some and over that 
of  your  good  and gracious  lordshyp to graunt your  sayd beseche~ 
a writte under a certeyne peyne agenst  the sayd  Harry to apeyr  in 
the Chauncerye at the xvme of Pasch' that next comyth, there to fore 
yow  to be  examyned  upon  the sayd  mater as right  and consciens 
requiren at the Reverence of  godd and in weye of Charitee. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Hugo atte Water. 
Johannes Corff. 
Bundle XI, NO. 4270. 
To  the ryght reverent fadur in god Bysshop of Bathe Chaunceller 
of England.' 
Mekely beseketh  youre  pore  bedman Thomas Baby,  Prest, that  After 
where as youre seid Suppliant delivered certein  godes of  grete  trust  1432. 
to on John Bramfeld of London, Prest, and therupon borowed XX. S. 
to be paid agen atte certeine day be twene hem acorded, atte whiche 
day youre  seid Suppliant come and paid to the seid John  the seid 
XX. S. and required  the seid John to deliver  hym  the seid godes; 
and the seid John aftur the seid payment ensured youre seid suppliant 
on faith  and on his  pristhode  [to]  delyver  the seid  godes  on the 
morow, and in the mene  tyme  the seid  John solde awey  the seid 
godes to a straunge man in grete disseit to youre seid Suppliant and 
to that entent that yef he toke an  accon of detenu agene the seid John 
that he myght have come in and waged his lawe;  and so your sayd 
Suppliant  shuld  be  withoute  remedie  in  grete  hyndryng  to hym 
withoute  your  special1 grace in this  mater  had: Wherfor, plese hit 
un to youre high grace to consydre these  premysses and in relevyng 
of  youre seid Suppliant to graunt a wryt directe to the seid John  to 
aper a  for you atte a  certein day in the chauncerie  under a certein 
peyne by you lymyted, there to be examyned of  this mater as trouth 
and cociens (sic) woll, for the love of God and in the wey of charite. 
Endorsed:  Memorandum  quod tam  infrascriptus  Thomas quam 
infrascriptus Iohannes pretextu cuiusdam brevis domini Regis eidem 
Iohanni directi et in Cancellaria eiusdem domini Regis ad diem  in 
eodem  breve  contenturn  ad respondendurn  super hiis  que sibi per 
peticionem istam ad persecutionem predict0 Thome obicerent, ibidem 
personaliter  comparuerunt.  Qua  quidem  peticione  in  Cancellaria 
predicta in presentia parcium predictarum lecta, ac materia in eadem 
nec non responsionibus et replicacionibus utriusque parcium illarum 
'  Bundle XI, Nos. 427 b,  427 c,  427 d, are copies of this pleading, and 
are substantially the same except that  they are not  endorsed with judge- 
ment.  Hole in document. THE  HISTORY  OF CONTRACT 
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pro iure suo in hac parte probando plenius auditis et intellectis, con- 
sideratum fuit per curiam Cancellarie predicte quod predictus Thomas 
recuperet bona,  infrascripta, videlicet  unam murram et quatuordecim 
solidos et octo denarios pro sex coclearibus parcell  bonorum predic- 
torum. 
Bundle XII, No. 201. 
A tres reverent Segnur l'evesque de Bathe et de Welles 
Chaunceller D'engletere. 
After  Supplie humblement vostre povre oratour Richard Pers, que come 
14s2.  John  Alewent  et Thomas  Fylder,  servantz le dit  Richard  en  son 
service  esteantz  en  alant en sez bosoignez  hors  de la  meere,  par 
dyvers  enemyez  nostre  Segnur le  Roy  furent sur la  meere  prisez 
ensemblement ove autres bienz le dit suppliant et cariez en la Mounte 
de Seynt Michell  et  illoqs  raunsome a xl marcz;  a cause de quele le 
dit suppliant vient a un William Becche et ovesque luy accorda qu'il 
duist delyveres lez ditz prisons hors del dit prison, A cause de quele le 
dit William preist del dit Suppliant xl marcz, et nient [obsteant]'  le 
dit  William  riens  a  ceo  fist,  par  qi lez  ditz  prisons,  pur  ceo que 
lour raunsom ne vient  a iour a eux limite, furent graundement  dis- 
tressez, stokkes et malement  tretes, issint q'ils  furent  en despeire de 
lour viez, a final destruccon  des ditz  prisons et a graund anientisse- 
ment le dit suppliant, saunz vostre tres gracious eide et socour :  Que 
please a vostre tres gracious Segnurie de considerer lez premissez et 
coment  le dit  Suppliant  n'ad  mye  remedie  solonque  la  cours  del 
Comune ley et sur ceo de grauntier a1 dit Suppliant bref de sub pena 
direct  a1  dit William  d'estre  examine devaunt vous de lez premissez 
a certein iour par vous limitez et sur ceo faire solonque ceo que bon 
foy et concience demaunde, Et ceo pur dieu et en overe du charite. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Edwardus Mills. 
Johannes Boteler. 
Bundle XIV,  NO.  5. 
To  the most reverent Fader in God John Erchbysshop of 
Caunterbury Chauncellere of Englond. 
1443 to  Besechuth humbully youre pore and contynuell oratoure, Conrade 
145O.  Goldsmyth,  that  where  oon  Laurence  Walkere  the  Saturday  next 
byfore the Fest of  the Purification  of  oure lady, the yere of  the regne 
Hole in document. 
of  the Kyng  oure sovereyne  lord,  that  is  to say  Kyng  Harry the 
Sixte, aftur the conquest xxje, att Teukesbury bought of  youre  seide 
besechere ij clothes and half of blankett for vij li. to be payode to the 
same besechere in the Fest  of  the Anunciacon  of oure lady thenne 
next  sewyng, for whiche  payement as woll  and trewely  to be made 
oon Symkyn  Bakere of  Teukesbury undurtoke  and bykome borowe 
for the seide Laurence, in as muche as the seide supliant wold nothur 
have solde nor delyverode the seide clothe un to the seide Laurence 
butt only uppon trust of the seide Symkyn and that he wolde undur- 
take  for .  . .' payement  of  the seide sume which  he feythfully  pro- 
myttode un to the seide supliant  that  he schulde  be  satisfiode and 
payode ther of atte his  day, of  which sume remayneth yett  iij li. un 
payode which nothur the seide Laurence nor the seide Symkyn yett 
hathe satisfiode nor  payode  un  to youre  seide besecher;  and the 
seide  Laurence  is  wythdrawen  and  dyssnodea to  strange  places 
unknowen  so  that  youre  seide  besechere  may  noo  remedye  have 
agenst  hym  thaughe he  sewe  hym  by  wrytte  nor  agenst  the seide 
Symkyn by the cours  of  the  comyn  lawe: Pleasith  youre  gracious 
Lordship to consyder these premissez and ther uppon to do the seide 
Conrade to have dewe remedy agenest the seide Symkyn, for the love 
of  God and in Wey of Charyte. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Ricardus Bury de Solbe in Com' Glouc'. 
Henricus Wakfeld de Camden in eadem Com'. 
Bundle XV,  No.  20 a. 
To  the ryght worchipfull fader in god the Erchebysshop of 
Canterbury and Chaunceller of Inglond. 
Besechith  mekely  youre  servauntz  and  continuell  oratours,  After 
Sir William Drury, Knight, and Johane  his doughter, lathe the wyfe  1432. 
of  Robert Aysshefeld the yonger, that, where as accorde was hadde 
be twen the seid William and Robert Aysshefelde, Squyer, the older, 
that the seid Robert Aysshefeld  the yonger, sone to the seid Robert 
Aysshefeld the elder,  shulde wedde  the seid  Johane,  doughter  of 
youre  seid  suppliaunt,  and the  seid  Robert  Aysshefeld  the  fader 
shulde  do lawful  estat  to  be  made  of  alle  his  meses,  londes  and 
tenementz  in  the townes  of  Michel Yernemouthe  and Southton to 
'  Hole in document.  The word  is uncertain. THE HISTORY  OF CONTRACT  APPENDIX  OF CASES 
the seid Robert  the sone and Johane and to the heirs  of  the seid 
Robert the sone of  the body of  the seid Johane be gotyn, and that 
the seid Robert the sone and Johane  his  wyfe  shulde be made suer 
in lawe of  a yerely rente of  x marcs to take in the maner of Lytylhawe 
duryng the lyve of  the seid Robert the fader, and also that the seid 
Robert the sone and Johane shulde be made suer be the seid Robert 
the fader and his feffes of the seid maner in Lytylhawe to have it after 
the decesse of the seid Robert the fader to the seid Robert the sone 
and Johane and to heyrs of  Robert the sone of  the body of  the seid 
Johane be gotyn ;  wheche Robert the fader be cause the same maner 
is helde of the kyng  in chief, sued a licence that he myghte of  the 
same maner enfeffe  Hug' Bekenham and Water  Gerard en fee, and 
that  thei  ther of  myghte make estat a geyn to the seid Robert  the 
fader  terme  of  his  lyve, the remaindre  ther  of  to the seid  Robert 
the sone and Johane in the some a bove seid, as in the seid license 
more  pleynly apereth,  and ther  of made  estate to the same  Hug' 
and Water to the same entent;  for the whech mariage and estates to 
be made your seid suppliaunt, William Drury shulde paie to the seid 
XX 
Robert the fader viij x marcs, wher  of  the seid William  hath  paied 
a gret parte and the residue he muste content at the dayes assignad ; 
and nout wythstandyng  that the seid mariage was finished and day 
a  poynted  at twene  theme  of  the seid  estates  to be made,  for  as 
muche as it  happed  the seid  Robert  the sone to dye in the mene 
tyme, the seid Robert the fader wulde nout  suffre the seid estates to 
be  made accordyng  to  the acordes  a  bove  seid : Please  hit  youre 
gracious Lordshippe to consedre  these  premisses  and howe of  this 
mater  youre  seid suppliauntes have no remedye  atte Comone iawe, 
and theruppon to graunt to youre seid suppliauntes Writtes sub pena 
directe  to the seid  Robert  Aysshefeld, Hug'  and Water  to appere 
a  fore you  atte a  certeyn  day  under a certeyn peyne by  you to be 
lymyted, to be examened of these premisses and theruppon to rewle 
hem to make the seid estates acordynge to the seid accorde, as good 
feith  and conscience requiren,  atte the  reverence  of  god  and for 
charite. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Johannes Hervy de Lavenham, Gentilman. 
Rogerus Brook de Bernaham, Gentilman. 
Note.--For  the defendant's answer see Bundle XV,  NO. 20  b. 
Bundle XV,  No. 20 b. 
The answer  of  Hug'  Bokenham  and Water  Bayard, Clerk,  to the 
bille  goven  agens hem  be  Sir William, Knyght, and Jane  his 
doughter, in pe Chauncerye. 
The seid Hug' and Water for answer seyn  that they were enfeffyd 
in ye seid Maner of Lytelhaghe for discharge of suyrte of an obligacion 
in which pe seid Hug' and Water were boundyn to the seid Sir William 
in xl  marcs  atte request  of pe seid  Robert Asshfeld;  And also to 
make  estate of  pe seid Maner to pe seid  Robert Asshfeld  terme of 
his  lyfe withoutyn  enpechement  of  wast, the remayndre  thereof  to 
Robert  Asshfeld,  his  sone,  and  to  Jane,  doughter  of  the  seid 
Sir William, accordyng to pe licence, upon certeyn condicions, which 
were rehersyd attwyn them, of certeyn payments and suyrtees to be 
payed and made be pe seid  Sir William  to pe seid Robert Asshfeld, 
the fadir, be the fest of  of (sic) lammesse last past ;  For pe which )~e 
seid  Sir  William  and Robert  ben  in  controversie  be bille  here  in 
this place, wherfore  so that  bothe parties can  agree them  that the 
condicions be parformyd, orell yf  it can be provyd they be parformyd 
on the pe (sic) said Sir William's  part, that we may be saved harmless 
agens  said Robert Asshfeld and have lyvere of  pe seid obligacion, 
we  be  redy and at alle tymes  shall be to make  estate accordyng to 
the seid licence;  wherfore we  praye  to be dismyssed  oute of  court 
with oure resonable costes. 
Note.-Bundle  XV, No. 21, is a petition addressed to the chancellor by 
the  same complainants, but  they pray for  a  'sub  pena  Against  Robert 
Asshfeld ' alone.  The petition sets up  substantially the same facts, and 
concludes  with  the  prayer  that  the  chancellor  '. . . rewle  the  saide 
Robert Asshefeld to do in seid mater as moche as he may do accordyng 
to the seid accord, as good feith and conscience requiren, atte the reverence 
of  god and for charite '. 
Bundle XV, No. 51. 
Unto the ful reverent fader in God the Archbisship of Caunterbury 
Chaunceller of  Ingelond. 
Besechen to your high lordship Thomas Acton, William de Lones,  After 
William Abraham, John Aleyn and Richard Hervy herby to consider  '444. 
that where  thei  hade C tonne Wyn wt  other godes to the value of 
vC  (i. e.  500) li. laded  in  a  ship called  the Mighell  of  Dertmouth 
comyng fro Burdeux toward London, the which wyn and godes were 
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trewes hade bitwene our soverain lord pe king of  Ingelond  and the 
Duke of Bretayne, for the which wyn and godes your  seid besechers 
sued a lettre undre the prive seal1 of our seid soverain lord directe to 
the same Duke to have her  seid wyn  and godes  agein or  elles  an 
answer wherfore thei shuld nat be restored  to hem ;  And theruppon 
your seid besechers comoved wt an herande of armes to have delivered 
pe same lettre to pe seid Duke and from him to have brought to hem 
an answer; ther come the fifte day of  May in the yere of  our soverain 
lord aforseid xxij in the parisshe of  Seint Martin in the vynetrie of 
London one Robert Wenyngton by covyn  of  pe  seid Thomas de la 
Tere and covenaunted  and  undretoke  to  your  seid  besechers  to 
deliver pe seid lettre and bryng in to pe seid parisshe a redy answer 
of pe same lettre fro the Duke aforseid atte fest of lamasse then next 
suyng, at which v day pe same Robert reseyved  the seid lettre and 
yet brought none answer to hem there of; So that your seid besechers 
are nat restored to her wyn and godes bicause none answer is hade, to 
her harmes of MI li. ;  and the seid Robert hath housed and herberwed 
pe same Thomas de la.Tere takyng godes out of  Bretayne for pe seid 
wyn  and godes  sithen the resceyt  of  the lettre aforseid:  Wherfore 
please it to your gracious lordship, consideryng pe premisses aforseid, 
to graunte a writte upon a certein  peyne directe to the seid Robert 
him comaundyng to appere afore  you in the Chauncerie at a certein 
day by you limyt for to be examined and answer to pe  mater  afore 
rehersed and whether  he hath delivered pe seid lettre or none and 
upon pe seid examinacon hade to content  your  seid  besechers  for 
her costes and damages and that for the love of  god and in wey  of 
charite. 
Note.-The  right-hand edge of this document is much worn;  in fact the 
whole petition was difficult to decipher. 
Bundle XV,  No. 140  a. 
To  the moste reverent fader in god Archbysshop of Cantuar' 
Chaunceller of Englond. 
After  Humble  besechith  Hammond  Sutton  that  where  late  hit  was 
'443.  accorded  and agreed  by  twix  John  Bussy,  knyght, and your  saide 
besecher,  pat  John,  sone  and heire  apperaunte  of  the saide  John 
Bussy, shuld wedde and take to wyff  Agnes,  doghter  of  your  saide 
besecher ;  For which maryagge so to be hadde and (sic) a sure estate 
of landez and tenementz of  the yerely value of xx li. a boffe all charges 
and reprys to be made by the saide John Bussy or other persones for 
hym to the saide John the sone and Agnes and heire heires of  ther 
bodys comynge with in a moneth after the mariage made.  Not with 
stondyng the saide John Bussy Knyght yite hath not made no suche 
astate of  dyvers landez and tenementz  to the saide John  sone and 
Agnes after the Fourme of the saide accorde, bot yt to doo he utterly 
refuseth  agenste all gude faith  and consciens : Please hit  to your 
right  gracious  lordeship  to  considre  thez  premissez  and  pat  your 
saide besecher  in this partye  hath no remedy by the comune lawe, 
and ther uppon  to graunte  to hym  a  wryte  directed  to the saide 
John  Bussy, Knyght, hym  comaundyng  to appere by  fore yowe at 
a certayn  day uppon  a  certayn payn by yowe to be lymeted,  to be 
examined of  this aforsaide and ther  uppan  to do and receyve pat 
gude fath and consiens requireth  in this party, and he shall pray to 
gode for yowe. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Johannes Burton. 
Ricardus Leek. 
Bundle XV,  No. 140  b. 
This is the answer of Sir John Bussy, Knyght, unto pe bill ageynes 
him in the chauncery be Hamond Sutton. 
First the saide Sir John saith that the mater contened in the saide 
bill  is  not  mater  sufficiant  to pute hym  to answer to, and if  it be 
sufficiant  he says  hit  is  mater  determinable  at  the comen  lawe; 
Neverbeless for  the declaracon  of  the trouth of  the mater he saith 
pat upon the trety of the mariage betwix the saide John the son and 
Agnes, hit was  agreede pat a ioyntoure of  xx li. of  lyflode shulde be 
made to pe same John  the son and Agnes and to be heires male of 
their ij bodyes begoton, for defaute of  suche issue the remeigner to 
the Right heires of the saide Sir John Bussy : bot for asmyche as hit 
was  doubted  whether  the saide  lifelode  were  tailled  to the  saide 
Sir John Bussy and to the heires of  his  body comyng or no, hit was 
appoynfed be the counsel1 of bothe parties, for peril1 of a remitter be 
cause the saide John the son was at that  tyme far with in age, pat 
astate of  the saide lifelode shulde be made to vj persons, iij at the 
denomination of  the saide Sir John and iij at the denomination of 
the saide Hamonde, in fee simple and pat the same vj persons at 
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full age of the saide John  the son shulde make astate  of  the saide 
lifelode to the same John the son and Agnes and to the heires male 
of their ij bodyes comynge, the remeigner over in the forme as it is 
above  saide: beforce (sic) of  which  accorde and appoyntement and 
accordyng to the same the saide Sir John Bussy made astate of xx li. 
of lyfelode to Thomas  Savage, Clerk, John  Langholme  and William 
Percy,  chosen  be  the  same  Hamond  and  to  John  Boure,  Clerk, 
John Denton and Richard  Byngham, chosen be the saide Sir John, 
in fee simple to performe the saide entent, be virtue of  whiche astate 
the saide vj persons are seised at this day of  the same lyflode in  fee 
simple, with oute pat the saide Sir John and Hamond were acorded 
pat the same Sir John or  other persons  for  hym  shulde make any 
astate to the saide John the son and Agnes and to the heires of their 
ij bodyes comyng with in a moneth aftur the saide mariage made in 
the maner as it is supposed be  the saide  Hamond be his  bill ;  and 
praith pat he may be dimissed and pat he may have his damage  for 
his wronge vexacon. 
Bundle XV, No.  141. 
To the moste reverent Fader in gode Archbysshop of  Canterbury 
Chaunceller of  Englond. 
~f~~~  Humble  besechith  Hamond  Sutton,  that  wher  late  accorde  of 
1443.  mariage toke be twix John Bussy, Knyght, and your  saide besecher, 
that John,  sone  and heire  of  the  saide John  Bussy, shulde wedde 
and take to wyf  Agnez, doughter of  your saide besecher;  For which 
mariage so to be hade and asure astate  of  landez and tenementz of 
the yerely value of xx li. aboff all chargez and reprysse to be made to 
the  saide John  Bussy  to Thomas  Savage, Clerk,  John Langholm, 
William  Percy,  John  Boure,  Clerk,  John  Denton  and  Richard 
Byngham, to that intente that whan John  the son of  the saide John 
Bussy come to the agge of xxj yere pat pai shuld make astate of  the 
saide landez and tenementz to the saide John  son  of  the saide John 
Bussy  and Agnez  his  wyf  and to the  heirez  malles  of  ther  bodez 
comyng, your saide besecher shuld pay  to the saide John Bussy ij C 
and lx marces, of  the which some the saide John Bussy is contented 
be youre saide besecher with owte any state maide to the saide per- 
sonez so named Feffes of  the saide landez and tenementz ;  Wheruppon 
your saide besecher suede agens the saide John Bussy afore the Kyng 
in his chauncerie to have hade remedy in theiz premissez, uppon the 
which  a trete was  takyn  be  twix  the  saide partez be mediacion of 
William Stanlowe and other of  theire  Frendez to abyde the rewelle 
and ordinaunce of  John Tailboys, Esquyer, Robert Sheffeld, Thomas 
Fitz William and William Stanlowe of  the mater a boffe specified, so 
that  awarde  made  be  hem  in  that  partye  shulde  be  wretyn  and 
inseelled under  theire seelez of  the saide arbitrures a fore the Quin- 
decim  of  Seint Michell last passed, which  arbitred  and awarde be 
dede indented maide and enselled under  all their  sellez excepte the 
seele of the saide William Stanlowe, the which be the excitation pro- 
turyng and styrryng of  the saide John  Bussy and  Kateryn his wyff 
hath refused to putte to his seelle to the indenture of  the saide awarde 
to the intent pat the saide award shulde not be effectuell nor avaylle- 
able in lawe, notwithstondyng both the saide Hamond and John Bussy 
to the award and ordinaunce aforesaide hath pytte to peir seellez, as it 
apperith of  recorde and so remaneth the saide Feffement  not execute, 
nor the saide award effectuell nor avaylleable in gret  hurte  to your 
saide besecher agens all gud fath, reson, and consiens : Please hit to 
your gracious Lordeschip to considre theiz premissez and theruppon 
to have the saide John Bussy to for yowe  and to be  examined perof 
and of all the circumstance of the same and  so to do dewe remedy 
and redresse theiz premissez to your  saide besecher, as gud fath and 
consiens requireth.  For the loffe of  gode and in MTey of  Charite. 
[Plegii de prosequendo :] 
Robertus Hawton. 
Thomas Baylton. 
Bundle XV, No.  181  a. 
To the right holy fader in god Archebysshop of Caunterbury 
Chaunceller of  Englond. 
Besechith mekely youre humble  servaunt, John Serle, that where  After 
as debate was betwene Richard Fortescu, John Silverlok of  that part,  "43, 
Thomas Wollywrought and the saide besecher of  the other part, of 
the  right  and title  of  the  mesis, landes  and  tenementz that nywly 
were the right and possession of  on John Braklee in Plympton erlys, 
Plymphome and Loghetorre, in the Countee of  Devon, and after that 
by  mediacon of  frundis to bothe parties aforsaid the said Richard, 
John  Silverlok, Thomas Wollywrought and the said besecher com- 
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promitte ham to stande to the awarde, arbitrement  and iugement  of 
Sir John  Fortescu,  Knyght, and Water  Burell  by  the said  parties 
indifferently  chosyn,  of  the title,  right  and possession  of  the said 
mesis, landes and tenementz;  wherof  the said arbitrours takyng on 
ham  the  charge  of  the said  arbitrement,  awarde  and  iugement, 
awardede and demyd the thursday next after the fest of  seint  Peder 
de Advincla,  the yere  of  kyng  Harry the  sixt  the xvjb  yere  at 
Plympton erlis in the said Countee, that the said Richard  Fortescu 
and John Silverlok afore the fest of  Seint Michell thenne next suyng 
after the said day of awarde, arbitrement and iugement sholde enfeffe 
the said Thomas and the said besecher to the use of the said besecher 
in  a miese with apurtenaunce in the said Towne of Plympton erlis in 
the west part of the geldhalle of  the said Towne to have and to hold 
to hem and to theire heirs in fee to the use  of  the said besecher; 
whiche awarde, arbitrement and iugement the said John Silverlok for 
his part hath parformid and the said Richard hath not parformyd ne 
fulfilled the saide awarde, arbitrement and iugment, and utterly hath 
refusid and in to this tyme haldith  the possession  of  the said mese 
with apurtenaunce to the dishereteson of the said besecher,  withoute 
your gracious help and socour in this partie : Plese to your  gracious 
Lordship to considere the premissis, that the said besecher hath no 
remedie by  the comyn  lawe,  to graunte a wryt  sub pena  directid 
to the said Richard Fortescu to apere afore yowe in the Chauncerie 
of oure soverain lord at a certein day by yowe lymet and on a certeyne 
payne ther to be examynyd  on the mater aforesaid and ther on to 
do as reson  and consciens askith,  at honour  of  god and foe  (sic) 
charitee. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Johannes Heryng. 
Willielmus Mychell. 
Bundle XV, No. 181  6. 
This is the answere of  Richard Fortescu Esquyer to the bille of 
John Serle. 
The said Richard seyth that the mater  specefyed in the said bille 
ys noo mater sufficiant in lawe to putte hym to answere too; wherk 
fore he askeyth Juggement and prayith to be Dymyssid  oute of  this 
Court Wyth hys resonable costes and damages, &c. 
Bundle XV, No.  181 c. 
This ys the replicacon of John Serle to the answere of 
Richard Fortescu. 
The said John  seyth the mater  specified in his  bill in (sic) mater 
sufficiant in lawe and mater determinable by this Court, to the whiche 
mater the seid Richard answereth nat, Wherefor he askyth iugement 
and prayth that he may have the effect of the seid bille. 
Bundle XVI, No. 386. 
To  the right reverent fader in god and our right gracious lord the 
Archiebisshop of Cauntbury Chaunceller of  Englond. 
Mekely besechen  your pore and continuell servantz Robert Harry  Date 
of Bradstede and Isabelle his Wyfe, that where on William Shoeswell uncertain' 
pe yonger,  fader  unto pe seide Isabelle, desired  pe  seid  Robert to 
wedde and take to  wyfe p  seide Isabelle and yf  the seid Robert wolde 
so doo pe forseid William promysed and graunted unto pe seid Robert 
and Isabelle yn  mariage xl  marces  yn money to be paide at Ester 
laste  passid  and on pat  to deliver  to p  seid  Robert and Isabelle 
goodes and catelles to Pe  value of  xl  marces whiche pat on William 
Shoeswell pe elther, fader unto  seid William Shoeswell pe yonger, 
in his laste dayes delivered unto hym saufly to kepe to pe  use of pe 
seide  Isabelle and to be delivered  unto  here  assone as she were 
maried ;  And now hit is so pat pe seid Robert hath wedded  Pe same 
Isabelle and Pereuppon  he hath come to be  seid William Shoeswell 
pe yonger  and requyred  hym  diverse tymes  setthe  seid feste of 
Ester to fulfill his graunte and promysse and pe seid William Shoeswell 
pe yonger yn  no wise will paye pe seid XI marces  neyther  deliver  pe 
seid goodes and catelles after his promysse and pe byqueste of pe seid 
William  Shoeswell his fader but atte pe oeptas of  seint hillary laste 
passid  afore pe Justicee  of  Comone place hath done his lawe yn 
a writte of  dette by your seid besechers in pis partie  sewed pat  he 
owed your  seid besechers no peny ne no suche goodes  ne catelles 
Pann withholdith where of  your  seid  besechers have notable witnes 
and profes of pe contrarie to pair grete hurte and losse for ever of pe 
seid  dette,  goodes and catelles,  wipoute  your  gracious socour and 
helpe yn pis partie  to paim  shewed : Plese  hit  unto  your  gracious 
lordship  to consider  seid premysses  and Pereuppon  to graunte 
unto  your  seid  suppliantz a  writte  directed  unto  pe  seid  William 
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atte a certein day and uppon a certeyne peyne by  you  to be lymyted 
there to answere unto pe seid premisses and pere  mak hym  do pat 
good feith, right and consience aske and require for  pe love of  god 
and  by  way  of  charite, Consideryng pat  your  seid  suppliantz ben 
wipoute remedie after pe cours of  be comone lawe, yn  so moche as 
pei have no specialte to shewe for paim yn Pis partie. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Thomas Hever de com' Kent. 
Robertus Parler de Brastede. 
Bundle XVI, No.  412. 
To the ryght holy fadre in god and my  goode lorde Archiebisshop of 
Canterbury and Chanceller of  England. 
~~t~  Besechith mekely your poure bedeman John Palgrave, That where 
uncertain. the sayde John boght of  on Cristain Gymbald  certain londes and 
tenementes in the towne of Pesynhale in the shire of  Suff' for sufficiant 
record and for certaine sommes of  money to be paiede to the saide 
Cristian att certain daies betwixte the saide parties lymyted ;  And for 
be cause ther was  no clerk nor lerned man there to make upp their 
dedes accordyng to  the sayde covenauntes,  It was  appointed and 
accordid betwixte the saide parties that att a certaine day by  thaime 
assigned  they shuld have  mette and  paied  the furst paiement  and 
made upp here dedes ;  And noghtwithstondyng that this sayde bargan 
was sufficiently  made [and of goode]' record and the sayde john  was 
redy with  the saide furst paiement att he saide day, the sayde Cristian 
by styrryng of oother evil1 willid poeple (sic) refusith utterly the [saide] ' 
bargain unto grete hynderyng of your saide besechiere without youre 
gracious  lordship  in  this  party:  Wherfor  please  hit  unto  youre 
gracious lordship, consideryng that youre saide suppliaunt may have 
no remedy att the comune lawe, to graunte a write under a certaine 
paine  directe  unto  the  saide  Cristian to  appere afor  you  in  the 
Chauncerye atte  certaine  day  by  you  to be  lymyted, there  to  be 
examyned uppon the mater  aforsaid, he there to have and receyve 
that by youre gracious lordship shall be awarded in that partie, For 
the love of  god and in Wey of  charite. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
. . .' Stapilton de villa Westm', yoman. 
Johannes Ceyfi de villa Westm',  Cordwaner. 
Bundle XIX, No. 26. 
To the most reverent fader  in god and right gode and gracious lord 
the Archebisshop of York Cardynall and Chaunceller of  Inglond. 
Besechith  mekely  your  poore Oratour John  Carter  of  Beverley  1450 to 
1454.  that  where  [he]'  and  Roger  Kidall  were  possessed  ioyntly of  ix 
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Stockfisshes and an  C iiij Saltfisshes pe  which  [were]'  putte  in  to 
a hous to have ben uttered and sold to their bother use and profite 
Wheruppon the forseid Roger all the forsaid Stockfissh and Saltfisshe 
hath manured, occupied and putte unto sale and noon accompte nor 
profite  therof,  ner  of  any  parcel1  therof,  will  yelde  to  your  said 
Oratour, to his perpetuell undoyng withoute your full gracious lord- 
ship be to hym  shewed in this behalf, for he  may have no  remedie 
by  the  Course of the  comone  lawe in this partee:  Wherfor, those 
premisses tenderly considred, please it  your gode gracious lordship 
to graunt a writte sub pena to be direct to the forseid Roger to appere 
afore the  Kyng  our  soverayne lord in his  Chauncerye at a certayn 
day by  you to be lymitted there to be examyned of  the premisses and 
theruppon to do as faith and conscience requireth, for the love of god 
and in the waye of charite. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Johannes Killyngholme. 
Nichelaus Elys. 
Bundle XIX,  No.  59. 
To the most wurshippful and reverent fadir in god the Cardinal1 and 
Archebisshop of York Chaunceller of Jnglond. 
Besechith mekely your pour and continuell oratour John  Mercer, 
After  that  where  as oon John  Halsnoth  was  seysyd of  a Meese and xvj 
u5a  acres of  lond wythynne the Parysh of Cranebroke in his demesne as 
in fee and there of  soo seysyd  of gret  fayth and  trust  enfeffid  oon 
Simon  Doreham and  other to have and do (sic) hoold to theym and 
theyre heyres for evermore to the  use and behoft  of  the seyd John 
Halsnoth  and hys heyres, aftyr whych feffement, accord and  aggre- 
ment  was  had  betwene your  sayd  Suppliaunt  and  the  seyd  John 
Halsnoth  that  your  seyd  suppliant shold  have  the sayd  Mies and 
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xvj acres of lond to hym  and to hys  heyres for  evermore, And that 
the seyd Halsnoth  shold require hys seyd feffez to make an astat to 
your seyd Suppliaunt and to such as he wold name wythynne a moneth 
next aftir the seyd accord ;  for the which Mies and xvj acres your seyd 
Suppliaunt shold paye to the seyd John  Halsnoth atte tyme of  the 
makyng of  the seyd astate xliiij mark, wherof part is payd.  And now 
gracious lord the seyd moneth  and more is  passyd  and your  seyd 
suppliaunt  hath  required  the  seyd  feffes  to  make  astat  to  hym 
accordyng to the seyd aggrement, the whych  they all been redy for 
to doo except oonly the seyd  Simon Doreham, With that  the  seyd 
John  Halsnoth woold  there  to require  hem; and  the  seyd  Simon 
Doreham seyeth that he hath bought the seyd Mies and xvj acres of 
lond  of  the  seyd  John  Halsnoth to thentent (sic) to put  your seyd 
Suppliaunt from his seyd bargayne, where of  trowith the seyd Simon 
had never noo maner of  covenant of  the seyd londys and tenementes 
afore the seyd aggrement had bytwne your seid  Suppliaunt and the 
seyd Halsnoth, but oonly syn, how be it pat the seyd Simon had very 
knowyng of  the seyd bargayn  had betwene your  seyd besecher and 
the  seyd  John  Halsnoth  long  tyme  byfor  the  seyd  bargayn  had 
bytwene the seyd Simon and John Halsnoth, the whych is agenst all 
reson, feyth and good concience :  Wherefore please it youre good and 
gracious lordship tenderly to concider thyse premisses and that your 
seyd suppliaunt hath noo remedy atte the comyn lawe, to graunte to 
hym several1 wryttes sub pena direct to the seyd John Halsnoth and 
Simon to appere atte a certeyn day be yow  to be  lymyted and that 
the seyd John Halsnoth may be compellid to require his  seyd feffez 
to make astat to your seyd Suppliaunt, and also that the seyd Simon 
may be compellid to make astat forth wyth his cofeffees to your seyd 
suppliaunt as good feyth and concience will for  the love  of  god and 
in wey of  charite. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Thomas Reynold de London, Gentilman. 
Ricardus Richard de London, Grocer. 
Bundle XIX,  No. 58. 
This is the answere of John Halsnoth and Simon Durham agenst, 
the bill of John Mercer in the kynges Chauncerye. 
to answere to whiche [they] praye that theire avantage there of  alwey 
to be saved.  Furpermore, where as the said John  Mercer hath sur- 
mytted and aleyde  by  his  seid  bill  that the  said  John  Halsnothe 
shulde have be seised of  a mees  and xvj acres of  lond within  the 
paryssh of  Cranebroke in his demene in fee and so seised of  greet 
trust shuld have infeffed the said Simon Durham  and other to the 
use of  the said John  Halsnoth and of  his  heires, after whiche feffe- 
ment  accorde and agrement  shuld  have be bytwene the said John 
Mercer and the said John Halsnothe pat youre seid suppliant shulde 
have the seid mees and xvj acres  of  lond  to him and to his heires 
and that the said John Halsnothe  shuld require his  seid feffees to 
make estate to your seid suppliaunt at whiche tyme as he wold name 
within  a  moneth  next  after  the  said  accord  as in the  said  bill  is 
conteyned ; 
Therto the said John Halsnothe and Simon answere and seye for 
declaration of  trouth that longe tyme afore that ever the said John 
had  eny  possession  in  the  said  mees  and  xvj  acres  of  lond  on 
John Robert of  Cranebroke pe elder was seised perof in his demenes 
in fee whiche said John Robert in and of the said mees and xvj acres 
enfeffed the said John Halsnoth, Simon Durham and oper to have to 
hem  and to her  heires forever, by  vertue  of  whiche pey  were  perof 
seised; whiche said Simon and oper so beyng ioyntly seised with the 
saide John Halsnoth afterward into the possession of  the said John 
Halsnothe by  her dede relessed all her right title and clayme pat @y 
had perin in any wyse  by vertue of  the said feffement ;  whiche seid 
John Halsnoth perof so beyng sol1 seised sold the said mees and xvj 
acres to the said Simon Durham, by cause of which sale he infeffed 
perin the said Simon Durham and oper to pe use and behoove of the 
said  Simon and of  his heires forever by vertue of  whiche Fey were 
perof  so seised, withoute  pat  ever  eny  accord  and agrement  were 
made or had bitwene  seid John Mercer and John Halsnoth for ]le 
seid  mees  and land,  and  withoute  pat  the  said  Simon were  ever 
enfeffed by the said John Halsnoth  to his use in pe  seid mees and 
land in maner  and fourme as it is surmytted  by pe seid bill;  which 
mater pey be redy to averr as pis  Court  will  award, and prayen  to 
be dismyssed oute  of  Court and her  damages for  their wrongefull 
vexacion. 
John Halsnoth and Simon Durham by  protestacion seith that  the 
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Bundle XIX, No.  57. 
Thys ys the replication of John Mercer to the Answere of Simon 
Doreham and John Halsnoth. 
Ther to the seid John Mercer seyth that, where as the seid Simon 
and John Halsnoth seyen that ther was never non accord and aggre- 
ment hadde betwene the seid John  Mercer, Suppliant, and the seid 
John  Halsnoth for the seid Mees and lond and that the seid Simon 
was never enfeffed by the seid John Halsnoth to his  use in the seid 
Mies and lande in maner and fourme as it is surmittid, Therto the 
seid  suppliaunt  seith  that  ther  was  accord  and  aggrement  hadde 
betwene the seid suppliant and the seid John Halsnoth for the seid 
Mies and land in maner and fourme as the seid suppliaunt hath sur- 
mitted by his bill, and that the seid suppliaunt gaf notys to the seid 
Simon Doreham of  the said bargayn long tyme afore the seid John 
Halsnoth  solde  the seid  Mies  and  land  to  the seid  Dorham;  the 
whiche matiers the seid suppliaunt ys redy for to prove as this Court 
will awarde ;  and in as moche as the seid Simon and John Halsnoth 
with seyen not that the seid Simon was enfeffed to the use of  the seid 
John  Halsnoth atte tyme of  the Bargayn of  the seid suppliant made 
and longtyme syn and that the seid  Halsnoth hath reseyvid parte of 
the  seid  money  by  force of  the seid  Bargayn,  the  seid  Suppliant 
prayeth that the seid John  Halsnoth may be compellyd to make his 
feffeez  to make estate to the seid besecher of  the seid Mees and lond 
and that the seid Simon may be compellyd to make an astat in like 
wyse therof to the seid suppliant in  maner and fourme, as the seid 
suppliant  hath  disyryd  be  his  bill  as  good  feith  and  concience 
requireth. 
Bundle XIX, No.  56. 
Thys ys the reioinder of  Symon Dyrham and John Halsnoth to the 
replicacon of John Mercer. 
Where the seid John Mercer seith that ther was accord and agre- 
ment  hadde  bytwene  the  seid  John  Mercer  and  the  seid  John 
Halsnoth for the seid meas and land as he hath  surmetted  by  hys 
byll, Therto seith the seid Simon and John  Halsnoth that  ther was 
non accord ne agrement had by twene the seid John Mercer and'the 
seid John Halsnoth for the seid meas and land in maner and fourme 
as he hath allegged by hys bille, the whiche he ys a redy to averr as 
the  Court  will  award.  And  also where as the seid  John  Mercer 
surmetteth in hys replicacon that the seid Symon and John  Halsnoth 
wythseyeth not  that the  seid  Symon was  enfeffed  in  the seid meas 
and lande to the use of  the seid John  Halsnoth, to the whiche the 
seyd Symon hath sufficiantly answered ageinste the seid bill, And to 
the whiche the seid John Mercer hath not sufficiantly replyed, wherfor 
he prayeth that he may be dismyssed. 
Bundle XIX, NO.  347. 
To  the right reverent fadur in god Cardinal1 of  Yorke Chaunceler 
of  Englond. 
Besechith lowly Richard Onehand of  London, Draper, that where  After 
Johane,  late the wyff  of  yon  Etton,  Squyer, owed un  to your  seid  '45'. 
besecher  ix li., on PheIypp  Lewston labored  to the  frendes of  the 
seid Johane to have her to wyff;  which Johane agreed to have the 
seid  Phelypp to housbond  so  that he wold pay your seid besecher 
the seid ix li. and also to pay  the residue  of  her  dettys  of  the seid 
Johane.  And afterward the seid Phelypp came to your seid besecher 
and lett hym to have knowlege that he shuld  be payed  of  the seid 
ix li., and promytted  hym  that he  shuld  be payed  ther of  with  yn 
short tyme.  Which Phelypp afterwarde wedded the seid Johane and 
after that tyme your seid besecher hath often tymes required the seid 
Phelypp to make hym payment of  the seid ix li., which to do utterly 
he refuseth a genst alle good feith and Concyens : Wherfore pleaseth 
your  gracious lordeshipp  tenderly to consyder thes  seid premysses 
and ther uppon  to geve  in  comaundement  to the seid Phelypp to 
a pere a fore [you] atte a certen day by  you to be Iymeted to aunswer 
to thes seid premysses and that he may  be  compelled  to pay  your 
seid besecher the seid ix li. as good feith and concyens requireth, for 
the love of  god and in wey  of  charite. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Robertus Blewet. 
Thomas Staff. 
Bundle XIX, No.  346. 
This [is  the] aunswer of  Philip Leweston a genst the bille of 
Richard Onehand. 
Where the seid  Richard by  his bille surmytteth that Johan, late 
the wyf  of  yon Etton, owed un to hym ix li., sche owed hym no peny, 
ne  never  was  cause  ne contracte by  twyx  them  wher  of  eny dette 204  THE HISTORY  OF CONTRACT 
shuld growe [out] l;  wher he aldith  that  sche schold  agre to take 
the seid Philip Leweston to husbond so that he wolde pay the seid 
Richard  ix li.,  ther  was  never  soche langage by twyx  [the]ms  ne 
y promytted hym never payment of  thes ixli. as he surmyttith by  his 
bille;  and pray that y may be demyssed  owte  of  court and to have 
my damages amged * to me for his wrongful1 vexacion, a cordyng to 
the statutes ther uppon ordened. 
Bundle XIX, No. 345. 
Memorandum,  that  Phelipp  Lewston come  to  Ric'  Onehandes 
Shopp in the parissh of  Seynt Marie Lothawe in Walbroke Warde in 
London in the Monthe of Jule the date of our lorde M1CCCCxxxviij, 
the reign of  kyng Henry the vjte x~te,~  he promytted  Ric' Onehand 
in presence of  Alyson, his wife, ix li. for the deute of  Johane, late the 
wife of  Jon of  Etton, to pay well and truly atte Ester twolf monthes 
after  that promyse, by  hie feith; and heruppon  my  wife  and I will 
swere uppon the sacrement that this is true that we  swere, and her- 
upon  will  bryng  Ric'  Hyfeld,  Thomas  Herford,  Harry  Mesant, 
William Dodde, Thomas Godyng and Thomas Steven and xxti goode 
men mo to conferme this true that my  wife and I will swere. 
Also oon John Scot, apperyng in hys propre  person in the kynges 
Chauncerie,  seys  upon  hys  sacrement  that  he ij yere nowe  agone 
herd  Phelip Leweston in Westmynster Hall sey to the seid Richard 
Onehand that the seid Richard Onehand was a foole on a day; for 
if  ye  hadde made obligacion as I bad you, y wolde have sealid it at 
that day and then ye shuld have be sekyr of  your money. 
Bundle XIX, No.  354a. 
Addressed to the Cardinal and Archbishop of  York. 
After  The complainant,  Robert  Ellesmere of  London,  makes  out  the 
1450.  following case in his petition : 
One William Serle of  London came to him (i. e.  the complainant), 
and said he had certain '  terms ' (i. e. leases) of  certain lands to sell 
of  the value of  £6 yearly.  There was  much discussion about this, 
and  finally  it was  'accorded'  that  complainant  should  come  with 
Hole in document. 
i.  e. '  ald ', to hold ; query perhaps '  aloith '. 
'  Hole in document. 
This word is uncertain. 
"vidently  one of  these dates is wrong; for 20 Hen. VI would be 1442. 
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counsel to Serle's house at a certain day to examine the evidence of 
title.  Complainant  went,  examined the said  evidence '  and  liked 
Peym  wele,  . . . wherupon  it  was  ful  accorded  and  covenanted 
between peim pat Pe said Robert shulde have pe said termes for the 
summe of  xlli. betwene peim accorded, And  pat  at a certaine  day 
Fey  shulde mete at a place  lymited to ensele and delyver fie writing 
of  pe  said  covenaunt'  at  the  payment  of  the  said  sum.  The 
parties came to the place assigned and complainant offered payment 
and :demanded  the  sealing  of  the  said  writing  and livery  of  the 
evidences.  The defendant (William Serle) '  utterly ' refused to seal 
the writing or to deliver the evidences, and still refuses, so that com- 
plainant  has  lost  his  bargain  and  is  without  remedy  at law.  He 
prays for a subpoena directed to the defendant, and general relief. 
Bundle XIX, NO. 354 b. 
The defendant's answer. 
The  defendant  says first  that this  case is  not  properly  brought 
in chancery ;  for the complainant has a remedy at law, namely by an 
action  of  Covenant, which, says  the  defendant,  is maintainable by 
custom of  London without specialty. 
Secondly, the defendant denies that there was ever such bargain or 
'  accorde ' as the complainant has alleged in his petition? 
Bundle XIX, No.  354 c. 
The complainant's replication. 
In reply to the defendant's first contention, he says : 
'Furst, where  as the seid William  seith that the custome of  the 
Cite of  London is and tyme with oute mynde hath ben, that accions 
of  covenaunt are and have been  of  the seid tyme maintenable with 
Inne the said Cite as well  withoute specialte as with  specialte, and 
seith that all bargaynyng as touchyng  the  seid termes of  the same 
mees was hadde betwene him and the seid Robert with Inne the seid 
Cite,  the  which  is  mater  determinable  by  an accion  of covenaunt 
with Inne the same Cite, 
'  Therto the seid Robert seith by protestacon that he knoweth noon 
suche  custome  with  Inne the  Cite  of  London,  ne that  the  seid 
bargayne and  covenaunt  was  made  with  Inne the  seid  Cite,  but 
he seith that, for asmoche as the seid William Serle hath  confessed 
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the same covenaunt  and  bargayne  as it  appereth  by  his  answere, 
he asketh  iuggement  and prayeth  that  the  same  William  may be 
compelled to make him astate.' 
Complainant then replies to the rest of  the defendant's answer. 
Bundle XM,  No.  354  d. 
This is the examinacion of  John Cresswell, Squyer, upon  the mater 
in  the  Chauncerie  of  oure soverayne lords  the  kynge  betwyne 
Robert Ellesmere, Goldsmyth, and William Serle, Carpenter. 
Firste, the saide John saith that he was presente whenne the saide 
Robert  Ellesmere  and the  saide  William  Serle, as touchynge  the 
termes  comprehended withynne the bill  of  the saide Robert, were 
fully accorded, the whiche bargayne the saide William Serle rehersed 
to  the said John  Creswell, the wyfe  of  the  saide William  beynge 
presente, and by thassente  (sic) of  here  they  were  fully  appoynted 
and accorded that at oure lady day the Annunciacion,  that last was, 
the saide Robert shulde come and have his bargayne  and paye his 
money;  at whiche  tyme  of  the saide  accorde, if  the saide William 
and his wife wolde have saide nay, the saide Robert wolde have hold 
him plesed and not desired it.  All whiche  comunicacion the saide 
John  Creswell herde  and was presente ;  And  pereupon they wente 
to the Swan beside Seynt Antonyes and there they dronke to gederes 
upon the saide bargayn atte the coste of the saide Robert Ellesmere ; 
alle whiche mater be trewe and that he woll swere upon a boke. 
This is the examynacion of  David Gogh upon the saide mater. 
David  Gogh, examined upon a boke, saith  that he  was  presente 
whenne the evydences touchynge pe saide termes was redde, and the 
saide Roger  asked on George Houton, a man of Counsell, reder of 
the saide evydences, wheder they were gode for hym  other no, And 
the saide George avised the saide Robert to take the bargayn, saynge 
that the evidence was gode, and this the saide David herde, the saide 
John Creswell saynge, thanne ye be accorded, and the saide William 
Serle sayde, yea. 
Bundle XM,  No. 354  e. 
The trouth is this, that I, George Houton, was desired by  ~odert 
Ellesmere to goo and to have sight of  the evidences of  William Serle 
concemyng the bargeyn  of  certeyn termez of  a  mees  of  the  same 
Query :  for '  Robert '  ? 
William  that  the  seide Robert  shulde  bye  and bargeyn  of  hym; 
the whiche George hadd sight of  the seid  Evidences, understandyng 
theym gode and sufficiant, counseld the seid Robert the (sic) bargeyn 
the seide termez with the seide William, with that he myght conclude 
for a competent some of  money ;  the same  Robert  then  desired  to 
wete of me, the seid George, what some I wolde thynk were competent 
to be  goven therfor ;  I seide xxx li.  were y nough and pen  the seid 
Robert answered me and seide that he wolde geve xl li.  rather  than 
leve the bargeyn, wheruppon  the seid  Robert comyned wt  pe  seid 
William  and his  wiff,  pe  seide  George  and  oon  John  Creswell, 
stondyng by  the same Creswell herkenyng better and more takhede 
as at that tyme to the comynycacion betwen  them  then  I, the seid 
George, did spake and seid un  to them, then ye be accorded ;  then 
I,  the  same George,  geveng  better  Erys  to their  speche,  desired 
to  knowe  howe  they  were  accorded; then  seide  the  seid  Robert, 
I shall geve a grete some of money ;  what  some I, the seid George, 
desired  to wete  and he  answered  me  and  seid, xlli.  and it  most 
be  purveyd  agenst our lady  day  Annunciacion  at whiche  tyme  it 
is accorded  that the seid William  shall delyver unto me, seide the 
same Robert, all the seid Evydences to geder wt  other Evydences to 
be  engrosed of the seid  bargeyn;  and yet, seide the same Robert, 
I  thank  the  godeman  here,  he  puttyth me  at my  choyse whethir 
I woll  have  it  or  leve  it  at pe  seid day;  then,  seide I, the seide 
William be ye accordeth in the maner as Robert here hath rehersed 
and  he  seid,  ye,  Then  goo  We  drynke;  and so We  did unto the 
Swan, a brewehaus fast by  Seynt Antoines and then departed, &c. 
Note.-Afurther  deposition (Bundle  XIX, No. 354f) is omitted, as it does 
not contribute any additional information. 
Bundle XIX, No. 404  a. 
To the most reverent fader in god my  good and gracious lord my 
lord the Cardynall of york Chaunceller of England. 
Besecheth mekely your contynuell bedman John Isaak of  Bourne  After 
in the  Counte of  Kent, that  where  as John Isaak, fader unto your  I4S0. 
said besecher nowe ded, by his lyve bought of  oon Robert Bisshop- 
pesdane and Johane his Wief ij acres of  lond lyeng in the said  toun 
of  Bourne  for a  certeyn  some of  money  which  he  payd wee1 and 
truly unto  the said  Robert  and  Johane,  and whan  he had  payd 
pe  money  the  said  Robert  and Johane  agreed and made  faithful1 
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heirs when he or his  heirs wold  theym  perto  requyre, and thenne 
sone after dide aswell (sic) pe  fader unto your said besecher as the 
said Robert,  after  whoos  deeth your  said  besecher,  sone  and heir 
unto the said John, hathe dyverse tymes required the said Johane to 
make estate unto hym accordyng unto hir  said  promyse;  the which 
to doo she utterly refuseth contrarie to all good feith and conscience : 
 herf fore  plese  hit your  goode  lordshipp  tenderly  to considre the 
premysses  and  hou  your  said  besecher  may  have  noo  remedy  as 
by  the comon lawe to graunt a writ of  sub pena direct unto the said 
Johane to apere be fore the kyng in his Chauncerye at a certeyn day 
by you  to  be lymyted,  there  to be examyned uppon  the premysses 
and to  do0 and resceyve  as  the  Court  wyll  award, atte reverence 
of god and in wey of  Charytee. 
[Plegii de prosequendo :] 
Johannes Doyle de Cantaur', Armig'. 
Ricardus Pargate de eadem, Gent'. 
Bundle XIX, No. 404 b. 
This is the answere of Johanne Byschopysdane to the bille 
of John Isaake. 
ffyrst she seith that she ouwyth not to answere to noo mater that is 
comprehendith in the  bille of  the seid  John, but she seith for  here 
answere that she never solde, concentyd, nothir  agreed to no sale of 
the seid  land  whiche  is  conteyned in  the  bille  of the  seid John ; 
Wherefore she prayeth  to be  dismyssed  oute of  court  as faith and 
consciens requireth and that  the seid  John  may  satysfye here  here 
costys  for  that he  hath  wrongfully  vexithe here  accordyng to  the 
statut in suche case provydyd. 
Bundle XIX, No.  49%. 
To the most reverend Fader in god the Archibisshop of  York 
Cardynall and Chaunceller of  England. 
,450 to  Sheweth  mekely  to  your  gracious  lordship  Thomas  Bodyn  of 
1454.  London, that where accord and covenant was made betwene hym and 
one Robert Chirche, Citezin and Haberdassher of  London, the xvth 
day of  Feverere the yere of  the  reigne of  King Henry the vjthe after 
the conquest the xxth, be the medeacion of  the frendez, beyng thenne 
your said suppliant with in age of xiiij yere, that he shuld be prentice 
to the said Robert in and of  the crafte of  haburdassher fro the Feste 
of Alhalowen  then  last  passed  unto  the  yend  of  xij  yere  thenne 
next  comyng,  So alwey  that the said  Robert  shuld  fynd  to  scole 
at  hys  awen  costes and  charge  the  said Thomas duryng  two  the 
furst yeres of the said terme, that is to say a yere and half therof  to 
lerne grammar and the resydue of the said two yeres, which amounteth 
to half a  yere, to scole for to lerne  to write, and theruppon the said 
Thomas by the advise of  his frendez, trustyng to have be founde to 
schole  in  fourme  aforsaid, graunted  the  same  xvth  day  by  dede 
indented thenne made betwene hym and  the said Robert to be true 
Apprentice to the same Robert duryng the said  terme of xij yere, of 
which  terme of xij yere he hath contynued in the Service of  the said 
Robert  as  his  prentice  in  the  said  crafte  from  the  said  Feste of 
Alhalowen unto the yende of  viij yere and more and often tymes in 
the bigynnyng of  the  same terme  and mony tymes  sithon  the said 
Thomas with  his frendes  hath prayed and required the said  Robert 
to putt and fynd hyrn  to scole in fourrne aforsaid after the effecte of 
the said  covenaunt and accorde, the which  to doo the said Robert 
wolnot (sic), but that to doo at all tymes  utturly hath refused, to the 
grete  hurte, harme  and losse  of  the  said  Thomas : Please hit your 
good and graciouce lordship to consider the premisses and that the 
seid Thomas therof may have no remedy by the course of  the comone 
lawe of this land, And theruppon to graunt a writte to be direct to the 
said Robert to appere by fore the kyng in his Chauncerie at a certeyn 
day and uppon anotable (sic) payne, by  your gracious lordship to be 
lymyted, there to answere and to doo and resceyve of  and in  thise 
premisses as by the Courte of  the same Chauncerye thenne shall be 
ordeigned, and he shall pray to god for you. 
Bundle XIX, No. 493. 
This is the Answer of  Robert Chirch agenst the bill of 
Thomas Bodyn. 
Frist (sic) the seid Robert, by protestacion yt the mater in ye  seid 
bill conteyned is not sufficient to put  hym  to answer  in  yi~  courte, 
saith yt ye  seid Endenture of Apprentice by ye  which the seid Thomas 
was  bounde  to ye  seid Robert  with 'all ye  circumstaunce yeof  was 
made and had with in the Cite of  London where by ye custom of  the 
same Cite ane accon of  covenaunt ys  mayntenable as well  withoute 
Especialte as with Especialte, so yt yf  eny sich covenaunt of  fyndyng 
at scole of the seid Thomas had be made and broken like as the seid 
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Thomas hath surmittyd, he myght yerof  have had and yit may have 
covenable remydy by pleynt within ye seid Cite after the fourme and 
cours of the Comone law yere ;  and foryermore, for ye more declaracon 
in yi9 mater, ye  seid Robert seith yt nygh aboute the fest of all halowen 
the yer of the reign of  our  soveign  lord  yt  [now  is]'  xixth,  ye  seid 
Thomas and Robert by ye  mene of one Henry Wakefeld were agrede 
and Endentures  yeruppon  made,  yt  the  same Thomas  shuld  be 
apprentice with  ye  seid  Robert  for  ye  terme of  xiij yere yen  next 
folowyng so yt sufficient  suerte were founde for the seid Thomas to be 
trewe  apprentice with  ye  seid  Robert  duryng  ye  terme  aforsayd ; 
Wherupon ye seid Thomas abode with ye  seid  Robert  fro yt  tyme 
unto ye terme of hillary ye  xxth yer of  ye seid kyng yen next cumyng 
and no suerte for  the parte  of  ye  seid  Thomas by  all  yt  tyme  was 
founde, wherfor ye seid Robert at yt tyme was in ful1,purpose no more 
to have had to do with ye  seid Thomas in so myche ye ye  (sic) seid 
Endentures en every parte afore yt  tyn~e  made werbroken (sic) and 
noght enrolled and so both parties at yere large, so yt ye seid Thomas 
myght  their have departyd if  hyrn  had  list but  yit  ye  seid  Henry 
eftsones entretyd ye  seid  Robert to take ye seid Thomas apprentice 
for  ye  terme of xij  yere next  folowyng  ye  fest  of  halowen  yen last 
passyd,  promittyng  to gete  suerte  for ye  seid  Thomas to be true 
apprentice duryng ye  same terme, so yt  ye  seid  Thomas in ye  seid 
terme shuld have covenable lernyng and doctrine as resonably for ye 
profite of sich apprentice shuld belong, the which he had withoute yt 
all ye seid Robert at yt  tyme or eny tyme Seth  made covenaunt  with 
the seid Thomas to fynd hym att scole in sich maner and fourme as 
ye seid Thomas hath  surmittyd ;  Wherupon ye  seid Endentures  of 
Apprenteshode were made like as ye seid Thomas hath declaryd, the 
seid Thomas beyng at yt tyme in ye xiiij yer of  his age or nygh upon, 
by virtue of which Endentures ye  seid Thomas and by the enrolment 
yerof was  admitte as alaufull  (sic) apprentice after ye  custom of  the 
seid Cite ye xxx day of Octobr ye  yer of the reign of ye  Kyng aforsaid 
xxj, the which terme ye seid Thomas on his parte hath not truly kept 
but by hys owne knowlage in hys seid bill nygh ye  iij parte yerof, yt 
is to witte all most iiij yer, wrongfully of hys obstinate willfulnes hath 
broken and disobeyed, which not withstondyng, ye seid Robert seith 
yt ye  seid Thomas is and afore his departure was  sufficiently lerdyd 
and instruct both in redyng and also in wrytyng as unto sich appren- 
tice resonably  may suffice, and over all yis ye seid Robert seith yt he 
Hole in document. 
and ye seide Thomas ye vij day of  Fevr' nowe last passyd at ye  grete 
instaunce of  ye  seid Thomas were put in  award  of iiij notable  and 
thrifty persones, then Wardenz of ye  Craft of haberdassher of  ye  seid 
Cite, Arbitrours bytwix  hem  both indeferently  chosen  of  all maner 
causes, accons, querelez, debates and demaundes betwix hem afore yt 
tyme  in  eny maner  of  wise  had,  movyd,  or  hangyng,  The which 
arbitrourz with in  ye day  to hem  yerof  limite  demyd, awarded  and 
finally determynyd  betwix  ye  seid  Robert  and Thomas, The which 
award, deme and determinacon ye seid Robert is and at at  (sic) all 
tymes hath bene redy onhys  (sic) parte  to kepe  and performe,  not- 
withstondyng yt ye seid Thomas yt  at to hym  yerof fulfill will in no 
wise nor obey;  The which maters and ich of  hem ye seid  Robert is 
redy to prove like as this Courte will award, Wherfor he prayth to be 
dismist oute of thys  Courte and to be restoryd  to hys  Costes and 
Damage for hys gret and wrongfull vexacon  after the fourme of  the 
Statute, &c. 
Bundle XX, No.  39. 
To  most reverent Fader in god the Archebisshop of Yorke 
Chaunceler of Inglond. 
Besechith  mekely  Bartholomew  Couper,  Citezin  and  Draper  of  1452 to 
London, that where he now late, that ys to wete the xx day of  Decembr  1454. 
the yere of oure sovereigne lorde the kyng that nowe ys the xxix, bar- 
gayned  with  one John  Broke of Stoke Neyland in the shire of Suff' 
for to have of him an C clothes called  Suff' streytes for  a  certeyn 
some of  money  betwene  hem  accorded;  And  moreover  that thei 
weren  accorded  that  the  seyd  clothes  shuld  be  of  certein  divers 
colours  convenient  for  such  parties  beyonde  pe  see  as  the  seyd 
Bartholomew  at pat tyme notified unto the seid John that he wolde 
XX 
sende  hem  unto;  Wherupon  then  iij  clothes,  parcel1 of  the seid 
C clothes, at that tyme weren delyvered, And the residue, that ys to 
say xl clothes, bi  the same accorde should have  ben delivered unto 
youre seid besecher at the feste of Estre then next folowyng, at whech 
feste the seyd John of  the seid clothes made no deliverance nor yet 
hidder to have none made ne none woll make, notwithstondyng that 
often tymes he hath ben requyred, to gete hurt and hinderance  of 
-.  - 
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youre seyd besecher, for as much as the seid iij clothes that he hath 
resceyved may not be  uttered nor solde to his  profite nor availe till 
he be content and perfourmed of the hole  nombre accordyng to 
seid bargeyn : Please youre  graciouse lordeshippe  considred  for  as 
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much  as youre seyd besecher  hath  no  writing  to  prove  the  seid 
covenaunt that remedie faileth him  at the comone lawe, to graunte 
a writte sub pena direct  unto pe  seid John  comaundyng him upon 
a certein peyne to appere before oure lorde pe king in his Chauncerie 
at a certein day bi  you  to be lymyted, there to be  examened  in pe 
premisses, And therupon such rule and ordinance bi you to be made 
as gode feyth and conscience requyren. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Johannes Rede. 
Ricardus Lawe. 
Bundle XXVII, No.  467. 
To the right reverent fader in god and good and gracious lord 
the Bisshopp of  Excestre and Chaunceller of  England. 
Mter  Besechith mekely  youre good lordshipp Andrewe Wolson, Brick- 
1460- maker, to consider howe oon Herry Johnson, Berebruer, hath attained 
an Accion of  dette of  x li.  agenst hym in London for a bargayn that 
was made betwene them  in Lambith where they bothe dwell  like as 
all ther neghbours, and reporte that yf  the seid  Andrewe wolde be 
served of  Bere of  the seid Herry youre seid besecher shuld paye noe 
redy money therfore but Brike and so everich '  of  hem  shuld  have 
of other ware for ware ;  which  bargayn  youre said besecher is redie 
to parfourme and at all tymes hath ben and nowe the seid Herry wold 
have  redie  money of  youre seid  Suppliaunte, the  bargayn  notwith- 
standyng, albe hit youre seid besecher myght have ben served of  an 
other  Berebruer, like as he  was  before of  hym  ware  for  ware, had 
nought the said Herry have ben, and so entendith to recover the seid 
money of youre said  besecher agenst all  feith and good conscience, 
to his  utter  undoyng,  withoute  youre gracious  lordschipp  to  hym 
beshewyd  (sic) in  this  behalf:  Wherfore please it  youre good  and 
gracious lordschipp tenderly to consider the premisses and heruppon 
to graunte a Corpus cum causa for youre besecher And he shall con- 
tynually pray to god for youre mooste noble estate. 
Bundle XXVIII, No.  210. 
To the Bischop of  Excestre Chaunceler of Englond. 
~fter  Mekely  besechith  your  gracious  lordschip  your  pore  Oratour 
1460.  William Grene, Marcheaunt of  the  Staple of  Caleys, that where  he 
Delivered C li.  sterling at  Brugges  the  secund  Day  of  April  last 
1 '  everich,'  each one (Halliwell). 
passid  to Thomas  Mollesley, factour and attorny veryly knowyn  un 
to John Warde of Loundon Grocer, and to the use of  his seid Master 
to be repaied agen to your said oratour at Loundon the secunde Day 
of  May thanne  next  folowyng,  as more plenely apperith by  a  bill 
Directid by the same Thomas un to the said John Ward, his maister, 
of  the  hand  of  the  said Thomas  Wretyn and  signid with  his  said 
Masteres Mark, testifying the same after the cours of  Marchaundice, 
at which Day nor no tyme sythen the said John paiyd  not  your  said 
suppliaunt the  said C li.  nor noo peany therof, notwithstondyng the 
seid bill testifying the premissis hath  ben shewyd unto hym  the said 
sume accordyng  to the  same  Demaund  and that  he  to  pay utterly 
hath refusyd  and yit  refusyth contrarie  to the Cours of trewe  Mar- 
chaundice to the utter Destruccon and undoyng of your said Besecher : 
Wherfor please  it  your  gracioux lordschip  the  premiss  tenderly to 
considere and to graunte a Writte of subpena directe to the said John 
Warde to appier afore the Kyng  in his  Chauncerie at a certeyn day 
there to Answere to the premiss and your  said  suppliaunt shall pray 
to god for you. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Rogerus Chesshure, clericus. 
Johannes Aleyn de London, Gentilman. 
Bundle XXVIII, No. 299. 
To the Reverent Fader in god Bysshoppe of Exceter and 
Chaunceler of Engelond. 
Mekely besechith youre poore Oratrice Elizabeth, late the Wyff  of  After 
John Gambon the yonger, that where, upon  the  Marriage made and  1460w 
hadde betwene the saide John and Elizabeth, it was appoynted and 
concluded  betwene  Jamys  Derneford, Fader  of  the  said Elizabeth, 
and John Gambon the elder, Fader to the  saide John Gambon the 
yonger, that the same John the Fader or his feffees shoulde by  thair 
dede graunte an Annuyte of  s  li. or ellis make a sure and sufficient 
astate of londes  and  tenementes  to  the yerly value of  x li. over all 
charges and reprises to the said Elizabeth for terme of  hir lyfe within 
iij  Mounethphes  (sic)  after  the  said  mariage,  And  that  the  said 
Annuyte or londis should be made as sure to the said Elizabeth as it 
coude  be made  by  advyse  of  the Councell  of  the  said  Jamys  her 
Fader for  terme of  hir  lyfe ;  Natheles  after  that  mariage  made and 
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beth  the said  John Gambon  the yonger  died  afore any graunte or 
astate to the said  Elizabeth of  such Annuyte or londes to be made, 
how be it that the same Elizabeth ofte tymes sithe the Dethe of  the 
said John Gambon the yonger hathe required the said John Gambon 
the fader  to graunte or  make  to hir  astate of  the said Annuyte  or 
londes accordyng to the  appoyntements and conclusions abovesaid, 
And that to do the said John the Fader agenste goode faithe and con- 
cience  hathe  utterly  Refused  and  yeit  refusith,  to the importable 
hurte and grete impoverysshment of  your said  Oratrice which hathe 
neyther  londes  nor  goodes  for  hir  sustinaunce  nor  can  ne  may 
Recovre  or  have other then  by  the  mene  of  concience:  Wherfor 
please it your gracious lordshippe the premisses tenderly to concidre 
and ther upon  to graunte a Writte of  Sub pena  to be directe  to the 
said John Gambon the elder to appere afore the lcyng in his Chaun- 
cery atte a  certeyn  day by your  lordshipp  to be  limited and under 
a certeyn payne there to Aunswere unto the premisses And to abyde 
there such Rule as your  lordshipp  and the said  Courte  ther  upon 
shall concidre and determine, And  this  for  the  love of  god  and in 
Way of  charyte. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Ricardus Pree de London, Gentilman. 
Thomas Harryes de Lanevet in Com' Cornub',  marchant. 
Bundle XXIX,  No. 13. 
To  the reverende Fader in god and full gode and graciuos lorde 
the Bisshop of  Excerter, Chaunceller of Englonde. 
1467 to  Humbly  besecheth  youre  gode and  gracious lordship  your  con- 
1468.  tynuell  Oratour,  William  Elyot  of  Brystowe, Mercer,  graciously  to 
conceyve that where  the seid  William  and oon  John Elyot, Fader 
unto the  same William, stondeth bounden  bi  theire obligacions [in 
the somme of a C li. to oon Stephen] '  Stychemerssh for certeyn mar- 
chandize of him bought ;  wheruppon, and also upon the Frendelynesse 
bitwene  theym,  the  seid  Stephen  specially instanced  and desired 
youre seid bisecher, forasmoche as he in  the fourme aforseid was to 
him so endetted, to deliver [to Stephyn  Stychemerssh, sone of the] 
seid Stephyn, his Fader, all  [such] '  marchandize and money as his 
seid sonne at eny tyme wolde of him desire  to have, promysyng and 
'  Illegible ; supplied  from  the  defendant's  answer  (Bundle  XXIX, 
No.  12), which repeats verbatim the substance of  the petition. 
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gauntyng your  bisecher to make  him payment therfore;  wherupon 
the  sonne of  the seid Stephyn,  bi  the  auctorite  and name  of  [his 
fadre come to your  seid Besecher at] '  Bristowe and there [desyred 
XX 
of]  him certeyne marchandize and money to the sume of iiij xiiij li., 
Offeryng him oon obligacion and billes  remembryng the same and 
promised him in the bihalf  of the seid Fader that at what tyme after 
he brought the same [obligacion and billes to his fadre] '  that then he 
XX 
shuld have  deduccion of  the same  somme of  iiij xiiij li. uppon the 
obligacion of  C li. ;  wherupon youre seid bisecher, trustyng specially 
to  the  promise and graunte  made  afore tyme  bi  his  seid  Fader, 
delyvered to the sonne the seid  marchandize [and  money to the]' 
XX 
some of iiij xiiij li.,  takyng of the same sonne for  his  remembraunce 
an obligacion and divers billes provyng the same delyveraunce, to the 
whiche receyte, aftir that the seid  Fader had notice therof, the same 
Fader bifore worshipful1 and full credible persones specially thanked 
your seid bisecher for the good will that he at his seid instaunce had 
shewed his seid sonne in  that  bihalf, and eftsonys accordyng to his 
seid instance aggreed to the same receyt and bifore the seid persones 
made feithe and promise that your bisecher shulde lose no peny therby ; 
And howe be it that your seid bisecher oftymes sithen hath [tended] 
the seid Fader vj li. in  money and  the  obligacion and billes of the 
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seid somme of  iiij xiiij li., desiryng him to  take the  same vj li. with 
the obligacion and billes aforseid in full contentacion and payment of 
the seid obligacion of  C li., The seid  Fader, for  asmoche as of late 
[he]  hath notice that his seid sonne hath indaungerd himself  in the 
parties of  portynggale to his  displeasure,  Therupon  refuseth to  be 
charged with  the contentacion  and payment  of  the  seid  somme of 
xx 
iiij xiiij bi his seid sonne  at his instance and in his name in fourme 
aforseid receyved or to make  deduction perof upon  the  seid obliga- 
cion of a C li. ;  And so demaundeth and entendeth  to levye of your 
bisecher the hole sume of  the seid obligacion of  a C li.,'to  his utter- 
most undoyng, without your gracious helpe in  this  bihalf to hym  bi 
you be shewed :  Please it your gode and gracious [lordship, consider- 
ing]  the premisses, to directe a writte Sub Pena unto the seid Fader 
comaundyng him bi the same upon certeyne payne bi you to be limited 
to appere afore the kyng, oure soverain lorde, in his Chauncery at a 
Illegible ; supplied from the defendant's answer. 
Illegible. 216  THE HISTORY  OF CONTRACT  APPENDIX  OF CASES  217 
certeyn day bi you to be assigned, there to be ruled in the premisses 
as [reason] '  and good conscience requiren,  and your  seid  bisecher 
shall pray to god for you. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Johannes White de Redyng in Com' Berk',  Gardener. 
Edward . .  . '  de Mussenden in Com' Buk'. 
Endorsed:  Memorandum  quod  pro  eo quod,  ista  peticione  ac 
responsione ad eandem facta et replicacione in hac parte habita nec- 
non desposicionibus et testimoniis tam ex parte infrascripti Willielmi 
Elyot  quam  ex  parte  infrascripti  Stephani Stychemerssh  patris  in 
premissis  coram  domino  Rege in Cancellaria sua factis  et habitis, 
lectis et auditis, ac materia in eisdem plenius intellectis (sic), visum est 
Curie Cancellarie predicte quod materia in eadem peticione contenta 
pro  parte dicti Willielmi Vera  et veraciter  probata existit, ac pro eo 
quod infrascrepte sex libre, residue Centum librarum, in dicta peti- 
cione specificate in plenam satisfaccionem eorundem Centum librarum 
in Curia Cancellarie  predicte per predictum Willielmum oblata sunt, 
infrascripto  Stephano  Stychemerssh, patri,  solvende  et  in  eadem 
Curia in  manibus Ricardi  Fryston,  clerici,  restant  eidem  Stephano 
libande ;  Ideo, vicesimo die Iunij, Anno regni Regis Edwardi quarti 
sexto, consideratum est per dominum Cancellarie Anglie  quod infra- 
scriptum scriptum obligatorium Centum librarum eidem Stephano per 
predictum Willielmum ac Iohannem Elyot, patrem eiusdem Willielmi, 
factum,  vacuum  et  nullius  valoris  penitus  existat  et  quod  idem 
Stephanus  idem  scriptum  obligatorium  in  Cancellariam  predictam 
deferat ibidem cancellandum et dampnandum aut sufficientes litteras 
acquietancie pro  scripto ill0  et pecunia  in eadem contenta  prefatis 
IYillielmo et Iohanni sine dilatione fieri et deliberari et in Cancellaria 
predicta de record0 irrotulari faciat. 
Bundle XXIX, No.  12. 
This is the Answere of Stephen Stichemersh to the bill put Ageynst 
hym by William Eliot of Bristowe, merchaunt. 
Fyrst, he seith by protestacion that the mater conteyned in  sei  7 
bille is not sufficiaunt in  lawe ne in Consciens, wherby he aught by 
this Court to be put  unto answere ;  bot  for  more  pleyn declaracion 
Illegible. 
of trowth the seid Stephen seith, where it is surmysed by the seid bill 
that the seid William .  . . 
(Here follows a copy verbatim of  the chief  allegations of  the petition ; 
this IS omitted.) 
. . . herto the seid Stephen seyth that well and trew it is that the seid 
William  and John  were boundyn to hym in pe seid obligacion in a 
C li.,  of  which sonlme thei feithfully promitted hym paiement at the 
daie conteyned in the  same obligacion ; and the seid Stephen seith 
pat he never instanced ne desyred  your  seid  besechers to deliver to 
his  sone marchauntdyse  and money,  grauntyng  to  nlak  paiement 
perof as is  surmised  by thair  seid bill.  And  also the seid  Stephen 
seith that is (sic) seid sone toke marchauntdise of your seid besechers 
to his owne use and noght to pe  use of the seid Stephen in maner and 
fourme as is  conteyned  in  pe seid  bill;  Wheruppon  his  seid  sone 
become bounde to your seid besechers by his obligacion for the same 
marchauntdise which was bowght of  your  seid  besechers be his seid 
sone unknowyng to the seid Stephen and withoute assent or Agrea- 
ment or eny comaundment goven by the seid Stephen to his sone to 
doo, insomuch  as when  the seid  Bargeyn  was in making,  thar was 
certayn merchauntz  of Byrstowe  (sic)  at (sic)  counseled  your  seid 
besechers  to be wele  avysed, for  thei underestode  veraly Pt pe seid 
Stephen wold  never answer of on peny for his seid  sone.  And also 
the seid Stephen seith pat  your seid  besechers never  tendyd pe seid 
vj li. and a  obligacion  to the seid  Stephen  as  is  surmysed  bi thair 
bill ;  all which materez  seid Stephen is redy to prove as this Courte 
of reason and Consciens wyll rewle hym, and prayeth pat he may be 
dismissyd with his Costes and his damages for his wrongful1 vexacion, 
accordyng to the statutz in such case ordenyd. 
Bundle XXIX, No. 10. 
The replication of William Elyot. 
William  Elyot  in his  replication reaffirms  all  the matter  set up 
in his petition and concludes : 
'. . .  All which maters your seid Suppliant is redy to prove as this 
Courts will  A  warde;  wherefor  he prayeth  that  the  seid  Stephen 
Stychemerssh myght be comytted to warde therefor to A byde un to 
the tyme he have brought the seid obligacion  of  C li.  into this seid 
courte to be cancelled and made voide,  as good  feith and conshens 
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Bundle XXIX, No.  11. 
The deposition of  John  Powele  of  Bristol and  John  Glasse '. . . 
made  in  the  presence  of  my  lord  Chaunceler  at the  More 
the xxix day of Novembre by their othes upon a boke',  kc. 
They swear that, the  13th day of  November, 3 Ed. IV,  William 
Elyot came to Stephen Stychemerssh and desired to have the obliga- 
tion by which he and his father were bound to the said Stephen, and 
that  he (William  Elyot)  then  offered  to  deliver an obligation and 
certain  bills  containing £94,  which Stephen,  the son,  had left with 
William Elyot for the discharge of  £94 against the obligation held by 
Stephen the  elder  (i. e. the defendant)  '. .  .  which  Stephen thelder 
(sic) seid to the seid William:  I thank you  of  that ye  have  do,  but 
what nede ye to doubte of  your obligacion ;  ye shall never lose peny 
therby and all thinges  that  ye  have  delivered  to  my  son  afore this 
I have content and paide you, and also ye nede not to be so hasty, 
for your day is not yet come'. 
Bundle XXIX, No. g. 
The deposition of William Nynge. 
The seid William Nynge, sworn and dywely examyned before my 
lord  Chaunceller in  the playn Court of  Chauncery, the xxvj  day of 
January,  the  iiijthe  yere of  kyng  Edward  the  iiijthe, seith and de- 
posith .  .  . 
(This deposition confirms the allegations in the complainant's petition.) 
Bundle XXIX, No. 8. 
The deposition of  William Aphowell '. .  .  afore the Maister 
of the rollez '. 
(This deposition is in further confirmation of  the complainant's allega- 
tions.) 
Bundle XXIX, No.  7. 
This  is  the  deposition  of  Stephen  Stychemerssh of  London  the 
yonger, Squyer, made  before  George, Archebisshopp of Yorke, 
primat  and Chaunceller  of  Englond,  the viij  day  of  July, the 
vth yere of  Kyng Edward the iiijthe. 
First, the  seid  Stephen,  sworn  upon  a  boke and duly examyned 
before  the  said  primat  and  Chaunceller  of  Englond,  saith  and 
deposith, by the othe pat  he hath made, that all such marchaundise 
and money that he hath resceyved of oon IVilliam Elyot of Bristowe, 
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which amountyth to the  some of iiij and xiiij li.  howe he resceyved 
hit  by  the  comaundement  of  Stephen  Stychemerssh of  London, 
theldyr (sic), fader unto the seid Stephen the younger, and in his seid 
Faderz name as his Factour and never otherwise. 
Item : The seid  Stephen the yonger  by  his  seid othe seith  that 
his seid Fader also comaunded hym that, as sone as he had receyved 
the seid marchaundise of  the seid William  Elyot, that then the seid 
Stephen the yonger shuld send to his seid Fader for an obligacion by 
the which the seid William Elyot  and oon John Elyot were bounde 
to the Fader  of  the  seid  Stephen, the yonger,  in  C li.  and that he 
shulde scrybe the hole some of the receyt of  the seid marchaundise 
upon the bak of  the seid obligacion. 
Item : The seid Stephen the yonger by the othe that he hath made 
saith that  he  myght  not  send  for  the  obligacion;  Wheruppon  he 
made an obligacon in his  owne name to the seid William Elyot, the 
which  obligacon the same William in  no wyse  wold  receyve of  the 
seid  Stephen  yonger  as  his  dede but at the Special1 request of 
the  seid Stephen, the yonger,  he receyved hit for  a  remembraunce 
unto the seid Stephen, the Fader, and noon other maner. 
Bundle XXIX, No.  6. 
The deposition of  William Elyot. 
(A long deposition by William Elyot in support of  his own  petition.) 
Bundle XXIX, No.  5. 
The deposition of Robert Talbot. 
(A deposition by one Robert Talbot which seems to be in support of  the 
allegat~ons  in the defendant's answer.) 
Bundle XXIX, No.  4. 
The declaration of Stephen Stychemerssh the elder. 
(A long declaration by  the defendant in support of  the statements in his 
answer.) 
Bundle XXXI, No.  82. 
To the most reverent fader in god George Archebisshop of 
York primat and Chaunceller of  Englonde. 
Mekely [besecheth ybur pouer]'  and contynuell Oratour John of  '470to 
Kent,  of  London  Skynner,  that  where  as oon  Gararde  Morys of  1471. 
London,  Barbour, hath  [commenced  an accion]'  of  trespas agenst 
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oon  Gyles  Thornton,  Gentylman,  for  whom  your  said  besecher 
became suerte, and it was so, gracious lord, [that the said] '  Gararde 
promytted  unto  the  said  Gyles  for  to  take  respyte  and sparynge 
of  the callyng uppon the said accion unto the tyme [that the  said] ' 
Gyles had ben beonde the see and comen ayen with oure Soveraygne 
Lady the quene, in  trust  wheroff  the  said Gyles departed ovre see 
[in theI1ship of  Thomas  Danyell,  Esquyer,  the  whyche the  said 
Gyles  wold  nat  have  doon,  had  nat  the said  promyse have  been 
made by  the saide Garard unto hyrn ;  And contrary therto now the 
said Gararde calleth uppon the said accion and so intendyth to con- 
dempne the said Gyles for defaute of  answere, agenst  all feyth and 
goode  conscience :  Wherfore  please  it  your  goode  and  gracious 
lordship tenderly to consydre the premisses and hereuppon to graunte 
a certiorari directed to the Shirffes of  London for the said Gyles and 
your said pouer suppliant shall specially pray to gode for yowe. 
Endorsed:  Corarn  domino  Rege  in  Cancelleria  die  Mercury, 
videlicet xxij die Novembris. 
Bundle XXXI, No.  374. 
To the right  reverent  fader  in  god  and gode  and  gracious  lord 
the Archbisshop of York and Chaunceller of Englond. 
Probably  Mekely  besechith  youre  gode  and  gracious  lordship  Thomas 
'47'  to  Cranwys, Clerk, that wher as oon John Benet and other his cofeffees 
1471'  late  beyng  seased  of  a  tenement in  their  demesne as yn  fee and 
the  seid  John  Benet  so beyng  seased  therof  enfeffed  your  seid 
besecher  and  oon  Thomas  Benet,  Chapeleyn,  to  thuse  (sic) and 
behofe of your seid besecher and albe it that  all the cofeffees of  the 
seid John Benet have relesed unto  your  seid  suppliaunt  except on 
Robert Benet, Clerk, which atte tyme of  the feffement so made was 
at  Rome, and in  the meane  tyme  the  seid  John  Benet  dyed and 
anoon after his disceas the seid John Benet,  Clerk, came fro Rome 
and your seid besecher came unto  hyrn  and requyred hyrn to relees 
unto hyrn as his cofeffours had doon, which to doo he refused, seyng 
that  that (sic) the seid John Benet shuld have be indettyd unto hyrn 
in  the some of  v marcs  of  the  which  he seid  he wold  be content 
or that he  releced, and herapon  the  seid Thomas Benet, cofeffour 
with your seid besecher, came to hyrn and seid that yf  he wold take' 
to hyrn xxvjv S.. . .  d.3 he wolde brynge to hyrn  a relees to the seid 
Hole in document. 
Query : a mistake for '  cofeoffee '  ?  Illegible. 
John Benet Clerk and your besecher, puttyng full Truste in the seid 
Thomas Benet, yn asmoche as he was his Cofeffour  I,  toke to hyrn the 
seid xxvj s. v.. .  d.%  for  the  getyng of  the  seid relees and it  is  so, 
gracious lord, that your seid besecher  hath often  tymes requyred the 
seid Thomas Benet to delyver hyrn  the seid relees of the seid John 
Benet Clerk and also to relees unto hyrn the right that he hath forth- 
with your seid besecher in the seid tenement and gardyn, which so to 
do he utterly hath refusid and yet doth agenst all right and conscience : 
wherfor please it your gode and gracious lordship, the premissez ten- 
derly to consider  and that your  seid besecher  can have  no  remedy 
at the comyn lawe, to graunte a writte sub pena to be direct to the 
seid  Thomas  Benet  streigtly  comaundyng  hyrn  by  the  same  to 
appere afore the kyng in his Chauncery at a  certayn  day and under 
a certayn payne by your lordship to be lymyt ther to be examined of 
the premyssez and to do and receyve  as right  and conscience shall 
requyre, for the love of god and yn the wey of charyte. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Simon Reynold de London, Gentilman. 
Johannes Payn de eadem, Gentilman. 
Bundle XXXIX, No. 55. 
To the full reverent Fader in god the bisshop of  Bathe Chaunceller 
of  Englond. 
Besechet lowely your pore oratour  John  Langton, Chaunceller of  After 
the universite of  Cantebrigge, that where  the seyd  Chaunceller and  1433. 
universite by the assent and graunt  of our soverain lord  the  Kyng 
have late ordeyned  to  founde  and stablisse a college in the same 
toun  it  to  be called  the universite  college and to endowe it  with 
diverses possessions in relevyng of  the sayd universite and encresing 
of  clergie therof, And how late  acorde took  bytwix  oon Sir William 
Byngham that the seyd Chaunceller and scolers shuld have a place 
of the seyd Sir William adioynyng on every side to the ground of the 
seyd Chaunceller and universite that they have  ordeyned to bild her 
seyd college upon for the augmencacon and enlargeyng of  her  seyd 
college and to edifie upon certein scoles of Civil1 and other faculteez, 
and for to gif the sayd Sir William a noder place therfor lyeng in the 
sayd toun bitwix the whit Freres and seint Johns Chirch and do it to 
be amorteysed suerly after the intent of  the seyd Sir William of  the 
cost of the seyd Chaunceller and universite, os the ful reverent fader 
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in god, the bisshop of  Lincoln, in whos presence this covenaunt and 
acorde was made, wole recorde ; And it is so, reverent lord, that the 
seyd Chaunceller and  universite  acordyng  to  this  covenaunt  have 
ordeyned the sayd Sir William a sufficeaunt place lyeing in the seyd 
toun of  Canterbrigge bytwix the said Whit  Freres  and seint  Johns 
Chirch and extendyng doun  to the  Ryver of  the  same toun wyth 
a gardeyn therto, which place is of  better value then this other place 
is,  and  profred  to  amorteyse  it  at her  own  cost  acordyng  to  the 
covenaunt forseyd, and  therupon  diverse costes and grete  labores 
have made and doon late therfor ;  And also required diverses tymes 
the seyd Sir IYilliam  to lepe  and performe  on his party these seyd 
covenauntz, the seid Sir William now of  self wille and wythoute any 
cause  refusith it  and will  not  doo it  in noo wise:  Plese it  to your 
gracious lordship to consider thes premisses and therupon to graunt 
to your seyd besechers a writ sub pena direct to the seyd Sir William 
to appere afore yow  in  the Chauncery of  our lord kyng at a certein 
day upon a certein  peyne be yow  to be limited, to be examened of 
these  materes  forseid  and  therupon  to  ordeyne  by  your  gracious 
lordship  that  the  said  Sir  William  may  be  compelled  to do that 
trowth, good feith and consciens requiren  in this  caas, considering 
that in alsomich as there  is no writing bitwix  your  seyd  besechers 
and the seyd Sir William thei  may have noon  accon at the comyn 
lawe, and that for god and in wey  of  charite. 
Bundle  XLIV,  No.  142. 
To the Right Reverent Fader in god the Bisshop of  Bathe 
Chaunceller of  England. 
1.470  to  Mekely  besechen  youre  humble  suppliauntes,  Mathew  Phylipp, 
147I.  Citezin and Alderman of  London, and Thomas  Coke, knyght, that 
where Johanne Reynolde, William Reynolde and Thomas Baldewyn, 
executours of  the  testanlent  of  Richard  Reynolde, afore this tyme 
bargayned  and  solde  unto  oon  Richard  Wright  certayne  wollen 
Clothes, Gorses,' lases and Rybons and divers dettis belonging unto 
the  said  Johanne,  William  Reynolde  and  Thomas  Baldewyn  as 
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executours of  the testament aforesaid, for  the some of xij l., paiable 
at certayne daies bitwex thaim accorded;  for the which  some youre 
said  besechers  oonly at the special1 instance  and praier  of  Piers 
Ardeyn, knyght, late Chief Baron of the Kynges Eschequer, be came 
suertees  unto  the  said  Executours  and were  bounde  ioyntly  and 
severally to thaim in the said some by divers obligations for the said 
Richard Wright, which Richard thanne hadde wedded  the  Nece of 
the said Piers Ardeyn.  Which Piers  promised  faithfully and wolde 
that thei therof shulde bee  saved harmles, and after  the  said  Piers 
made  his  executrix  Kateryn,  thanne  his  wiff  and now  the wiff  of 
Sir John Cheyne, Knyght, which hath taken uppon here the adminis- 
tracon of  the goodes of  the said Piers  as his  Executrix;  and more- 
over it is soo that sith the decesse of the said Piers, the said William 
Reynolde,  oon  of  the  Executours  of  the  said  Richard  Reynolde 
which  survived his  coexecutours,  hath  taken  an accon  of  dett  in 
XX 
London of  Clxxli., parcelle of  the said  some of xij li., which  accon 
was  nowe  of  late  removed  afore  the  Kyng  in  his  Chauncery  by 
a Certiorary, and afterward, for certayne consideracons movyng youre 
good lordship, Remitted agen, soo that youre said suppliauntes stande 
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yet bounde in the said somme of  Clxx li., parcel1 of  the said xij li., and 
in greet iupardie therof, and have no suerte for thair  indempnite in 
that behalve nor remedy by the comon  lawe but  stande destitute of 
remedye wtout  your  gracious lordship  to  thaim  be  shewed  in  this 
partie : Please it the same youre good and gracious lordship the pre- 
misses  tenderly  to consider  and theruppon  to graunte a writte sub 
pena to bee directed to the said John Chayne, Knyght, and Kateryn, 
his wiff, which have goodes sufficient in thair handes that were  the 
said Piers Ardeyn's, lawfully to content the said Clxx li. if it bee due, 
comaundyng  thaim  by  the  same to appere afore the Kyng  in his 
Chauncery at a  certayn day and under  a certayne payne  by  youre 
good lordship to be  limited, there to answere to the premisses and 
theruppon  that  it  may  please  your  good  lordship  to  sette  such 
direccon and rule therin for the indempnite of  your said suppliauntes 
as shalbe  (sic)  thought  to  your  good  lordship  to be  accordyng to 
faith, reason and good conscience, and this at the reverence of  god 
and in wey  of  Charite. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Ricardus Whyte de London, Gentilman. 
Ricardus Lowe de London, Gentilman. 
Query :  a mistake for '  kepe '  ? 
'  Corse,' a silk riband, woven  or braided (Halliwell). THE HISTORY  OF CONTRACT  APPENDIX  OF CASES 
Endorsed : 
Coram domino Rege in Cancellaria sua in quindena Sancti Martini 
proxima futura. 
Memorandum, that the xj day of  Febr', xlix yere of  the reigne of 
Kyng Henry  the vjte, &c.,  This  bill withynwriten atte the suyte of 
Thomas  Cook,  Knyght,  and  Mathewe  Philipp  agenst  the  withyn- 
writen John Cheyne, Knyght, and Kateryn, his wyfe, executrix of  the 
testament  of  Piers  Ardeyn,  Knyght,  the  aunswer, replication,'  and 
reioynyngl to the same, alle proves also and examinacions and othir 
circumstancez dependyng  uppon  the same of  both  partiez pleynly 
herd  and  understoud,  with  gode  and  ripe  deliberation  theruppon 
had, it is considerid and iuged by the reverend fader in god, George, 
Archebisshop of  Y~rk,~  Chaunceler of  England, and by consideration 
of  the Courte, that the seid John Cheyne and Kateryne shal acquyte 
and discharge  the  seid  Thomas and  Mathewe agenst  the  withyn- 
writen William Reynold of  and for  the withynspecified  obligacions 
and every  some therof, accordyng to the seid  peticion  of  the  seid 
Thomas and Mathewe, &c. 
Bundle XLIV,  No. 143. 
This is the answer of  John Cheyne, Knyght, and Kateryne, his wiff, 
to a bill of  Subpena brought agaynst theim by Mathew Phillypp 
and Thomas Cooke, Knyght. 
By protestacion that the mater conteyned in the bill is nat sufficiaunt 
in lawe netheir in conscience to putt theim to answer ;  Nevertheles, 
for trouth of  the mater, the seid John  and Kateryne saith that wher 
In the forseid bill is conteyned . . . 
(Here follows a brief  summary of  the complainant's bill.) 
Theirto  the  seid  John  and  Katerine  seith  that  the  seid  Mathew 
Philypp  and  Thomas  Cooke  wher  never  bounden  unto  the  seid 
Johane  Raynold,  William  Raynold  and Thomas  Baldwyn  at  the 
instaunce and praer of  the seid Sir Piers Ardeyn in maner and fourme 
as they have supposed by their  bill ;  and forthermore they say that 
the seid Sir Piers Ardeyn  never  made suche promyse unto the seid 
Mathewe  Philypp  and Thomas  Cooke  to  save  theim  harmles  in 
maner and fourme as they have surmytted ;  and more over the seid 
Sir John Cheyne and Katerine, his wiff,  sey that sith the deth of  the 
Only the answer is preserved. 
Chancellor 0ct.-April,  1470-1  (restoration of  Henry VI). 
seid Sir Piers Ardeyn and byfore this bill of  Subpena sued they have 
paid for  the dettes of  the seid Sir Pyers Ardeyn dyvers grette  and 
notable somez of money and have parfourmed and don otheir dedez 
of  charite  accordyng to the will  of  the seid  Sir  Piers Ardeyn  and 
emoung  otheir  in  Bylddyng  of  his Chaunterye  and  the  Chyrche 
Stapill in the Town of  Latton, in the Counte of  Essex, to the grete 
charge and costes of the seid Sir John Cheyne and Katerine, his wiff, 
ov which charges and costes the seid Sir John Cheyne and Katerine, 
his Wiff, have nat nor hade nat in  their handes at the tyme of  this 
bill brought nor no tyme sith  netheir goodes ne catailes of  the seid 
Sir Piers  Ardeyn to the value of  the seid somez conteyned in  the 
seid  obligacions;  all  which  maters  they  ar  redy  to prove  as  this 
Court will award Jugement and praith that they may be dismyssed. 
Bundle LIX,  No. 114. 
To the right reverent Fader in god the Bisshop of  Lincoln 
Chaunceller of  England. 
Mekely besecheth youre good and gracious lordship John Whithed,  After 
Esquier, that wher as oon Robert Orchard late in an accon of  waste  '475. 
suyd  by  the seid John Whithed  ageyn the  seid  Robert before the 
kinges Justices of  his comone benche  for brennyng  of  a water Mill, 
whiche the seid John Whithed had before leten to ferme to the seid 
Robert  for  terme  of  certeyn  yeres,  was  condempnyd  to the  seid 
John  Whithed  in  xxx li., and the  seid  Robert  Orchard  also at the 
suyte of  the seid John Whithed by processe thereuppon had was for 
the  same xxxli. in prison  and execucon  unto  the  tyme  that John 
Spryng of  Suthampton, Peautrer, grauntyd and feithefully promysyd 
to the seid John Whithed that, yf  he wold relesse and discharge the 
seid  Robert  Orchard  of  his  seid  imprisonment and execucon  and 
suffere hym  to go  at  his  liberte,  that  then  the seid  John  Spryng 
at his owne propre cost and charge wold sufficiently and substantially 
edifie  and bilde.the seid  mill ageyne bothe in tymber werk  and 
stonys to the same expedient by a certeyn day nowe long tyme past; 
Wheruppon  the seid  John .Whithed, trystyng the  promysse of  the 
seid John Spryng, at his  desyre immediatly relessyd and discharged 
the seid Robert Orchard of  his seid execucon and lete  hym  go  at 
large at his liberte, and howe be hit that the seid John Spryng before 
the seid day reedified not  the seid  Mill  in  fourme aforseid  nor  no 
'  Brenne,'  to burn (Halliwell). 
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part thereof and that the  seid  John Whithed  often tymes sythe the 
seid day hathe requyred  the seid John  Spryng to reedifie and bilde 
the seid Mill as ys  aforeseid acordyng to his  seid promyse, that to 
do at all tymes as yet he hath refusyd, contrarie to his seid promysse, 
good feithe and  conciens,  of  whiche  your  seid  besecher hathe no 
remedie by the comone law of this land : Wherefor pleaseth hit youre 
good  and gracious lordship, the  premissis  tenderly considered, to 
graunt  a  writ  Suppena  to  be  directed  to  the  seid  John  Spryng 
comandyng  hyrn  by  the  same  to appere  before  the kyng  in  his 
Chauncery at a certayne day and undur  a certeyne payne by  youre 
lordship to be lymitted  and ther to be  rewled  and Juged  as good 
conciens requyreth, for the love of god and in wey  of cheryte. 
[Plegii de prosequendo :] 
Johannes  Purvyer de London, Iremonger. 
Thomas Clyfton de eadem, Draper. 
Endorsed:  Coram domino Rege in  Cancellaria sua in  quindena 
sancti Iohannis Baptiste. 
Bundle LIX,  No.  117. 
To the right reverent Fadere in god the Bisshop of Lincoln 
Chaunceller of England. 
After  Mekely besecheth youre good lordship Richard Colnet that where 
1475-  as oon John Hill of  the Cite of Wynchestre in a pleynt of  Detenue 
of  a Cloth of  the value of  x mark  by the seid  Richard  Colnet late 
ageyn the same John Hill before the Mayre and Baylyes of  the same 
Cite affermed, was  condempnyd to the seid Richard Colnet in vij li., 
and thereuppon in prison in kepyng of  the seid Baylyes and execucon 
for the same and so restyd in execucon till the seid John Hill desyred 
the seid Richard  Colnet to relesse  and discharge hyrn  of  his  seid 
execucon and to geve hyrn  dayes of payment of  the seid vij li., pro- 
myttyng feithefully to the seid Richard Colnet that Immediatly after 
that he were at large and so discharged of  his seid execucon that he 
wold do make an obligacon of the seid vij li. to be payd  to the seid 
Richard at certayn dayes betwene them  then  acordyd ;  whereuppon 
the seid Richard, trystyng to the promyse of the seid John, relessyd 
his seid execucon and caused the same John Hill to be at his liberte, 
Sithe whiche  Relesse  and discharge the  seid  Richard  hathe  often 
tymes  requyred  the  seid  John  Hill  to  do make  to hyrn  the  seid 
obligacon of vij li. acordyng to his  seid promyse and that to do the 
seid John  Hille at all tymes hathe refusyd and yet refuseth, contrarie 
to his seid promyse and good conciens, of whiche youre seid besecher 
hathe no Remedye by the comone lawe of this land : wherfor pleaseth 
hit  youre good  and  gracious lordship, the premisses  tenderly con- 
sidered, to graunt a writ Subpena to be directed to the seid John Hill 
comaundyng hyrn  by  the  same to appere  before  the  Kyng in  his 
Chauncery at a  certeyn  day and under  a  certeyn  payne  by youre 
lordship to be lymytted and there to be rewled and Juged as consciens 
requyreth, for the love of god and in wey of  cheryte. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Willielmus Lyngard de London, Grocer. 
Ricardus Farlyng de London, Yoman. 
Endorsed:  Coram  Rege  in  Cancellare  (sic)  sua  in  xvie  sancti 
Iohannis Baptiste. 
Bundle LIX,  No.  132. 
To the Right reverent Lorde and Fader in god the Bisshop of 
Lincoln and Chaunceller of England.' 
Mekely besechith youre goode and gracious lordship Richard Massy  After 
of  London Goldsmyth  that where Edmunde Chertesey late of  Rou-  '475. 
chester in the Countie of Kent, Gentilman, promysed to youre saide 
besecher if  he wold  marye Maryon, doughter of  the saide Edmunde, 
I  marcs  of  lawful1 money,  in trust  of  which  promysse  youre saide 
besecher toke the saide Maryon to wif,  at which tyme of mariage the 
saide  Edmunde paied  to  youre saide besecher xxli. parcell of  the 
saide I marcs and as for xx  marcs residue of the said some youre said 
besecher is not as yit contented [norI2 paied and afterward the saide 
Edmunde made John Bamme his executour and dissesed, the which 
John Bamme hath godes the which were the saide Edmunde at the 
tyme of his  deth sufficient to content the saide xx  marcs and more 
and the saide John Bamme hath often tymes ben required by youre 
saide besecher to content and paye hyrn  the same xx  marcs and he 
that to doo hath at all  ty~nes  refused  contrary to goode consciens, 
wherof youre saide besecher 'hath  no remedy by the  Cours of  the 
Comon lawe.  Please it  therfore your goode lordship the premisses 
tenderly considered  to graunte a Writte Subpena tobe (sic) directed 
See Bundle LIX, Nos.  137-9,  for  amended bill, answer, and replica- 
tion.  =  Hole in document. 
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to the saide John Bamme comaundyng hym by the same to appere 
be fore the kyng in his Chauncerie at certeyn day and uppon certeyn 
payne by youre goode lordship to be lymitted to answere the premisses 
and to doo as goode consciens requireth  and your  saide besecher 
shall praye to god for your goode lordship. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Jacobus Galon de London, Gent'. 
Edwardus Bowdon de eadem, Yoman. 
Endorsed:  Coram domino in Cancellaria sua in quindena Pasche 
proxima futura. 
Bundle LIX,  No. 133. 
The Answer of John Bamme to the by11 of  Ric' Massy. 
The seid John  Bamme, by protestacon that the mater conteyned 
in the bill  of  the seid  Richard  Massy is nat  sufficient in  lawe  nor 
Conscience wherto the same John owe to answer, seith that Edmund 
Chertesey namyd in the bill of the seid Richard made his executours 
Alianor  Chertesey,  late  the wife  of  the  seid  Edmund,  Wyllyam 
Chertesey, Squyer, sone and heir to the same Edmund, and the for- 
seid John Bamme, which Alianor and Wyllyam as well admynystred 
the godes of  the seid Edmund as the forseid John Bamme, and for 
asmoche as the same Alianor and Wyllyam  be  yit  in playn  life and 
nat  namyd in the  bill of  the seid  Richard, the same John Bamme 
praieth  that the by11  of  the forseid  Richard  therfor  be  abated and 
that the seid John Banime be dysmyssed owte of this Courte. 
Bundle LIX, NO. 137. 
To the right reverend fader in god and right gode and gracious 
lord my Lord of  Lincoln Chaunceller of  Englond. 
After  Mekely besecheth your gode and gracious Lordship, your humble 
'47.5.  Oratour, Richard Massy of  London, Goldsmyth, That where Edmond 
Chertesey, late  of  Rouchestre  in the  Countie of  Kent, Gentilman, 
promysed unto  youre seid  besecher  if  he  wold  marye  and wedde 
Maryone, doughter of  the seid Edmond, I marc of  lawful1 money of 
Englond.  In trust of whiche promisse, youre seid besecher toke the  '1 
seid Marione to wife ;  at the tyme of which mariage the seid Edmond 
payed to the your seid besecher xx li. parcel1 of  the seid I marcs, and 
as for xx  marc, residue of  pe  seid I marc, your  seid  besecher is not 
yet  payed  nor  contented ;  and  afterward the  seid Edmond  made 
Alianore, his wif, Willyam Chertesey and John Bamme his executoures 
and dyed.  The which executoures have goodes which were pe godes 
of  pe [seid]  Edmond the tyme of  his deth sufficient to contente your 
seid Oratoure of  )e  seid xx marc and more.  And how be it that your 
seid besecher hath often tymes required  the seid executoures to pay 
unto hym the seid xx  marcs, yet that to do they at all tymes have re- 
fused and yet doth, ageyn all right and conscience, wherof  your seid 
Orator hath  no  remedy  by  the  comyn  lawe  of  the  land:  Please 
it perefore your gode lordship, the premisses considered, to graunte 
several1 writtes of  sub pena  to  be  directe  to  the  seid executoures 
Comaundyng them  to appiere  afore  the  kyng  in  his  Chauncerye 
at a certayn day and under a certayn payn there to answere unto the 
premisses, and furthermore to do therin as by  the seid Courte shal be 
demed  and awarded,  and that  for  the love  of  god  and in wey  of 
charite. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Jacobus Galon de London, Gent'. 
Edwardus Bowdon de eadem, yoman. 
Endorsed: Coram domino Rege  in  Cancellaria sua in  quindena 
Pasche  proxima futura,  breve  directa Iohanni Bamme.  Et memo- 
randum  quod  xviij  die  Aprilis  emanarunt duo alia  brevia  directa 
infrascripto Willielmo Chertesey et Alianore Chertesey respondendurn 
Crastino Sancti Iohannis Baptiste futuro. 
Memorandum  quod  xiij  die  Octobris  anno presenti  dies  data 
est  partibus  infrascriptis  ad  producendum  testes  ad  probandum 
materiam infrascentum (sic) hincunde usque Crastino Sancti Martini 
proximo futuro ex assensu utriusque partis. 
Bundle LIX,  No. 138. 
The defendants' answer. 
Defendants  in  their answer  say by  protestation  that  the  matter 
contained in the bill is not sufficient to put  them  to answer.  They 
then set up other facts, denying that Edmund Chertesey ever promised 
more than  £20,  which, they say, is paid; they also allege against the 
complainant  a  promise  of  his  own  which,  they  say,  remains  un- 
performed.  Also they say that they have administered fully, &c. 
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Bundle LIX, No.  139. 
The complainant's replication. 
Complainant in his  replication  reaffirms  the facts set  up in  his 
petition, and denies those alleged by  the defendants in their answer, 
and concludes with the prayer that . . . '  the same executours may 
be rueled to pay to hym the same xx  rnarcs accordyng to conscience '. 
Bundle LIX, No. 185. 
To the right reverent Fader in god the Bisshop of  Lincoln 
and Chauncellar of  England. 
After  Mekely besechith your gracious lordship Adam Knyght of Shrowes- 
'475.  bury  where  on John  Adams  of  Acton  Burnell  sold  to  your  said 
suppliant certeyn wolles beyng in an house at Acton Bumell in grete 
at  aventure  for  vij  rnarcs  to  be  paied  at  such  tyme  as your  said 
suppliant shuld fette the said wolles, before which tyme your Oratour 
paied to the said John Adams for the [saide] l wolles v rnarcs, parcell 
of  the said  vij rnarcs;  And  afterward he  send his  servant dyverse 
tymes for the said wolles to have lyvere therof  accordyng to his bar- 
gayn and therof he was denyed, for the said wolles were not the said 
John Adams at the tyme of the said bargayn ;  by which bargayn so0 
untruely made  the proprete  of  the  said wolles vested not  in youre 
said  suppliant, and so [he] is withoute  accion by the  Cours  of the 
comen lawe  to  his  grete  hurte in  lesse your  gracious lordship  be 
shewed  to hym  in this behalfe:  Please  it  therfore  the  same  your 
lordship, the premisses considered, to graunte a writte of sub pena to 
be directe to the said John Adams comaundyng hym by the same to 
appere before the kyng in his  Chauncerye at a certen day and upon 
a certen payn by your lordship  to be lymet  to answere to the pre- 
mysses and thanne and there such direccion to be had heryn by your 
said lordship as shalbe thought to the same accordyng to reason and 
conscience, and this for the love of  god and in wey  of  charite. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Johannes Baker de London. 
Willielmus Hauke de eadem, yoman. 
Hole in  document. 
Bundle LIX, No.  227. 
To the right reverend Fader in god and my gode lorde  the 
Bisshope of  Lyncoln Chauncellar of  Englonde. 
Mekely besecheth  your  gode and gracious lordshipp your  Poure  1480  to 
Oratour Roger Godemond,  that where he afore this tyme uppon a x  I4*I. 
yere past and more was bounde to one Alice Reme, Wedowe, be his 
syngle Obligacion in x marke sterlyng paiable at a certeyn day in the 
seid  Obligacion specified, and afterward the same Alice  made her 
executours John Hale and one Thomas Plane and died, after whos 
dethe  your  seid  Oratour  truly  paied  and full  contented  the  seid 
executours of  the dewete of  the seid obligacion, trustyng be that pay- 
ment  to  have  be  discharged  of  the  seid  Obligacion lefte the same 
Obligacion in  the handys  of  the seid  executours and trustyng that 
the  seid  executours  wolde  have  delyvered  the  seid  Obligacion to 
your seid besecher at all tymes when they hadde ben therto requyred ; 
and afterward tbe  seid  John  Hale died  after whos  dethe  the  seid 
Thomas Plane as executour of the seid  Alice, not  withstandyng the 
seid  payment  hadde  and  contentacion  of  the  Obligacion  made, 
suethe an accion of dette nowe late afore the kyngis Justice of the 
Comen  place upon  the  seid Obligacion agenst your seid besecher, 
not dredyng god ne th'offens  of his owne consciens, intendyng be the 
same accion  shortly to  condempne your  seid  besecher  in the seid 
x marke, be cause the seid payment can make no barr at the comen 
lawe and so to be  twys  satisfied upon  the same Obligacion for one 
dewte, contrary to all  reason and gode conscience, wherof  your seid 
besecher is withoute remedy be the Comen lawe withoute your gode 
and gracious lordshipp to hym be shewed in this behalve : Please it 
therfor your gode and gracious lordshipp the premysses tenderly to 
consyder and to graunte a writte Suppena to be  directe to the seid 
Thomas Plane comaundyng hym  be the  same to appere  afore the 
kyng in his Court of Chauncerie at a certeyn day and upon a certeyn 
peyn be your  lordshipp to be  lemette,  there to answere to the pre- 
mysses and to bryng afore your seid lordshipp the seid Obligacion to 
be  cancelled,  and  ferthermore  that  he  may  have  ynyongcion  no 
further to procede in the seid accion  at Comen  lawe till your seid 
lordshipp  have examyned  the  premysses  and  sett such  rewle  and 232  THE  HISTORY OF CONTRACT 
direction in  the same as shall  accorde  with  reason  and gode con- 
sciens, and this for the love of god and in the Wey of Charite. 
Plegii de prosequendo : 
Ricardus Somer de London, Gentilman. 
Thomas Mey de London, Gent'. 
Bndorsed:  Coram domino  Rege  in  Cancellaria  in Crastino Ani 
marum futuro. 
Memorandum  quod termino  Sancti  Michaelis, videlicet sexto die 
Novembris  Anno  etc.  xixo,  iniunctum  fuit  Thome Sharp,  attorn' 
infranominati Thome Plane, quod ipse sub pena Centum marcarum 
minime prosequatur versus infranominatum Rogerum Godemond  in 
quodam  placito  debiti  super  demandum  decem  marcarum  coram 
Iusticiis  Regis  de  Banco  suo,  quousque  materia  infraspecificata 
plene determinata fuerit et discussa. 
Bundle LIX, No. 228. 
This is the answere of Thomas Plane on of  the executours of Alice 
Reme, Wedowe, to the bill of complaynt of Roger Godmond. 
The seid  Thomas  Plane by  protestacon  sayeth  that  the  mater 
conteigned in the bill of  compleynt of  the seid Roger is not sufficient 
in lawe to put hym to answere to the same ;  for  plee he sayeth that 
the seid Roger paid not the seid x marcs nor non parcel1 there of  to 
the seid Thomas plane ne to John Hale his  coexecutour in maner 
and forme as the seid Roger be his seid bille of  complaynt hath sur- 
myttyd;  all whiche maters the seid Thomas plane is redy to averre 
as this court will award, and askith iuggement and prayeth to be dys- 
myssed out of this court wyth his  resonable costys  and expenses for 
his wrongful1 hurte and vexacon in that behalf don, had or susteyned. 
Bundle LIX,  No.  285.' 
Addressed to the .Bishop of  Lincoln. 
1479  to  The complainant is one Cecil  Merfyn, executrix  of  the testament 
1480.  of John Merfyn.  The substance of  her petition is as follows : 
John Merfyn and William Clyfford bound themselves  jointly  and 
severally  in an obligation  of £140  .  . . to  the  use  of  Agnes,  wife 
of  William  Halowe,  late the wife  of  Henry Cheveley . . .  to the 
intent  that an estate  of  lands  and tenements of  the annual value 
The substance of the petition is given ;  the endorsement is transcribed 
in full. 
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of  12  marks  should  be made to the said  Agnes  within  two  years 
following.  After the decease of  John Merfyn and William Clyfford, 
complainant  caused  a  sufficient estate to be made to Agnes within 
the time limited . . . 'accordyng to the trewe intent of  the makyng of 
the  seid  obligacon,'  . . . yet  Geoffrey and  William  Hamond  (the 
defendants) will  not  give  up the  obligation,  nor  make  acquitance 
thereof, but are now suing an action against  the complainant in the 
king's  court, '  callid  the Comone  place,'  upon the said  obligation, 
which  is  against  all reason and conscience.  Complainant says she 
has no remedy at law.  She prays for a subpoena to be directed to 
the defendants, Geoffrey Blodwell and William  Hamond, and asks 
general relief. 
The petition is endorsed as follows : 
Coram  domino  Rege in  Cancellaria  sua  in  xv  Sancti  Iohannis 
proximo futuro. 
Memorandum  quod  termino  sancte Trinitatis, videlicet  nono die 
July anno regni Regis Edwardi quarti decimo octavo, Ista peticione 
per  infrascriptam  Ceciliam  Merfyn  coram  dicto  domino  Rege  in 
Cancellaria suaversus infrascriptum Galfridum Blodwell et Willielmum 
Hamond  exhibita, ac responsionel  prefati  Galfridi eidem peticioni 
facta, lectis, visis et auditis et ad plenum intellectis, advocatis que (sic) 
tam  infrascripto  Willielmo  Halowe  et  Agnete  uxore  sua  quam 
prefata  Cecilia Merfyn  et super  materia  (sic) huius  peticionis  dili- 
genter examinatis,  iidemque Galfridus, Willielmus, Agnes et Cecilia 
fatebantur  et  recognoverunt  infranotatam  obligacionem  factam  et 
delibatam fuisse prefatis Galfrido et Willielmo ad intencionem infra- 
specificatam, ipsi Willielmus Halowe et Agnes tunc ibidem presentes 
'  recognoverunt  de fore  satisfacta  et  contenta  iuxta  allegacionem 
peticionis predicte et secundum causam ob quam ipsa obligacio facta 
fuerat, unde dicta Cecilia  peciit  quod  dicti Galfridus  et Willielmus 
Agnes, uxor eius, per auctoritatem huis Curie ad dictam obligacionem 
sibi  delibandam  et  cancellandam  compellantur,  quamobrem  dicta 
obligacio per  prefatos  Willielmum  et Agnecem  prefato (sic)  Cecilie 
per auctoritatem  Curie Cancellarie predicte  et per  consensium par- 
cium delibata fuit cancellandum. 
Bundle LXXI,  No. 7. 
Right mekely besechith youre  continuell oratoure, Richard Dryf-  Date 
feld of  London,  Clerke,  that, ther  as William  Brampton, Citeceyn unce*ain. 
and  Scryvener  of  the  said Citee,  made  contracte  of  Mariage  by 
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his  owne  pursuyng  by  twene  the  seid  Richard  and  Denys,  the 
Doughter of  Thomas  Sele, the said William Brampton promysyd to 
the said Richard x marcs of sterlinges and other x marcs  in howsold 
to  be  paied  by  the handes  of  the said William  Brampton,  of  the 
whiche  the  said  Richard  hath  reseyved  vj  marcs  in  mony  and in 
howshold the value of  viij rnarcs, whiche the said Richard hath divers 
tymys asked  in  presence of  worthy men ;  but for  as  muche as the 
same  Richard  hath noght  to  shewe  for  hym  in  wrytyng the said 
William  Brampton  wolnot  (sic)  do  hym  ryght,  sayng  that he  can 
never recover any thyng of  hym  be the comyn  lawe, and thus with 
owt youre gracious lordschip youre said besecher ys with owte remedy : 
where  fore plese hit  your  god  and gracious lordschip to make the 
said William to appere afore yowe  in the Kynges Chauncellarie and 
to shewe whi youre said besecher shuld not be content after promys 
made be twix  them, and also to abyde and resayve that schall [be] 
ordeynyd at that tyme by  youre full and gracious lordship, and this 
for the love of god and in Way of  Charite. 
Bundle LXXI,  No.  8.' 
The answer of  William Brampton. 
William Brampton says in substance : 
That the said  Richard  by  mediation  of  friends  'laboured  to pe 
seid  Thomas, fader of  pe seid Denys, .  . .  of  his owen desire willing 
to have . .  .' the said Denys as his wife.  And as William Brampton 
is a cousin of  Denys, complainant  asked him to come and 'to here 
the comunicacon bitwene pe  seid Richard and Denys, upon  which 
comunicacon the seid Richard desired xx marcs wt  the seid Denys ; 
To  which matier it was  answerd by  pe seid William in name of pe 
seid  Thomas and  his  frendes, pat,  yf  pe seid  Richard  wold  have 
pe seid Denys to wyf,  that he and all the frendes of  pe seid  Denys 
wold make hir worth x marcs in money and in godes ;  To which the 
seid  Richard  agreed and Perupon wedded  pe  seid  ~en~s  and of 
pe seid x mark in money and godes the seid William and frendes of 
the seid Denys hath content be seid Richard and more ' . .  . ,  &c. 
'  As this document is very long the substance of  it only is given. 
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